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Marketing Myopia is a theory developed by the late, great, Theodore Levitt, an 
influential economist and marketing innovator born to a Jewish family in Vollmerz, 
Schlüchtern, Germany. The family emigrated to the United States in 1935 when 
Theodore (Ted) was ten years old. He would eventually become a highly respected 
professor at the Harvard Business School. He commenced his tenure there in 1959, 
where he is credited with many marketing innovations. This included bringing the term 
'globalization' into everyday use. Levitt, who died on June 28, 2006 is widely regarded as 
one of the giants of the marketing profession. His thinking lives on through his books 
and articles. His concepts remain highly relevant to marketers, and to those concerned, 
with winning and keeping customers. His theory of marketing myopia underpins this 
applied research and business project.  
Af e  eading e en i el  h gh Le i  ide-ranging contributions to marketing, I 
would sum up his connected messages by suggesting he may have said, "The world is 
disruptive so keep your eyes and minds open. Ensure your enterprises have excellent 
leadership, and make sure you know what business you are in. Be very careful how you 
define that choice, and above all things, remember, you exist to serve customers. Do not 
forget those customers have choices. Fail in any of these areas and be prepared to meet 
the headwinds of irrelevance first-hand." 
Levitt believed that when short-sighted mindsets were allowed to proliferate and become 
embedded in organizational cultures, the impact could, and often would, position an 
organization for failure. These impacts were more likely to be acutely felt in enterprises 
leveraging business models focused on selling the bulk of their production into so-called 
'endless' growth industries or markets. For example, enterprises selling undifferentiated 
commodity products like timber logs, dairy powder, and beef and lamb into recently 
explosive growth markets like China. History has not played well for enterprises that 
over-invested in these types of 'mirage' markets, which are driven by commodity 
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exchanges and low-level relationships. I would assert that achieving premium pricing in 
any industry requires a premium relationship. This enables an enterprise to create the 
environment and opportunity for high quality and meaningful engagement with the 
consumer. Transactional relationships are less likely to achieve this state. 
Levitt's (1960) examples of reliance on endless growth industries, include the railroad, 
movie, and oil and gas industries. He observed complacent incumbent enterprises, 
steered by poor leadership, often missed significant opportunities because they lacked 
innovation and consumer awareness. Levitt (1960) believed that such enterprises were so 
over-invested in generating returns from the present, they did not see the future. Levitt 
argued that strong growth for whatever reason was likely to generate complacency. This 
meant that a myopic (complacent) organizational strategy and its subsequent execution 
tended to be geared to short-termism, which often ignored the shifting needs and wants 
of the consumer. Levitt refer ed  he e need  and de i e  a  'c me  a i fac i n . I  
i  he e a i fac i n  Le i  a g ed, ha  e e en  he ainabili  f an en e i e  
future.  
Responding to these shifts in consumer requirements is where today's enterprises are 
most likely to find tomorrow's profits. Failure to respond to shifting consumer behaviour, 
increased competition, and disruptive forces can, and often does, create an extinction 
pathway. Think Blockbuster (1985 2010), Polaroid (1937-2001), Toys R Us (1948-
2017), Pan Am (1927-1991), and there are many more examples. These extinct 
businesses all failed to see the future or were very narrow in what they saw, and as 
established by Levitt's (1960) theory of marketing myopia, it does not end well for 
enterprises so afflicted. 
This applied business research project examines the New Zealand red meat industry for 
signs it is suffering from marketing myopia. The methodology used to support the thesis 
and investigation combines qualitative interviews with a broad cross-section of 
infl en ial ind  la e , a ma ke ing em called an ec i n' ed  a e  he 
flow of profits and culminates in the real world commercialization of Triple Nine Farms 
Limited. 
At the beginning of this project Triple Nine Farms was merely a concept in my mind. 
Today, nearly four years later, Triple Nine Farms is a tested, validated, business concept 
ready for further investment, which will allow it to reach its goal of becoming an 
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innovative, consumer-driven, natural, regenerative, red meat protein business. The 
enterprise had the vision to create and build customer satisfactions capable of delivering 
differentiated premium red meat offerings to customers, and well above average returns 
to investors and shareholders. In doing so, it aimed to offer the wider New Zealand red 
meat community fresh thinking on how to develop potentially disruptive business 
models.  
It is one that could provide an alternative approach to the value-poor commodity models 
used by New Zealand producers and processors today. The Triple Nine Farms vision has 
been formulated by viewing the world with non-myopic eyes. It  has looked far into the 
future with fresh eyes and open minds. The new venture has listened carefully to the 
voice of the consumer. New consumer behaviours are emerging and many of them offer 
real opportunities to New Zealand red meat producers.  
The results of this applied business research project have been pressure tested in both 
theory and practice and strongly demonstrate two key outcomes. Firstly, the New 
Zealand red meat industry appears to have suffered from the impact of marketing 
m ia. The e i  e idence ( e i en l   financial e l )  gge  Le i  cla ic 
failure scenarios (preconditions) may exist in the New Zealand red meat industry in 
2020. Historical examination of other industries, (Railroads, Oil & Gas, Movies, Nokia, 
Blockbuster, and GMH Australia) where effective responses to marketing myopia were 
not applied resulted in suboptimal outcomes.  
Secondly, the commercialization of Triple Nine Farms demonstrates there is an 
alternative pathway, but it requires a paradigmatic shift in thinking, fresh engagement 
with a new mindset, significant, and patient capital, and the unequivocal support of 
producers, processors, and industry leaders. Achieving this alignment in a conservative 
New Zealand agricultural sector has been a major challenge in its own right. At Triple 
Nine Farms, alignment is still a work in progress, capital is still constrained, and the 
future is far from certain, particularly given the Covid 19 world we all currently inhabit.   
Right now in 2020, alignment, collaboration, and cooperation can be difficult to find. A 
highly competitive environment appears to exist and it can be hostile to collaboration, 
particularly where disruptive start-up companies like Triple Nine Farms are concerned. 
Big would appear to have many advantages over small as the infrastructure required to 
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enable small red meat enterprises is compromised right across the New Zealand red meat 
industry.  
Sadly, like many other industries, real innovation usually does not stem from big, slow-
moving, inflexible, incumbents. It often comes from smaller, more agile, more consumer 
connected enterprises. Innovation is an industry challenge and New Zealand 
policymakers, farmers, industry leaders, and the wider red meat community may need to 
grapple with how to facilitate disruptive innovation in the future.   
The current leadership of New Zealand's red meat enterprises, or at least the leadership 
that counts, appears not to view marketing myopia as an issue.  Whilst the boards, 
leade hi  eam , and he ind  ide  managemen  eg la l  e e he i e  f 
value-added strategies, there is a lack of evidence to support their adoption or their 
success, particularly in return-on-investment terms. This oversight could become costly 





Preface and Acknowledgements  
My DBA journey was instigated by my pondering of the linear fall in the living 
standards of New Zealanders. This was of concern and interest to me because I had 
chosen to come and live here with my Kiwi-born wife, Michèle. Many of my initial 
business consulting projects after arriving in New Zealand in 2008 came from the 
agricultural sector, encompassing firstly the wine industry, and eventually the red meat 
industry. 
Ironically, both industries share similar problems, however, the wine industry has thus 
far been more successful in addressing the challenges of disruption and competition. 
That said, the 'wine wall' remains a constant challenge for marketers, as does dealing 
with rapidly decreasing alcohol consumption driven by the adoption of healthier 
lifestyles by consumers. Ironically, these lifestyle change challenges are mirrored in the 
red meat industry, where health requirements are also driving shifts in consumer 
behaviour. 
Since I arrived in New Zealand I have struggled to understand why so many of New 
Zealand's world-class producers have battled to make ends meet. Global consumers 
would appear to be demanding more and more premium products. New Zealand has 
them in abundance. Wh  a e  man  f Ne  Zealand  d ce , fa me , and ag i-
food enterprises not paid what their products are worth?  
Thi  l  aid cena i  i  a ic la l  ac e in he ca e f Ne  Zealand  beef and 
lamb producers, with many farmers demonstrating weak financial returns year on year. 
This weakness is endemic, historical, persisting to the present day, and looks set to 
remain for the foreseeable future. Interestingly, in recent times, lamb prices have reached 
record highs and there has been a steady increase in the schedule price for beef. What 
has driven this price spike? Will it be sustainable? Is this just the commodity cycle at 
work? 
To an outside industry observer the cooperative structure and industry setup can be 
confronting and confusing. The cooperative entities set up by farming communities and 
then trusted to achieve reasonable returns have struggled to compete, innovate, 
collaborate, or perform. Their financial performance in particular, highlights the extent 
of the challenge. At the time of writing, there was only one genuine New Zealand owned 
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cooperative remaining, Alliance Group. Their 2019 return reported an overall profit of 
$20 million on $1.6 Billion in revenue. In percentage terms, that result represents a 1% 
return on gross sales.  
M  m i a i n  nde ake hi  a lied  b ine  jec  em  f m a de i e  d  
something practical to help improve the futures of farmers. I wanted to find out what was 
not working, understand why it was not working, and then generate a real alternative for 
innovative farmers. That alternative culminated in a new start-up venture, Triple Nine 
Farms Limited. The Triple Nine Farms venture represents the 'applied' component of this 
business research project. One of the key aims of this research was to make a difference. 
I did not just want to research and write. I wanted to apply and learn. Being exposed to 
risk forms a truly 'applied' model and makes any output derived from this research more 
meaningful, because it is anchored in the real world. Ask any entrepreneur and many will 
tell you, knowledge comes from experience, wisdom comes from failure. To fail, first, 
you have to try and do something. Triple Nine Farms did something.  
The process of commercializing Triple Nine Farms was invaluable in helping test for the 
presence of marketing myopia. Starting something new and different provided a first-
hand opportunity to experience all sorts of interesting industry dynamics, such as 
defensive behaviour from incumbents. Many appear prepared to vigilantly defend the 
status quo. My interactions with the industry highlighted a the lack of collaboration, 
dysfunctional leadership, self-interested politics, and toxic behaviour. These behaviours 
supported my decision to investigate for the presence of marketing myopia. Interestingly, 
man  f he i e  de c ibed ab e can be ela ed di ec l   Le i  (1960) ma ke ing 
myopia preconditions, particularly issues concerning leadership.  
Levitt (1960:42) sums up what the defence of the status quo looks like reporting, "Even 
after the advent of automobiles, trucks, and airplanes, the railroad tycoons remained 
imperturbably self-confident. If you had told them 60 years ago that in 30 years they 
would be flat on their backs, broke, and pleading for government subsidies, they would 
have thought you demented. Such a future was simply not considered possible. It was not 
even a discussable subject, or an askable question, or a matter any sane person would 
consider worth speculating about. The very thought was insane. Yet a lot of insane 
notions now have a matter of fact acceptance, for example, the idea of 100-ton tubes of 
metal moving smoothly through the air 20,000 feet above the earth, loaded with sane and 
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solid citizens casually drinking martinis  and they have dealt cruel blows to the 
railroads." 
My journey has been tough, expensive, bruising, and psychologically challenging at 
every level. It has tested friendships, challenged relationships and at times tested my 
resolve to continue. I have invested the last three and a half years of my life 
investigating, researching, and innovating in the New Zealand red meat industry. Many 
people in my close networks suggested I was wasting my time. Others told me I was just 
going over old ground. Many felt there was nothing new to see, and some, genuinely did 
not want to witness a small, disruptive company succeed.  
In Australia, where I come from, we refer to individuals that demonstrate these traits as  
'knockers'. Many times throughout this research there have been industry professionals 
ready to tell me something cannot be done. Often, this advice was offered even though 
they had not tried the idea themselves. I ignored these people from the start, and I 
continue to ignore them today. Most of this advice emanated from individuals employed 
by enterprises in the incumbent space. Again, this attitude tended to reinforce my 
decision to investigate for the presence of marketing myopia. 
Along my research journey, I have met some of the most amazing people you could meet 
anywhere. The thing I constantly experience in New Zealand is there is always, a like-
minded individual somewhere. They are not always easy to find, but when you do find 
them, it is like striking gold. Dr. Hugh Jellie, a man on a parallel journey with 
regenerative agriculture has been a great supporter of Triple Nine Farms. Hugh has 
always been ready to listen to my thoughts sharing the highs and lows of this applied 
business research project. Importantly, he has also been an excellent wall to bounce ideas 
off. Thanks, Hugh. 
My supervisors Dr. Robert Hamlin and Dr. Ben Wooliscroft have also played pivotal 
roles. They have been very supportive and very patient in helping me navigate the 
sometimes strange alchemy of academic and applied thinking. We have explored many 
conversations acknowledging that adding value is way more than just putting a fancy 
new label on some meat, in a bag, on a shelf. It is about creating products that are 
healthy, come from environments that enhance our big blue planet, are delicious to eat, 
and provide memorable experiences.  Food is important, it sustains our life, it is part of 
our culture.  
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We, humans, are anthropologically adapted to work together in close-knit teams. We 
form life-long bonds and part of the cohesive force that drives this dynamic is provided 
by food. It fuels our minds and our bodies, and it brings friends and families together. To 
me, New Zealand's red meat has never been about commodity. I deeply believe  that 
Ne  Zealand  ama ing ed mea  i  just far too important to be traded as such.  
As the global population grows and climatic events become more volatile, there will be 
some real pushback against the red meat industry around the globe. Here in Godzone, 
New Zealand, we have the opportunity to connect humans to their health, each other, and 
to our planet. Raising beef and lamb and other animals in New Zealand regenerative 
farming operations offers an opportunity to help reduce the impacts of climate change. It 
is an area where New Zealand can excel. This is the vision I have for the industry. It is 
why I undertook this research project and hopefully, it will play a small part in opening 
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A small group of New Zealand beef and sheep producers gathered on the farm as they 
did each month to share and discuss ideas for improving their operations, profitability, 
and futures. If you were to look for a single word to describe the feeling emanating from 
the gathering, it would be angst. Many of the independent, strong-willed individuals 
present were from multi-generational farms with proud histories of substantial 
contributions to New Zealand's economy. 
Why were so many of these proud farmers feeling powerless, concerned, and downright 
apprehensive about their futures? Where was the New Zealand red meat industry 
heading? Discussions ranged across industry leadership, schedule pricing, and the 
industry's ability to secure premium returns. During the conversation, the central issue, 
and the issue of most significance to farmers, centred on low financial returns. 
The farmers' group debated backward and forwards about whether the rewards from 
many of New Zealand's beef and sheep operations justified the effort and the risk. They 
were concerned their operations did not justify the cost of capital. Investopedia (2020) 
suggests, The c  f ca i al e e en  a h dle a e ha  a c m an  m  e c me 
bef e i  can gene a e al e.  It is a metric financiers and investors use to weigh risk 
and an e  g , n -g  questions about investment decisions and commercial projects' 
viability.  
It was an exciting experience to observe such a group. The questions raised were very 
much rhetorical. Not one farmer in the room was likely to pack up and do something 
else. What would they do? Farming was not just a way to earn a living. It was a way of 
life, and in many cases, had been a way of life for generations. This dynamic provided 
the impetus to germinate the seeds of my thinking in this area. What actions could be 
taken by the industry to improve things? Thinking the farmer's conversations through, 
why were the financial returns so endemically low? What was wrong? What was not 
working?   
With this in mind and with a willingness to help farmers, I began this research. My 
strategy for this applied business research project was to immerse, engage, and 
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investigate the New Zealand red meat industry's dynamics at the coal face. I set out to 




PART I:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Key Points 
x The New Zealand red meat industry: What went wrong?  
x Introducing Marketing Myopia & Transvection: Marketing tools from the past.  
x An investigation begins, the way forward is described. 
 
1.1  Preliminary Background: Research in Context 
 
As a country, New Zealand is primarily a producer of primary products, with a 
significant need to export them to earn its living. A considerable quantity of these 
primary exports, especially in the red meat sector, is currently traded through commodity 
platforms and intermediaries. In many cases, products are repackaged, utilized in value-
added pursuits, or redistributed more effectively by enterprises with in-depth knowledge 
of their markets. These importing entities generally demonstrate in-depth market 
knowledge that benefits them through better market access. Backed by strong existing 
relationships with key players in the sector, these enterprises appear to accrue the lion's 
share of the benefits. 
  
New Zealand traditionally leveraged its comparative advantage of producing red meat 
relatively cheaply to provide commodity beef and lamb to protected markets back in the 
United Kingdom. By the 1950s, farmers had made moves to create cooperatives to 
control their fate by marketing to countries other than the United Kingdom. The idea was 
these new cooperatives would combine and leverage farmers' capital and production 
resources, giving them the ability to reach new markets with increased power to 
negotiate better prices. These improved returns would then flow to farmers. For the next 
forty years, New Zealand farmers, through their cooperatives, enjoyed steady export 
growth. However, the industry, instead of retaining its dominant market position, 




This research will argue that as a commodity producer with no real product 
differentiation to the end customer, New Zealand's primary products do not enjoy the 
premium they deserve. The key reason for this is potentially a lack of focus on, and 
under-investment in, marketing.  Two big ideas from two marketing giants are used to 
explore this question.  Theodore Levitt (1960) developed the theory of marketing 
myopia, and Wroe Alderson (1965) created the groundbreaking concept of transvection. 
Levitt's (1960) work drills into the conditions that support an enterprise not paying 
attention to marketing, and Alderson's (1965) transvection provides a mechanism for 
assessing product flows. Both ideas will enable the researcher to identify how value is 
distributed in the New Zealand red meat industry. Who makes what? Where? How? 
Why? Through applying these frameworks, this research aims to improve the industry's 
knowledge about how marketing as a function, is being leveraged in the New Zealand 
red meat industry.  
 
1.1.1 Research Focus 
Sha n Hend  and Si  Pa l Callaghan  (2013) fam  b k Get off the Grass powerfully 
opened with, Ne  Zealande  k ha de  and ea n le  han m  he  e le in he 
de el ed ld.  That comment was a tough pill to swallow then, and it's not going 
down any easier now, especially with the farming community. Of course, this is not a 
new insight but understanding the past economic decline is potentially helpful. Looking 
back at past economic models and theorists can help us look forward.   
New Zealand's standard of living began to decline with the collapsing wool price in 1967 
and accelerated with Britain's economic realignment. It joined the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1973. Before these events took place, New Zealand and New 
Zealand Farmers had one of the highest standards of living anywhere on the planet and, 
while it might not look like it to some, it is well-positioned to recapture that glory. This 
research will investigate one caveat to such glory's reinstatement: marketing and how 
marketing is used.  
Drucker (1958:252) declares, Ma ke ing i  al  he m  effec i e engine f ec n mic 
development, particularly in its ability rapidly to develop entrepreneurs and managers. 
And it contributes what the greatest need of an "underdeveloped" country is: a 
systematic discipline in a vital area of economic activity . . . a discipline which is based 
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on generalized, theoretical concepts and which can, therefore, be both taught and 
lea ned.   
According to Drucker (1958), marketing may provide a pathway back to the level of 
performance that will allow New Zealanders in the red meat industry to work smarter, 
n  ha de . Thi  e ea ch ill le e age Le i  (1960) c nce  f ma ke ing m ia  
investigate the health of marketing in the New Zealand red meat industry.  
1.2  Global Background to the Research: How did endemic poor red meat sector 
performance in New Zealand contribute to 50 years of linear decline in the 
co n  anda d of li ing   
People from all walks of life often ask me, what possessed a native-born Western 
Australian to spend three and a half years of his life researching the good, the bad, and 
he gl  in Ne  Zealand  ed mea  ec ? The an e  i  im le. I an ed  kn  h  
a c n  ali  f life c ld lide d n he orld rankings so dramatically. How 
could a country go from being one of the richest in the world to one that demonstrated a 
linear decline in its standard of living with its citizens experiencing ever-increasing 
inequality?  If this could happen to New Zealand, a country that was once a shining star 
of the British Empire, what could be learned from such a decline? What had gone 
wrong?  
Hendy and Callaghan (2013) compiled some provocative thinking in their innovation 
book aptly titled, Get off the Grass. It is an excellent read, and its narrative suggests, 
New Zealand is overly reliant on agriculture. As a result, they identify that the country 
has flourished less than it should have and less than other countries of similar weight and 
status in the OECD. Their narrative provides many examples of systemic issues in New 
Zealand, such as inadequate housing, decrepit infrastructure, a substandard health system 
and, many other disorders, including a lack of investment in innovation, increased 
environmental decline and, significant under-investment in universities. This claim is 
supported by the actual deterioration of New Zealand universities in international 
rankings. My research acknowledges their thinking, but I am not convinced about the 
need to get entirely off the grass just yet.  
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Grass and its productivity partner water, while threatened by climate change, remain 
plentiful in New Zealand at this point, particularly when compared to other red meat-
producing countries like Australia, which in 2020 experienced one of the worst droughts 
and bushfires on record. When diverse pasture and water are managed with new 
regenerative farming approaches, they offer farming operations an enhanced opportunity 
to store carbon. This makes a positive contribution to the reduction of greenhouse gases, 
which is an outcome that consumers view very favourably. This is important for farming 
operations to understand because climate credentials are proving to be an increasing 
influence in c n me  purchasing decisions, because of situations like bushfires. 
1.3  Opportunities to Innovate 
S ainable and egene a i e a ache  ffe  an ni  f  Ne  Zealand  fa me  
to innovate. In doing so, they can leverage consumer trends and position the red meat 
industry to take advantage. New Zealand farmers are in an excellent position to become 
the preeminent providers of sustainably derived, highly nutritious, and delicious red meat 
to the world's most discerning consumers, particularly where beef and lamb are 
concerned. New Zealand can be the premium delicatessen of the world. Why does this 
matter? 
The short answer is straight forward. More innovation helps create better products, 
which provides marketers with more scope to deliver concrete outcomes. They can 
strategically brand and position products that can provide added value for consumers and 
Ne  Zealand'  fa me . I  ill hel  im e c n me  li e , he c n  e  
ea ning , and fa me  fi abili .  
Hendy and Callaghan (2013:34) refer to Nobel-Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman 
who suggests, P d c i i  i n  e e hing, b  in he l ng n i  i  alm  e e hing.  
In essence, productivity is the output produced by an individual for each hour worked. 
New Zealand has suffered significantly from low productivity, particularly when 
compared to countries like Australia. Hendy and Callaghan (2013:34) suggest, T  
match Australia, New Zealand must increase its long-run productivity growth 
e enf ld.  That is a big ask, especially if you throw in the extra challenge of 
diversifying away from New Zealand's traditional primary production strength. 
Innovation is important.  
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Achieving such a goal would require significantly improved access to capital. Much of it 
ld need  be a ien  ca i al , beca e he change  e i ed  ansition 
traditional operations towards increased productivity methods will take time, and the 
investment level required to provision and drive such changes will need to be made well 
'ahead of the curve.' Company Balance Sheets under these scenarios are not attractive to 
the financial sector, which is  used to bricks and mortar security. Currently, securing 
capital for such initiatives is challenging. 
1.4  The Productivity Challenge 
The lack of capital can make achieving a productivity transition, largely an illusory ideal. 
This situation is currently mostly down to the banking sector's overwhelming preference 
to lend money against housing, which is an unproductive asset. The historical rise in 
housing values may make homeowners feel wealthier, but the reality is, a house does not 
produce anything, and selling houses to each other has a limited upside. They only go up 
in value if the next buyer can, and will, pay more for it. As the 2008 global financial 
crisis demonstrated, housing's value equation can operate in both directions, up and 
down. 
The current situation is increasing inequality in the nation and adding to a continued 
decline in living standards for many. Investment in overpriced housing is not doing 
anything to future-proof New Zealand's economy. This is a shame because receiving 
significantly more for the production output from farming operations is another way to 
improve a nation's income dramatically. A productivity work-around if you will. Capital, 
along with an increased appetite for risk, is also required to help the New Zealand red 
meat sector achieve such an aim. This is important if firms are going to increase their 
spend on innovation and marketing significantly. The results of failing to do so are 
illustrated in Figure 1.0 below. At one time, Australia and New Zealand were almost in 
lockstep. These days, New Zealand has been relegated to playing catch up with its 




Figure 1.0: GDP per hour worked. Australia versus New Zealand. Source: OECD Data 2020. 
 
Productivity remains a huge challenge for New Zealand with Hooton (2020) recently 
reporting, National's claims that it has the wherewithal or courage to genuinely 
address New Zealand's poor productivity record should be treated with deep scepticism 
given its performance under John Key. Early in his term, National rejected entirely the 
recommendations of its own 2025 Taskforce working group aimed at closing the gap 
with Australia. Instead, it grouped up a bunch of Wellington bureaucrats, called them a 
Productivity Commission, and asked them to write more reports." 
Yes, producing more from a worked labour hour is one way of creating more volume, 
and it certainly brings benefits. Still, this approach to me has an industrialization and 
commodification tendency. In a New Zealand red meat farming operation, productivity 
is usually measured in kilograms per hectare; however, the results are quite climatically 
dependant. In a good season, animals tend to be better fed and gain weight more 
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effectively. This differs significantly from countries like Germany, which can provide 
many reliable examples of sustained high productivity levels in their engineering and 
manufacturing industries. Their investments in research and development are staggering, 
and there are certainly lessons for New Zealand farming operations here. The Daimler 
(2018) Annual Report highlights Mercedes-Ben  ca  in e ed 7 Billi n n e ea ch 
and development in 2017.  
The New Zealand red meat sector, is unable to invest at Mercedes-Benz levels of 
research and development, but perhaps the question to ask is, why do German companies 
like Daimler invest so much in research and development? If you look back 50 years and 
examine the automotive sector's progress, led by companies like Daimler, the 
improvements in vehicle efficiency, factory productivity, vehicle safety, fuel efficiency, 
and innovation are staggering. Mercedes-Benz is now allocating significant funding and 
effort into their EQ electric brand and positioning it for continued future success. The 
c m an  2018 Ann al Re  a e , We an   c n in e hel ing ha e m bili  
through our pioneering innovations in the coming years while moving ahead with 
digi i a i n h gh  he en i e g .  The Daimler (2018) Annual Report states the 
Mercedes-Ben  Ca  di i i n ed EBIT f 7,216 milli n in 2018.  
Looking back 50 years in the New Zealand red meat industry provides a very different 
view of research and development, productivity, and progress. Greig, Nuthall, and Old 
(2018) argue,  Gi en he low level of annual return (2.5% on capital), and virtually 
zero net real capital gains, it is clear that farmers, and their families, must obtain many 
ide benefi  f m fa m life c m en a ing f  he l  e n .  Greig et al. also 
poignantly report, "If farmers wish to make real capital gains, they will need to initially 
purchase at lower prices in keeping with conservative estimates of future product prices 
and increasing costs. It is possible, for example, the availability of the farm 'next door' 
tempts farmers into paying too high a price to allow making an annual return on capital 
similar to urban-based fixed interest investments (currently around 4.3% for five 
years)."Chaston (2019) reports a similar view and states, Farmland prices are not 
rising and haven't been for at least a decade. Farmers are not 'farming for capital 
gains', no matter what farm type you review." Figure 1.1 below highlights the very 





Figure 1.1: Median prices per hectare for grazing land across New Zealand. Source: 
www.interest.co.nz (2019). 
 
The low returns produced by the red meat sector to date means there has been a reduced 
capacity to invest in research and development. This impacts the industry's ability to 
promote, position, and propel New Zealand red meat enterprises to levels where 
excellent financial returns could be secured. In stark contrast, it would appear the 
industry has been held in the tight grip of a commodity trap, which has contributed to 
low financial returns.  
1.5  The Business Question: Does the New Zealand red meat industry suffer from 
Marketing Myopia? 
Not being able to see is rarely a good thing, particularly failure to see the customer, 
which can bring dramatic and unintended consequences. Often, such effects can become 
e minal. Unf na el , in man  f da  ind ies, including the red meat industry, 
these survival events continue to be far too prevalent. Theodore Levitt, Professor of 
Marketing at Harvard University (1960:3), asked, H  can a c m an  en e i  
c n in ed g h?  Baker (2001:58) highlights the 1960 in d c i n  Le i  a icle 
e ing, In 1960 "Marketing Myopia," which answered that question in a new and 
challenging way by urging organizations to define their industries more broadly to take 
advantage of growth opportunities."  
Le i  n  eminal article written nearly sixty years ago is full of navigation markers 
for alert marketers. Levitt (1960) advocated that there was no such thing as a growth 
industry. He believed there were only growth opportunities, and organizations needed to 
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understand the difference to position their organizations to take advantage of them 
successfully. Levitt (1960) stated, "The history of every dead and dying "growth" 
industry shows a self-deceiving cycle of bountiful expansion and undetected decay. Four 
preconditions that usually guarantee this cycle are: 
1. The belief that growth is assured by an expanding and more affluent population; 
2. The belief ha  he e i  n  c m e i i e b i e f  he ind  maj  d c ; 
3. Too much faith in mass production and in the advantages of rapidly declining unit 
costs as output rises; 
4. Preoccupation with a product that lends itself to carefully controlled scientific 
e e imen a i n, im emen , and man fac ing c  ed c i n.  
The underlying trigger for this business project was to answer one fundamental question. 
Why has such an important export sector, a sector New Zealand's cultural identity is built 
on, and an industry with seemingly so much potential, performed so poorly? Does the 
New Zealand red meat industry suffer from marketing myopia?  
McMullen (2015:119) channels Lewis Carroll, "Would you tell me please, which way I 
ought to go from here?" asked Alice." "That depends a good deal on where you want to 
get to," said the Cheshire cat. "I don't much care where," said Alice. "Then it doesn't 
much matter which way you go", said the cat." One of the key aims of this research is to 
determine whether the essence of Lewis Carroll's Alice  can be detected within the 
organizational, political, cultural, and informational subsystems of New Zealand red 
meat enterprises. 
Do the boards, executives, and industry leaders in charge of the nation's red meat 
enterprises know where the sector they lead is heading? Have they defined the business 
they are in correctly? Do they deeply understand the needs and wants of their customers? 
Do they know how to reach them? Do they understand the critical influence climate 
change will have on their business models, and are they prepared for it?  Do New 
Zealand's red meat enterprises believe too much in growth markets like China to fuel 
their future? Do New Zealand red meat companies think there are no real protein 
alternatives or substitute products? Is the New Zealand red meat sector too focused on 
mass production technologies like robotics and camera grading? Is the industry over 
investing and over-reliant on cost reduction initiatives? Do the words on red meat 
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ind  eb i e  alk he alk. F  e am le, Sil e  Fe n Fa m (2020) eb i e claim , 
Delici  a  he e. Delici  i  e ec . Delicious is care. Delicious is passion. 
Delici  i  n hine.  The business question remains: Does the New Zealand red meat 
industry suffer from marketing myopia?   
1.6  Answering the Question: Background and structure of the applied research 
This research is structured around a DBA pathway as opposed to being framed in a 
traditional Ph.D. format. The main reason for a DBA preference was the applied and 
practical focus it takes on developing solutions for a specific business problem. This 
research project was centred on assessing why the New Zealand red meat industry 
produces such low returns. The University of Otago's DBA program aims to deliver 
practical outcomes with real-world solutions to particular problems. It is, therefore, 
highly suited to this investigation.  
The University of Otago (2019) website states, The aim of the programme is to support 
students to resolve critical problems for businesses and industries through the 
application of research and theory in a business environment. Students develop critical 
thinking and problem-solving skills, which they are encouraged to use in combination 
i h hei  n e e ience  and kill .  I believe I have achieved precisely this balance 
between theory and practice. To complete this project, I have conducted extensive 
research, and in doing so, I have developed practical solutions to critical problems. These 
solutions were successfully applied in the prototype, Triple Nine Farms Limited.  
I elec ed he Uni e i  f O ag  beca e, a  he ni e i  eb i e tates, "The Otago 
Business School ranks in the top 1% of Business Schools worldwide with both AACSB 
and EQUIS accreditation. It has an international reputation for excellence and teaching 
and is acknowledged as a centre of business and economics excellence. Otago Business 
School is the leading Business School in New Zealand for research." I wanted my 
significant investment in New Zealand red meat sector research to stand up to scrutiny 
and forensic interrogation, particularly from those in the red meat industry.  
I have believed from the outset that providing rigor would be critical to supporting my 
research insights because the New Zealand red meat industry has a well-documented and 
widely reported reputation for intense politics, dysfunctional culture, and a  lack of 
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openness. The following extract from a Federated Farmers of New Zealand discussion 
a e  in 2013 ide  an in igh  in  he ec  d namic . 
"Meat industry people don't need to take advice or listen to new ideas. They already 
have the answers. They strangle new thoughts at conception. If that fails, they discredit 
the source. If you haven't been in the meat industry for years, you don't know what you're 
talking about. If you have, you're washed up... 
Presenting any new view on restructuring for the red meat industry is akin to holding a 
loaded gun to your head. There will be a clamour to pull the trigger. You pull it yourself, 
and then blame the Meat Board! Someone will always bring a bigger gun to the party, 
and it is likely to go off when lea  e ec ed.   
To this end and well aware of the industry challenge I was taking on, the entire 
University of Otago DBA process and my academic supervisors have demanded and 
ensured that my insights and research conclusions stand the integrity test. This a lied  
business project is my interpretation of the research narrative spanning three and a half 
years of investigation into the red meat sector.  
From the very beginning, I wanted this research project to enquire, investigate, assess, 
analyze, consider, and reflect. More importantly, it needed to deliver some fresh ideas 
for the red meat industry. These ideas have been developed in the Triple Nine Farms 
prototype, and to that end, Triple Nine Farms has left a legacy, which champions 
disruptive thinking as the genesis to something better.  Providing fresh insights is the 
reason behind this entire project.  
Triple Nine Farms demonstrates in a very tangible way that there are other options to 
reach consumers. This research and its real-world application show that effective 
marketing can create, encourage, and champion the adoption of more sustainable, 
regenerative, and consumer credible approaches. The thinking behind some of these 
approaches could be useful in assisting those tasked with future-proofing New Zealand's 
red meat farming enterprises. 
1.7  Objectives: Why is this research needed? 
This project is needed because the world is changing, and it is changing very quickly. 
The shifts in consumer trends and behaviours are delivering disruption across the red 
12 
 
mea  ec  en i nmen  behind-the-gate in farming operations, in processing 
operations, and in selling operations. A vital tool in an enterprise's competitive armoury 
is marketing, but what happens to an organization's ability to compete if its marketing is 
weak? How will it hear the voice of the consumer? How will it innovate? How will it 
stay relevant? How will it remain profitable? My research hypothesis asserts the New 
Zealand red meat industry is suffering from marketing myopia, which, if sufficient 
evidence is found, may provide a credible explanation as to why the red meat sector has 
under-performed.  
1.8  The Voice of the Consumer 
This research project has focused on investigating, examining, analyzing, and then 
reporting on the presence of marketing myopia in the New Zealand red meat industry. Its 
research methodology was predominantly aimed at deeply understanding the producer 
and processor sides of the red meat sector. For this reason, formal investigations have not 
been undertaken directly with consumers in this study. This is because the primary aim 
for this research was to find out how marketing  as a function is perceived and 
implemented in key supply side organizations first.  
The red meat transvection begins on the farm. That is where the data flows begin, and 
that is where this research commenced. This research, whilst maintaining a strong 
interest in understanding consumer needs, has been more concerned with whether the 
industry can see what those needs are. Gaps in understanding consumers were 
c n ide ed a  likel  ma ke ing m ia h  h  f f he  e l a i n. F  
example, Tyson Foods in the USA has invested in alternative proteins because they have 
seen their market growth, relevance, and potential.  
Ultimately, a diagnosis for marketing myopia is likely to have an impact on how well 
New Zealand red meat enterprises have, or have not, heard the voice of the consumer. 
This project has been undertaken by a sole researcher with limited resources. For this 
reason, direct consumer engagement was limited to interaction through the Triple Nine 
Farms  retail premises. The main engagement points with consumers during this project 
came from one-on-one interaction with customers visiting the retail store in Nelson. This 
activity was augmented with marketing activity to the hospitality sector across New 
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Zealand, and through digital media, which was leveraged through Facebook and 
Instagram.  
In pursuit of clarity, it is appropriate to acknowledge that the c me  e ec i e n 
New Zealand red meat has not been fully considered in this project. Their inclusion in 
the extension phase of this research will be sought. The most obvious connection to 
marketing myopia from the consumer side is likely to be found in consumers who 
express frustration in not being able to satiate their particular red meat demands. There 
are also likely to be links between homogeneous and heterogeneous settings worth 
exploring. For example, do consumers see themselves as individuals when it comes to 
red meat purchase decisions or are their decisions low involvement? The size, scope, and 
resources required to do justice to a comprehensive consumer research project is why it 
has been omitted from this particular study. That does not for a moment, diminish the 
absolutely critical requirement for any red meat enterprise to hear the voice of the 
consumer. 
During the research process, fresh perspectives and insights that emerge were noted. 
Especially those capable of keeping the sector relevant in the future. For example, 
Rogers (2019) asserts, "81% of brands could disappear, and European consumers 
wouldn't care. Brand's failure to create relevant and meaningful content, combined with 
their inability to improve consumers' wellbeing, means they are becoming increasingly 
irrelevant in the minds of shoppers." Many of the applied aspects (testing industry 
assumptions) of this research have been deployed and tested through the 'live' prototype. 
In that context, active exploration of how consumers interact and feel about the New 
Zealand red meat industry and its product offerings has exposed this research to 
significant anecdotal feedback. The experience will prove an invaluable stepping stone in 
designing and conducting future research.   
Understanding the voice of the customer is critical. Powton (2019) suggests, Voice of 
the Customer (often referred to as simply VoC) is a term used to describe the process of 
capturing customer's experiences, expectations, preferences, and aversions. It is a 
process that provides a detailed set of customer wants and needs and often includes both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods. You collect feedback on your customer's 
experience with your products and services."  
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Anecdotal observation suggests marketing myopia may contribute to the red meat 
industry's poor performance; and poor performance for any enterprise is often derived by 
a failure to produce appropriate customer satisfactions. For this reason my investigation 
commenced at the farm level and worked towards the consumer. The research could just 
as easily, have been engineered to work in the opposite direction. In this project, the 
investigation strategy I deployed took a bottom up (producer and processor), rather than 
a top down approach (consumer). There is of course, excellent arguments for both 
choices. Future research will ideally attract sufficient financial and human resources to 
enable the coalescence of both research streams to occur.  
There is an excellent argument to combine transvection, marketing myopia and systems 
dynamics to underpin further research. This is because of synergy. For example, 
transvection is a marketing provisioning system. Marketing myopia is a detection tool 
for assessment of the health of that system and systems dynamics is a comprehensive 
discipline capable of contextualising all of the research. This concept is being looked at 
to drive extended research once this first stage exploration has been completed.  
The people I have drawn on for this research, which represent the New Zealand red meat 
industry's highest levels, have a collective tendency to suggest the New Zealand red meat 
industry could do better regarding hearing the consumer's voice. Many felt the New 
Zealand red meat industry was failing itself, its farmers, and, most importantly, its 
consumers. During this project, I travelled to Argentina, the USA, UK, Australia, Asia, 
and Europe looking for evidence of vital, iconic, and loved New Zealand red meat 
brands. I did not find compelling evidence to support brands being successfully 
developed. I witnessed none with a dominant market presence or power.  For example, 
Lurpak butter from Denmark is a much loved global brand. It is prevalent even in the 
dairy centric economy of New Zealand.  
It appeared the degree of success of some brands reported in New Zealand might have 
differed from the in-market reality, mainly when it came to brand perception in export 
markets. I readily acknowledge this is my opinion, but I am articulating directly from 
'lived' experience in international markets. I reiterate this is just my observation.   
I had many conversations in export markets with consumers who acknowledged New 
Zealand's history of lamb production. Still, evidence of a real connection culminating in 
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a purchase preference for a particular New Zealand brand eluded my inquiry. Vizard 
(2017) reports, The maj i  f c n en  c ea ed b  b and  i  ha ing li le  n  im ac  
n b ine  e l   e le  li e , acc ding  Ha a  la e  Meaningf l B and  
d .  It would appear the New Zealand red meat industry is yet to emerge with really 
meaningf l b and  , a  lea  ba ed n m  in-market conversations.  
Kelesidou (2014) raises another potential issue concerning positioning and preference. 
He reports, "During the last half-decade, however, an emerging "luxury for less" or 
"affordable luxury" industry thrives on emulating what once was considered exclusive 
and making it accessible to the masses. But, "true" luxury was never meant to be 
accessible. And this massification is causing an identity crisis, one that could have 
severe implications for high-end luxury brands down the line." 
I believe this issue resides in the New Zealand red meat narrative. In the future, it is 
likely, even probable, that New Zealand grass-fed red meat could become a luxury 
product. Therefore, advanced strategic positioning of red meat offerings driven by 
narratives that acknowledge heterogeneous consumer demand is more likely to favour 
the future. For example, such a strategy could help future brands fend off the 
'massification' of feed-lot beef as consumers move towards more climate-friendly 
options.  Such a positioning strategy early on could prove useful should the industry 
wish to leverage a premiumization approach.  Currently, sizeable red meat processing 
companies are attempting to claim some degree of 'premium'  in their offerings by 
leveaging the narratives of the farmers they promote.  A specific weakness in this 
approach could emerge in the future as blockchain initiatives weaponize transparency. 
Transparency can be dangerous if you have something to hide.  
1.9  The Language of Commodity 
Commodity platforms are not generally renowned for their marketing prowess as they 
rely on supply and demand price fluctuations as the clearance mechanism, not marketing 
effort.  Production efficiency, low-cost innovation, and volume references are the usual 
language of enterprises engaged in commodity trading. This appears to be the dominant 
language utilized for communication in documents like Annual Reports. It speaks to 
market orientation. It is about tonnes and throughput, not consumer experiences.  
Genuine pasture-to-plate, farm-to-table, or farmer-to-consumer aspirations that offer a 
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premium output would usually be derived from premium inputs as well, and that would, 
in theory, include the language across the transvection. For example, one could ask a test 
question: do farmers produce their animals predominantly for weight or flavour?  
A narrative that champions tonnage is unlikely to be a language that is meaningful to 
consumers. Does marketing myopia play any role here? Those in the industry often use 
the term transitioning-to-value to inform the red meat community of an intended shift 
upwards in the value chain. It is difficult to find evidence that such a transition is 
occurring, particularly in some of the larger red meat enterprises' financial performance. 
Financials would typically be a leading indicator of such an initiative's success.  It may 
be a good time for the industry to reach a broader agreement on the definition of what 
transitioning-to-value means. How should it be measured? EBITDA? ROI? RONE? How 
is the voice of the consumer assessed? Is there a measurement of push versus pull 
transition in-market? Does diversification of the customer base come with any 
transitioning implications? For example, the industry is currently highly dependant on 
Chinese consumers. What does their voice say?  
1.10 Three lines of inquiry: Qualitative, Transvection, and Real-World Application 
The research methodology is fully documented in Chapter 5; however, it is appropriate 
that the introduction narrative provides an initial rationale on the critical lines of inquiry 
selected to frame this applied business project. Firstly, I wanted to test my 'marketing 
myopia' hypothesis from multiple perspectives. To achieve this, I wanted to test 
assumptions, ideas, and concepts through more than one line of inquiry. I wanted to be 
able to cross-check my findings in more than one research arena. For example, if 
qualitative interviews suggested farmers were not receiving an equitable profit 
distribution, I wanted a method to test this assumption in the real world. I needed a way 
to follow the money.  
To achieve this aim, I decided on leveraging interviews as my primary source of 
information. This would provide actionable insights from across the New Zealand red 
meat industry. To follow the money, I would utilize the concept of 'transvection'. Finally, 
the Triple Nine Farms prototype would test assumptions in the real world. This approach 
provided triangulated results and a platform on which to develop robust results.  
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Farmers are generally very practical people. They respond well to facts and evidence.  If 
you can show them there is a better way of doing something, they will generally listen. 
Farmers are inherently conservative and sometimes risk-averse, so I felt it would be 
advantageous if my research methodology could validate its findings from three different 
perspectives anchored in results from the real-world. The theory is attractive to farmers, 
but it will not necessarily drive action. Practical solutions are more likely to be 
successful. Hopefully, this research's value will come from providing a body of work to 
help the industry think, debate, discuss, and take actions that will help secure the red 
meat industry's future.    
To assist with clarity, the following are three brief third-party definitions of each line of 
inquiry. Firstly, qualitative research. Patton (2005:1) suggests, Q ali a i e e ea ch 
analyses data from direct fieldwork observations, in-depth, open-ended interviews, and 
written documents. Qualitative researchers engage in naturalistic inquiry, studying real-
world settings inductively to generate rich narrative descriptions and construct case 
studies. Inductive analysis across cases yield patterns and themes, the fruit of qualitative 
e ea ch.  
Secondly, the concept of transvection has been selected to follow the money. If a 
restaurant, like Jervois Steakhouse (www.jervoissteakhouse.co.nz), sells a prime 800g T-
bone steak for NZ$96.00 and the farmer schedule provides the farmer with NZ$5.64 per 
kilogram for Prime P2 steers (indicative schedule price Silver Fern Farms South Island at 
23rd December 2019) which enterprise is making the best returns? Are the returns 
equitable? Transvection, a concept developed by 1960s marketing great, Wroe Alderson, 
was designed to capture and explain all of the inputs and outputs across what he referred 
to as a comprehensive marketing provisioning system.   
Alderson and Martin (1965) submitted an article for the Journal of Marketing Research 
which presented the initial steps in the formalization of a partial theory of marketing, 
where the new concept of transvection played a pivotal role because as Alderson and 
Martin (1965:118) stated, A an ec i n incl de  he c m le e e ence f e change , 
but it also includes the various transformations that take place along the way. The pair 
of shoes in the hands of a consumer is obviously a very different thing from the raw 
ma e ial in na e.  The effort, technology, and innovation required to transform an 
animal grazing in a paddock into a great dining experience on a consumer's plate follow 
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a similar trajectory where value is increased as the products flow from nature to the 
consumer. 
Wooliscroft and Wilkes (2018) suggest that Ma ke ing i  a i i ning echn l g  
ha  h gh an ec i n  aim   ma ch he e gene  l  and demand.  By 
identifying all the inputs and outputs, a 'transvectioneer' can identify how efficiently and 
fairly the marketing system is distributing the monetary returns. This is useful 
knowledge for marketers. 
A belief in heterogeneous markets underpins Aldersonian thinking. This appears to differ 
from the New Zealand red meat industry belief, which tends to view markets are 
homogeneous. The evidence for this assertion can be found in how processing 
companies portion and package their meat cuts. One General Manager insisted, Y  
guys at Triple Nine Farms will need to decide what thickness you want your prime cuts; 
we need to inform the processing team." Their issue was their system would become less 
efficient if customer requirements were met. Priem (1992:136) states, Unlike ec n mic 
models of perfect competition, which assume homogeneity, Alderson suggests that 
ma ke  be ie ed a  he e gene  n b h he l  and demand ide .  In the 
context of exploring the poor performance in the New Zealand red meat industry, this 
way of thinking may offer a fresh perspective to help the industry understand how 
consumers might be thinking.  
Team a belief in heterogeneous marketing with an innovative concept like transvection, 
and you can move up and down the supply chain, not only viewing transactions but 
examining organizational behaviour systems. Considering the red meat sector in this way 
highlights areas of concern and pinpoints defective sorts. These conflict zones represent 
areas where the specific investigation may be useful, and they can also highlight 
opportunities for innovation, and potentially, even differentiation. Such an investigation 
may reveal business model elements that are not working, and deliberate examination 
and analysis may help competitive advantages emerge, but finding them means someone 
has to go looking.  
The final method selected to support the research was the real-world application of a 
li e  m del. In he end, making an idea fl  in he eal ld was the entire point of this 
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thesis, and the best way to test if something is going to fly is by trying to take off. It 
ked f  he W igh  B he  Flyer. 
Creating, building, and developing Triple Nine Farms as an integral part of this research 
project has enabled the testing of many traditional assumptions about consumer 
behaviours, pricing, positioning, value creation, and value-adding. It has made it possible 
to push back on industry incumbents because talking about something, and doing 
something, are two very different things. The Triple Nine Farms  prototype inclusion 
adds value to this project, because it is a business operating in the real world.  
1.11 Interacting with Change and History 
Cutting through the fog of the familiar is never easy. Human beings do not like change 
for many reasons; some of these are baked into our DNA and stem from our shared 
anthropological and sociological history. Kanter (2012:1) reminds us that, "Leadership is 
about change, but what is a leader to do when faced with ubiquitous resistance? 
Resistance to change manifests itself in many ways, from foot-dragging and inertia to 
petty sabotage and outright rebellion." Kanter highlights ten key reasons people resist 
change. They are: 
1. Loss of control  interference with autonomy and perceived loss of power. 
2. Excess uncertainty  People fear the unknown. 
3. Surprise  Pe le like ime  e a e. When he  d n  ha e ime, he  e i . 
4. Everything seems different  humans are creatures of habit. 
5. Loss of face  Th e a cia ed i h he e i n ha  didn  k ma  feel 
threatened and resist.  
6. Concerns about competence  Pe le d n  like feeling id. 
7. More work  Change is hard work, so people resist. 
8. Ripple effects  unintended consequences and disruption are part of the change, 
but people do not like being forced into change. 
9. Past resentments  battles of the past can re-emerge during change. 
10. Sometimes the threat is real  disruption and change may mean employees are 
displaced. Failure to change can also lead to the same place and often with even 
m e di e c n e ence . Le i  (1960) he  f ma keting myopia incorporates 
similar thinking into his explanation for organizational failure.   
20 
 
The ten points above are entirely relevant to the New Zealand red meat industry and this 
research. An examination of historical evidence in the New Zealand red meat industry 
often leads to views that avoided pro-active change. For example, the failure of Silver 
Fern Farms and the Alliance Group to join forces. There were many reasons given for 
the failure to merge. Kissun (2015) reports, "MIE's main aim was to retain farmer 
ownership and the co-op structure within New Zealand  getting the two co-ops together 
and determining a vision for the shared future of the two co- .  I  a  a maj  
disappointment that we never got to have that discussion," McDonald says. 
He says a lack of "inspired leadership" by the co-ops is to blame. "We never had the 
needed leadership  someone standing up in one of those leadership positions and 
saying 'this is what we need to do'. 
"All we've got now is the respective chairmen saying 'we tried our best'. I guess we will 
never know the answer to the 25-year-old question, 'would a collective future have been 
better, or are we better apart?' " What is now evident in 2020 is there is only one New 
Zealand cooperative left, Alliance Group. Why? 
During the literature and media communications produced during this time, there was 
minimal discussion concerning the consumer or marketing. This was because the giants 
of the New Zealand red meat industry were in survival mode. Woodford (2015) 
suggested that Silver Fern Farms never got their debt back under control after acquiring 
North Island's Richmond meats. These unsuccessful forays are relevant to my research 
because they demonstrate a failure to see things.  
Levitt (1960:24) suggests, The fail e i  a  he . The executives responsible for it, in 
the last analysis, are those who deal with he b ad aim  and licie .  Poor acquisition 
decisions are often connected to business failure, particularly where too much leverage is 
utilized. Woodford (2015) reports on the Silver Fern Farms acquisition stating, "Then in 
the later 1990's it took a step which has arguably proved to be their long term undoing. 
It got involved in a secret campaign to invest in Hawkes Bay-based Richmond Meats, 
working towards a long term goal of majority ownership. In the process, it ran foul of 
the law. To extricate itself from an untenable position, it took over the total company in 





1.12 Thesis Structure 
This thesis's structure comprises eight chapters arranged across six parts, beginning with 
this introductory chapter, which provides an overview of why this applied business 
project was commissioned. Chapter Two begins the thesis journey with a working 
proposition. The working proposition outlines my early-stage conceptual thinking and 
brings together a broad discussion around what has been happening historically, and 
contextualizes industry realities against the New Zealand red meat industry's 
performance. 
The working proposition sets up the scope of my argument and places my view in 
today's environment. It offers the assertion that marketing myopia is likely to exist and 
prepares the reader for the subsequent chapters of this thesis. Chapter Three provides a 
literature review and critical analysis of the existing research. It assesses observable 
phenomena, such as opinions by experts like Ross Hyland (2015), who suggest the New 
Zealand red meat industry is a slow learner failing to learn the lessons, he hand f 
hi  ha  deal .  The literature review chapter also provides an academic review of 
the existing theory. 
Chapter Four sets up the applied research by framing the business question and 
hypotheses, explicitly asking whether the New Zealand red meat industry suffers from 
marketing myopia? This chapter highlights the symptoms and outlines the problem, 
essentially operationalizing the research. Chapter Five explains the multi-content method 
used to develop the results.  
Chapter Six, the results chapter, is the engine room of this thesis delivering industry 
feedback from the extensive multi-content platform. This has allowed industry insights 
to emerge after in-depth interviewing, testing core assumptions about the New Zealand 
ed mea  ind  h gh an ec i n anal i  and de l men  f he li e  m del.   
Chapter Seven extends the discussion and includes further insights and implications. 
This chapter reviews whether the responses of the multi-content research fit with a 
marketing myopia diagnosis. The chapter discusses the results in the current business 
setting, looking at a range of possible scenarios for the future of the New Zealand red 
meat industry. Chapter Seven discusses substitute and alternative protein enterprises. It 
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looks at how they have become successful when it could be argued they are, in essence, 
soybean commodity traders.  
The final chapter, Chapter Eight, demonstrates how Triple Nine Farms has endeavoured 
to apply the lessons of Levitt & Alderson (1964,1965) to build a blueprint for new 
thriving and sustainable red meat enterprises.  Chapter Eight discusses and demonstrates 
how Triple Nine Farms implemented novel approaches and offers fresh thinking about 
how-to capture premium opportunities.  
1.13 Research Value 
There is currently limited research into how marketing is deployed and leveraged in the 
New Zealand red meat industry. This may be because defining marketing theory is still 
an ongoing academic pursuit. That said, there are some common and powerful themes 
identified. For example, Hunt (1983:16) suggests, Gene al he ie  in ma ke ing ld 
explain all the phenomena within one of the four sets of fundamental explananda of 
marketing: (1) the behaviors of buyers directed at consummating exchanges, (2) the 
behaviors of sellers directed at consummating exchanges, (3) the institutional framework 
directed at consummating and/or facilitating exchanges, and (4) the consequences on 
society of the behaviors of buyers, the behaviors of sellers, and the institutional 
frame k di ec ed a  c n mma ing and/  facili a ing e change .  
The application of Levi  (1960) and Alderson's concepts will open up insights into the 
four areas identified by Hunt (1983) above, and by doing so, will add value and 
knowledge to the New Zealand red meat sector.  
1.14 Research Aims and Objectives 
This research's key objective was to identify whether or not marketing myopia could be 
detected and diagnosed in the New Zealand red meat industry. If marketing myopia 
could  be detected, the research would investigate and determine what impacts such a 
diagnosis might have on such an important export industry to New Zealand. 
The research would assess and evaluate what role the ind  distribution dynamics 
(transvection) played in securing the current levels of performance and profitability. The 
research would also explore and identify the New Zealand red meat industry's market 
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orientation, paying a  particular focus to how the sector exploited, or failed to exploit,  
heterogeneous consumer demand.  
Finally, before proceeding, I would like to thank you for your interest. Combining what 
has been very much a practical hands-on project with academic rigor has been 
challenging, particularly concerning structuring the narrative. The New Zealand red meat 
industry and the broader global red meat industry are at a crossroads. This applied 
business project aimed to make a contribution to the debate: Where to from here? 
Levitt's and Alderson's (1964,1965) theories stand behind this research and have been 
applied to the best of my ability. They have greatly enhanced my capacity to understand 
and deconstruct the New Zealand red meat industry, but the truth is, I have hardly 
touched the surface of these two unique marketing perspectives. For this reason, perhaps 





PART II:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Chapter Two:  Working Proposition: A case study contextualizing the 
   research within the New Zealand red meat industry 
   story, past, present, and future. 
 
Key Points 
x New Zealand red meat industry is small, but not yet mighty. 
x The industry was born from innovation over a century ago.  
x Time  ha e been ha d ince he   
2.1  The Context 
Imagine an industry with persistently poor profits, low levels of research and 
development, a poor track record of innovation, damaging and destructive politics, 
hubris, a lack of collaboration, significant capital constraints, few and successful value-
added initiatives. It is surrounded by industry spectators suggesting the present business 
model exhibits all the signs of a volatile, financially unstable, and even unsustainable 
future.  Imagine the same industry choosing to compete as a subsidy clean skin on the 
global stage against bigger, subsidized, competitors, with massively larger economies of 
scale, significantly deeper pockets, and more robust infrastructure located in closer 
proximity to consumers. This all takes place in a highly commodified marketplace that 
drives a relentless price war between identical competitors trying to sell the same thing, 
to the same customers, at the same time.  
Im an l , n e ha  he Ne  Zealand ed mea  ec  ima  c me  (m l  
unemotional middlemen, namely wholesalers and distributors) inhabiting this 
commodified battlefield view the product offerings presented by the competing groups 
as identical. These customers are predominantly located in export markets where the 
origin story, the primary differentiation tool the industry is attempting to leverage, is 
quickly diluted due to the players' needs in the channel. Why promote or lock your 
customer into an origin story if you might be sourcing from a different origin next week? 
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This is a world where products are traded with little or no real product differentiation or 
market segmentation, Smith (1956). This is problematic because customers who find 
themselves faced with selecting from undifferentiated products (commodities) will 
nearly always display a strong preference to purchase at the lowest possible price. Where 
would an industry structure like this ideally play, and how would they win? How would 
they escape the commodity trap? Given marketing is the primary discipline responsible 
for price and positioning in most industries, what has gone wrong here?  
To make things interesting, pretend the organization is in this situation because its 
organizational ecosystem cannot face up to a critical truth identified by Harvard 
Professor Theodore Levitt (1960) fifty-eight years ago. Levitt examined several 
impossible to fail 'growth' industries that at the time were seen as industries or sectors 
that would go on delivering outstanding growth in perpetuity. His research offered two 
key conclusions. One, guaranteed forever-growth is a delusional state-of-mind. Levitt 
identified industries that believed they were somehow connected to endless automated 
growth displayed a tendency for their leadership and management structures to miss the 
next big thing, often failing because of disruption or innovation they were unable to see 
or acknowledge. 
The second conclusion Levitt (1964:41) observed was, The ie  ha  an ind  i  a 
customer satisfying process, not a goods-producing process, is vital for all businessmen 
to understand. An industry begins with the customer and his needs, not with a patent, a 
raw material,  a elling kill.  In our example above, pretend the industry and its 
constituency has lost its marketing capability and is blinded to new opportunities as a 
result. This could present a challenging dilemma with a potentially terminal prognosis 
because how can an industry fix what it cannot, will not, or does not want to see? Levitt 
(1960) named this organizational malady Marketing Myopia. 
Of course, marketing is widely acknowledged academically as a critical asset for 
organizational success. Gross (2016) suggests, Marketing is one of the most important 
things a business can do. Not only does marketing build brand awareness, but it can also 
increase sales, grow businesses, and engage customers." Gross goes onto suggest 
marketing informs, equalizes, sustains, engages, sells, and grows an enterprise.   
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Could it be that organizations with a perceived inability to differentiate, particularly 
those operating in commodity-driven environments, have been worn down by 
commodity trading?  Have they relegated marketing to a level where it can no longer 
play an essential and influential role? Why would an organization fail to invest in 
marketing? In Levitt's (1960) examples, management's failure to invest in marketing is 
the primary reason he provides for the companies he observed and examined to fail.  
Next, imagine critical leadership, management, and shareholders are entirely aware of 
problems, such as persistent low profitability. Still, they cannot find approaches capable 
of solving the complexities trapping their industry and organizations in subpar 
performance trajectories. For example, Senge (1990:17) identified, In most companies 
that fail, there is abundant evidence in advance that the firm is in trouble. This evidence 
goes unheeded, however, even when individ al manage  a e a a e f i .  Senge 
(1990:23) also points out, Herein lies the core learning dilemma that confronts 
organizations: we learn from experiences but we never directly experience the 
consequences of many of our most important decisions. The most critical decisions made 
in organizations have systemwide consequences that stretch over years or decade .   
MIT Sloan School of Management Professor John Sherman (2002:501) also noted, 
Thoughtful leaders increasingly recognize that we are not only failing to solve the 
persistent problems we face but are, in fact, causing them." Is an organization that does 
not embrace 'adaptive learning' and evidences the inability to solve 'persistent' problems 
more likely to have succumbed to, or be suffering from, marketing myopia?   
My thesis assumes that marketing myopia is likely to explain many of the performance 
problems in organizations, particularly in the industry alluded to in this introduction. 
Still, marketing myopia does not just occur in isolation. It would appear highly likely 
that the way an organization is led, managed, and operated might increase or decrease an 
organization's susceptibility to marketing myopia.  
Collins (2001:65) famously pointed out in his fi -who, then- ha  analogy that any 
organization failing to attract, engage, and retain the human capital it requires to see, act 
on, and resolve the critical issues raised above will struggle to compete successfully. An 
organization demonstrating these shortcomings is also unlikely to post excellent financial 
results. Welcome to the New Zealand red meat industry, and welcome to my 
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examination and analysis of marketing myopia's potential presence and possible 
influence on the industry's past, present, and future performance. 
2.2  The Beginning 
Having now established the industry under investigation and the direction I have  headed 
in with my research, I will travel back in time to where it all started. It did not begin 
badly; in fact, it started brilliantly. New Zealand was on an innovation roll and leading 
the world in red meat export innovation. In 1882, the first frozen meat shipment of 5000 
carcasses left on the Dunedin bound for Britain. These shipments effectively established 
New Zealand as a world-leading innovator in frozen meat exports and set New Zealand 
farmers up to enjoy excellent returns right up until Britain joined the European 
Economic Union in 1973.   
This trading period equated to 91 years of enjoying the rewards from a red meat export 
business operating in a relatively sheltered workshop, and times were very good indeed. 
Hendy and Callaghan (2013:11) stated, Ne  Zealand  eal h a  f nded n fa ming, 
a e i  b il  n ce ed g a , i h high ice  f  ag ic l al d c  and 
g a an eed B i i h ma ke .  During these halcyon times, New Zealand's per capita 
GDP was amongst the world's highest. According to Hendy and Callaghan, Britain's exit 
from the nearly century-long relationship was one of the most significant jolts to the 
New Zealand economy in its 130-year history. From that point, everything changed, and 
New Zealand red meat farmers have been forced to ride a turbulent wave of price-taking 
commodity trading to the present day. 
The trading environment endured by red meat farmers today has thrown up numerous 
challenges, which I have  examined and addressed throughout this thesis. My primary 
objective was to understand what has caused such low returns to the nation's farmers and 
look at what can be done to improve the situation. I would initially look at these 
challenges through a multi-content research model, which would start with qualitative 
interviews of crucial red meat industry executives, personnel, and industry influencers.  
2.3  The Challenge 
Understanding what had gone wrong with a once elite industry would be challenging. 
What is a premium animal like an Aberdeen Angus worth to an individual farmer? Is it 
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$1,500 through selling to a processing company, or is it $5,000 from engaging directly 
with a red meat consumer? Are New Zealand red meat producers and processors missing 
opportunities because those responsible for red meat industry performance fail to see 
alternatives?  
Does the current level of performance reflect any impacts of marketing myopia? If it 
does, this would mean the industry has not effectively leveraged the discipline designed 
to deal with some of the performance issues the industry is facing. Marketing is critical 
to organizations because it is responsible for a company's survival on many fronts. For 
example, Ritson (2018) states, You need brand equity for differentiation, for a price 
premium, for brand loyalty and a host of other important strategic advantages. Equally 
important, without a strong brand, you are vulnerable to retailers, competitors, 
suppliers, and long-term sustainability uncer ain .  Marketing is responsible for the 
brand, and the brand is critical to organizational survival. 
These days, the New Zealand red meat industry is being forced to adapt and respond to 
increasingly difficult trading conditions. This environment is very different from the 
virtually tariff-free terms enjoyed back in the day when doing business with the mother 
country provided an exceptional and reliable revenue stream. Massey (1995:3) reported, 
In 1950, two-thirds of New Zealand's exports went to the UK, but by 1990 less than 10 
percent of total exports went to the mother country. " Ha  hi  he i age f being B i ain  
farm contributed to the sector suffering from marketing myopia?  
New Zealand does not have a history of engaging with consumers directly because it has 
not had to, and as Senge (1990) suggested, structural decisions often play out over 
extended time frames. For example, it is not a low-cost exercise to stand by and watch 
assets become stranded, so the default is to dig in and defend. Unfortunately, that 
approach often fails to be effective against shifts in consumer behaviour. Kelly (2015) 
highlights the ramifications of ignoring such shifts with a Tesco example reporting, 
Af e  ending 22 milli n n i , he c m an  ann nced he i e in Cha e i , 
Cambridgeshire, will be mothballed  one of 49 planned new  stores across the UK to be 
cancelled, i h a f he  43 e i ing le   be h  d n.  
During this research, I have investigated whether the red meat industry is being held in a 
commodity trap through potential exposure to marketing myopia. I have  also 
29 
 
investigated whether red meat farmers are imprisoned by their mythology. For example, 
What does it mean to be a man-on-the-land in New Zealand? Are farmers focused on 
their lifestyle or consumer satisfaction? Are they focused on volume or flavour? Are 
their business models extractive or regenerative? Can they see any of these things in a 
meaningful context? Are they at risk of being caught out with stranded assets like Tesco? 
What happens if animal welfare concerns drive a shift to new on-farm ethical meat 
models? 
Farmers often appear to be more or less tied to the same lifestyle-driven business models 
they have been using since the 1880s, and these traditional lifestyles potentially 
influence the performance of red meat industry cooperatives. For example, the alleged 
lack of financial commitment by red meat farmers to their cooperatives. The so-called 
'sharing-up.' Ironically, farmers do not seem to be great collaborators. They are often 
quick to abrogate themselves from any responsibility for the red meat industry's poor 
performance. The red meat industry has many moving parts, and many players, and 
understanding the roles they each play is central to understanding the challenge. 
2.4 Transition 
It should be remembered, according to the Meat Industry Association (MIA)  (2009), In 
1970 71,  87% f Ne  Zealand lamb e  ill en   B i ain.  One cannot help 
thinking some remarkable parallels are playing out in 2020. The red meat trade to China 
is aggressively promoted and touted by industry and government as an ever-growing, 
cannot-go-wrong opportunity. The same rhetoric has been relentlessly promoted by the 
country's pre-eminent commodity trader of dairy products, Fonterra, who have recently 
run into trouble with China. They are another company that often promotes the benefits 
of transitioning-to-value.  
Ne  Zealand He ald c l mni  F an O S lli an (2018) e ed, La  eek I e ha  
Fonterra had run out of lip gloss to apply to its $774 million investment in Beingmate, 
which has smoked a huge amount of cash since CEO Theo Spierings led the acquisition 
of a stake in the Chinese company three years ago and formed a joint venture with its 
cha i ma ic f nde , Sam Xie.  These types of scenarios raise potential governance 
issues, illustrate some evidence of marketing myopia, and seriously encourage industry 
observers to question whether the influence (hubris) of intelligent organizational 
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politicians is at play. As O'Sullivan points out, Fonterra ignored a report by Ward 
Associates, which suggested back in 2016 that taking a stake in Beingmate was ill-
judged. What are the organizational prerequisites for mistakes like that to be made? Is 
marketing myopia one of them?  
Unf na el , F n e a  mistakes are not isolated to its ill-judged and ill-advised 
investment in Beingmate. Oram (2019) provides a summation of some of the key issues 
currently faced by Fonterra, suggesting, F n e a  ice ag f fail e i  he hick end 
of $1 billion. The co-op announced this week write downs totalling up to $860 million, 
hich c ld e l  in a ne  l  f   $675m hi  ea . C led i h la  ea  l  f 
$192m and the risk of further write downs in China and South America, the co-op is debt 
heavy and capital light. As a result, its strategy is shot, its confidence sapped and its 
ha eh lde  a led.  Even organizations seemingly full of experts can still have trouble 
seeing clearly.  
In an ea lie  ed mea  ind  e am le, TRADENZ  Chief E ec i e, R.G.M. Christie 
(1991), suggested at a food innovation conference that, "Perhaps here we have a failure 
to answer the question (or at any rate get the right answer); "what uniquely 
differentiates our product from that of competitors? - why do people want to buy it?" The 
answer, of course, is likely to be different in different markets. But how much notice has 
the industry taken of that? The right answers would be those that provided a long-term 
competitive advantage, and the maximum nett [sic] return for New Zealand. A couple of 
ideas to consider: Most of our access problems preclude access for anything other than 
cuts of meat. Yet 40% of the world trade in meat products is consumed in manufactured 
meat products - salamis, sausages etc. - and manufacturing grade sheep meat sells for 
about half the price of beef. Should we be looking at offshore investment in smallgoods 
manufacturing, particularly if they could utilize our manufacturing grades of sheep 
mea ?  Was this the green shoots of marketing myopia showing through nearly thirty 
years ago? Interestingly, in 2020, nothing much has changed. The New Zealand red meat 
industry mostly cuts meat into bits, puts them into plastic bags, and sends them off to 
market in bulk containers. The transition to value challenge continues.  
The New Zealand red meat industry appears to demonstrate a preference for taking 
substantial bets on Chinese growth over seriously investing in the hard work of true 
consumer-driven value-added innovation. The Fonterra failure demonstrates remarkable 
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parallels to Levitt's (1960) case studies, which included looking at how marketing 
myopia contributed to the failure of a wide range of impossible-to-fail companies over a 
range of industries and sectors. For example, Levitt examined the railroad industry and 
the movie industry and discovered both had wholly missed the phenomenon that led to 
their demise. What has Fonterra missed? What has the New Zealand red meat industry 
missed? We now have some insight into Fonterra's challenges, and they were 
significantly better resourced than enterprises in the red meat industry. It would be 
interesting to know what keeps red meat executives awake at night. 
This thesis's journey started with a conversation between myself and an Aberdeen Angus 
breeder in a pub called the Gladstone Inn (The Gladdy), which opened its doors in 1871. 
This famous establishment and the Angus farm, a property with a unique century-old 
history, is situated in the South Wairarapa, a farming district just over an hour North East 
of New Zealand's capital city, Wellington. At the core of our conversation, the state of 
the New Zealand red meat industry, its processors, its low-performance in-market, and 
most concerning, its persistently low returns to farmers, even when a farmer was capable 
of producing some of the best quality beef in the world. 
Farmers have been doing it tough for a long time now. Many farmers in the industry 
have grudgingly accepted an inevitable decline in both the overall New Zealand herd and 
continued low profitability. While the farmer did acknowledge glimpses of light, his 
overall sentiment and demeanour were slanted towards the negative. His concern for the 
future of his enterprise was genuine. Would he be the last to farm the property? Would 
his legacy be selling the family farm? In 2017, this farmer was acknowledged by his 
peers for his farming prowess. He won the farmer of the year award for his region. He is 
widely acknowledged as one of the best farmers in the district. The point here is if 
excellent farmers are being challenged, what does it look like for less well-equipped 
farmers? How entrenched is this problem? 
Born and bred in Western Australia, my first job after leaving school was working on 
sizeable broad-acre wheat and sheep farms. At the time, farmers were being encouraged 
by the Commonwealth Development Bank to scale up and get big. They were buying 
into the growth story of the time. Wheat, another commodity, was the story driving this 
1980's initiative, and it did not go as planned, with many farmers being guided into large 
debt traps they would never emerge from. Many, often intergenerational farmers, ended 
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up selling their family farms as a result. These farmers included my friends and family. 
That said, it was a period of my life I loved. Western Australia in the 1970s and into the 
1980s was very farming focused. Mining had not yet dominated the landscape or the 
culture of Western Australia. 
It was perhaps, for this reason, the Wairarapa farmer's concerns around future-proofing 
struck a chord with me. I could see his Aberdeen Angus cattle were in superb condition, 
and I struggled to reconcile the value chain in my mind. The farmer was receiving 
around $5.50 per kilogram for selling his animals through either one of the two large 
processing companies. This resulted in what, to me, appeared to be an incredibly poorly 
allocated return. 
I had recently been in Australia on assignment and had paid AUD 75.00 for a 450-gram 
Cape Grim T-bone steak at Neil Perry's Rockpool restaurant in Sydney. Why is there 
such a large differential in the price between the gate and plate? What happens between 
$5.50 and $75.00 (steaks are similarly priced in top restaurants in New Zealand) to add 
$69.50 to a steak's cost? Yes, processing companies and restaurants have costs, but can 
the prices they are charging consumers be justified? Who is making all the profit?  
The quest to find out what is going on in the New Zealand red meat industry has brought 
me to this point. I have heard many anecdotes over several years from those in the red 
meat industry community about what the problems are; however, I want to begin at the 
beginning for the sake of objectivity and accuracy. I want to map some history, look at 
the industry from different perspectives, and explore the New Zealand red meat 
landscape, past, present, and future. I want to form a defensible view of how the industry 
has arrived where it has in 2020. 
Understanding the New Zealand red meat industry is a complex undertaking on 
numerous fronts. The industry has a proud and innovative past, which has morphed into 
a challenging present along with what I believe, is a potentially promising but very 
uncertain future. Many in the industry and academia have suggested my task as a 
researcher will be a daunting one. I acknowledge their input, but a very salient fact 
remains. As an industry, the red meat sector represents New Zealand's second-largest 
goods exporter.  According to the Meat Industry Association (MIA), in 2016, it 
generated NZD 6.7 billion in revenue, exported to over 120 countries, and employed 
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25,000 people across 60 locations. These numbers are significant and vital to New 
Zealand.  
Over the years, various government departments and cooperative entities within the New 
Zealand red meat industry have commissioned multiple inquiries, investigations, and 
reports into the poor performance of a key New Zealand industry. One such piece, 
Pathways to Long-term Sustainability (2015), led by Principal Advisor Ross Hyland, 
identified several key weaknesses in the New Zealand red meat industry, and his report 
supports my empirical and anecdotal references above. Other reports undertaken by 
Australian and New Zealand research specialist Coriolis in 2013 and 2017 have 
identified similar weaknesses and threats.  
2.5  A Wicked Problem 
These reports and others like them have all identified persistent problems concerning 
procurement, operational efficiency, and in-market co-operation. Analyzing the SWOT 
matrixes in the 2013 and 2017 Coriolis reports demonstrates little change over the four 
years between accounts. The slow speed to address significant issues is a red flag and 
will be explored further during this research. The slow response appears to be a hallmark 
of the industry. So, why is the red meat industry so slow to respond to challenges or 
adapt to change? Collectively, the main themes identified time after time in any 
exploration of the New Zealand red meat industry are: 
x Inefficient procurement resulting in aggressive competition for declining stock 
numbers. 
x Inefficient use of meat plants resulting in expensive and unnecessary duplication. 
x Lack of in-market co-ordination overseas. In 2015 the Alliance Chairman 
suggested there were 70 competing exporters competing with one another in-
market.  
x Inefficient demand management 
x Minimal f m ma ke  ignal .     
x Massive overproduction creates huge inventory surpluses and impacts 
profitability. 
From a working proposition point of view and relevant to assessing for marketing 
myopia, what is striking about the findings above is the elements that are missing. For 
example, how do procurement challenges, increasing competition, and inefficient use of 
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processing assets explain the apparent lack of leadership, entrepreneurship, and 
marketing? Are these three elements not related? Can the administration not see what is 
going on? 
Callagher (2015) suggests three salient points. Firstly, Callagher points out, Ine i abl , 
b ine  en i nmen  change.  This point is made concerning unrestricted markets in 
the UK disappearing in the 1970s as the UK joined the European Economic Union. What 
was happening in marketing? Secondly, Callagher highlights the critical role of 
innovation. Finally, Callagher (2015) states, The c en  b ine  m del  f  d  ck 
farmers, meat processors and distributors appear to be unsustainable in the medium and 
long- e m.  Both innovation and business model agility are directly related to marketing. 
Marketing's role is to ensure the organization adapts and responds successfully to 
increased competition, changes in consumer demands, and the inevitable disruption from 
an innovation.   
How we think about challenges and how we break them down has a lot to do with 
whether we solve them or not. Ideally, understanding how to solve complex problems 
begins with the problem-solvers understanding the big picture. Those seeking to solve 
problems are usually encouraged to adopt a broad, open, and global perspective. You 
often hear about 'fresh eyes' being useful in this situation. The big picture approach 
defines systems thinking, which is a well-proven problem-solving methodology.   
Systems thinking has its foundations in systems dynamics, a concept that originated in 
1956 by MIT professor Jay Forrester. Stroh (2020) suggests, Systems thinking is 
different from most other problem-solving tools because it takes into account the fact 
that we are a part of the system we seek to understand and influence. Therefore, 
becoming a systems thinker requires that we both learn a new methodology and develop 
a particular way of looking at the world. The system's orientation not only increases our 
ability to apply the tools but it, in turn, is strengthened when we work with them." This 
hil h  a l  e lain  he a i nale f  ing a li e  e in hi  e ea ch. 
Immersion is a useful approach to learn what is going on. For example, salespeople deal 
with competition at the coal face, which means they are likely to have the insights 
needed to address the system's faults. Faults can include consumer problems, price, and 
product and market access. It should be noted, coal face exposure to end consumers is 
often limited in the New Zealand red meat enterprises. It is limited by distance, the 
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decision to sell through intermediaries, and the sheer task of moving large volumes of 
meat.  
Effective systems thinking takes a global view and avoids being caught up in detail at the 
wrong time, which, to an extent, replicates the way marketing should work. When 
Performed well, marketing executes on the requirements of both producer and consumer. 
It does this by creating a balanced and equitably allocated transvection. This results in a 
win-win for producer and consumer. This is likely to be achieved when those responsible 
for marketing think about the big picture. In doing so, they consider the wants and needs 
of all of the parties involved. A supermarket, restaurant, or butcher cannot sell beef if no 
farmers are left to produce it. Equitable distribution and the ability to see things from 
different perspectives are part of a big picture approach. If farmers and supermarkets are 
interdependent, why do they operate in the win-lose way they do? Would not a win-win 
outcome provide a more sustainable platform? What about other partners in the supply 
chain?  
Systems thinking is seen as an excellent way to solve problems, especially when they are 
complex. Fundamentally, systems thinking is focused on understanding all of the 
touchpoints, and drivers, impacting any given problem or challenge. It seeks to 
understand complete ecosystems and whole environments. Traditional analysis, in stark 
contrast, aims to dissect and separate systems into individual components so that they 
can be studied in great detail. This could be described as myopic. Heading into too much 
detail too early comes with risk. Staying out of intimate detail until the entire system is 
fully understood, according to Forrester (2007), can enable new perspectives and new 
solutions to be generated.  
Alderson and Martin (1965:118), like Forrester, were also interested in viewing an entire 
system. Alderson and Martin's approach was to deploy transvection, suggesting, A 
transvection is in a sense the outcome of a series of transactions, but a transvection is 
more than that. The transactions as such are limited only to successive negotiations of 
exchange agreements. A transvection includes the complete sequence of exchanges, but 
it also includes the various transformations that took place along the way. The pair of 
shoes in the hands of the consumer is obviously a very different thing from the raw 
ma e ial  in he a e f na e.   
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As a red meat marketer, observing the transition of cattle from their natural state to the 
c n me  mile in a estaurant offers many possibilities. This is especially the case if 
you also view the market as heterogeneous. Providing for consumers' unique demands 
should be a strength for a small scale player like New Zealand. Why does the country's 
meat have to be sold as a commodity? Does optimizing the hook equate to optimizing 
the value creation potential of customization? 
For example, during my research, nine out of ten chefs I spoke with said they would 
prefer hogget to lamb if they had a choice. Sadly, they did not have that choice, and 
neither did the consumer. The reason given for this preference was a hogget had more 
flavour, but still retained tenderness. The best of both worlds. In mid-October 2020, a 
farmer reported, "As soon as these lambs cut their teeth, they are going from $9 per kilo 
down to $5." Many top chefs would argue that the price should increase when the lamb 
turns into a hogget. This is an example of a problem that marketing can solve. 
The New Zealand red meat landscape has been fascinating for my entrepreneurial side 
because I have seen so many opportunities not being capitalized on at present. The 
working proposition is straight forward. When a product is not differentiated (the role of 
ma ke ing) in he c n me  e e , ha  d c  i  a  i k f bec ming a c mm di . The 
lamb to hogget example above is a prime example. This is not good for farmers, profits, 
or the wider red meat community, and indeed, it does not benefit consumers either.  
2.6  Weight or flavour? 
My conversations with farmers have informed me that they are not greatly rewarded or 
incentivized to produce quality. There are some upsides to providing a premium animal 
carcass, but they are not significant. Farmers more generally talk about hook weight and 
payment per kilogram. The key production aim for many farmers was increasing an 
animal's weight, not its flavour. How did this happen? Imagine having that conversation 
with Gordon Ramsay, Neil Perry, or Walter Puck. The connection between New 
Zealand's claim to producing some of the best quality grass-fed beef in the world and 
how farmers are rewarded appears to be in dramatic conflict.  
Why does the industry not reward farmers with much better premiums for producing 
excellent produce? A premium Angus animal is not worth a lot more than a post-
production dairy cow being destroyed at the end of its productive life. How can that be? 
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Specialist beef cattle breeds in New Zealand are also relatively rare. Morrison (2017) 
reports, "The New Zealand beef industry is unique in the world, as 70% of our beef sold 
has a dairy component in its genetics. More than 80 percent of the beef we produce is 
exported overseas." This, in theory, should represent an enormous opportunity for 
specialist beef breeds to differentiate, particularly for heritage beef breeds like Aberdeen 
Angus. What has gone wrong? Where is marketing? Where are the premium brands? 
Where are the premium dollars?  
2.7  The Crying (Commodity) Game 
In the commodity game, the game the New Zealand beef industry plays, price is the 
ultimate clearance mechanism. This is hugely problematic because both farmers and 
their processors are all forced to become price takers. Early work by scholars, heavily 
influenced by the economics discipline, sought to classify products into similar groups, 
so they could be easily treated as commodities. This simplified understanding of supply 
and demand, and this is also where the belief that markets are homogeneous was born.  
Sheth, Gardner, and Garrett (1988:35) highlighted in their Commodity School of 
Marketing study that bunching similar products together seemed like a great idea at the 
time. This approach's motivation was to assist the marketing discipline to be seen as a 
more scientific pursuit and, therefore, more legitimate. In theory, the homogeneous 
classification of similar products would allow a go-to-market playbook to be developed. 
Practitioners simply needed to look up the product classification they wanted to market 
and follow the scientific marketing guidelines for successful market entry. This 
approach's elements are still discernable in the New Zealand red meat industry today, 
particularly in secondary cuts and trim.   
This was the marketing approach in the 1900s, but I cannot help but ask when it comes 
to the New Zealand red meat industry in 2020, what has changed? Seasonal production 
still drives the industry, and processors are hemmed in by the need to deal with an 
avalanche of supply. From this point, the whole industry gets locked into the 
homogeneous road to commodity trading. Farmers are driven by schedules. Processors 
are driven by hook optimization. Their downstream customers are driven by an intense 
desire to minimize what they pay, mainly because one piece of meat in a bag looks just 
like another piece of meat in a bag. Failure to differentiate has cost the New Zealand red 
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meat industry billions. More importantly, how does this system work for anyone? It 
almost appears like the system has been designed by the end-users to keep a lid on 
prices. At the risk of repetition, where are the indust  ng b and ? Whe e a e he 
ind  ma ke e ? And he e a e he ind  fi ?  
Organizations like the Coriolis Research Group have provided in-depth analysis and 
insights on numerous New Zealand industries that rely on commodity trading to reach 
consumers. For example, the timber, milk, wool, seafood, and horticulture industries. It 
is also true of the New Zealand red meat industry. There are notable exceptions. These 
include Icebreaker, 42 Below, and Whittakers; however, robust and successful export 
brands appear to be underweight compared to the New Zealand primary sector's 
dominant commodity orientation. What has motivated the overwhelming majority of 
primary producers to choose commodity trading? Where is marketing? 
As a country, New Zealand produces way more than it can consume, having a small 
population of 4.8 million people. It is widely accepted that much of what is produced is 
exported with little or no value-added component, for example, timber logs. Coriolis 
(2017:8) suggests, Fa mer-ownership and direction of aggregators of key raw material 
ing edien  f en ha e limi ed ma ke  i i n.  I believe this is very true of the New 
Zealand red meat industry because it relies heavily on commodity platforms to sell and 
lacks ideas about where, when, or how to add value. Could this be marketing myopia at 
work? Is this a hangover from being Britain's farm? Is it merely short-term thinking 
driven by the need to pay back the bank loan on the farm?  
D A eni  (2010:12) k n c mm di  a  identifies three areas worthy of further 
investigation in a red meat context. He suggests deterioration, proliferation, and 
e cala i n can all infl ence an gani a i n'  c m e i i e i i n. D A eni  c nce  
are further expanded and described through Chapter Four. Throughout this introductory 
working proposition, marketing myopia, as a potential contributor to poor red meat 
sector performance has remained ominously relevant. 
Continuing to eke out an existence trading potentially world-class produce through a 
commodity platform does not make sense. If consumers cannot differentiate between one 
product and another product, they will automatically default to selecting the product 
offering the lowest price. This may suit massive volume commodities like iron ore and 
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coal, but it is not a great environment to rely on, if for example, you are the producer of 
world-class Aberdeen Angus.   
The significance of differentiation is not new knowledge. Smith (1956:6) suggested, 
The literature of both economics and marketing abounds in formal definitions of 
product differentiation. From a strategy viewpoint, product differentiation is securing a 
measure of control over the demand for a product by advertising or promoting 
diffe ence  be een a d c  and he d c  f c m e ing elle .  As commodity 
platforms are cleared by price, he  d n  gene all  ffe  he be  e ns on 
differentiation effort. Smith (1956:5)  believed, P d c  diffe en ia i n and ma ke  
segmentation are both consistent with the framework of imperfect competition. In its 
simplest terms, product differentiation is concerned with the bending of demand to the 
ill f l .  
In the New Zealand red meat industry, reflecting on demand and supply could prove 
useful, particularly with regard to considering heterogeneous demand and imperfect 
markets. This of course is the opposite view to Neo-classical economists, who build 
models assuming perfect competition. For example, Ross (2019) reports, The cientific 
me h d e i e  i la ed a iable  and e ing  e ca ali . Ec n mi  can  
possibly isolate individual variables in the real world, so they make assumptions to 
c ea e a m del i h me c n anc .  The problem of course, is many of their scenarios 
are likely to prove imaginary.  
According to Andrén-Sandberg (2018), the commodity game was kick-started by the 
industrial revolution and gained traction throughout the 20th Century and during the early 
part of the 21st Century. Andrén-Sandberg believes this dynamic has culminated in what 
i  n  being efe ed  a  Peak C mm di , hich he e  cc ed in 2011. He 
suggests this peak may have been formed from the low growth environment created 
around the world by the financial and economic fallout from the global financial crisis. 





 Figure 2.0: The visual demonstrates economic GDP output doubling at different growth rates. 
A 6% growth rate implies an 18-fold increase in economic output over 50 years, while a 2% 
growth rate implies a relatively modest doubling of economic output.  
Source: (2018) Commodities Pricing and the Bulk Trap. 
 
Andrén-Sandberg (2018:14) reports, Regardless the cause of the bubble bursting, there 
were plenty of investment firms, funds, and individuals who suffered substantial losses by 
investing in commodities before the boom, just to see their investments eroded as prices 
collapsed. Another obvious loser of the collapse was the industry extracting or 
producing commodities, which had anticipated elevated prices levels and demand for 
years to come, and had thus pursued investment decisions according to those business 
assumptions which turned out to be fla ed.  This thinking is supported by Senge (1990), 
who recognized that significant investment decisions demonstrated their consequences 
over time. The anticipation of elevated price levels in the New Zealand red meat industry 
may explain the New Zealand red meat industry's communication around capital intense 
programs. Is this evidence of red meat enterprises expecting elevated price levels? If it is, 
then it also provides evidence for marketing myopia existing. 
Andrén-Sandberg (2018:21) suggests, The inherent problem with commodities is that 
the indistinguishability of the goods is largely an illusion, conjured since the end 
customers are unable to fully comprehend all parts of the goods inherent traits. If the 
customers could see next to the store window how the diamond for sale has been mined, 
or in which manner the meat at the butcher shop was raised, then there would arguably 
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be a diffe en ia i n in ice  f  he ed c mm di .  Alderson (1965) recognized 
this issue in depth when he developed his theory of transvections. His work in the 1960s 
provides marketers with an incentive to understand all parts of the good's inherent traits 
to create differentiation. Levitt (1960) would argue you could also use the same 
knowledge to create 'customer satisfactions', which is one aim of differentiation.    
2.8  Where to Next? 
According to Andrén-Sandberg (2018) and his latest research, the super cycle for 
commodities is over. If this is true, and after digesting Andrén-Sandberg's recent book on 
the subject, there are now new strategic questions that require answers. For example, 
which business is the New Zealand red meat industry really in?  Perhaps the New 
Zealand red meat industry could position as a luxury food products business.  
Prime cuts to premium red meat lovers, by-products to high-end cosmetic and fashion 
companies, and hides to Rolls Royce vehicles and luxury furniture designers. What 
happens if low global growth rates persist? Will China maintain its consumption 
trajectory? Are New Zealand farmers investing in farming approaches that will help 
make their enterprises future-proof? How do they shield their operations from 
catastrophic losses? How will the externality costs of producing red meat play out once 
transparency becomes weaponized through Blockchain innovations? What happens when 
the consumer can finally see what is going on? 
Where do New Zealand red meat farmers play now, and how do they win? Is their 
current business model sustainable, and for how long? What is the role of marketing in 
the red meat industry's future? Will we now see a proliferation of poorly marketed red 
meat brands all shouting their direct farmer credentials from the rooftops? Are farmers 
and processors ready to race each other to the bottom? Can price-taking morph into price 
destruction? While all of this red meat repositioning takes place, how will consumers 
react? What do they want from their red meat producers in the future? How will the 
future impact the red meat industry? One thing is for sure, marketing myopia is not an 
affliction the New Zealand red meat industry needs now.   
Winning the commodity game requires operational excellence, economies of scale, and 
above all, efficiency. For example, the low cost of land has been a traditional advantage 
New Zealand farmers have enjoyed. Those costs, compliance costs, and environmental 
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costs are rising, making the New Zealand farmer less efficient per kilogram of red meat 
produced. Future success in the commodity world will require the expertise and mindsets 
of people who can thrive in these brutally defining, competitive, capital intense, and 
transactional environments.   
In this world, even one percent can be a significant number. It is into this dynamic, New 
Zealand's red meat farmers have been supplying their production, and in this crowded 
trading space, the price has been calling the shots. Unfortunately, due to a lack of 
differentiation, global consumers do not always show a preference for New Zealand 
farmers' animals. This results in New Zealand farmers becoming price takers with little 
or no control over the price their animals are sold for. 
On the flip side, as previously mentioned, animals provided for sale are not always of the 
highest quality either, with farmers arguing they do not receive enough of a premium to 
warrant the additional effort and cost of raising super-premium animals. This prevalent 
attitude adds to New Zealand red meat marketers' challenge, and frankly, what is the 
point when most of the production is destined for the grinding market or is sold to 
intermediaries?  
During this applied business project, transvection analysis has tracked the financial flow 
from the cattle in the farmer's paddock to the end consumer. This has identifed exactly 
where the highest returns are being generated and pinpointed which enterprises are 
receiving them. This has directly assited clearing up any marketing myopia because the 
hot spots for revenue generation across the transvection are likely to be the best places to 
invest in marketing. Chapter Six, the results chapter, will address this in-depth.  
New Zealand farmers and their cooperatives are trying to compete in a game where they 
have a significant disadvantage due to their small size.  New Zealand supplies less than 
one percent of the global volume of beef traded in the beef sector, and even premium 
breeds like Aberdeen Angus are suffering from declining numbers. This is creating a 
challenging space for farmers to operate a successful commodity trading business. How 
can you win if you do not call the shots? And how can you call the shots if consumers 
think you are simply another one, just like the other one. So, what is the answer?   
Farmers know what the problem is. They can see it in their low returns. Processing 
companies feel the pressure too. Their Annual Reports reflect the downstream impacts of 
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commodity trading. What has not been so obvious is the way out. Better marketing is 
highly likely to be the answer.  Yes, some promotional initiatives are going on. One 
farmer provided me with a dozen cooperative brochures the other day, which he seemed 
at a loss to explain. They were expensively produced too, and some advertising agency, 
who knows how to charge a premium, has done very well. Most of the promotional 
material I examined appeared to be more directed at farmers than consumers, which was 
very strange. At its best, it was promoting farmers to themselves, and at its worst, it 
pretended New Zealand farmers had invented grass. Is this inwards focus on promoting 
themselves to farmers, evidence of marketing myopia at work in large cooperatives? Is it 
an attempt to shore up procurement? What is going on?  
These are complex questions with many moving parts, and there is unlikely to be one 
obvious answer. Future success seems more likely to come from choosing the right 
overall strategic direction. I think the words collegiate, collaborative, and cooperative 
will also play an essential role in the future. The New Zealand red meat industry is 
crying out for a red meat version of Jeremy Moon, Icebreaker's founder. The industry 
needs a robust and visionary leader to cut through all the red tape and politics. 
This applied business project was designed to define, assess, and develop various options 
to help farmers escape the commodity trap. What we now know from Andrén-
Sandbe g  (2018) ecen  e ea ch i  he g lden age f c mm di  ading ha  m  
likely come and gone. There may be some argument over timing, but many of the 
world's commoditized products are now headed for de-commoditizing. Look at energy, 
look at transport and look at retail, particularly supermarkets. The consumer landscape is 
changing in front of our eyes. 
Andrén-Sandberg (2018) argues that the dominant technology in the last century has 
changed. Since the industrial revolution, advances in manufacturing and production have 
driven the rise and rise of commodities to the point where consumers have been 
completely disconnected from where things are made, how things are made, and where 
they come from. This includes food. Up until now, most consumers did not think too 
deeply about their meat purchasing decision. Their decision began and ended in the 
supermarket. This is because there is a massive lack of transparency in the supply chain, 
much of it deliberate. The consumer simply cannot see where their meat is coming from. 
Supermarkets tend to hijack labelling preventing strong brands from emerging and 
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pushing the farmer stories they do not own and control into the background. There are 
some exceptions, but they are rare.  It must also be remembered that many decisions like 
what meat to buy are low-involvement decisions for many consumers, and this opens up 
a world of opportunity for all sorts of claims, many of them seemingly harmless but 
deliberately misleading. 
Talking with supermarket executives, owners, or employees about where their beef 
comes from was revealing because they cannot usually go beyond their immediate 
supplier. It would be an interesting exercise to track some of the supermarket beef and 
lamb meat offered back to its origin. I think there would be some surprises for 
consumers, and what happens when all this changes? Could de-commoditisation be the 
beginning of an entirely new ball game, a completely new era? The way meat goes to 
market in the future could change dramatically.  
New ideas like craft beef and new lifestyle niches (low and slow cooking, cold and hot 
smoking, competition BBQ, and craft charcuterie) are emerging, and value-added 
initiatives (premium food processing offerings) are ramping up. New Zealand is yet to 
embrace them fully, but the trends are here and growing. New Zealand, by default, is one 
of the most perfectly positioned countries on the planet to take advantage of these new 
trends and opportunities. They may offer a lifeline to battling red meat enterprises.  Of 
course, that is, if they can see them. Levitt's (1960) seminal work on marketing myopia 
suggests if they are not looking, they may not.  
The Internet of Things is underpinning new technologies in this century, and a vital 
ingredient of this technology is knowledge sharing and transparency. These two elements 
create a seismic shift in consumer behaviour as consumers finally discover the real story 
and truths behind the products they are buying. This means things will get interesting, 
particularly in the red meat sector. For example, the externalities of products are now 
being highlighted.  
Using cheap labour is not cool; damaging the environment is not acceptable. How an 
animal is raised, where it was raised, and who raised it will become more important to 
consumers, particularly those with the means to buy premium food and beverage. The 
momentum behind this movement is already making itself felt. The way consumers are 
choosing to purchase products is changing rapidly. Red meat is unlikely to be impervious 
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to these changes. Many products, including red meat, are now primed to enter a de-
commoditization cycle, which means differentiation will become incredibly important.  
Differentiation is back on the agenda, and learning how to fully leverage this opportunity 
to build a strong and powerful niche beef brand is what this research is focused on. Mary 
Shelman (2010) Director Agribusiness Program, Harvard University has lectured in New 
Zealand, and she suggests, A brand is an established reputation with a customer. It is 
an asset in three ways: customers are willing to pay more for a brand compared to an 
unidentified product, customers are more willing to stick with their favourite brands 
even in the face of innovative products from competitors, and customers are more willing 
to try innovative products from a favoured b and.  Besides, a brand's reputation will be 
forged by how it faces up to new levels of transparency. To remain competitive in the 
future, it is likely New Zealand red meat enterprises will need to invest much more in 
both human and financial capital in the marketing function. Smart companies will 
recognize and accept that marketing is a primary income centre, not a primary cost 
centre.  
There is so much history and hot debate surrounding the red meat industry's performance 
that it represents a real challenge, and it's one that needs to be grappled with to solve. 
Shaun Hendy (2013:222) called the last chapter of his and Si  Pa l Callaghan  j in  
publication, A Last Voyage, out of respect to Sir Paul passing away in 2012. Hendy 
writes, "Adventure is not just about backpacks and combi vans, it is also about the 
businesses we start and the national challenges we accept. We need to become more 
comfortable with trying new things and with governments that take risks. We must build 
greater diversity in our economy and not always back the things that will deliver the 
greatest short- e m g h.  It is with this spirit at my back that I pursue the goals of 
this applied research project. My objective was to make a difference to the New Zealand 
red meat industry, for red meat-loving consumers, and for the country that has enabled 
me to fully explore my potential.  
My aim for this research was to investigate why the New Zealand red meat industry has 
performing so poorly. Is it because red meat enterprises cannot see what is changing and 
why? Is it because leadership was lacking? Was it something else, or can the industry's 
endemic poor performance be linked to a significant under-investment in, and under-
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utilization of, marketing? Does the New Zealand red meat industry suffer from 
marketing myopia? My working propositions are as follows: 
1. Marketing myopia can be diagnosed with behavioural observation? (Y/N?)  
2. Marketing myopia can be diagnosed by outcome observations via quantitative 
secondary analysis that, in this case, are consistent with proposition one. (Y/N?) 
3. These outcomes are not an automatic outcome of the New Zealand red meat 






Chapter Three: Applied Literature Review on Marketing Myopia 
Key Points 
x C ome  ma ke ing  inno a ion epea   
x The Irish collaborate, Kiwis work alone. 
x Elephants cannot get down mouseholes.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1  Critical Literature: Marketing Myopia - The Big Idea 
The most relevant literature to marketing myopia is derived from the theory's originator, 
Theodore Levitt (1960). Levitt (1960:138) suggested, Sustained growth depends on 
how broadly you define your business and how carefully you gauge your customers' 
need .  Harvard Business Review (1960:138) stated, "The article is as much about 
strategy as it is about marketing, but it also introduced the most influential marketing 
idea of the past half-century: that businesses will do better in the end if they concentrate 
on meeting customers' needs rather than on selling products. "Marketing Myopia" won 
he McKin e  A a d in 1960.  
 Levitt's (1960) idea was well received at the time, and many suggested its success was 
due to its ability to bridge the gap between academia and business. The writing style in 
this thesis, within the confines of its academic grounding, will attempt to emulate 
Le i  ea   ead i ing le  b ine  e le can ea il  dige  i . The  a e he 
primary target market for this research. 
Levitt credited many others for providing the DNA strands to secure his theory, and he 
viewed his article as a narrative built on the shoulders of his colleagues and others. For 
example, he was a close friend of Peter Drucker. He respected other marketing 
luminaries, such as Wroe Alderson (1965), who developed the concept of transvection, 
the other pivotal concept underpinning this research.  Alderson and Martin (1965:118) 
suggested, "A transvection is, in a sense, the outcome of a series of transactions, but a 
transvection is obviously more than that." 
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Alderson's theory was a vision for a complete distribution system, which he referred to 
as a marketing provisioning system. These concepts aimed at understanding consumers 
are directly related to preventing marketing myopia. Alderson also produced many other 
marketing concepts such as postponement, heterogeneous markets, and information 
exchange. Alderson (1948) was an early pioneer in the marketing discipline and 
proactive in defining it. Alderson and Cox (1948:137) proposed, C n ic  in he 
professional study of marketing in recent years has been a lively and growing interest in 
the theory of marketing, i.e., the general or abstract principles underlying the body of 
fac  hich c m i e hi  field.  That lively and growing interest continues to this day. 
The ele ance f Alde n  hinking  ma ke ing m ia c me  f m i  ig  
pursuit to understand the consumer, and not only the consumer, but the consumer's 
comprehensive environment. Alderson was the polar opposite of myopic. He was long-
sighted.  
Since the 1960s, other marketing scholars have been stretching, expanding, and 
innovating Levitt's original idea. One of the more interesting comes from Richard, 
Womack, and Allaway (1992:65), who suggest, "Since its introduction, much has been 
written on the various aspects of Marketing Myopia. It appears that Marketing Myopia 
pertains to several types of narrow-mindedness. The purpose of this article is to organize 
he e  f Ma ke ing M ia in a cla ifica i n cheme.  Figure 3.0 below identifies 
four new types of myopia. 
 




Richard et al. (1992) believe firms with Classic Myopia are production orientated and do 
not invest in significant marketing resources. Richard et al. (1992:67) report, The  
possess a single-industry perspective, being concerned only with the actions and 
reactions of immediate competitors. Management is inbred, and since managers 
consider their industry-unique, they are unwilling to learn from firms in other 
ind ie .  Competitive myopia is described by Richard et al. (1992) as another limited 
approach.  This approach does leverage marketing, but it does so in a limited fashion and 
a egie  a e limi ed  me-  a ache  imila   c m e i . Schlitz Brewing 
was presented as an example of a firm with Competitive Myopia. Richard et al. 
(1992:70) conclude, In hi  e a f gl bal c m e i i n, he ake  a e en m . 
Companies affiliated with Marketing Myopia lack vision and impose strategic limitations 
n hem el e .   
Marnali and Diderich (2017:11) support this theme and suggest, Le i  em ha i e  he 
im ance f making he c me  cen al  he c m an  b ine  lan. He ged 
organizations to think about what the customer wants and needs  revolutionary advice 
at a time when companies focused on their products rather than their customers; the 
consensus was that if products were good enough they would sell themselves, and if they 
did n  ell hem el e , hen ad e i emen  ld ell hem.  
Johnston (2009:144) moves the concept of myopia forward and also widens its use 
stating, In an ec em f ne k gani a i n  he ca abili  e  f a fi m i  
potentially broadened through access to external competences and new ideas for value 
creation may be more readily generated. That potential may never be realized if a highly 
bounded concept of a firm is held by its senior management that results in cognitive 
m ia.  I  i  clea  f m he li e a e, he DNA f Le i  (1960) iginal c nce  
continues to reverberate through the minds of marketing academics and practitioners. Its 
usefulness remains undeniable.  
3.1.2 The Importance of Marketing 
Gallo (2016) states, "Every year, a large majority of product launches fail. There's 
debate about exactly what percentage  some say it is 75%, others claim it's closer to 
95%. Regardless of which number is right, there is no doubt that a lot of time and energy 
goes into marketing products that will no longer exist in a year. Why is this? Some of the 
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failures are likely attributable to the fact that many company leaders, including 
executives, have what's called marketing myopia a near-sighted focus on selling 
products and service , a he  han eeing he big ic e  f ha  c n me  eall  
an .  
During my 35-year career, I have worked in sales, marketing, strategy, management, 
engineering, and consulting. This zigzag career path led me via an engineering project 
eventually, to Christchurch, where I took on this applied research project. As an 
entrepreneur with a management consulting background, I have learned fixing a problem 
requires you to fully understand the problem first, no matter what the problem is. This 
requires the ability to see the problem with clarity. To achieve this, you need space, time, 
money, expertise, and willingness to view the situation from multiple dimensions and 
perspectives. The problem solver must also be capable of distilling the essence of the 
problem. This means filtering out any 'white noise' and allowing the necessary non-
sanitized information to flow through to the problem solver. In the case of this research, 
my focus is on marketing.  
Ili , O ji , and Damnjan i  (2014:34)  he c i icality of marketing, suggesting, 
N ada , he e m inn a i n mean  n  nl  a ignifican  im emen  in ce  
and product technology, but it refers more to the innovation process in the field of 
h man e ce , e eciall  in ma ke ing managemen .  The echoes from the past can 
be heard emanating from the work of Drucker (1958), Alderson (1965), and Levitt 
(1960). Their contributions remain highly relevant today, and scholar after scholar stand 
on their shoulders echoing the importance of harnessing the marketing function.  
3.1.3 Seeing Clearly 
To see and hear the customer Levitt (1960) suggests, the first question to ask is: what 
business are we in? John Deighton, the Harold M. Brierley Professor of Business 
Administration Emeritus at Harvard Business School, supports Le i  a ach and 
marketing myopia theory. When interviewed by Amy Gallo in 2016, Deighton suggested 
the next question should be: what are we doing for the customer? 
Another preeminent marketing scholar Bagozzi (1975), developed a body of work 
understanding how marketing exchanges are responsible for delivering equitable and 
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profitable outcomes to both producers and end consumers or, in this business project's 
case, farmers and consumers of world-class beef. Priem (1992) supports this line of 
thinking, reminding us that Alderson (1965) had earlier proposed ideas around the 
importance of heterogeneity of supply and demand.  
Priem (1992) reminds us that heterogeneity formed a core pillar of Aldersonian 
marketing thought, which was coupled to his ideas of transaction and transvection as 
units of analysis. They joined organized behaviour systems and sorting to form the 
components of an efficient and effective marketing system. A  he c e f Alde n  
(1957) marketing philosophy is the concept of information exchange.  
D'Aveni's (2010) work on commodity traps demonstrates possible connections to 
marketing myopia as commodification can result from inattention as it was in Harley 
Davidson's case. D'Aveni's work shows there are other influences aside from marketing 
myopia that can adversely impact businesses. When organizations fail to respond to 
consumers' signals, no matter what the cause, problems, often sales problems emerge, 
and organizations can find themselves embedded in a commodity trap. Harley Davidson 
(expanded in Market Orientation section below) is a recent example of an organization 
with a premium offering succumbing to commoditization impacts. 
Escaping commodity traps comes from seeing things clearly, and the effort required is 
challenging n e ce . D A eni (2010) de c ibe  in de ail h   g  ab  hi  
'extractive' process. He provides comprehensive and tested exit strategies for three 
different types of commoditized markets, which he categorizes by the impacts causing 
he c mm di i a i n. D A eni (2010) efe   he e ca eg ie  a  de e i a i n, 
escalation, and proliferation. Levitt's (1965) theory of marketing myopia has also clearly 
demonstrated numerous times across diverse industry sectors that when marketing 
myopia is present, these 'extractive' opportunities are often missed and on many 
occasions at significant cost. 
3.2 The Irish Context 
According to Teagasc (2020), the Agriculture and Development Authority in Ireland, 
The ag i-f d ec  in I eland in 2016 gene a ed 7% f g  al e added ( 13.9 
billi n), 9.8% f I eland  me chandi e e  and ided 8.5% f na i nal 
em l men .  Add in the upstream inputs such as marketing and value-added 
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processing, and the agri-food industry generates nearly 10% of all employment. The 
primary sector in Ireland, just like it is in New Zealand, is essential.   
Oram (2019) writes, "For decades, Irish farmers, scientists, and politicians have flocked 
to New Zealand to learn how we farm so well. They saw us as global leaders." That was 
then. Now, in 2020, there is an argument that things have changed. It would appear the 
Irish Agri-food industry has been more proactive in dealing with the farming challenges 
of our time, particularly when it comes to successfully grappling with climate change. 
Oram (2019) states, On M nda , I i h fa me  fea ed minen l  in hei  c n  
launch of its response to he gl bal clima e c i i .  
Back in New Zealand, Oram (2019) reports, In a k c n a ,  fa m leade , and he 
li ician  he  , kee  c ming  i h i  ea n  h  he  han , can  
and n  ac .  This prevalent New Zealand attitude risks sullying the country's up to 
now stellar reputation for food and beverage exports. This is particularly so when the 
country's industry leaders and government delay taking more urgent action concerning 
methane producing animals, particularly those in the dairy sector.  Red meat and dairy 
animals have been identified as significant contributors to the global climate challenge.   
Ireland's unique response mechanism, vision, and implementation strategy are housed in 
its innovative Origin Green program. The initiative provides a cross-sector, collaborative 
approach to marketing Ireland's environmental credentials. In the context of this 
research, the project shines a light on the criticality of marketing. The Irish have heard 
the voice of the consumer, and this comes through the narrative behind Origin Green. 
Bell and Shelman (2010:8) stated in their report that, A brand is an established 
reputation with a customer. It is an asset in three ways: customers are willing to pay 
more for a brand compared to an unidentified product, customers are more willing to 
stick with their favourite brands even in the face of innovative products from 
competitors, and customers are more willing to try innovative products from a favoured 
b and.  This inclusion supports the importance of marketing and shows how it can be 
fused with very traditional industries to future proof earnings and livelihoods. This is 
critical to both Irish and New Zealand futures.  
Of specific interest to marketing myopia, Oram (2019) asks, "So, how did Ireland usurp 
our leadership as a global leader in dairy farming?" His answer was, "Because almost 
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all our farming leaders  individuals and organizations  choose to be oblivious to the 
world's climate crisis, their role in contributing to it, and their responsibilities for it." 
RethinkX (2020), a global thinktank, escalates the urgency of a response suggesting, By 
2030, demand for cow products will have fallen by 70%. Before we reach this point, the 
US cattle industry will be effectively bankrupt. By 2035, demand for cow products will 
have shrunk by 80% to 90%. Other livestock markets such as chicken, pig, and fish will 
follow a similar trajectory." 
It would appear the Irish have heard the warning bells. They are taking action via the 
Origin Green program. At the same time, New Zealand seems to be still grappling with 
how to respond, with some of the sector's leaders persistently arguing that a dramatic 
response is not required. They appear to be more supportive of what is sometimes 
referred to as tinkering at the margins. For example, Joy (2020) reports, Ne  Zealand  
government has been praised for listening to health experts in its pandemic response, but 
hen i  c me   dealing i h ll i n f he c n  a e a , cien ific ad ice 
seems le  im an .   
T  man , Re hinkX  e i n f e en  i  c nf n ing. Thei  e ea ch da a i  e en i e, 
developed by a large group of highly qualified individuals, and hard to refute. Their 
messages are tough to hear. For example, RethinkX states, We a e on the cusp of the 
fa e  dee e , m  c n e en ial di i n f ag ic l e in hi .  New Zealand 
does not seem to be successfully downloading the app on climate response.  
Thinking ahead of the curve back in 2010, Bord Bia engaged Professor David Bell and 
Mary Shelman of Harvard Business School to help the Irish agri-food industry grapple 
i h he f e. The ini ia i e a  called Pa h a   G h  and a  i al  he 
establishment of Origin Green. Bell and Shelman (2010:2) state, B d Bia engaged us 
to conduct a high-level assessment of export opportunities for the Irish food and drink 
ind . The emi e a  ha  a f e h e  f e e  migh  ide a ne  e ec i e n 
a h a  f  g h e  he ne  h ee  fi e ea .  In 2020, the results of ten years 
of hard work are paying off. The program now has 53,000 farms and 320 leading Irish 




In a strategy background paper available online,  Bord Bia's 2025 Agri-Food Strategy 
highlighted the importance of developing an overarching brand. It explained the 
development process as multi-stranded and complex, with strategic thinking focused on 
unlocking the brand's essence and values. This demonstrates the utilization and 
integration of marketing into the Irish approach. This default setting was not intrinsic at 
the beginning. Bell and Shelman (2010:3) discovered that a lack of consumer orientation 
was a top-three issue in their early research findings. They stated, "Most Irish food 
exports are sold as commodities or on a business-to-business basis (as food ingredients 
or for private labels), but either way, Irish firms have little contact with the end 
consumer in foreign markets. There are few customer-facing managers with the power to 
move the industry, or even a non-trivial portion of it, in the right direction." Escaping the 
commodity trap was a key challenge for the Irish agri-food sector and the Origin Green 
program.  Ireland appears (with the help of Bell, Shelman, and many others) to have 
embraced the importance of marketing as a critical means of escape. New Zealand so far 
has failed to create or develop a similar unified response. 
Perhaps tellingly, Oram criticizes a recent primary sector policy document, which was 
launched proudly by the leader of the opposition at Fieldays in 2019. The paper 
contained, according to Oram (2019), hi  age  f la i h h  and ac  
content, of which two pages were devoted to climate change and one to hor e acing.  It 
would appear that the Irish are ahead by more than a nose.  
3.3 Market Orientation 
It is highly relevant when researching marketing myopia and discussing research in the 
New Zealand red meat industry to include market and brand orientation concepts. The 
strength of their presence could provide support for the presence of marketing myopia or 
evidence to refute its existence. Urde, Baumgarth, and Merrilees (2013:13) suggest, 
Brand orientation is an inside-out, identity-driven approach that sees brands as a hub 
for an organization and its strategy. Similarly, market orientation is an outside-in, 
image-d i en a ach.  They go on to suggest that each concept can act in synergy 
with the other. This is potentially a useful thinking platform for this research. 
Interestingly, as far back as 1993, Jaworski and Kohli (1993:54) reported, In d ced in 
the early 1950s, the marketing concept (the philosophical foundation of a market 
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orientation) represents a cornerstone of marketing thought (see Borch 1957; McKitterick 
1957).  They go onto discuss the lack of research into the concept at the time. The 
timeline is fascinating because the concepts of marketing myopia (Levitt 1960) and 
transvection (Alderson 1965) were being created during the same period. Perhaps this 
was because the early wins in post-war consumerism were waning? By this stage, the 
Madison Avenue firms in New York's creative precinct were in full swing. There may be 
some clues here.     
Atuahene-Gima (1996:93) points out, "Several scholars describe the marketing concept 
as a form of organizational culture." This construct would tend to be supportive of 
Levitt's (1960) assertion that marketing myopia when present, is derived from a top-
down influence. This is well supported by a unified belief that leadership is influential in 
establishing, supporting, and directing organizational culture and its critical sub-systems.    
Even a famous motorcycle company like Harley-Davidson can fall victim to cultural 
challenges and a myopic mindset. Their famous enterprise has been commoditized by 
deterioration, a market environment where prices and benefits go down for example, 
Zara's deferred fashion model. In Zara's case, postponement strategy and finely tuned 
distribution dynamics are deployed to make their 'fast fashion' business very disruptive 
and effective. D'Aveni (2010) described the Harley-Davidson phenomenon as the 
commoditization of a classic. D'Aveni (2010:130) links marketing and commoditization 
through price-benefit analysis and what he calls mapping the market. The aim of the 
approach D'Aveni (2010:129) suggests, is understanding,  "The fact is, commoditization 
is not going away soon. Pragmatic executives learn to live with it. Smart executives will 
use it to their advantage." 
The key to the Harley and Zara examples above is their market orientation. Harley, a 
successful company since the early 1900s, had subliminally entered an environment 
where their market driving culture has allowed competitors room to move. Their 
business model was disrupted by custom offerings encroaching on Harley's traditional 
customers, reducing their market share.  In Zara's case, they were the disruptor and were 
very much market-driven. Their business model was making luxury fashion design 
accessible to the masses. In both cases, continued success relies on marketing. 
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Embracing another line of inquiry, Randhawa, Wilden, and Gudergan (2020) conducted 
a longitudinal research project that examined the differences between market-driving 
business models and market-driven business models. I believe this concept could be 
useful for assessing the New Zealand red meat industry's market orientation. A market-
driving orientation is more likely to support the presence of marketing myopia. 
Randhawa et al. (2020:1) suggest, De igning a b ine  m del i  n  a ne-off process; 
adjustments are often required. To create such adjustments and realize business model 
inn a i n, fi m  e i e he de l men  f d namic ca abili ie .  Their research 
specifically investigated the enterprise's market orientation against its ability to innovate 
its business model. This inquiry line is relevant and, in some ways, travels in parallel to 
Levitt's (1965) concept. For example, how an organization downloads and leverages 
information derived from consumers is relevant to their orientation. That knowledge 
applies to form a diagnosis of marketing myopia.    
Awareness of market orientation can be a subliminal mindset as a research project into 
Norway's Red King crab export business demonstrated. Voldnes, Kvalvik, and Nøstvoild 
(2020:1) conducted research that provided evidence of disparities between exporter and 
consumer thought. They reported, "The results reveal that the resource is not optimally 
handled due to lack of market orientation and the sellers have several misperceptions of 
their behavior and the buyers' satisfaction with their behavior. The disparities are 
explained by examining the complexity of the market orientation for small, nature-based 
value chains in the context of cross-cultural trading." This Norwegian experience 
demonstrates the relevance of market orientation to this research project. Do the key 
players in the New Zealand red meat industry form an accurate perception of how 
downstream processors view the red meat offers they are receiving?  
3.4 Resource-Based Assets 
Galbreath (2005:979) suggests, "The resource-based view of the firm (RBV) is one of the 
most important areas of research content to emerge in the field of strategic management 
in the last decade. The RBV posits that a firm's success is largely driven by resources 
that possess certain special characteristics." Figure 3.1 below depicts a resource 
portfolio. It demonstrates that some assets are tangible, and some assets are intangible. 
The visual also highlights the separate categorization of assets and skills. This is 
57 
 
arguably an essential element to understand as there are some interdependencies. For 
example, the skill level may impact the value of the resource-based assets, mainly when 
they are intangible and tied to the strength of existing relationships in-market. 
 
Figure 3.1: An Organisational Resource Portfolio. (Source: Galbraith 2005) 
The resource-based assets viewpoint aligns with thinking about marketing myopia 
because an organization that is focused on curating resource-based assets is more likely 
to be immune to marketing myopia.  
3.5 In the Real World: A Systems Approach 
Alderson (1965) suggested Functionalism (a school of marketing theory) asked two 
crucial questions: How does the system work? How can the system be made to work 
better? In essence, that is what this business project is attempting to achieve. Alderson's 
(1965) functionalist approach sits well with my aims for this business research project 
because it aims to extract knowledge and to learn from diverse sources, as does my 
research. I believe utilizing a multi-content approach will help me understand the 
complete ecosystem between producers and final consumers. This will help me test for 
the presence of marketing myopia in the New Zealand red meat industry.  
Anecdotal feedback, along with empirical research to date, suggests that marketing 
myopia may exist in the New Zealand red meat industry. The lack of consistent and 
sustained success in high-value export markets is reflected in the annual reports of key 
industry players like Silver Fern Farms and Alliance. The results reported reflect poor 
performance over the previous decade.  
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Success in premium markets is derived from, and supported by, strong in-market selling. 
This is guided by effective marketing and is less likely to be achieved if an organization, 
or an industry, is suffering from marketing myopia. University of Otago's Dr. Robert 
Hamlin suggested, I think that what we are finding out here is that size and high value-
added in the chain are incompatible. This is the problem the big processors are facing. 
The elephant can get through the first portal but is then looking at a distribution system 
that branches continuously and ends up in a million mouseholes. This may be 
addressable by dividing the co-op marketing/sales force up into smaller autonomous 
teams  The mouseholes may remain inaccessible, but the foxholes won't be."  
What Hamlin means here is large organisations like red meat processors are likely to be 
inhibited by their inherent organisational structure. They are simply too big to 
successfully reach many high value opportunities. The reference to marketing myopia 
here is contained in a proposition that larger entities are likely to be less able to see rich 
veins of opportunity, because their requirements to sell volume stampedes across this 
aspiration. For example, we hear about transitioning to value a great deal. Evidence of it 
occurring is harder to find, and the schedule payments to farmers have at best 
demonstrated incremental movement.   
This is a very insightful comment and c me  f m Hamlin  dee  kn ledge f how 
meat purchasing decisions are made in the sector. This line of thinking ties in with the 
direction of this investigation. It is particularly relevant to export markets like the United 
Kingdom and the United States, and such a problem also justifies this project, because 
there are gaps in the knowledge. Closing them adds value to the New Zealand red meat 
industry.  
Hamlin  (1997:29) he i  n ed mea  cha e deci i n  al  n ed, Value added food 
products represent an opportunity for marketers to increase receipts from the sales of 
red meat, either by increasing the unit retail value of the products containing the meat 
concerned, or by increasing the producer marketer's share of the unit retail dollar. 
However the eventual success of any such marketing initiative will largely depend upon 
the degree of understanding of consumer attitudes towards the meat cue acting as an 
identifying ingredient, and their role in the decision processes with respect to value 
added f d d c .  Marketing myopia is one element that is capable of reducing such 
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an understanding. Interestingly, the value-added side of New Zealand beef and lamb 
sector remains somewhat constrained.  
A ckland Uni e i  f Techn l g  P fessor of Macro Marketing, Ben Wooliscroft, 
adds, Remembe , me f he e mice can and ill n in  ele han .  This is a hugely 
relevant comment too, and offers a big signpost for those looking to identify future 
opportunities. It also balances out the proposition. Scale can be a good thing provided the 
growth is controlled, so the value creation that generated the scale in the first place is 
retained. For example, more milk powder for the sake of more milk powder has damaged 
Ne  Zealand  nce i ine iver systems. This situation can negatively impact a brand 
trading on strong ecological values and therefore, such a dynamic warns against growth 
for growths sake.  
It is worth remembering the planet is finite and therefore logic implies, so is growth. 
Meadows et al (2004) a e, To overshoot means to go too far, to grow so large so 
quickly that limits are exceeded. When an overshoot occurs, it induces stresses that 
begin to slow and stop growth. The three causes of overshoot are always the same, at 
any scale from personal to planetary. First, there is growth, acceleration, rapid change. 
Second, there is some form of limit or barrier, beyond which the moving system may not 
safely go. Third, there is a delay or mistake in the perceptions and the responses that try 
 kee  he em i hin i  limi .  The secret, as Sir Paul Callaghan once pointed out, 
is to grow without stressing the limits of natural resources. This of course, represents the 
case for innovation.  
Tesla in the automotive industry is an excellent example of a mouse turning into a high-
value elephant through innovation. For example, Baer (2014) reported The last 
successful American car start-up was founded 111 years ago. It's called Ford. Barely a 
decade old, Tesla is already gigantic and adored. Its market capitalization hovers 
around $US28 billion.  Morgan Stanley calls it "the world's most important car 
company," and a 2014 nationwide survey found tha  Te la  M del S a  he M  
L ed Vehicle in Ame ica.  YCharts (2020), an investment research firm based in the 
United States, now reports the market capitalization of Tesla at $US99.56 Billion. Ford's 
market capitalization is $US22.20 billion, and the other giant US automaker GM has a 




As proposed above, it appears the New Zealand red meat industry could benefit from 
asking two key questions. Question 1. How does the system work? Question 2. How can 
the system be made to work better? For example, Levitt (1980) reports, "The usual 
presumption about so-called undifferentiated commodities is that they are exceedingly 
price sensitive. A fractionally lower price gets the business. That is seldom true except in 
the imagined world of economics textbooks. In the actual world of markets, nothing is 
exempt from other considerations, even when price competition rages." The failure of 
organizational leadership to understand (or see or act) this principal may expose their 
organizations to higher vulnerability levels and a heightened potential to suffer from 
marketing myopia. The concept of resource-based assets is relevant here, for example, 
in-market relationships.  
3.6  It's about Marketing  
Organizations running in a myopic modality need to review their relationships with 
marketing as a top priority. For example, 'Push' selling of products to customers with a 
production or selling mindset is usually the dominant strategy. Canning Jr., (1988:35) 
reports, In c m anie  ha  a e ma ke ing c n ci , c a e a eg  eflec  he 
realities of the marketplace and deals with those realities with specificity and 
nde anding.  Canning goes onto suggest that, Man  c a e rategies are largely 
financial in ien a i n, ha  i , he  a e c nce ned ima il  i h f li  lanning.  
Could the way the New Zealand red meat sector leverages its entire marketing system be 
modified to its advantage? Could their current systems be improved to produce and 
deliver increased value through fresh approaches that might generate more substantial 
returns?  
In companies with a low emphasis on marketing, the tendency is to focus on what is 
suitable for the organization, not what is best for the customer. Empirical evidence 
suggests red meat enterprises in New Zealand exhibit these tendencies. For example, 
during 2018-19, according to Beef and Lamb New Zealand, the New Zealand red meat 
industry has achieved an average export price for beef of NZD 7,756 per tonne FOB. 
This result represents suboptimal performance. While there was a slight improvement 
from 2015-16, the result delivered is still a relatively low price considering what the final 
price paid by the end consumer represents. The differences between the ratio of returns 
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at both ends of the marketing delivery system (transvection) are worth questioning as the 
ind  eff   diffe en ia e a ea   be lacking ac i n. 
Industry commentators suggest some of the recent improvements in FOB prices could be 
credited to the pork problem in China, demonstrating the power of such a big commodity 
market on price levels.  Marketing has had little influence on the outcome. For example, 
Craymer and Bunge (2019) report, China i  n a gl bal mea -buying spree, pushing up 
beef, k and l  ice  a nd he gl be a  he ld  m  l  na i n 
c amble   fill a la ge id in i  mea  l .  In typical commodity fashion, the 
likelihood of an increase in New Zealand beef prices could be fleeting. 
Rabobank (2019) highlights another phenomenon of commodity markets. When 
increased demand signals emanate from markets, competition for that market can also 
increase. Rabobank (2019) reports, In addi i n, e e ecen l  een he China Mea  
Associa i n ann nce ha  China  g e nmen  ld be e anding i  cing f 
animal protein products in an attempt to replace the lost pork production that has 
resulted from ASF. This may include allowing imports of Indian buffalo and lifting the 
current ban on UK beef. There are also reports of an increase in the number of 
in e na i nal mea  facili ie  being acc edi ed f  e  in  China.   
Efforts to transition-to-value at the processor level are proving to be illusory in these 
conditions, and equally, the efforts (or abilities) of large commodity orientated 
processors to differentiate New Zealand beef in such markets successfully is also proving 
relatively ineffective. The needle is not moving much.  The chart in Figure 3.2 below 




Figure 3.2: Beef export chart showing average value of New Zealand beef exports (excluding 
veal) worldwide. Source: Beef and Lamb, New Zealand (2020) 
 
Le i  (1960) fam  ma ke ing m ia a icle c mmence , In e e  fl nde ing 
industry there is a self-decei ing c cle f g ea  e an i n and nde ec ed deca ..,  
Levitt goes on to list four preconditions for defining marketing myopia being present in 
an enterprise. They are as follows: 
1. A belief growth is assured by an expanding and more affluent population. 
2. A belief ha  he e i  n  c m e i i e b i e f  he ind  maj  d c . 
3. Too much faith in mass production and the advantages of rapidly declining costs 
per unit as output rises. 
4. A preoccupation with a product that lends itself to carefully controlled scientific 
experimentation, improvement, and manufacturing cost reduction. 
Woodford (2020) reports, The latest concern, captured recently in a commentary to 
the Wellington Chamber of Commerce on March 11, 2020 by Finance Minister Grant 
Robertson, is that 'some industries' had probably become too reliant on China."  The 
New Zealand red meat industry would appear to fit this criterion. Levitt's first 
precondition concerns a belief in growth, and the New Zealand red meat sector 
demonstrates strong confidence in China.  
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Red meat enterprises have dialled up the grass-fed message, improved packaging, and 
refined their advertising and promotional material, but much of their rhetoric could be 
viewed as somewhat defensive of their market share. Rae (2018) reported, "There was 
untapped demand for naturally raised, grass-fed, hormone and antibiotic-free red meat, 
with consumers prepared to pay a premium for such products. Red meat consumption 
was becoming more specialized and niche, but opportunities still existed." 
The New Zealand red meat industry would also appear to have faith in another marketing 
myopia precondition, mass production. It has made significant investments in robotics, 
camera grading technologies, and plant upgrades to increase efficiencies. Callagher 
(2015) warns, While incremental innovations are important for short-term 
performance, they do little to address processing overcapacity and the need to add value 
to what is a commodity product. According to the industry life-cycle theory, the red meat 
sector's continued reliance on incremental innovation can only lead to its decline." 
Finally, on the last of Levitt's (1960) preconditions, the New Zealand red meat industry 
risks becoming preoccupied with grass-fed narrative and regenerative versus organic 
arguments, which could equate to watching Rome burn. At this stage, the country is 
al ng a  behind g am  like I eland  O igin G een, hich in e ed hea il  in hi  
space a decade ago, which suggests they may be a long way in front.  
In recent times, the industry has amplified the source of origin narrative. It is attempting 
to push the benefits of GMO-free, antibiotic-free, grass-fed, and 100 percent pure 
environments. It is still unclear whether the industry fully understands what business 
they are in or whether they know what customers want.  Are they a meat processing 
company, a food company, or are they something else? Larger processors are currently 
doing their best to convince farmers, markets, and consumers they are a high-end food 
business. In contrast, they are still behaving and operating in a traditional volume-driven, 
commodity manner. This appears to be underpinned by a belief in homogeneous 
markets, and their returns remain overwhelmingly anchored to selling low-value protein 
through commodity platforms.   
The information presented in Table 3.0 below was extracted from a Materiality 
Assessment commissioned by the Red Meat Profit Partnership.  Both Tables presented 
below list the top priority issues for the group. Interestingly, and perhaps tellingly, 
marketing and consumers are not mentioned. There is a mention of consumer 
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preferences regarding product and quality, but there are no links made to flavour, eating 
experience, or brand. Critical, because consumers will pay a premium for a brand, and 
they also buy on emotion. The lack of priority given to marketing supports the value of 
an investigation into marketing myopia.  
 
Table 3.0: Materiality Assessment showing priorities from Red Meat Profit Partnership 
meeting in Christchurch, New Zealand. Source: Love S., Thinkstep (2020:22)  
 
3.7  Show me the Money 
The current evidence from Annual Reports reinforces the profitability challenge. For 
e am le, Alliance G  2017 Ann al Re  h  he c m an  made a fi  f 
$20.2 million on a turnover of $1.53 Billion. In 2016, Silver Fern Farms lost $30 million 
on a turnover of $2.14 Billion. Boot (2017) reports Silver Fern Farms Chairman Rob 
Hewitt suggested, While he e l  a  in line i h e i  g idance f a mall 
operating loss, it was nonetheless particularly disappointing and reflected a very 
challenging ea  ac  he ind .   
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Montgomery (2012) suggests those responsible for strategy should ask and answer the 
following question: Does your company matter? How would senior red meat executives 
nning Ne  Zealand  ce ing c e a i e  an e  hi  question? How do you 
answer the question if the company ownership is partly or wholly in foreign hands? For 
e am le, Sil e  Fe n Fa m  i  n  50% ned and 100% c n lled b  China  bigge  
meat processor Shanghai Mailing. Hamlin (2015) states, On Friday, October 16, 82%-
plus of the shareholders of Silver Fern Farms agreed to irrevocably place all the assets 
of their organization completely under the control of the Chinese government." ANZCO, 
another prominent New Zealand meat processing company, is also 100% owned by a 
foreign interest,  Japanese food company Itoham Yonekyu. 
These developments are concerning as so far, they have done little to shift the profit 
needle to the producer's or processor's advantage. Hamlin (2015) further states, "Even by 
global standards; this acquisition is one of the greatest business coups of the 21st 
century. Such is the attractiveness of the SFF outcome for its architects that the same 
well-choreographed dance may well be played again with other asset-rich groups in this 
country." A trajectory which supports 'selling off the family silver' as it were, is unlikely 
to be in the future interests of New Zealand farmers. However, it may encourage farmers 
to face up to the challenge of marketing their products. Silver Fern Farms et al. do not 
own the farms. 
 





3.8  Eyes wide open 
Levitt (1960) cites marketing myopia as the reason railroads, energy companies, and 
movie enterprises all surrendered substantial market positions, large profits, and missed 
many significant opportunities of their day. According to Levitt (1960), marketing 
myopia occurred partly because the leadership and management of these organizations 
failed. He suggests their inability to answer questions about how their organization 
should define their operations ultimately led to their demise.  
For example, the railroad industry missed road and sea transport opportunities, 
particularly the economies of scale that would eventually be delivered through 
containerization.  Kodak missed digital. Ansett Airlines missed operational efficiency 
and made poor aircraft purchasing decisions leading to its ultimate failure, costing 
15,000 people their jobs and forcing the New Zealand Government to rescue Air New 
Zealand. 
In another famous example of myopia, Gustin (2013) reported, Blackbe  fail e  
keep up with Apple and Google a  a c n e ence f e  f a eg  and i i n.  
Figure 3.4 shows an image of the once venerable Blackberry mobile. My brother, a 
senior partner of a major global law firm, reported that his firm did not switch to Apple 
quickly because of the superior encryption capability offered by Blackberry. 
 
Figure 3.4: Blackberry mobile. Source Image: Google 
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Obtaining the right information to inform strategy and vision is often challenging 
because of the natural human default to resist change. This trait can prevent responsive 
problem solving and halt innovation in its tracks. For example, according to numerous 
reports from many organizations, including Coriolis reports in 2013 and 2017, many in 
the New Zealand red meat industry think the problem of low profitability stems 
predominantly from a range of easily visible and endemic issues. These include 
procurement battles, processing efficiency, and a lack of in-market coordination. 
The reality might be, the answers to the problem of low profitability may lie somewhere 
else. The problem might be the industry is defining the business they are in incorrectly. 
Levitt (1960) would say, too narrowly. Gallo's (2016) interpretation is, The myopia that 
Levitt describes is a lack of insight into what a business is doing for its customers. 
Organizations invest so much time, energy, and money in what they currently do that 
he e f en blind  he f e.  
The literature suggests the real problem may be those responsible for seeing the problem 
simply cannot, will not, or do not see it. If marketing myopia is allowed to infiltrate an 
organizational culture, the modus operandi it encourages may blind individuals and 
enterprises to important consumer signals. This blindness may equate to missing key 
ecosystem stimulus designed to elicit, encourage, and drive organizational responses and 
entrepreneurial pursuits towards staying competitive. The likelihood of capturing new 
opportunities is also diminished. When these symptoms impact marketing, thanks to 
Levitt (1960), it is referred to as the theory of Marketing Myopia. 
"The railroads did not stop growing because the need for passenger and freight 
transportation declined. That grew. The railroads got in trouble because the need was 
filled by others (cars, trucks, airplanes, even telephones) and not filled by the railroads 
themselves. They let others take customers away from them because they assumed 
themselves to be in the railroad business rather than in the transportation business. The 
reason they defined their industry wrong was that they were railroad-oriented instead of 
transportation-oriented; they were product-oriented instead of customer- ien ed.




3.9  Commercial Review  Observable Phenomenon 
In an interview between Amy Gallo (2016) and Harvard Professor John Deighton, 
Levitt's (1960) article's real significance is amplified. Their message reminds Boards, 
leaders, and managers running enterprises that they are all part of marketing. Levitt 
(1960:11) gge ed, It is not surprising that, having created a successful company by 
making a superior product, management continues to be oriented toward the product 
a he  han he e le h  c n me i .  In the 1800s, as the frozen lamb was shipped to 
Britain, there was no doubt the New Zealand red meat industry had developed superior 
technology. 
The New Zealand red meat sector conducts trade in a dynamic, competitive, and 
commodity-driven global environment. It is an environment that has created substantial 
headwinds, challenges, and survivability moments for both producers and processors. 
My research investigates why the New Zealand red meat industry has failed to develop 
an effective strategy to cope with the endemic headwinds it has faced decade after 
decade since the early 1970s. Why does the sector demonstrate such a persistent pattern 
of low profitability and performance? 
San Francisco consultancy, Antedote (2018), an insight specialist firm recently engaged 
by Beef and Lamb New Zealand, suggests, "The market is responding to consumer 
demand for new produc  ha  mee  e l ing need  and de i e .  It is a phenomenon that 
everyone in the industry supposedly understands, agrees with, and articulates, but do 
he ? Wh  can  he Ne  Zealand ed mea  ind  c n i en l  and ainabl  ca e 
the premium opportunities in these evolving markets? The New Zealand red meat 
industry appears to be assuming that the continued growth of emerging markets in South 
East and North-East Asia is capable of soaking up production long into the future. 
The historical evidence suggests things can change, and being dependant on too few 
markets can be risky for example, Britain's exit from the European Union in 1973. 
Figure 3.5 below highlights the exposure New Zealand has to the North Asian and North 
American markets. What happens if these markets experience an event which creates a 




Figure 3.5  Ne  Zealand  Beef E po  Source (2020) Beef and Lamb New Zealand. 
A c en  a m i n i  he ne  eme ging ma ke  ein c n me  ill be e a ed 
to pay a premium. What has changed? These markets have been growing strongly for 
decades, yet the price consumers in these regions have been prepared to pay for New 
Zealand sourced red meat has been, and remains, subdued. Balmer (2011) refers to the 
failure to see relevant change as a corporate marketing myopia symptom. In Stuff 
(2017), Mike Petersen, a well know industry influencer, stated, Not a lot of New 
Zealanders understand we export over 90 percent of what we produce," he said. "That's 
an incredibly difficult position to be in today. No other country has a profile like New 
Zealand's. Most countries consume 90 percent of the food they produce. New Zealand is 
the complete inverse of that." 
Could the country's natural default to commodity agriculture encourage farmers to 
produce more than the country's marketing systems can deal with add to the challenging 
situation? Petersen thinks it is an incredibly tricky position to be in.  Should farmers 
produce less and charge more? Are there opportunities for the red meat industry to 
dramatically increase food manufacturing innovation? For example, no value-added 
charcuterie products are being developed by the two largest red meat processors in New 
Zealand. NHDSC (2020 reports, In 2019 Americans spent more than $6.2 Billion on 
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h  d g  and a age  in US S e ma ke .  That equates to nearly NZD 10 billion in 
retail revenue. Is providing a GMO-free, antibiotic-free, 100% grass-fed premium 
hotdog a viable proposition? 
It worked for butter. Skerrett (2020) reports, In the deal reported to be worth up to 
US$5 million (NZ$8m) in its first year, the New Zealand grass-fed butter is now on 
Whole Foods shelves in 37 states, including in flagship stores in Union Square, New 
Y k, and A in, Te a .  Figure 3.6 below highlights the Lewis Road Creamery 
packaging and grass-fed message.  
 
Figure 3.6: Grass-fed butter by Lewis Road Creamery. Source: Newshub (2020) 
The global protein market remains dynamic. Adele Peters (2017) from online ezine Fast 
Company observes, When he mea acking gian  Ca gill ld ff i  la  ca le feedl  
in April, it said that it wanted to free up funds to invest in alternatives like insects and 
plant-based protein. Four months later, along with Bill Gates and Richard Branson, the 
company joined a $17 million round of investment in Memphis Meats, a start-up 
that grows beef and chicken from cells in ead f n fa m .  
 
"It was one of several large deals in 2017 for meatless meats. Tyson Foods, the largest 
meat producer in the US, was part of a $55 million round of investment in Beyond Meat. 
Roughly a year after it started selling its meat-like burgers in mainstream grocery stores, 
Be nd Mea  d c  a e n  in 19,000- l  e .  Figure 3.7 below visually 
highlights the rapid progress substitute protein enterprises are making. They are 




Figure 3.7: Image of Memphis Meat Burger. Image: Memphis Meats 
When companies like Cargill Corporation (Revenues circa USD 115 Billion) and Tyson 
Foods (Revenues circa US 42 Billion) free up funds to invest in innovation like 
alternative proteins, they are demonstrating a strong awareness of what is going on in the 
markets they serve. This behaviour is the opposite of defensive strategies adopted by 
organisations defending status quo positions. It is quite possible, defending such 
positions could be symptomatic of marketing myopia. Levitt (1960) would suggest being 
a a e f he c me  need  and an  i  ke   iding he all-im an  c me  
a i fac i n .   
Balmer (2011:1330) states, All too often, according to Levitt (1960), the myopic 
mindset of managers resulted in acute institutional malaise, and the cause was the 
failure of CEOs to answer the seemingly simple but, in reality, supremely difficult 
question: "What business are we in?". Cargill and Tyson food  CEOs have clearly 
thought about what business they are in. Levitt (1960:7) suggested, Mass production 
industries are impelled by a great drive to produce all they can. The prospect of steeply 
declining unit costs as output rises is more than most companies can usually resist. The 
profit possibilities look spectacular. All effort focuses on production. The result is that 
ma ke ing ge  neglec ed.   
The literature suggests a belief in mass production can be a hallmark symptom of 
marketing myopia. From an observational perspective, New Zealand producers and 
processors, and the wider red meat sector, appear to support an internalized belief that 
traditional red meat markets are a), constantly growing, relatively safe and secure, and 
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b), should respond well to New Zealand's clean green red meat propositions. There 
appears to be no sign of a change in direction from volume to value, or not one that is 
easily observable. The tone of press releases, company communications, Annual Reports 
and general media relay a predilection for volume, plant optimization, ideas that sit more 
comfortably with mass production than value-adding. To some extent, this suggests 
inductive thinking is winning over deductive thinking. The influence of that dynamic 
may enhance the likelihood of marketing myopia occurring because it reduces the ability 
to identify areas in which to innovate and create value.   Figure 3.8 below highlights the 
differences between the two thinking processes.  
 
Figure 3.8: Deductive versus Inductive Logic. Source: Stratechi (2020). 
 
3.10 Observations 
The current state of low returns is endemic.  Garden (2010), reported A continuing 
decline in sheep and beef farming profitability, inadequate industry returns and fierce 
competition from alternative land uses are forcing more and more farmers out of the 
ec .  Profitability remains a challenge in 2020 and has been a real problem despite 
the farmer's best efforts. Parsons (2008:7) stated, When you examine the amazing 
efficiency gains New Zealand producers have made since the deregulation in the 1980s, 
it is truly impressive. So much so that New Zealand's agricultural industry is frequently 
held up as an example internationally. Yet despite all these amazing gains, our country's 
meat and wool producers are not making more money." Fox (2015) reinforces the 
intractable nature of the problem reporting, The next year is crunch time for the red 
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meat sector, with farms that have been in families for generations poised to be lost to 
foreigners and dairy farming, say the publishers of a no-holds-barred report they hope 
ill  a cke  nde  ind  c e ef m.  There have been many reports, and 
many meetings held, all attempting to grapple with the problem. History suggests these 
problems are unlikely to be solved by employing or amplifying traditional approaches. 
Industry performance remains low, particularly when you review return on revenue. 
Refer to Table 4.0 for details.  
According to Hyland (2015), I  i  an ind  that has largely failed to learn the lessons 
ha  he hand f hi  ha  deal .  Not learning has allowed low profitability to 
bec me a icked  blem, hich Ri el & Webbe  (1973) a  i  a blem ha  i  
difficult to define and is inherently unsolvable. Le i  (1960) he  f ma ke ing 
myopia could offer a fresh set of eyes to help explain and possibly solve this wicked 
problem. Levitt's (1960) approach has proven that where myopic managerial mindsets 
exist, there can be a strong correlation between marketing myopia, failed leadership, and 
low profitability. It may be a dynamic the New Zealand red meat industry could 
investigate further. 
During my research, I will examine the relationships and dynamics of marketing, 
entrepreneurship, and leadership. Marketing myopia does not just occur in a vacuum. For 
example, Lee and Paterson (2000:406) have suggested, "Entrepreneurship (at both 
societal and industry levels) depends on the unique blend of cultural factors (i.e., values, 
attitudes, and behaviours) that together combine to foster (or not) a strong 
entrepreneurial orientation." It is widely acknowledged in management literature and 
axiomatic among academics and management consultants that leadership is crucial for 
creating, developing, and architecting high-performance organizational culture. This 
thought line suggests that the administration responsible for high-performance culture is 
also potentially liable for allowing marketing myopia to take hold. Levitt's four 
marketing myopia preconditions provide an excellent dashboard to monitor such 
organizational dynamics.   
Culture in the Red Meat Industry is worthy of mention at this point too. My observation 
and experience with the New Zealand red meat industry provide empirical evidence of a 
very conservative and traditional industry, which reflects the behaviour and culture of 
farmers. It is not a sector used to disruption, rapid change, or doing things differently. 
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This embedded reluctance to change, combined with very conservative values may have 
the potential to increase the industry's vulnerability to marketing myopia.  
Camillus (2008) supports that while many corporations have made improvements, 
including red meat enterprises, there are still significant headwinds for organizations 
embracing traditional organizational structure and management styles. He reports, "They 
crunch vast amounts of consumer data, hold planning sessions frequently, and use 
techniques such as competency modelling and real-options analysis to develop 
a eg .  Camillus (2008) arg e , Companies tend to ignore one complication along 
he a : The  can  de el  m del  f he inc ea ingl  c m le  en i nmen  in hich 
they operate. As a result, contemporary strategic- lanning ce e  d n  hel  
enterprises cope with the big problem  he  face.  The red meat industry is complex, 
hich  he e i  icked blem  a e i n. The ef e, i  make  en e f  an 
organization to harness the full potential of its leadership, entrepreneurship, and 
marketing to increase the chances of success and limit any downsides stemming from 
marketing myopia. Once an organization is blind to opportunity (myopic), it can become 
more vulnerable to being disrupted.  
The catalyst that changed the New Zealand Red Meat Industry's profitability profile 
occurred immediately after the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Union 
(EEC) in 1973. This move dramatically disrupted what had been an excellent and long-
anding l  a angemen  f  Ne  Zealand  d ce  and ce . Since hen, 
the industry has steadily declined, taking New Zealand's living standards with it. Massey 
(1995:10) supports this line stating, All f he ke  mea e  indica e a de e i a i n in 
he Ne  Zealand ec n m  e f mance -1973.  Can this prolonged period of poor 
economic performance in the red meat industry be related, at least in part, to marketing 
myopia? 
The Mea  Ind  E cellence (MIE) g  c mmi i ned a e  called Pa h a  in 
2015. The report highlighted low returns as an issue, reporting, "The global shortage for 
quality protein and New Zealand's reputation for nutritionally ethical products and 
clean green image support a favourable future for the red meat industry. However, low 
profitability in the processing sector due to falling stock numbers, procurement battles, 
and structural deficiencies result in uncertainty and volatility of returns for farmers." 
This knowledge is not novel. It's persistence as an issue does support an investigation 
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into marketing myopia. If the demand for New Zealand red meat is high, and the prices 
farmers receive are low, the industry would appear missing or not seeing something. 
What is it?  
It is difficult to determine a numeric level that equals an ideal return to an individual 
farmer because being a farmer is often a lifestyle choice. This is particularly the case 
with intergenerational farmers.  Also, the level of return required is different for every 
individual and every farming enterprise. Farming businesses are no different from any 
other 'for profit' company, and most seek to maximize their risk for return reward.   
The amount of debt a farming operation has leveraged to grow, develop, and run the 
operation can be a predetermining factor in the return required because farms must meet 
the bank's lending requirements. All farms are likely to have different lending profiles 
and parameters. However, it would be safe to say that most farmers, cooperatives, 
executives, and operational managers would expect a cash return of 8 to 12 percent to 
justify the operational risk of farming operations. Is the industry meeting this 
requirement in 2020? Dealing with reality can also have links to other forms of myopia. 
Table 3.1 below illustrates the level of industry profit versus total assets. The return for 
sheep  beef cattle farming in New Zealand measured as a percentage of total earnings 
against total assets in 2019 was 3.1 %. Across 2017, 2018, and 2019 the average return 
was 3.2 %. 
 
Table 3.1 Sheep and Beef Cattle Financial data. Source: (2020) Stats NZ. 
Cronshaw (2014) reports, G d e f me  n n he n Ea  C a  fa m  a e ielding 
8 to 12 percent on total capital invested including the value of the land, which is better 
than man  dai  fa me  ge  in an a e age ea n.  That may sound positive, but as 
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AgriHQ (2016) reports, The l k edic  ha  he a e age fa m fi  bef e a  n 
sheep and beef farms in New Zealand will fall 13% to $67,000 this season.  The e 
results demonstrate that sheep-beef farming is challenging, and participation comes with 
a level of risk. While there are goals for a certain level of return, they are not always met, 
and like many organizational budgeting processes, sometimes aspirations do not reflect 
reality. New Zealand Farmers rarely interact directly with consumers, relying on others 
to perform that task. This generally means their processor's performance can 
significantly influence their performance.  
At this point, it is perhaps timely to mention the industry has many participants. These 
include banks, governments, specialist advisory groups, and a host of supply chain 
participants, who all potentially share some responsibility for the New Zealand red meat 
industry's success or lack of success. For example, a conservative bank may prevent a 
farmer from investing in higher-value pursuits beyond the farm gate. Governments may 
generate expedient, protective, or politically driven trade barriers. 
New Zealand is already one of the world's most open economies, making its farmers 
vulnerable in some export markets. In 2018, the Executive Director of The New Zealand 
International Business Forum (NZIBF) Stephen Jacobi, welcomed the new 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), 
reporting the agreement, C me  n  a m men   n f  Ne  Zealand in Ja an 
where our trade interests have suffered because we lack the sort of trade arrangements 
ha   c m e i  enj .  New Zealand Beef and Lamb (2019) reported, Prior to 
CPTPP, Ne  Zealand  beef ma ke  ha e had been d ing. Ac  he Ta man, 
A alia  2015 ade ag eemen  i h Ja an a  i  beef e   Ja an a  b  $NZ1 
billi n, hile Ne  Zealand  fell b  $NZ25 milli n.  
3.10.1  The Challenge of Industry Definition 
There is significant empirical evidence to suggest the New Zealand Red Meat Industry is 
continuing to define itself as a bulk provider of commodities, which according to Levitt 
(1960), may signal a tendency towards too narrowly defining the scope of operations. Is 
the New Zealand red meat industry in the meat production and processing business, or is 
it in the premium food business? If it is in the premium food business, does it understand 
the simple concept that great meat makes red meat lovers happy?  Observations that 
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'meat makes you happy' in existing New Zealand red meat enterprises' DNA are difficult 
to find. In contrast, evidence of a penchant for 'hook' optimization is easier to find. Is this 
the real situation, and what impact does it have on financial performance?  
Should the big processors invest in food manufacturing or retailing, or both? What would 
happen to producer returns if Alliance Group acquired a large company like Hellers and 
produced value-added smallgoods? According to Levitt (1960), poor definition is a 
primary determinant of marketing myopia, which his research directly links to significant 
evidence of enterprise failure. Levitt (1960) does not mix his words when he suggests, 
The fail e i  a  he . The e ec i e  e nsible for it, in the last analysis, are those 
h  deal i h b ad aim  and licie .  In other words, those who set and decide the 
business strategy of where to play and how to win are the same group responsible for 
defining what business an enterprise is in. The knowledge developed by Levitt (1960) 
guides this project.  
Levitt's (1965) research demonstrates that once an enterprise suffers from marketing 
myopia, the lack of leadership can cause other problems. For example, Levinthal & 
March (1993:98) report, Marketing departments experiment with alternative marketing 
strategies and production departments experiment with alternative production strategies, 
each e al a ed in ch a a  ha  hei  effec  n each he  a e ign ed.  Johnston 
(2009:139) reinforce  Le i  k gge ing, This paper proposes that many firms 
suffer from 'self-concept specificity.' This is an unconsciously self-imposed restriction on 
creative strategy formulation that is the result of a highly bounded concept of a firm held 
by its senior management. Recognizing that this concept resonates with Levitt's seminal 
Marketing Myopia concept, the paper draws on Resource-based View and Network 
Organisations literature to add two further dimensions, Capability Myopia and 
Boundary Myopia, respectively. " 
Hernandez (2017) developed related thinking focusing on motivated reasoning. His 
research highlights the development of self-serving behaviour, which is demonstrated by 
many leaders. I have recently heard the term Intelligent Organisational Politicians 
expressed, and this would appear to be another way of describing self-serving behaviour. 
If industry leaders responsible for championing the marketing function are focused on 
self-serving behaviour an organization may face additional exposure to the risk of 
marketing myopia.  
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Hernandez (2017) suggests, E am le  f leade  aking m e han hei  fai  ha e a e 
bi i  in m de n gani a i nal c n e .  The 2016 annual reports of Alliance and 
Silver Fern Farms may support Hernandez's claims; given the significant salaries, the 
businesses are paying their executive teams. For example, compensation in the region of 
NZD 1.5 Million per annum was being paid to one Silver Fern Farms employee, most 
likely the CEO. Refer to Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below for verification of this claim. The 
remuneration levels appear to be very high, given the performance of the company at the 
time. The salary levels would seem to support Hernandez's (2017) claim about leaders 
taking more than their fair share, particularly when referenced against the profits 
delivered to the farmer-shareholders the company serves.  
In recent times, the performance was so low the Australian banks withdrew their 
financial support. This was the catalyst that forced Silver Fern Farms to sell 50 percent 
of the company to Chinese entity Shanghai Maling. Rae (2016) reported, "This week, Mr. 
McGaveston said it has been disheartening that cooperative directors, Beef and Lamb, 
Federated Farmers, the Government, and organizations farmers trusted to show 
leadership and direction had fought to stifle all MIE's efforts to create a bright future for 
New Zealand meat farmers." 
The (2019) Silver Fern Farms Annual Report states, "The following table shows the 
number of Silver Fern Farms employees and former employees of Silver Fern Farms and 
its subsidiaries who in their capacity as employees received remuneration and other 
benefits or entitlements (including non-recurring payments to employees on leaving the 
Group) during the year ended September 30 2016, the value of which was or exceeded 
$100,000 (NZD). All Directors' fees earned by the Chief Executive from external 
organizations where the Chief Executive represents Silver Fern Farms are paid to Silver 




Table 3.2: Silver Fern Farms Remuneration. Source (2016) Annual Report. 
 
Table 3.3: Alliance Group Remuneration. Source (2016) Annual Report. 
Historically, producer fortunes have been tied to their processors' success. In 2020, 
nothing much has changed. Both parties are still mostly unsatisfied with their return on 
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investment. Annual reports from all reporting periods reflect some PR spin and hype 
aimed at swaying the communications to the positive. For example, the 2016 Alliance 
Group Annual Report stated, Alliance G  i  a gl bal leade  in c ing, 
processing and marketing the world's best quality red meat products. We are a food 
company and our products are enjoyed in more than 65 countries across the globe. As 
New Zealand's only true 100% farmer-owned red meat cooperative, our aim is to 
maximize returns to our committed farmer shareholders and support them to operate 
profitable and sustainable farms." 
The 2016 financial reality was the delivery of a net operating profit of $12 Million 
(before pool surplus distribution and restructuring costs) on a turnover of $1,357 Billion. 
That is a return on sales of less than 1%. The Alliance Annual Report (2017) did not 
demonstrate much improvement showing an operating profit before tax, pool 
distributions, and gains on asset sales of $20.2 million on an annual turnover of $1,537 
Billion.    
In 2019, an internal media release from Alliance Group reports, The fi  e l  a  
he be  ading e l  ince 2010.  The cooperative managed to produce a $20.7 million 
profit before distribution and tax on revenue of $1.7 billion. This equates to a one 
percent return on gross sales. An enterprise seeking capital and presenting investors with 
a business opportunity delivering a one percent return on gross sales would be unlikely 
to attract capital.  
The financial sector, particularly banks, is likely to be extremely reluctant to lend with 
these financial performance levels. Norman (2019) reports, "Nearly a quarter of farmers 
say they're feeling pressure from banks to reduce debt, according to a Federated 
Farmers survey. It reflects the bank's reluctance to lend to the sector, and means more 
farmers are borrowing from family and other lenders." As Figure 3.9 below 




Figure 3.9: Non-performing Bank loans in New Zealand Business Sectors. Source RBNZ (2019) 
Can marketing myopia help explain the low profitability in the New Zealand red meat 
industry? Mintzberg (2018) liked Levitt's (1960) concept of marketing myopia but also 
felt the idea had limits stating, The idea was a good one like all good ideas, within 
reason. Why not open up perspectives beyond existing positions: fast food beyond 
hamburgers (McDonald's), delivering packages beyond selling books (Amazon), offering 
unassembled kitchens beyond unassembled tables (IKEA). Just so long as the 
competencies of the company are respected." Mintzberg goes onto suggest, Companies 
have to build on whatever capabilities they can make use of, without being overwhelmed 
b  eakne e  ha  he  ne e  c n ide ed, ma ke ing ne  incl ded.  
Mintzberg's thinking offers another perspective on marketing myopia. Embracing 
Mintzberg's interpretation of marketing myopia may suggest it is the capability within 
the New Zealand red meat industry that is flashing orange. For example, does the New 
Zealand red meat industry have the sales and marketing capability required to engage 
closer to the consumer? It is one thing to talk about transitioning-to-value, but has the 
industry access to the necessary talent and capital to make this a reality? Current 
performance would suggest it may not. It is an exciting twist on Levitt's (1960) theory 
and also a way of explaining how marketing myopia could metastasize across an entire 
organization. Marketing myopia is a well-proven contributor to poor performance; 
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however, poor performance may also simply be an organization lacking the capability 
and capacity to respond. 
Collins (2001:13) famously suggested and demonstrated through a five-year research 
project comprising five hundred companies that the need to get leadership right was 
critical. Collins advised, The e ec i e  h  igni ed he an f ma i n  f m g d  
great did not first figure out where to drive the bus and then get the people to take it 
there. No, they first got the right people on the bus (and the wrong people off the bus) 
and then fig ed  he e  d i e i .  The red meat industry could do worse than take 
this well-proven, well-researched advice on-board. Transformation, according to Collins 
(2001), begins with outstanding leadership.  
3.11 Academic Review  Existing Theory in an Applied World 
With a relatively detailed industry overview now provided, and a rigorous search of the 
literature completed, the business question that will drive this applied research project is 
now well defined. The 'applied' reference is essential contextually too. I am aiming to 
resolve a real problem in the real world. Theories provide useful frameworks, historical 
learning, and guidance. Still, it must be remembered, getting to the crux of the issues in 
the New Zealand red meat industry will primarily come down to my ability to apply 
theory in practice. The business question this project seeks to answer is: Does the New 
Zealand red meat industry suffer from Marketing Myopia?  
3.11.1 The Problem 
In essence, my research will investigate, analyze, and evaluate the lack of producer and 
processor profitability. Both are interconnected and co-dependent on each other. The 
investigation into this problem will ideally include and integrate a study of both. The 
Pathways Report (2015) quotes Harris (1990), who suggested the New Zealand red meat 
industry S agge  f m c i i   c i i  beca e he c cle a  i  in  a h -term 
c mm di  i a i n, ading n fi abl  i h dimini hing e i .  Another translation 
could be death by a thousand cuts.  
The Pathways Report prepared for MIE by Hyland (2015) quotes a frustrated Meehan 
back in 1991. Meehan, at that time, was the CEO of Southpac Bank. He suggested, "At a 
time where the requirements are for added value, research and development, distribution 
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horsepower and visibility to the customer through focused marketing expenditure; the 
meat industry is, in my opinion, behind the eight ball." This comment supports the failure 
to change since 1991, which was 29 years ago. The size of the problem remains 
significant, is wide-ranging, and impacts industry participants across New Zealand. 
Historical and current analysis of red meat processor annual reports demonstrates the 
issue. For example, Alliance Group results for 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 & 2019 are tabled 
in Table 3.4 below. 
 
Table 3.4: Data extracted Alliance Group Limited. Source 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 & 2019 
Annual Reports. 
 
My interactions and communication with farmers around their kitchen tables have 
enabled me to access direct feedback, reinforcing profitability as the number one 
industry challenge. Producers are also concerned about shifts in consumer behaviour, for 
example, the tendency to eat less meat, the so-called flexitarian lifestyle. They are 
carefully watching innovations like Alternative Proteins. These include laboratory-
derived meat from stem cells, synthetic offerings from plants, and proteins extracted 
from insects.  
These relative newcomers are attracting considerable capital and a strong following, 
which is creating intense competition, disruption, and momentum at a time when the 
New Zealand red meat industry is still considering its response. This represents a classic 
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'Levittian' disruption pattern, and at this point, the New Zealand red meat industry 
demonstrates an inability to respond meaningfully.  
Slow response patterns have been experienced in New Zealand before and have caused 
many problems. Slow responses resulting in lost opportunities can be seen in the New 
Zealand housing sector and the New Zealand superannuation space. New Zealanders 
have missed out on opportunities to improve their financial health and secure their 
futures in both cases. Hendy and Callaghan (2013:1) remind us, Ne  Zealand i  n , in 
fact, the land of innovators that the myth of our number-eight-wire mentality suggests. In 
fact, on a per capita basis, the average OECD country produces four times as many 
a en  a  Ne  Zealand.  Slow responses may support the presence of marketing 
myopia being more prevalent in New Zealand enterprises than in enterprises from other 
countries, which New Zealand must compete with. If this assumption holds, this could 
have a very significant influence on the country's economic future.  
The ideal strategy is to be the disrupter and play offence. Many enterprises, like 
alternative protein start-ups, are doing just that. For example, Glasner (2017) reports, 
"This month, for instance, Impossible Foods, maker of the burger mentioned earlier, 
closed a $75 million Series E round that brings total funding for the six-year-old Silicon 
Valley company to more than $250 million. Backers include Bill Gates, Google, and 
Temasek. So, if anyone's going to be the first soy-based unicorn, it's probably 
Impossible." Los Angeles based Beyond Meat is also bulking up. Glasner reminds 
people who think all this sounds far-fetched and weird to look back at the past.  Look at 
what happened to turn-of-the-century favourites like chicken pudding and liver loaf. 
Even the once habitual Sunday lamb roast has to compete with a raft of new competitors, 
lifestyle changes, and shifting consumer behaviour. Animal welfare, climate change, and 
health requirements have all stepped up to the plate, and 'Big Meat' in New Zealand has 
so far failed to stabilize the domestic market. My mother-in-law, a solid middle-class 
New Zealander, rarely buys lamb in 2020 because it is too expensive. I asked her what 
she had replaced lamb with, and she quickly responded with a myriad of recipes. 
Consumers have price thresholds. This does open up the opportunity for premiumization 
of lesser cuts and paves the way for substitutes, which will infiltrate the existing faster if 
red meat marketing goes missing. Where is the defence of lamb in New Zealand? 
Consumption has dropped to around 3 kilograms per New Zealander per year.  
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This is problematic because once a product pushes these affordability boundaries, it 
opens itself to substitutes and competition. It also impacts the cultural heritage of the 
offering. Lamb has always been an intrinsic part of the New Zealand diet. What happens 
when New Zealanders start replacing lamb with substitutes? I purchased two artisan 
lamb legs online last week (14.10.20) at the cost of $140.00. including GST and freight. 
That may be too expensive for many.  
Innovative new initiatives and business models are already developing value 
i i n  i h he en ial  ignifican l  im ac  he ed mea  ind  e a i n  
in the future. Galloway (2017) reports, Cell  can g  mea , and he  can g  he 
ld  mea  f m nl  20,000 ca le.  As Levitt (1960:46) points out, it is the things 
management doesn't see because of marketing myopia that causes the problems. He 
famously reported, Wha  he ail ad  lack i  n  ni , b  me f he ame 
manage ial imagina i ene  and a daci  ha  made hem g ea .   
Johnston (2009) says it another way, coining the term self-concept specificity, which 
refers to unconsciously self-imposed restrictions on creativity. Levinthal and March 
(1993:96) suggest, E e ience i  a  eache , being icall  i e meag e ela ive 
 he c m le  and changing na e f he ld in hich lea ning i  aking lace.  All 
four men are forging links to the impact of myopia on enterprises.  
3.11.2 Positioning the Research: Why is this research needed, and where are the 
knowledge gaps?  
This research is needed to explore, investigate, examine, analyze, and assess the issues 
relevant to the New Zealand red meat industry's poor financial performance. New 
Zealand is well placed in history, geography, and expertise to secure a healthy future for 
its red meat industry. An essential part of achieving this aspiration is understanding the 
barriers which are holding it back. This research will help new solutions to emerge. 
Hyland (2015) suggests, "The global shortage of quality protein and New Zealand's 
reputation for nutritionally ethical products and clean green image support a favourable 
future for the red meat industry. However, low profitability in the processing sector due 
to falling stock numbers, procurement battles, and structural deficiencies result in 
nce ain  and la ili  f e n  f  fa me .  Hyland believes this situation links to 
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poor financial performance and the sacrifice of a long-term strategy for short-term 
thinking. Deloitte (2011) suggests, In he da a-gathering phase of this strategy, and 
quite emphatically in the wider consultation process, there was considerable comment 
n he i e f lack f leade hi .  Many complex issues need to be understood to see 
clearly. Opening up these issues so new insights can emerge is a crucial objective of this 
project. This goal is to reduce the gaps in the current research.  
Levitt (1960:8) reporting the impact of marketing myopia on the railroad industry  
suggested, E en an ama e  like Jac e  Ba n can ee ha  i  lacking hen he 
a , I grieve to see the most advanced physical and social organization of the last 
century go down in shabby disgrace for the lack of the same comprehensive imagination 
that built it up. What is lacking is the will of the companies to survive and to satisfy the 
public by inventiveness and skill." A key way to inoculate an enterprise against 
obsolescence is to ensure entrepreneurial spirit is cultivated, supported, and nurtured.   
Investigating the New Zealand red meat industry for the presence of marketing myopia is 
reasonable, if not desirable.  For example, Richardson (2017) reports, "In five years, 
China became the world's second-largest beef importer." New Zealand has only just 
started exporting chilled beef to China. Why is New Zealand so far behind Australia? 
Why does 70 percent of New Zealand beef exported to the USA go into low value 
grinding beef? Mitchell et al. (2005:3) suggest, Entrepreneurial cognitions are defined 
to be: the knowledge structures that people use to make assessments, judgments, or 
deci i n  in l ing ni  e al a i n and en e c ea i n and g h.  Do the 
knowledge structures in the red meat industry need enhancing? What are the knowledge 
gaps? According to Mitchell (2005:3), entrepreneurial cognitions are critical, but they 
need to be supported by a range of product, industry, and consumer intelligence to 
inform quality decisions.  
Levitt (1960:58) states, E e  maj  ind  a  nce a g h ind .  He 
expands, "In every case, the reason growth is threatened, slowed, or stopped, is not 
because the market is saturated. It is because there has been a failure of management." 
This project has constructed a knowledge pathway by exploring the New Zealand red 
meat problem using marketing ideas and concepts created by two giants of the marketing 
world, Theodore Levitt and Wroe Alderson.  
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Chapter Four: The Business Question: Does the New Zealand red 
   meat industry suffer from marketing myopia? 
Key Points 
x Playing for premium is the game New Zealand is destined for? 
x You can learn a lot from the old masters. 
x Marketing myopia, it can be terminal. 
 
4.1  Marketing Myopia: The Symptoms 
Diagnosing the symptoms of marketing myopia in the New Zealand red meat industry 
will be challenging and is highly likely to brush up against intense politics. The New 
Zealand red meat industry is a conservative industry managed and run by traditional 
mindsets on both sides of the fence, producer and processor. It is a complex and 
competitive industry, and there are many concerns. In 2020, there are many forces 
creating headwinds that are acting against the momentum needed to move this 'stalemate' 
industry towards consumers. The industry is crying out for approaches capable of 
reliably shifting the profit needle sustainably into the black. 
These complexities include effectively dealing with animal welfare, alternative proteins, 
climate change, government policy, compliance, policy changes, changing banking 
criteria, global trade restrictions, environmental stewardship, sustainability, future-
proofing farming operations, and dealing with the challenges of intergenerational 
succession and the trend towards corporate farming. In essence, though, standing at the 
core of all this complexity is one central truth. When I talk with producers or processors, 
it stands above all others. It is a lack of profitability. The desire to successfully treat this 
painful and persistent symptom is the one thing that all parties have in common. It is the 
one unifying element the industry truly shares. It is the one statement nearly all red meat 
industry participants will agree on. Critically, is low profitability a symptom of 
marketing myopia? 
My original concept, which leads to this project, was to help farmers with 
'premiumization' to achieve better returns. In theory, a simple idea. Build and position 
the brand to move towards premium consumers and then charge more to earn more. In 
the early stages, I hitched my wagon to explaining how declining living standards and 
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poor export returns were linked to a failure of export facing businesses to innovate. In 
other words, they were not earning enough. Why was this? 
New Zealand producers and processors might be struggling because they were not 
hearing the voice of the consume . The inf ma i n di ance  c ea ed b  adi i nal 
commodity trading models is responsible for weak communication links between 
producers and processors, and critically consumers. This has translated into New 
Zealand export businesses being slow to pick up on consumer behaviour changes and 
trends because they were relying on intermediaries for market intelligence. 
The New Zealand red meat industry sector and the enterprises within it were 
information-poor by design, making them vulnerable to a range of value-destroying 
dynamics. For example, the rise and rise of alternative proteins, shifts in consumer 
behaviours, and the ever-increasing requirement to address a wide range of issues 
stemming from climate change. The operational landscape has been rapidly evolving, 
and the demands of the future were rapidly revealing themselves. Many of these changes 
were likely to challenge the New Zealand red meat industry.  
This lack of information potentially contributes to holding many producers and 
processors in endemic, low return, commodity traps. A farmer raising beef in the 
Wairarapa is a long way from a customer enjoying a steak in a swish restaurant in San 
Francisco, Shanghai, or Sydney. This loss of information was lamented by Alderson 
(1957, 1965). There are direct links between a lack of information and Levitt's (1960) 
marketing myopia theory.   
The New Zealand red meat industry would appear not to be ideally structured to manage 
the marketing system as an organic whole. There is some evidence of this emerging 
through observable industry behaviours and actions. For example, the industry has failed 
to come together to resolve procurement battles. It has been unable to cooperate to win 
consumers in export markets effectively. Operating in a vacuum without valuable 
information from high-quality engagement with consumers is likely to compromise the 
industry's performance. New Zealand red meat processors are currently promoting their 
efforts to transition to value; however, given their financial performance to date, these 




4.2  Where to play and how to win 
New Zealand provides less than 1% of the world's export beef; therefore, 'volume' is 
unlikely to be a game New Zealand beef producers can win, yet the industry's strategy 
relies on precisely this approach. It also appears to be over-reliant on continued 
exponential growth in regions like China. How does the transitioning to value mantra 
ec ncile i h he ind  c mm dified c e? I  hi  j a sition symptomatic 
of marketing myopia?  
On retiring in 2018, Sir Graeme Harrison, Chairman of ANZCO Foods, was quoted by 
Stuff Business (2018). They reported, Ha i n'  ie  i  ha  hile Ne  Zealand'  mea  
industry has been relatively stable in recent years, with no company collapses, make no 
mistake, its meat companies continue to be locked in a battle for survival. The industry 
e a e  n in en e li e ck c emen  c m e i i n and hin ma gin . Harrison went 
onto suggest that the red meat industry was, by far, New Zealand's most competitive 
industry. 
He also stated, C i ic  a  h -term thinking plagues the meat industry, which lacks 
innovation. People looking from outside think it's management incompetence, but they 
don't understand its competitive nature. A processing and marketing sector operating in 
survival mode has little or no capital surplus to invest in innovation to help the industry's 
relative competitiveness." Harrison's statement provides evidence to support an inability 
to invest in marketing. Is the industry still in survival mode? Does it have the capital it 
needs to innovate successfully and market? Will the industry be able to maintain, defend, 
or grow its market share?   
The war chests of alternative meat companies are immense, and they are gaining 
traction, even if it is small in relative terms at this stage. Linnane (2019) states, The 
market for plant-based or lab-made meat could climb to $140 billion in the next ten 
years as emerging companies capture a 10% share of the $1.4 trillion meat market, 
Barclays said Wednesday." Maintaining a balanced view Linnane (2019)  also reports, 
A  c n me  bec me m e a a e f he im ac  n he en i nmen  f he mea  
industry, alternative meats are likely to gain in acceptance and popularity, but there are 
risks to consider. One is that alternative meat may prove to be less healthy than some 
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are claiming as companies turn to additives to add flavour or if regulators intervene to 
c n ain ma ke ing a egie .   
Levitt (1960:45) stated, The fail e i  a  he .   It is, therefore, conceivable that poor 
leadership and management could work together in a value-destroying coalition. At the 
same time, Levitt (1964) confirms the link between marketing myopia and organizational 
failure. Based on the New Zealand red meat industry's abysmal financial performance, 
there would appear to be a strong possibility that sub-standard leadership may have 
contributed to the red meat industry suffering from marketing myopia.  
While many executives of meat processing companies are talking about shifting to value, 
with some citing refreshed balance sheets, they appear to have forgotten they have 
minimal access to resources to invest in the future. Where will the capital fuelling this 
new wave of competitive sentiment come from? Will they go back to borrowing capital 
and leveraging debt beyond their means to payback? Silver Fern Farms has demonstrated 
that running out of capital and not paying back debt is problematic.  
Understanding the history of poor performance is essential because if the symptoms of 
marketing myopia exist in the country's leading meat companies, there is also the 
possibility of a trickle-down effect. Large companies (the industry leaders) potentially 
have the scale and power to set the wider red meat community and industry agenda. 
Farmers look to their cooperatives for leadership, and when they cannot see it, they can 
become frustrated, fragmented, and disillusioned. Ferguson (2018) suggests, "Those with 
a historical understanding of past scenarios are likely to be better at visualizing what's 
to come." For this reason, poor historical performance may be linked to slow response, 
particularly if farmers think something has been tried before without success.  
4.3  Marketing Myopia and GMH. What SUVs?  
The New Zealand red meat industry would not be the first, or the last, industry to be 
susceptible to being surprised by, or impacted by, marketing myopia. Any enterprise in 
existence has the potential to suffer from marketing myopia. General Motors Holden in 
Australia is the latest example that comes to mind. McRae (2020) reports, Holden was 
the victim of dwindling sales in what's considered a minor market, but killing off the 
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brand that goes back 160 years - from dependable family transport to motor racing - has 
n  g ne d n ell.   
Newton (2019) pondered, So is there anything that could have saved Holden as a 
manufacturer? If the Hanenberger offensive battle plan had been retained and evolved. 
If GM had invested in Holden as its regional tech centre rather than bought Daewoo. If 
Holden had been allowed to export its rear-wheel-drive models unfettered to California, 
they would have been well received. If GM had elected to sell Holden when it was worth 
me hing. If GM hadn  c lla ed in  bank c .  That is a lot of 'ifs,' and I am 
quietly confident that sitting alongside some of those 'ifs' might be marketing myopia. 
As an Australian, whose first car was a Holden (a V8 HX Sandman, 308 engine, full 
GTS dash, and four on the floor), I am disappointed. The question, of course, is, are 
' ha  if' cena i  ela ed  ma ke ing m ia? Wha  if  hinking im lie  hind igh ; 
however, the problems at General Motors Holden have been in evidence for a long time. 
What they needed was foresight. Perth Now (2020) reports, Holden's vehicle sales in 
Australia have collapsed in the wake of parent company General Motors' decision last 
month to retire the brand by the end of the year. Official industry figures released on 
Wednesday put the demand for Holden products down by 64 percent in February 
compared to the same month last year." Figure 4.0 below supports the demise of 
H lden  ale .  
Perhaps the command question that defines this chapter's discussion is: Why do 
companies that fail also appear to have been unable to embrace marketing? What went 
wrong at General Motors Holden? How did General Motors Holden not see the 
extinction event coming? Levitt (1964:24) would lay this failure firmly at the foot of the 
boardroom table, facing all of those who sat around it. Chesterton (2020) reports, But 
you only need to look at the top-selling cars in Australia to find out where the mainstream 
growth lies. Of our top-10 models in 2018, not one was a full-size sedan(unthinkable, even a 
decade ago), and just three passenger cars in total. We have now entered the era of light-
commercial vehicles and SUVs. The a enge  ca  i , if n  dead, hen d ing.  Why did 
General Motors Holden miss the relatively easy to see consumer shift to Medium SUVs? Was 






Figure 4.0: Holden car sales are declining rapidly after GM made the decision to exit the 
Australian market in early 2020. Source: www.caradvice.com.au 
Figure 4.1 below outlines car sales by body type in Australia. Can we see any similar scale 
consumer shifts in the New Zealand red meat industry? Alternative proteins, flexitarian diets, 
climate change, environmental concerns, and the consumer's visualization of red meat 
animals as sentient beings are all issues on the table. How might these challenges impact 
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consumer demand, and how will they affect the New Zealand red meat industry in the future? 
Almost no one in Australia saw the complete demise of GMH. Failure to see trends is also a 
genuine trend. 
 
Figure 4.1: Australian car sales by body type in 2020. Source: carsguide.com.au 
 
4.4  Hidden Traps 
Moving back to the New Zealand red meat industry and looking at the challenges the 
sector faces, effective leadership will be paramount for success. The price-taking 
environment of commodity trading is transactional, and relationships are subservient to 
price. This is where the New Zealand red meat industry chooses to earn its living. The 
environment it operates in is an exemplar of a commodity trading space. The price will 
be he ma ke  clea ance mechani m.  S b a  en e i e  ill ge  ea en ali e. D A eni 
(2010:15) reports, "Once a company is caught in a commodity trap; differentiation is 
rarely enough to get it back out. Indeed, the reason most companies find themselves in 
the trap in the first place is that they failed to innovate early enough to avoid it, or they 
later differentiated and cut prices so much they have exacerbated the trap."Again, 
connections to policymakers and leadership are apparent, and so are the possible links to 
marketing myopia.   
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In 2020, sizeable red meat cooperative organizations in New Zealand tend towards 
production era thinking instead of being market-led or consumer-driven. Is this a fair 
observation? Is production style thinking a symptom of marketing myopia? Does the 
need to compete in a commoditized environment make an organization more likely to 
di la  ma ke ing m ia m m ? D  c mm di  a ici an  a  ned in   
consumers? Would a more substantial marketing presence on the boards have made a 
difference to poor performances? Would strong, visionary leaders have taken corrective 
action earlier?  
Would focus on marketing in the past have enabled the New Zealand red meat industry 
to have captured more value? How much value has been left behind? Would more 
investment in marketing have helped reduce the losses and avoided some of the poor 
performances? Peter Drucker is acknowledged along with others for coming up with the 
mantra, N hing ha en  n il me ne ell  me hing.  These challenges are the 
responsibility of the marketing discipline. What happens when it is missing?  
Many management experts would agree that a marketing strategy should be top-down 
and championed from the very top of an organization. That becomes much less likely if a 
non-marketer is in control. How many world-class marketers hold board positions across 
the enterprises in the New Zealand red meat industry?  
Jim Collins (2001:1) suggests two ideas. Firstly, "G d i  he enem  f g ea .  Many 
enterprises do not survive by being 'good' at marketing. Survival often requires excellent 
marketing, supporting the argument for elevating marketers to senior executive roles in 
preference (or at least in balance)  to those from the accounting discipline. Secondly, 
Collins (2001) who ironically, studied mathematics at Stanford University, famously 
suggested great companies were the ones who were exceptional at getting the right 
people on the bus, the wrong people off the bus, and the right people in the right seats. 
Collins (2001) makes a case for marketing as the cornerstone of business management 




4.5  Ferrari and Defective Sorts 
A defec i e  i  an a ea be een a d c  igin and i  end c n me  ha  i  n  
performing. It is defective. For example, poor performance by critical suppliers or 
channel partners fits the definition of a defective sort. Defective sorts can create very 
negative impacts on profitability. For example, supermarkets are not an excellent 
channel choice for generating premium returns for those in the red meat industry. Most 
of the upside is captured by the supermarket enterprise, not the red meat processor or 
producer. Therefore, apart from the need to move volume, why would such a channel be 
selected? 
In the same way, why would an enterprise continue to purchase from a supplier who 
overcharges or misses delivery deadlines? Alderson (1965) viewed transvections as 
comprehensive marketing provisioning systems. Optimizing transvections is one of the 
keys to securing premium returns. Optimized transvections are devoid of defective sorts.  
As figure 4.2 below demonstrates, Ferraris are not sold from a down-market showroom. 
They are marketed from high-end stores reflecting the needs, wants, and aspirations of 
accurately segmented and targeted consumers. Failing to do so would equate to a 
defective sort and arguably profit vandalism. 
On my first visit to Museo Ferrari in Maranello, I spent hours taking in the breathtaking 
combination of history, legacy, design, and innovation. On completion, I asked if I could 
view the factory, which was close by.  The answer was, A e  g ing  b  a 
Fe a i?  My response was not right now. Their answer reflected my answer. In other 
words, no, customers only. In this way, the integrity and aspirational 'specialness' of the 
brand is kept alive. The New Zealand red meat industry can learn a lot from how Ferrari 
engineer their transvection.  
  
Figure 4.2: Ferrari in Swiss Dealership. Image supplied by Shutterstock 2018. 
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4.6  Marketing Myopia: The Problem 
Championing and executing an effective marketing strategy could deal with many of the 
New Zealand red meat industry's problems. Before that could happen, the lack of 
marketing focus would first need to be identified. Is the lack of marketing a problem? 
The knowledge certainly exists, the marketers exist, but it is hard to join the dots to 
profits. Why is that?  
There are many different marketing schools, each offering unique insight and a body of 
knowledge around how to deal with the problems facing the red meat industry. Why are 
they presently being under-utilized? For example, the non-interactive commodity school 
of marketing points out: when a product fails to differentiate sufficiently, consumer 
decisions are driven by price. This is not good for producers or processors, so why do 
those responsible for marketing in New Zealand red meat enterprises persist in trading 
through intermediaries and commodity platforms? 
The easy retort and defence employed to counter this argument is nearly always the 
industry's requirement to shift seasonal volume. I ask to what degree has marketing been 
leveraged and engaged with to help drive innovation capable of overcoming this hurdle? 
Finding the answer to this question has proved elusive.  
This line of thinking was supported by a 5th generation beef farmer (and lawyer) from 
Sao Paulo in Brazil, who suggested over lunch in Christchurch in April 2018 that, "You 
999 guys are on the right track. Marketing is the future; it is the only future for beef." 
Figure 4.3 below depicts our lunch. The researcher, in this case, is the one taking the 
photo. The meeting was to discuss the opportunity of marketing premium Angus to high-
end customers in Brazil. Those discussions are progressing. 
The New Zealand red meaty industry has the opportunity to leverage both craft, 
provenance, and terroir in the way craft beer and boutique wine producers do. Premium 
consumers want choice. Burgundy from France today, Cabernet Sauvignon from 
Margaret River in Western Australia tomorrow, and maybe Malbec from Mendoza, 
Argentina, for Sunday lunch. Why is beef or lamb any different from wine? 
The New Zealand red meat industry seems to have missed this opportunity, and I'm at a 
loss to explain why. Is it because marketers inside commodity processing companies are 
97 
 
forced to help their companies survive by selling volume? Does the daily grind of selling 
indistinguishable tonnes of beef also grind down the imagination?  Since both creativity 
and innovation require time, an organizational environment that does not support such an 
ecosystem will always be vulnerable to being late to the next big thing. 
 
Figure 4.3: Triple Nine Fa m  beef fo  l nch in  Ch i ch ch  Ne  Zealand 
 
“It’s the best steak I’ve tasted in my whole  life . Octavio Moura Andrade, Brazilian beef 
farmer. (pictured right): Source: J Wilkes (2018)  
 
A New Zealand response from an ex CEO of a significant processor to an article I posted 
on the social media site LinkedIn went along these lines. I reported that I liked the 
Swedish business model example of on-farm killing and processing because of the 
benefits to animal welfare, craft processing, and also to premium positioning and 
branding. The response was, "This stuff just isn't real. In a 600kg prime steer, there is 
about 16kg of primals (that blokes like you like to eat), and most of the rest is 
manufacturing to some extent. It's true; commodity needs commodity meat plant 
economics to make it work, not a butcher with a truck!" Perhaps the USA hotdog market 
beckons. I submit this as an example of myopic thinking, which I have fought against 
from this project's beginning. Firmly held beliefs like this may limit the industry's ability 
to innovate and respond.  Why isn't New Zealand the market leader in nutritious, 
delicious grass-fed, gmo-free, antibiotic-free, and additive-free hotdogs? 
If the end consumer does not exist in the core of an enterprise mindset, not much will 
likely change within that enterprise. The comment offered about meat plant economics is 
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fair, but shifting volume does not necessarily match future requirements.  Accepting 
there is no other way, by definition, is myopic. 
Another interesting and recent red meat event in New Zealand also appears to ignore 
well-understood marketing principals. A decision by First Light to sell their premium 
Wagyu product line through a Supermarket setting would seem to be a defective sort. 
Their rib eye offering retailed at a significant premium ($100 per kilogram at the time of 
writing) over rival offerings from Silver Fern Farms and other red meat processors. Their 
packaging was mostly the same; however, the high level of marbling in Wagyu can make 
the meat appear fatty to those who don't understand,  believe in, or understand extensive 
marbling benefits. The meat is also much darker in colour. Not necessarily a bad thing, 
but something a consumer may view as a barrier to purchase.  
The example above provided an opportunity to view a FirstLight transvection. 
Wooliscroft et al. (2010:239) suggest, The den  f an ec i n  i  in e e ed in e e  
step along the way by which this flow through the marketing em a  acc m li hed.  
In this case, where is the differentiation? How does a consumer justify the high price 
when compared with Angus Pure? If one product looks much like the other product, 
price is highly likely to come into play. What will the consumer do? In the example 
provided, the FirstLight product was discounted to clear it. It had failed to sell before its 
due date.  
Martín-Herrán, Taboubi, and Zaccour (2011:285) extend myopia's scope and impact by 
suggesting it can be present in more than one part of the marketing system. They 
reported, A m ic e aile  i  an agen  ha  di ega d  he effec  f i  icing a eg  
n he e l i n f he e cei ed b and ali  and he efe ence ice.  In the case of 
First Light above it was clear the retailer was not concerned about the FirstLight brand. 
If they were, they would have presented the First Light offering in a premium format. In 
the trial initiative I experienced (New World store in St Martins, Christchurch), the 
supposedly premium FirstLight product was simply sold from the same chiller display as 
other existing commodity-based red meat. There was no attempt to differentiate. 
As a result, FirstLight's story was lost, consumers could not differentiate, and the product 
ended up being put on special, which damaged the brand's premium positioning. Why 
did the FirstLight marketers allow this situation to develop? Did the need to shift might 
99 
 
volume play a role? This example also demonstrates marketing myopia can be present in 
more than one part of the supply chain. This may even amplify the impacts of marketing 
myopia in a red meat enterprise, as I believe it did in this case. Poorly selected retailers 
can kill a brand quickly, and apart from acting as a defective sort, they can also display 
myopic behaviours at the same time, which can negatively impact their enterprises. 
Alderson (1957:232), a functionalist marketer, suggested, " he c n me  i  a blem 
solver with limited resources faced with choosing among alternatives, consistent with 
some objective." Understanding those objectives is likely to be a key element to success. 
Alderson (1957) was a champion of information exchange. Robert Keith (1960:35), an 
advocate for the buyer behaviour school of marketing, reminds marketing practitioners, 
"In today's economy the consumer, the man or the woman who buys the product, is at the 
absolute dead centre of the business universe." Knowledge from the functionalist and 
buyer behaviour marketing schools, combined with concepts from Alderson (1957), and 
Keith (1960), could help Firstlight think about their challenge above. 
4.7  Marketing Missing, Transvections ignored, Billions lost 
MacIntyre, Shailer, and Garland (2015) were tasked with reviewing the marbled grass-
fed beef Primary Growth Partnership (PGP), which underpinned the First Light 
program's development. In hei  e , he  ci ed The Ridde  In i e  Call to Arms 
report written in 2012. The report identified New Zealand food and beverage export 
earnings of NZD 25.3 billion FOB (free on board) were being converted to NZD 140 - 
200 billion in-market when ownership was transferred through transactions (purchase) to 
overseas consumers. In other words, New Zealand exporters were not the ones enjoying 
the very large profits stemming from their world-class food and beverage products. Why 
do processing companies' marketing professionals not study the gap between NZD 25.3 
billion and NZD 140  200 billion? This represents significant value not being captured 
by New Zealand enterprises.  
The report recommended that New Zealand businesses, including New Zealand red meat 
enterprises, should find ways to capture significantly more of this massive increase in 
value. The report suggested that if even 25% of additional value were captured, it would 
increase the FOB value of New Zealand's exports to $60 billion. Marshall, Avery, 
Ballard, and Johns (2012) suggested, "Urgent action is required from the agri-food 
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business sector leaders in partnership with Government. It is frustrating that such action 
has not occurred anywhere near the extent required, despite the frequent and consistent 
calls over recent years. There is an urgency for action because time is short, and New 
Zealand faces a mediocre economic future if it does not rapidly and significantly grow 
i  eal h and im l ane l  ec  i  eci  e ce .  This commentary suggests 
it is highly probable at least some traces of marketing myopia will be detected in the 
New Zealand agri-food sector.  
Lima and Giesbrecht da Silveira (2014:482) sound a warning to all those with high-end 
product aspirations suggesting, "With the risk of losing the motivations to purchase 
luxury goods due to commoditization, marketers need to formerly understand this 
phenomenon to initiate the necessary precautions to protect their brands." A company 
can very quickly get into trouble by positioning a once-exclusive brand as commonplace.   
Lima and Giesbrech da Silveira (2014) point out how 'Zarafication' disrupted the luxury 
fashion industry through their clothing designs imitating tier-one luxury brands' luxury 
attributes. How is this relevant to the New Zealand red meat industry? Jkyvelid (2016) 
states, Less than five years ago, in 2011, fast-fashion giant Zara opened its first store in 
Melbourne. The resulting cult-like following has been well documented. A year later, 
Za a  A alian ale  e ceeded $100 milli n remarkable growth for a new player in 
a highl  c m e i i e $19 billi n ind  g ing a  3% e  ann m.  
Through the selection of a supermarket channel, FirstLight may now be exposed to 
imitation by its competitors. As a result, they may become more vulnerable to downward 
pressure on pricing. The food and beverage equivalent of 'Zarafication.' It is often a 
chicken and egg scenario for producers and processors as they try to balance profitability 
with the need to sell volume. I believe that rather than this being a negative, it has the 
potential to be positive.  
Jkyvelid (2016) states, As Bonin e lain , Za a a ed a dem c a i a i n f fa hi n , 
reproducing catwalk designs at affordable prices by using lower grade fabrics and 
making them available to customers within two weeks of being designed. This compared 
to traditional fashion retailers where catwalk designs were not affordable or took 
months to become available." C ld he e be a Za a  m men   m del being de el ed 
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now or in the future that could turn the red meat industry on its head? I think the answer 
is yes, it is highly likely.  
Figure 4.4 below shows a beautifully presented Zara retail outlet. Zara marketers 
understand the importance of presentation.  Even though their offerings are mainstream, 
they still emulate the high-street credibility and mystique of their higher-cost luxury 
peers. Supermarkets also do this by attempting to curate red meat brands; however, there 
is an awful lot of smoke and mirrors involved, notably when you 'deep dive' into the 
supply chains providing the product being curated. Perhaps the most curated element, in 
the end, is the narrative. Supermarkets, it seems, invest more in marketing than red meat 
companies do. Why is this?   
 
Figure 4.4: Zara retail outlet. Source: (2016) Deakin Business School. 
 
4.8  Back to the Future: Lessons from the Past 
A guide to the building blocks for successful differentiation and 'premiumization' in the 
New Zealand red meat industry is freely available in the documented discussions and 
debates that form the twelve marketing schools. Each school provides clues to improving 
marketing performance, including advice from the commodity school. Jones, Shaw, and 
McLean (2011:42) suggest, "The most important cause of the paradigm shift in 
marketing thought, however, was the thinking of the dominant scholar of his time  Wroe 
Alderson. His numerous articles, marketing theory seminars, newsletters, and two 
seminal books (1957, 1965) resulted in or impacted most modern schools of thought, 
including marketing management, marketing systems, consumer behaviour, macro 
marketing, and exchange. Interestingly, Alderson's (1957) Marketing Behaviour and 
Executive Action was praised by the Ford Foundation as an exemplar of the direction in 
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hich b ine  ed ca i n needed  g  (Tadaje ki, 2006).  The point here is, there is 
almost no excuse for making elementary mistakes in marketing. The knowledge about 
how-to surmounts common marketing challenges has been available for a very long 
time. 
Alderson (1965:185) suggested six differential advantage strategies. These were market 
segmentation, selection of appeals, transvection, product improvement, process 
improvement, and product innovation. For example, the premium reputation New 
Zealand beef company FirstLight has enjoyed from the beginning was built on the 
company selling premium cuts directly to high-end restaurants. It is in this rarefied air 
they forged their initial premium reputation. Their decision to sell in the same channel 
(supermarkets) as their lesser ranked competitors, with a product that looks similar and 
costs much more, makes their offering susceptible to the process of commoditization.    
FirstLight provides an excellent example for marketers to learn from because they are an 
enterprise trying very hard to escape the gravitational pull of commodity beef. Their 
efforts demonstrate that, and even with deliberate intention, there are still huge 
challenges. The commitment and resilience required to successfully and permanently 
break free of the commodity trap are demanding and expensive. Any shortcuts risk 
damaging a brand's non-commodity positioning and being met with downward pricing 
pressure. This risks becoming vulnerable to becoming commodified once again a back 
to square one moment. Breaking free of gravity requires enormous horsepower. In the 
red meat world, horsepower can be translated into human and financial capital. Trying to 
escape the commodity trap short on either is unlikely to succeed.  
4.9  Deterioration, Proliferation and Escalation: An Escape from Commodity 
Trading? 
D A eni (2010:16) gge  c mm di i a i n i  ca ed by deterioration, proliferation, 
and e cala i n hen mena. D A eni gge ; 
Deterioration demonstrates the following signs: 
x A dominant low-cost competitor has emerged in your market. 
x The economies of scale enjoyed by the disrupting company make it impossible 
for you to compete on price. 
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x Customers are less and less willing to pay for additional benefits such as superior 
service and expertise. 
x Your margins and market share are falling even after you have lowered prices to 
compete. 
Proliferation is identified by: 
x The market is increasingly fragmented. 
x The value proposition is being undermined by new offerings targeting ever-
narrower market niches. 
x Attacks occur on many fronts, and you find you don't have the resources to fight 
marketing and innovation wars to protect against incursions. 
x The business is surrounded and under constant pressure to reduce prices. 
 Signs of Escalation are: 
x One competitor is making money by leading the escalation of benefits and 
lowering costs while you are trapped in a game of non-profitable catch-up. 
x You find the primary benefit which excited customers yesterday is taken for 
granted today and will be no more than entry stakes for tomorrow. 
x Your customers have the power to constantly demand more for less money. 
Ignoring these powerful influences can translate into an enterprise no longer playing 
where it has strengths or competitive advantage. In these settings, the edges of 
differentiation are quickly whittled down, and pressure on price increases. In the red 
meat industry, commoditization is often exacerbated by an enterprise's need to sell large 
inventories of producer products.  Attempting to do so presents a challenging 
environment in which to maintain a commitment to differentiation.  
These situations are often stimulated and amplified because of the speculation structured 
business models attached to these industries. Postponement or deferred differentiation 
may offer opportunities to reverse red meat transvections' polarity by encouraging 
consumers to initiate the provisioning system. Follow up research from this project will 




4.10  Evolving mindsets 
In innovation, being big is not always best. Slow responses to disruption stemming from 
cognitive biases (mindsets) favouring efficiency-driven processing may signal the 
presence of marketing myopia. At a time of great change in global red meat markets, you 
would expect to see increased signs of consumer-driven value-added products evolving 
from New Zealand. An examination of processor websites across the country suggests 
this may not be the case.  
It may be reasonable to suggest the red meat industry is slowly trying to shift from the 
non-interactive marketing schools (commodity, functional and regional) towards the 
interactive marketing schools (institutional, functionalist, managerial). Their current 
thinking would appear to be mostly anchored in the managerial camp. This marketing 
school has price, place, product, and promotion at its core, the famous 4 Ps. Of course, as 
Homburg et al. (2014:438) confirm, this approach is also known as strategic marketing 
and is, as they point out, he d minan  f m f ma ke ing da .   
One of the managerial approach's weaknesses is it views the world very much from the 
seller's side, or in red meat's case, the producer's side. This approach may dampen 
marketing innovation and prevent business models from adequately responding to shifts 
in consumer demand. This could explain why most processors are still just cutting up 
meat and putting it in a bag; all be it with a better narrative and a promise the beef being 
ld adhe e   an enf ced g ading em, f  e am le, Sil e  Fe n Fa m  Re e e 
g ade .  
This suggests that both producers and processors are distant from their customers and 
look the wrong way because the current approach ignores clear market signals. It would 
a ea  ha  e  li le ha  changed. Re i ance  change fi  Le i  (1960) he  f 
marketing myopia and further supports the possibility of marketing myopia existing in 
New Zealand red meat enterprises. Homburg et al. (2014) compare and contrast the 
managerial approach with Alderson's (1965) approach, which leveraged economics, 
anthropology, political science, psychology, and sociology to fully understand the 
marketing environment. Alderson's (1965) approach is arguably a richer way to view the 
world. It is more likely to create new, innovative, and much-needed options to help the 
industry break free from the commodity trap it is currently in.  
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Homburg et al. (2014:444) also pointed to intangibles like relationships and service 
offerings as tools to help marketers access differentiation opportunities. They cite 
Starbucks' example viewing their enterprise as a people business first and a coffee 
business second. Levitt (1960) suggests defining a business too narrowly has proven 
repeatedly to be a perilous strategy, mostly ending in failure, obsolescence, or 
demonstrating an inability to capture the rich profits of new opportunities.  Levitt cites 
the railroad, energy, and entertainment industries, all succumbing to the narrow 
definition downside. 
What business are New Zealand red meat producers and processors in? Is it the red meat 
business, or could it possibly be something else? The Triple Nine Farms prototype 
pushes the boundaries of definition and will experiment with craft meat positioning as 
the start-up is established. This project's prototype component will also investigate the 
functional foods sector, the retail sector, the digital environment, premium red meat 
opportunities such as grass-fed hotdogs, and examine opportunities to innovate red meat 
distribution dynamics. The trademark Triple Nine Craft Beef has been registered with 
additional trademarks to be added in the future. Notably, there is not one claim to 'craft' 
anything anywhere on the New Zealand Intellectual Property Office's trademark 
platform.  
W li c f  e  al. (2010:475) emind  f ma ke ing  c ea i e en ial, in ing  a 
more creative Aldersonian style reporting that, Alde n fel  ha  eal ad ance  in 
marketing knowledge could only come from the interaction of theory and empirical 
re ea ch.  In other words, you need to have some knowledge, but you also need to get 
 and i i  he c al face   ee and e e ience ha  i  g ing n f m he c me '  
perspective. This resonates with me for the same reason Wooliscroft et al. (2010) 
reported it resonated with another Alderson fan, Leonard Berry, an ex-President of the 
American Marketing Association.  
Berry (1991:1) suggested, "Marketing needs generalists as well as specialists; it needs 
scholars whose specialty is marketing rather than a subset of marketing." Berry (1991:4) 
understood single desk marketing schools had their limitations; for example, he 
highlighted, "Service quality is the foundation of services marketing. The textbooks stress 
the four P's of marketing  product, place, promotion, and price  but in a service 
business, none of this works very well without Q  for quality." In this reference, quality 
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would come from common sense and culture, not the managerial marketing school and 
the marketing mix. This type of observational or empirical research can add significant 
value to thinking about ways to leverage and apply marketing.  
This approach could add real value to the New Zealand red meat industry because it 
encourages thinking differently. This is where innovation begins. Poor marketing can 
often be attributed to the primary schools of marketing being ignored. For example, 
Wooliscroft et al. (2010:196) point out, "In the homogeneous market, it is assumed the 
market is cleared by price." This is a call to arms for differentiation. As previously 
discussed, red meat processing companies might create some new ideas by thinking 
deeply about what this means. The New Zealand red meat industry has not successfully 
dealt with its endemic challenges, which may mean the timing is fortuitous for such an 
exercise.  
New Zealand red meat industry communications, in general,  attempt to provide 
observers with an overall impression that the industry players are on the pathway to 
investing in marketing, and this may be true, but the reality more closely resembles price 
the advertising and promotion strategies required by organizations with a sales 
orientation. At this point, industry initiatives have not been able to mitigate the critical 
competitive challenges in the markets they serve. The FOB average export price of circa 
NZD 7.30 per kilo for beef moves up and down in small increments, remaining relatively 
stable, but has not transitioned the profit needle at this point.  There have been few 
initiatives that have successfully delivered premium returns to producers. The evidence 
suggests the opposite.  The financials extracted from a decade of annual reports listed in 
Table 4.0 at the end of this chapter reinforce this view.  
4.11  If i  i  b oken fi  i  
Between 2007 and 2017, Silver Fern Farms and Alliance Group Limited, two large New 
Zealand red meat cooperatives, collectively generated total revenues of NZD 40 billion 
achieving total earnings before tax of NZD 160 million. It is appreciated that cooperative 
structures are not designed to make profits in the same way as traditional organizations; 
however, the fact remains, the performance over the last decade is a significant warning 
to the broader industry that something is broken. The fact that evolution appears to have 
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been chosen over more paradigmatic innovation suggests a conservative acceptance of 
the status quo.  
Leading farmer cooperatives have, at this point, not been able to leverage their 
investments into expensive websites, premium office locations, highly paid staff, outside 
consulting expertise, premium packaging, or expensive in-market initiatives to improve 
performance dramatically. Marketing appears to be subordinate to selling, and effective 
marketing does much more than just chase dollars; it has a social construct. It is 
concerned with the well-being of all involved.   
Wroe Alderson was a Quaker with a social conscience, and he believed marketing had 
responsibilities beyond profit. The advent of fixed pricing is an excellent example of 
putting the consumer first. Kotler (1972) writes in support, "The business sector may 
have deluded itself into thinking that it has been serving the consumer well." Indeed, a 
statement worthy of deep reflection and contemplation by existing New Zealand red 
meat commodity trading cooperatives.  
Producing quality products and marketing them successfully to premium consumers 
requires a very different focus to delivering volume products for unseen consumers in 
commodity markets. The collaboration requirements and the mindsets across entire 
industry sectors need to factor in these differences for their value propositions to be 
successful. For example, Danish online publication (www.thelocal.dk) reports the 
Danish government is currently considering helping its farmers convert their farms from 
traditional farming operations to organic farming operations because, There is so much 
growth in sales, both on the domestic market and in a number of export markets, that we 
e i l  need  ge  la ge a ea  c n e ed  ganic e a i n,  according to 
k l gi k Land f ening  marketing director Henrik Hindborg.  
Wh  i  Denma k  g e nmen  ha ing ch a diffe en  c n e a i n? When I ha e 
ai ed he idea f  ganic  d c i n  Ne  Zealand d ce  and ce , he  
have quickly gone on the defensive, offering many reasons why the approach will not 
work in New Zealand. It is an interesting response because relying on grass-fed and pure 
credentials is fraught with danger in a country that is currently not as green as it purports 
to be, particularly around the confluence of farming operations and clean rivers. Joy 
(2020) states, The declining state of rivers, lakes, and wetlands was the most important 
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environmental issue for 80% of New Zealanders in a recent survey. It was also 
an election issue in 2017,  he e a  a clea  manda e f  ignifican  change.  A 
headline in the New Zealand Herald on April 26th, 2018, was, US back acke  bla  
P e Ne  Zealand  a  a myth.   
The future challenge to differentiate may be mitigated by merely accepting the 
commodity school's teaching: The clearance mechanism for homogeneous markets is the 
price. If one product looks like another product, a marketer should see flashing orange 
lights. It is the market's way of warning those looking for market access to premium 
consumers to think more deeply. There appears to be a perfect argument for a more 
rigorous intellectual effort given the current challenges of disruption, increased 
commoditization, and globalization. Enterprises faced with succeeding in these 
environments would most likely benefit from revisiting the more creative approaches to 
thinking about marketing.  
Perhaps an option for red meat processing firms caught in the commodity trap is to 
rethink small first and then scale up. Maybe a red meat company could consider 
investing in, creating, and developing highly differentiated artisanal product lines. For 
example, aged beef, pastrami, bresaola, lamb prosciutto, premium frankfurters, single-
origin burger patties, salami, and so forth. Products like these could be offered along 
with many other high-value charcuterie options. In practice, most sizeable red meat 
organizations appear to persist with thinking in tonnes because their short-term challenge 
is always to clear volume. This is challenging because it continually works against their 
long-term aspiration to transition-to-value. Such an approach mirrors the physics battle 
between the main rotor and tail rotor of a helicopter. They are always fighting against the 
force created by the other to keep the aircraft in flight. In the end, control comes from the 
pilot. In red meat, market control ideally comes from marketing.  
Why hasn't the New Zealand red meat industry created its own Hellers 
(www.hellers.co.nz)? A Christchurch based company employing over 400 staff and 
producing 500 tonnes of delicatessen meats per year. Their estimated turnover is NZD 
200 million, and according to Rangatira Investments 2017 Annual Report, Hellers are 
performing very well and continuing to expand and grow their market in international 
markets. Rangatira delivered an 8.8% return to shareholders, which is nearly ten times 
greater than either Silver Fern Farms or Alliance Group Limited's ten-year average of 
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.25% and .27 %, respectively. Figure 4.5 below showcases the Hellers manufacturing 
facility in Christchurch. While the products from Hellers are far from artisanal, the 
company does show what adding value can do for an organization's bottom line profit. 
 
Fig e  Helle  Ch i ch ch Man fac ing facili  Image So ce  Christchurch NZ 2018 
 
In the New Zealand red meat industry, the goal is clearing volume. When volume is the 
goal, the likelihood of a business adopting a standardized marketing approach increases. 
The firm's orientation is likely to be sales, not marketing. Aspinwall (1958:435) alludes 
to this tendency in his study of the commodity school, suggesting, The ma ke ing 
characteristics of a product determine the most appropriate and economical method for 
di ib ing i .  Arguably, in commoditized markets, even marketing approaches become 
c mm di i ed. Thi  i  a el  imal, and D A eni (2010:1) a n , E e hing 
commoditizes over time. The edges and points of difference get worn off by the 
competition. The facets of diamonds are worn away, and you are left with a piece of 
glass. I  i  ea   imi a e and ha d  inn a e . D A eni a g e  ha  he h e -
competition created in commoditized markets destroys value and drives firms out of 
business.   
Reiterating, marketing as a discipline has twelve currently well-accepted schools, all 
with their theories, and according to Sheth et al. (1988:3), there are currently five areas 
of intense debate. Tapping into a century of knowledge, debate, and intellectual rivalry is 
the right way to pressure test approaches. The functionalist school, managerial school, 
buyer behaviour school, commodity school, and organizational dynamics school, to 
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name a few, all offer excellent foundations for exploring and developing an effective 
marketing strategy. In researching the different marketing school's philosophies, I have 
been able to consider the New Zealand red meat industry with fresh eyes, and I feel 
confident to challenge its direction. The marketing school debate positions marketing as 
a combination of art and science. This is useful in thinking about how to leverage 
elements from individual marketing schools. For example, the differences between the 
functionalist and managerial schools could help shape thinking about market entry.  
4.12 Volume shouts above the customer 
The problem of low returns is supposedly well understood, but is it? The evidence tends 
to suggest otherwise; for example, Silver Fern Farms reported a loss of NZ $30.6 million 
in 2017. Can such a low return be linked to ineffective marketing?  Has marketing been 
forgotten or underutilized in a dynamically developing red meat world? Drucker 
(1958:259) states, "In a developing economy, marketing is, of course, all of this. But 
also, in an economy that is striving to break the age-old bondage of man to misery, want, 
and destitution, marketing is also the catalyst for the transmutation of desires into 
accomplishments, and the development of responsible economic leaders and informed 
economic citizens."  
The Red Meat Industry Report (2015) Pa h a  to Long-Term S ainabili  provides 
strong evidence that the problems are well understood and as far back as the early 1990  
economists like Peter Harris from the Council of Trade Unions (CTU) were suggesting 
the industry, "Staggers from crisis to crisis because the cycle traps it into a short term 
commodity situation, trading unprofitably with diminishing equity"...Harris went 
on...."Meat companies have low equity, high fixed costs, and excess capacity, forcing 
them to maximize throughput to spread overheads; individually, each company under 
invests in product and market development, training, and other investments that could 
improve returns in the long run; companies pay above actual market prices for stock to 
ensure throughput which depletes equity further, and the company begins the next 
season in an even worse position. The industry never gets into a position where it is 
responding to long term market imperatives." Thi   Si  G aeme Ha i n  
thoughts referred to previously, so what has changed in 2020?  
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The report points to excess capacity, inefficient plant, out-dated technology, over-
investment in procurement, and insufficient marketing investment. The Red Meat report 
states, "Production of red meat will never be as efficient as the production of milk. Red 
meat has to out-compete dairying for land by having a much greater focus on the final 
consumer and the value-added opportunities of that food. It can do this because a 
significant proportion of red meat is sold directly to the final consumer. Unfortunately 
for New Zealand, the industry's behaviour and its structure militate against a successful 
consumer and value add focus, helping to ensure that dairying continues to acquire more 
land.  This sounds like the industry summing up its problem. The report's thrust was to 
create a single desk like Fonterra and trim out duplicated costs by rationalizing the 
sector. This style of thinking suggests more efficient commodity trading is the desired 
outcome.  
Marketers seeking premium returns will need to take a different path. They will need to 
acknowledge the current state-of-play is problematic first; then, some past ideas may 
offer them solutions. Alderson and Martin (1965) developed the law of exchange to 
explain why two parties will enter a transaction. In developing their law, they also 
outlined the drivers of an exchange, and employing this approach can open rich veins of 
new possibilities. It provides a marketer with direct knowledge about what is going on in 
the customer's world, and when this is hooked to an innovation agenda, new 'customer 
satisfactions' can emerge.  
Reekie and Savitt (1982) remind marketing practitioners in the New Zealand red meat 
industry, " Marketing is multi-faceted and describes a societal institution and an 
organizational function as well as prescribing a philosophy of decision making. In all 
three of these dimensions, the main concern is understanding how markets work and how 
market participants behave." When an enterprise is under constant pressure to sell, the 
ability to stay in such a philosophical zone is severely compromised. The 'global' nature 
of marketing's thinking becomes an obstacle to an enterprise with a short-term focus on 
volume. Reekie and Savitt (1982) highlight what goes missing in such a situation, 
stating, "As a philosophy of decision making marketing is the process of first determining 
and then fulfilling consumer wants. It is premised on a recognition of the heterogeneity 
found in real-life markets and on the appreciation of how decision-makers go about the 
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matching of market offerings with market demands. The want satisfaction is the prime 
consideration, not Pareto optimality." 
How can it be that three of the most significant primary producing nations in the world, 
New Zealand, Australia, and the United States have so many struggling farmers? 
Forming these countries' backbones, the men and women working on the land should be 
earning better returns for feeding consumers. Undoubtedly, the best products in the 
world should attract the best prices. This point was driven home in a conversation I had 
with a beef farmer's sister the other day. She is a young, independent, new generation 
farmer in the process of completing her Master's degree in Finance. Her excellent 
question to me was politely blunt. She asked, "Why are we selling our lovingly reared, 
grass-fed, beautiful animals for such ridiculous prices? We need to stop doing it now." 
William Lesser (1993:4) understood this viewpoint well. In his meat marketing 
publication, he suggests, "Livestock producers share their myopic world view with other 
mass-production industries. Where technological change and lower unit costs for larger 
operations are prevalent, the urge to produce, produce, produce becomes irresistible. 
Firms become product, rather than consumer-orientated." Alde n  (1957:69) k n 
product differentiation stated, P g e i e diffe en ia i n f d c  and e ice  is 
he ke   defining he al e  c ea ed b  ma ke ing.  In many ways, this sums up the 
challenge faced by red meat producers and processors.  
Poor application of basic marketing principals appears to have contributed to the red 
meat industry becoming incarcerated by production era mentality. This approach is no 
longer working, and industry financials support this assertion. Doyle (2000:299) 
highlights the jigsaw piece that is missing and suggests, The e i  a a ad  in h   
management view marketing. On the one hand, marketing has become accepted as the 
central driver of shareholder value. Every world-class company now puts building long-
term relationships with customers at the forefront of strategy. Yet while the role of 
marketing in achieving competitiveness and creating value is undisputed, the place of 
ma ke ing fe i nal  a ea  inc ea ingl  e i ned.   
McEachern and Schröder (2004:497) appear to agree, advising those addressing the red 
meat challenge to remember, "Superior knowledge of customers' perceptions of value is 
recognized as a critical success factor in today's competitive marketplace." I am 
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confident Wroe Alderson (1957) would say that this is all part of the information of 
exchange, and he would certainly say that having a full, deep understanding of all the 
relevant information would be necessary before considering the optimal approach for 
de igning he e change be een a d ce  d c  and a c n me .   
Alderson (1957:195) originally suggested information exchange was the basis of 
marketing activity and was responsible for the dynamics between consuming and 
supplying groups. Flowing from this concept was the idea of potency, which was used in 
conjunction with explaining the power of assortment. Bagozzi (1975) suggested, The 
beha i  f e change i  he ac  f inc ea ing ne  enc  f a men  b  
e changing i em  f a men  i h an he  a .  Bagozzi indicates that for an 
exchange to happen, he i em  f he e changing a ie  m  e  me f m f 
al e.  Houston and Gassenheimer (1987) pushed the value concept further and 
introduced extrinsic and intrinsic value.   
This is interesting for marketers in the red meat industry because it potentially separates 
thinking about utility and emotion. For example, Houston and Gassenheimer (1987) 
suggest that extrinsic value is derived from the marketplace and intrinsic value comes 
from elsewhere. They use the example of sentimental value. This is where provenance 
and narrative can be leveraged. Getting-to-grips with what drives exchange brings home 
the critical importance of understanding all the elements at play. This is fertile ground 
for developing differentiated offerings and allows the marketer to tap into the buyer 
behaviour school of marketing, another rich marketing knowledge.  
Drawing on marketing's existing theories and laws can be leveraged to cross-check all 
doors. It can facilitate innovation from paddock to plate, and indeed it should. The latest 
KPMG (2017) Agribusiness Agenda report points to the future of New Zealand red meat. 
The agribusiness professionals at the firm suggest change is in the air stating, "We 
believe the future for the New Zealand agri-food sector is as an artisan, niche producer 
of premium-quality, safe and sustainable food and beverage, fibre and imbe  d c .   
From a New Zealand red meat industry perspective, this will require an enormous 
change in the way producers and processors think and act. Providing food at the artisanal 
le el i  an en i el  diffe en  ball game. Gl bal head f KPMG s agri-business Ian 
Proudfoot suggests, A  he c e f hi  e  i  a ingle, im le belief: ha   cceed 
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in a world that is changing, and will continue to change, rapidly, the ultimate consumer 
of the product must be central to everything that we do.  Achieving this aspirational goal 
will require the agribusiness sector to rethink and reframe where marketing sits. Beyond 
the farm gate, creating value to transition the industry from volume to value will requires 
careful attention to how products are branded, positioned, and marketed.  
4.13  A Decade of Poor Performance: The Financials 
Beef and Lamb New Zealand Limited (2019) commissioned and released a report boldly 
titled, Sha ing he F e f Ne  Zealand  Red Mea  Ind .  The report contains 
contemporary ideas about where the red meat industry is heading and why. 
Disappointingly, there is nothing genuinely transformational or newly presented in 
industry trends, but it is useful to see them reinforced. The seven areas shown as priority 
areas for action are: 
1. Exporting a food culture - Continue the push towards value-added food products 
tied to a unique New Zealand culture 
2. Maximize co-products - Ensure we get the most possible value from co-products 
both to drive profitability and hedge against a rise in meat alternatives  
3. Reframing sustainability - Take charge of the sustainability debate by defining 
our story and telling it more effectively  
4. Driving transparency beyond traceability - Using the right tools to make sure our 
g ea  d c  can e idence hei  g ea ne   
5. Own new premium narratives - C n in e  de el  Ne  Zealand  nique 
premium attributes and narrative and communicate it to consumers across global 
markets  
6. Lead the health debate - Firmly establish our health credentials and engage with 
 heal h ibe   
7. Set up systems for collaboration and innovation - To unlock the potential of the 
sector  
The la  decade f financial  f m  f Ne  Zealand  la ge  ed mea  ce ing 
companies has not been stellar. Why is that? What elements present in the market have 
meant that two companies turning over billions of dollars and employing thousands of 
people to do so have returned such poor results? Table 4.0 below highlights the tragic 
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performance record of the New Zealand red meat industry. Could it be that marketing 
myopia existed then, and could it be that marketing myopia exists now? This research 
has been tasked with finding that out. 
 
       
Table 4.0: A Decade of Poor Performance. Source: Annual reports from New Zealand 
Companies Office.  
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PART III:  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Chapter Five: Research Methodology: Qualitative interviewing, 
   transvection and immersive prototyping technique.  
 
Key Points 
x Industry Deep Dive: Three lines of inquiry 
x Marketing Myopia can be observed 
x Pent up Frustration in the New Zealand red meat industry exposed 
 
5.1  The Research Question 
Does the New Zealand red meat industry suffer from marketing myopia? Yes? No? How 
did I find this out? What methods and approaches were used? Was the use of one way 
sufficient, or did it need more than one method? The challenge was completely 
unknown. No one had researched this aspect of the red meat industry before. My 
approach to the research design was to err on the conservative side, and I selected 
multiple methods. Early on, adopting this approach ensured the research output had the 
inherent ability to evolve and pivot if required. As it turned out, pivots were unnecessary, 
apart from a prototype pivot to digital during Covid 19, which was towards the end of 
the project. Doing so provided additional insights to add to the final research result.  
The environment this research inhabited was dynamic. The New Zealand red meat 
industry has been operating in one of the most disruptive periods in its history. 
Successfully navigating the study through such a challenging period, validated the multi-
content approach. Its robustness ensured the data required was collected. The methods 
selected also added value to the entire project by offering different perspectives sourced 
from different contextual backgrounds. For example, interviewees were drawn from red 
meat marketing, finance, farms, processing operations, retailers, and consumers.  
The conceptual map provided below in Figure 5.0 illustrates how the integrated 
methodology deployed in this project worked cohesively inside a customized research 
system. The em  de ign in en i n a  to reach out and explore the dynamics in the 
New Zealand red meat industry. Its goal was to obtain insightful data to drive results 
capable of successfully answering the research question. In essence, the conceptual map 
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takes the reader through the e ea ch jec  j ne  from beginning to end. The 
project commenced with the researcher pondering the endemic poor performance of the 
New Zealand red meat industry. It progressed to the development of a research question 
and to answer the question it leaned on two key themes emerging from the literature. The 
intelligence from each core theme was applied to the New Zealand red meat sector using 
a multi-content methodology. This approach extracted data, reported results, undertook 
analysis, and was able to reach a conclusion. 
The final results showcased real-world insights from a comprehensive exploration of the 
marketing dynamics inside the industry. According to Oxman, (2003:69), Concepts are 
part of our everyday life; they present our understanding of the world, and govern our 
thoughts and our communication with the world. The way we think, the way we 
experience, and what we do is much a matter of our conceptual understanding of the 
world around us. Concepts are, therefore, intellectual constructs and a form of 
ideational structure. According to diverse theories, they can be innate, formed from 
experience, or formed from other concepts.   
Figure 5.0 presents the conceptual map of this research project and is supported by 
visuals detailing the method steps (Figure 5.1)  and a timeline (Figure 5.2). Together, 
these figures highlight the intellectual constructs of this research project from beginning 
to end. The combination of conceptual map and methodology provides a guide 
explaining how the research program was constructed using Le i  (1960) he  f 
ma ke ing m ia and Alde n  (1965) c nce  f an ec i n. Both concepts 
emerged from the literature review as ideal theories to underpin this project. Both 
ideologies have proved invaluable. 
Dynamically, the two theories formed the connective tissue between the academic 
literature and the applied research, which powered this project. Levitt (1960) researched 
marketing myopia across a range of industries, and his matrix of four preconditions 
proved incredibly useful in exploring and identifying signs of marketing myopia in the 
red meat sector.  Levitt believed that creating customer satisfactions was the fundamental 
driver of any business.  
He felt distractions like a belief in endless growth markets, or a mass production 
orientation were not always conducive to delivering these customer satisfactions. His 
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research demonstrated that enterprises with mindsets that championed these positions 
often struggled to perform. His term for this dynamic was marketing myopia. Belief in 
ma  d c i n and endle  g h ma ke  e e en   f Le i  f  ec ndi i n  
for marketing myopia. The other two conditions are a belief that no viable substitutes are 
available, and a willingness to over invest in research and development in existing hero 
products (cash cows) of the day. Levitt described this situation as a preoccupation with 
improving an existing product.  
Marnali and Diderich (2017:36) point , Al h gh a m bile c m anie  en  
millions of dollars on consumer research, they did not ask open-ended questions that 
ld all  c n me   gi e ice  hei  need .  Thi  e l ed in he American car 
companies missing the emergence of consumer demand for smaller cars. Similarly, the 
New Zealand red meat industry continues to make claims about the security of future red 
meat demand.  
A contemporary illustration  of such a preference would be evident if an automotive 
company chose  to continue investing significant capital  into pursuing further research 
and development of internal combustion engines at a time when electric energy is 
coming of age. Lambert (2019) states, After reigning in the auto industry as the 
powertrain of choice for a century, the internal combustion engine is finally dying. Now 
even Daimler says that it is stopping development of new internal combustion engines to 
f c  n elec ic ca .  If Daimler were to ignore the emergence of electric cars, then 
according to Levitt (1960), such a decision would meet one of the four preconditions for 
a diagnosis of marketing myopia.  
As the conceptual map in Figure 5.0 bel  highligh  Le i  (1960) preconditions were 
extracted from the literature review. The growth precondition described as a distraction 
earlier, is identified in the conceptual map. During the research design phase when the 
qualitative question set was being created,  the facets of the growth precondition (along 
with the other three preconditions) were taken into account in the design of the 
qualitative question set. For example, question eight asks the interviewee: What could 
the industry look at improving where marketing is concerned? Is there anything else that 
can make a more significant difference than marketing? For example, Robotics. 
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The reference to robotics was an exploratory question designed to open up the 
conversation around operational efficiency without prompting for a response that would 
support a belief in growth markets. I designed the entire question set to work in this way 
to effectively canvas a host of key issues related to the critical knowledge extracted from 
he li e a e. Clea l , e n e  f m he c h  ha    align i h Le i  
(1960) preconditions, are also likely to support the presence of marketing myopia, or at 
the very least indicate the possibility. In this way, concepts from the literature and 
existing theories have been fused within this research.  
Another example concerns sorting, an Aldersonian (1965) concept belonging to 
transvection, an innovative, end-to-end, marketing provisioning system.  Question 14 
asked: Do you have a view on why the value chain (transvection) is so distorted? 
Example one. The average payment to a farmer for beef is $5.50 per kilogram, and the 
average price per kilo exported is $7.10 FOB.  Example 2. Foodstuffs in the South Island 
reportedly posted EBIT of $300 million in 2017. That is triple what SFF has earned over 
the last decade.  This question made the interviewees think and enabled a deep dive into 
the supply chain dynamics of the industry.  
The line of this questioning also tested whether interviewees were reductionist or open 
loop thinkers. This assisted the researcher develop an understanding of whether feedback 
loops played a role in helping industry participants understand complex problems like 
endemic financial underperformance.  The benefit of such an exploration is its 
contribution to investigating for the presence of marketing myopia. For example, if poor 
returns across the transvection are not recognized or understood as defective sorts, this 
indicates the enterprise is missing critical information exchange. The missing 
intelligence links to marketing myopia being present within an organization.  
Another benefit of Alde n  (1965) transvection concept, was it equipped the research 
with an auditing function. This was engaged to assess red meat enterprises' financial 
flows. This is also where he addi i n f a li e  m del ( e) came into its own 
enabling man  f he jec  finding   be a lied and e ed. The conceptual map 
demonstrates how the confluence of each data stream adds weight to the efficacy of the 
data collection and in doing so, plays a key role in strengthening the outputs, and most 







Figure 5.1: Integrated Methodology Steps. Source: J Wilkes (2020) 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Integrated Methodology Timeline. Source: J Wilkes (2020) 
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All three methods in the Conceptual Framework had degrees of iteration. The research 
project contained some non-linear elements. For example, the transvection was 
continually changing as new knowledge emerged.  As this occurred, the business model 
was adapted where possible. All three methods were applied to some degree in parallel. 
5.2  Research Design Methods: Background and Rationale 
According to York University (2017), A e ea ch e i n i  a clea , f c ed, c nci e, 
c m le  and a g able e i n a nd hich  cen e   e ea ch.  As a Doctor of 
Business Administration candidate, this research in my mind was never going to be 
designed as a purely academic research exercise. Understanding the red meat industry's 
marketing orientation in an applied' way was a key aspiration, objective, and goal of this 
jec . Ackn ledging he 'a lied  c m nen  f hi  e ea ch i  c i ical  
understanding the rationale behind the research design, the researcher's philosophy, and 
his choice of multi-content research methodology. 
The multi-content research process was chosen because no prominent, singular, or 
perfect method stood out as 'the one.' I wanted a flexible research framework that could 
analyze data from multiple streams.  Interviews on their own would never have been 
sufficient for me to feel comfortable enough to stand resolutely behind the research 
findings. What will this approach be called? Extended interviewing, industry immersion, 
and applied prototyping.  
The idea behind this research project was to understand whether marketing myopia could 
be identified in the New Zealand red meat industry. In exploring the issue, it was hoped 
the findings would improve the overall performance of enterprises in the industry by 
highlighting the critical importance of the marketing function.  
5.3  Three Lines of Inquiry 
The theories derived from Levitt (1960) and Alderson (1965) provided the nucleus for 
the research design to be developed around. Establishing this research direction was 
achieved by deploying, and then following, three lines of inquiry. All three contained the 




x Inquiry Line 1.  
Qualitative interviews: These were utilized at the beginning of the research program to 
report the findings from extensive semi-structured interviews held with sixteen senior 
key red meat industry personnel. The interviews explored their views and perspectives 
gained through their red meat expertise to determine what they thought the industry's 
problems were, mainly regarding financial performance.  
This immediately positioned me as the researcher, into the world of red meat, as seen 
through the eyes of those operating in the red meat world and making their living from it. 
Using this methodology, I tapped into the interviewee cohort's experiences, motivations, 
and beliefs about the New Zealand red meat industry. The qualitative approach delivered 
the added benefit of being acknowledged as an excellent approach to go beyond just the 
numbers, which helped to round out the research design. Taking this approach allowed 
me to take a deep dive into the New Zealand red meat industry's sociological and cultural 
side and I was able to extract some useful insights.  
x Inquiry Line 2.  
Transvection: Selected was my tool of choice for 'opening the kimono' on red meat 
industry value chains. Employing transvection mapping has enabled this research to 
analyze the flow of money from behind he fa m ga e  he end c n me  la e. 
Transvection also augmented findings from the qualitative interviews to balance any 
conclusions that were flavoured by cognitive biases.  
Leveraging transvection focused on tracking and auditing financial flows.  Specifically, I 
investigated the producer and the end consumer's price chains to understand how profits 
were distributed across the enterprises involved in producing, processing, distributing, 
and retailing red meat. For example, did supermarket owners generate more profit per 
kilo of beef than producers? What role did red meat processors play? I wanted to 
understand where, how, and who the money flowed to. 
Transvection acts in the same way as radar, sending out investigative signals to various 
points across the value-chain (transvection) and then plotting, mapping, and analyzing 
the pricing information that comes back. Inconsistencies, unfairly apportioned profits, 
inequitable ratios, and negative constructs were retrieved, collated, and classified as 
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defective sorts. A Defective sort is an area in the transvection identified as likely to be 
problematic. 
Problematic hotspots may support marketing myopia, because the strategic decisions 
made regarding these elements, price, for example, are usually made by marketing. 
Where the price was deemed to be unacceptable by a producer or processor, remedial 
action was required. The application of transvection as a research method exposed many 
situations where poor financial results were baked-in.  
x Inquiry Line 3.  
Immersive Prototyping: The commercialization of a new red meat business was 
commissioned to test, extend, and apply research findings in the real world. A brand-new 
enterprise Triple Nine Farms was created directly using the outputs from the applied 
research. It was, in essence, a start-up enterprise and was used as a testbed for this 
research. The emerging factory shop signage is shown in Figure 5.0 below.   
The research design employed in this project is unique to the New Zealand red meat 
industry. I know of no other program or project where an applied researcher has used 
findings from traditional research methods in a  brand-new red meat business enterprise 
explicitly developed as an integral component of the research undertaking. The 
knowledge extracted from the interviews and transvection processes were tested in the 








To facilitate and augment full immersion I also designed and built an Argentinean 
Barbeque Grill, pictured in Figure 5.1 below. The grills weigh 500kg and is made with 
stainless steel and constructed in partnership with Trinder Engineering in Nelson, New 
Zealand. The grills retail for NZD $15,000 plus GST.   
 
Figure 5.4: Triple Nine Argentinean grills were constructed to augment full immersion.  
Source: (2020) J Wilkes photography 
 
 
5.4  Research Propositions 
In discussions around organizational failure, Gallo (2016) suggested,  "Some of the 
failure is likely attributable to the fact that many company leaders, including executives, 
have what's called marketing myopia  a nearsighted focus on selling products and 
services, rather than seeing the "big picture" of what consumers really want." Gall  
(2016) insight suggests that marketing myopia could explain the poor financial 
performance of many red meat enterprises in the New Zealand red meat industry. This 
insight by Gallo (2016) opened up this research project to several propositions, which 




Proposition 1.  
Behavioural observations can diagnose marketing myopia, in this specific case, or 
generally? 
Marketing myopia may well be a behaviour that can be observed, and if myopia can be 
observed, the argument that is can also be diagnosed is supported. I believe this is a 
realistic proposition to make given senior red meat industry personnel are immersed in 
the culture and cultural subsystems of the organizations they work in, for, and actively 
represent. Senior players are likely to have high levels of exposure to the political, 
informational, behavioural, and structural systems behind the enterprises they inhabit. It 
is not unreasonable to expect that they may also have some credible input into whether 
they think marketing myopia does or does not have a presence in the New Zealand red 
meat industry. 
Senior red meat executives and industry people are privy to what goes on behind 'closed 
doors,' and they are undoubtedly capable of observing and commenting on behaviour. 
This includes marketing myopia influenced behaviour. Schein (2010), at a Meta level, 
advocates that culture can be grouped into three areas, artifacts, espoused beliefs and 
values, and fundamental underlying beliefs. His research supports this proposition, 
which is marketing myopia may be diagnosed through behavioural observation.   
The visual graphic in Figure 5.5 below depicts culture and highlights the potential of 
behavioural observation to fully understand what is going on in an organization. This 
would include understanding the cultural nuances behind how the organization thinks 
about, engages with, and interacts with the marketing discipline in the context of their 
organization and how their organization uses 'marketing' as a tool to ensure their 




Figure 5.5 Organizational Culture and Leadership. Source: www.sidewaysthoughts.com (2010) 
 
Proposition 2.  
Outcome observations can also diagnose marketing myopia via quantitative secondary 
analysis that is consistent with proposition one. 
It is highly probable that marketing myopia can also be diagnosed through observations 
stemming from the application of Alderson's (1965) transvection theory. Transvection 
maps money flows and follows each sort, transaction, and transformation required to 
deli e  an animal f m add ck  la e. T acking an animal  j ne  f m its natural 
state on a farm (in nature) through a range of transformative processes into the 
consumer's hands is relatively straightforward. The outcomes of this process have been 
observable and easily accessible. For this reason, they have the potential to provide 
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valuable quantitative data to this project, supporting proposition two at the same time. 
Trading activities of large meat processors are also 'observable'; for example, the average 
FOB (free on board) export price per kilogram has been retrieved from easily accessible 
data.  
Processor profitability and performance are also reviewable and observable through 
Annual Reports and other industry media and discussions. For example, the concept of 
transitioning to value is regularly reported in the press. These reports indicate the 
opinions of those responsible for red meat leadership. The cross-referencing of these 
sources with opinions from senior executives has helped this researcher compare the 
observed rhetoric with reality.  
Proposition 3.  
These outcomes are not an inevitable outcome of the New Zealand red meat industry's 
nature, but rather, are delivered by its myopic management? 
According to Levitt (1960), the current level of performance in the New Zealand red 
meat industry must be primarily attributed to the leadership and executive teams who are 
charged with the responsibility of leading, running, and managing red meat enterprises. 
Of course, these responsibilities are shared across the broader management, who also 
plays a key role, particularly when it comes to implementing the organization's strategy 
day-to-day.   
In business, if performance is low, you generally review what is going on, reflect, and 
then introduce appropriate remedial changes to surmount the issue of non-performance. 
If a failure occurs or performance is lacking, then according to Levitt (1960), the 
outcomes are consequences of policy developments and strategic settings engineered by 
those empowered to make such decisions.  
5.4.1  Proposition Summary 
Strong leadership and performance are going to be, more often than not, observable. A 
consumer can also experience a strong performance, and this interaction is also 
observable. For example, a great restaurant experience, an enjoyable flying experience, 
or a memorable shopping experience. What is it about leaders and managers of highly 
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successful businesses that make them stand out? Can the New Zealand red meat industry 
learn anything from other sectors operating in highly competitive markets? Can this 
learning behaviour be observed anywhere in the New Zealand red meat industry? Is there 
a relationship between marketing myopia and leadership? 
More often than not, a great experience is delivered through an effective strategy brought 
to life by excellent in-market execution. In the red meat industry, there is no reason for 
this process to be any different. Poor consumer experiences should be observable and 
easy to detect. An observation of consistently poor performance also signals something 
may be wrong with the business model. Marketing myopia is not automatic. For 
example, in the New Zealand red meat industry, the boards and senior executives are the 
enterprise custodians, ultimately responsible for delivering a solid experience. The 
absence of one is likely to be detectable through direct observation.  
During this project, I travelled to Argentina, Australia, United Kingdom, Asia, and the 
United States to better understand international consumers' attitudes towards New 
Zealand red meat. While those experiences are not extensively or directly reported in this 
research, the experiences contribute to the immersion aspects that support this research 
project's methodology. Figure 5.6 below was taken during my visit to the Borough 
markets in London. 
 
Figure 5.6: A scene from my trip to the famous Borough Markets, one of the oldest 




5.5  Methodological Overview 
5.5.1  Trade Interviews (Qualitative)   
The primary research method used for this research has been qualitative, relying on a 
series of semi-structured interviews (as introduced above) with key industry personnel. 
This was to investigate if a myopic managerial mindset could be identified within the 
New Zealand red meat industry. As a management consultant, I have been fortunate to 
build an extensive and diverse network of agri-business professionals. To provide 
qualitative data for this research, I have leveraged my contacts to access a group of high 
calibre people from across the red meat industry. Interviewees were drawn from finance, 
marketing, production, retailing, processing, farming, science and technology, and agri-
business. 
The recruitment focus was specifically designed to ensure the research was populated 
with: 
x A diversity of perspectives and opinions. 
x A representation at each key sort, transformation, and transaction between 
the gate and the plate. 
x Fresh eyes and fresh perspectives to provide a view from the outside. 
x Experienced eyes and real-world perspectives to provide a view from the 
inside.  
x Real depth and detail about what is going on in the New Zealand red meat 
industry.   
x Real insights and hopefully, some valuable insights as well.  
x Feedback from brave people, whose industry knowledge and expertise are 
widely respected.   
Individuals were qualified as suitable after an initial qualifying conversation with 
prospective candidates. My primary goal was to select individuals that were prepared to 
provide candid responses and full disclosure of their opinions on the New Zealand red 
meat industry. I made sure I chose balanced individuals who were not overly biased one 
way or the other. The research objectives were made very clear to interviewee 
candidates. All research was conducted in line with the University of Otago's ethics 
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guidelines. The critical requirement for the exchange of information was anonymity. 
This request has been fully respected.    
Interview Questionnaire Set 
Introduction was a five minute preamble. J Wilkes outlined his research explaining 
marketing myopia and its role in the research. Marketing myopia as a concept was 
explained to the interviewee cohort as a condition that could adversely impact 
gani a i nal e f mance. Le i  (1960) f  ec ndi i n   managemen  m h  
were outlined at the beginning of each interview to set the scene. The four key themes 
were described as belief in unending growth, a belief that there were no substitutes, too 
much faith in mass production, and finally, a preoccupation to improving the current 
product.  
1. How do you think the New Zealand red meat industry is travelling from a 
financial, cultural, and innovation standpoint? Is the sector positioned where it 
needs to be to thrive into the future, given the evidence shows it hasn't succeeded 
for a very long time? 
2. What does marketing mean to you? Could you describe/explain your 
understanding of the marketing function? 
3. What do you think marketing should be able to deliver for the New Zealand red 
meat industry? 
4. What do you think the discipline of marketing has delivered to the red meat 
industry to date?  
5. How well represented and influential is the marketing function at the boardroom 
level and in the 'C' suites of New Zealand red meat industry enterprises? Is the 
voice of marketing being heard, or is the voice of optimization and efficiency 
louder? Where does the customer feature? 
6. What is leadership's role in directing, supporting, and providing the resources for 
marketing? 
7. How effectively do you think New Zealand red meat is marketed? Can you think 




8. What could the industry look at improving where marketing is concerned? Is 
there anything else that can make a more significant difference than marketing? 
For example, Robotics. 
9. Why do you think the New Zealand red meat industry has struggled to produce 
acceptable returns for its producers and processors for the last ten years? 
10. What is your view on the future of New Zealand red meat? Would you invest? 
Will things get better? Why? When? How?   
11. What is your view on alternative proteins? We see everything from cricket flour 
to test-tube burgers. Should red meat producers be fearful? 
12. Is the industry marketing itself successfully enough and strong enough to resist 
losing further market share to competitive substitutes? 
13. What would you do if you were a red meat producer to earn more and secure 
your future? Would you consider growing soybeans and raising crickets? Is it 
time to move out of animal production into crop production?  
14. Do you have a view on why the value chain (transvection) is so distorted? 
Example one. The average payment to a farmer for beef is $5.50 per kilogram, 
and the average price per kilo exported is $7.10 FOB.  Example 2. Foodstuffs in 
the South Island reportedly posted EBIT of $300 million in 2017. That is triple 
what SFF has earned over the last decade.   
15. How will the New Zealand red meat industry combat the enormous investments 
being made into marketing by new entrants like Impossible Burger and Beyond 
Meat? The capital these enterprises have attracted, and are continuing to draw, is 
nothing short of staggering. The cash in their war chests most likely matches our 
most significant red meat company's revenue at the topline.   
16. Can the performance of New Zealand red meat industry marketing be linked to 
the significant decrease in red meat consumption by consumers? Since the 1970s, 
American beef consumption has declined by one third, and consumers are 
currently migrating to chicken and other alternatives and substitutes. 
17. People say New Zealand red meat is a premium product. If this is true, why is red 
meat predominantly traded through commodity platforms and wholesale channels 
where marketing has little significance or influence, and price is the primary 
clearance mechanism? The story of origin just evaporates.   
18. What is your view on the New Zealand red meat industry leadership?  
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19. Do you think New Zealand is wise to invest in and rely heavily on high-growth 
markets like China? What happens if the growth dries up? 
20. Is the New Zealand red meat industry ripe for a foreign take over? Will its 
customers continue with reverse integration? Shanghai Mailing has acquired 50% 
of SFF. ANZCO has turned Japanese. Who is next? How will this impact 
producers? 
21. If you had total power over the New Zealand red meat industry, what would you 
change? 
22. Finally, in your opinion, does the New Zealand red meat industry suffer from 
marketing myopia. In essence, can the sector see the wood from the trees?  
5.5.2  A guide to qualitative data collection 
As previously stated, I employed semi-structured interviews to establish some 
frameworks and boundaries initially. That format has allowed for extended scope, which 
has enabled explorative conversations to take place. My question design above sets the 
limits and parameters for these discussions. During the interview process, the questions 
were used to stimulate the discussion and did not necessarily require specific answers to 
each particular numerical question.  
Given that the interviewee cohort was selected from different parts of the red meat 
supply chain, interviewees presented their specific ideas and perspectives about their 
thoughts and feelings on the New Zealand red meat industry. Their thoughts were 
embedded in their individual contexts. This is why the research question design was as 
broadly constructed as it was. Interviewees from different areas had very different 
focuses. For example, What was relevant to a marketing interviewee was not necessarily 
as relevant to an operational interviewee, although there was considerable common 
ground. The interviewee diversity increased the richness of data collected. The data 
gathered from the deep dive provided real insight. It directly connected me to what was 
going on inside New Zealand's red meat industry enterprises' existing cultures and 
environments.  
The data from the interviews was collated and assessed. This has enabled an informed 
decision to be reached about what senior red meat industry participants think about 
marketing myopia. Thematic analysis of the transcribed interview notes provided 
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feedback on whether senior people thought marketing myopia was an issue or not. The 
results were then reported. Table 5.0 below outlines the business sectors interviewees 
were drawn from, the roles they played and the extent of their experience. The 
c nfiden iali  a ec  ag eed  nde  he ca eg  B  e hic  ag eemen  e en  m e 
detailed information being provided. The reward for confidentiality has been 
transparency from the interviewee cohort, which was greatly appreciated. Their candid 
responses have strengthened the research findings.  
Candidate Selection Table 
Business Sectors 
 
Finance;  Processing;  Academia;  Marketing;  Farming;  Science;  




Marketing Managers;  Directors;  Financial Controllers; Finance 
Managers;  Farm Owners;  Operations Managers;  Retailing Owners;  
Frontline Salespeople;  Production Managers;  Senior Executives 
 
  
Experience Minimum 10 years Professional From 3 - 35 years in Red Meat Industry 
  
 
Table 5.0: Candidate Selection Table.  Source (2020) Design by J Wilkes. 
 
5.5.3  Qualitative Interviews links to the Multi-Content Methodology 
Unlike some research projects, this applied business research project did not rely solely 
on qualitative data. The heavy lifting to produce this project's results have been shared 
between three research methods. Qualitative data has been analyzed to pinpoint the 
opinions of senior management and operational personnel. Transvections have been 
assessed to identify financial flows across the red meat provisioning system. Immersive 
prototyping provided a third dimension and a real-world test of assumptions. 
The results reported from this exercise reflect actual results. For example, price 
assumptions were tested. The value of the prototype was its ability to conduct 
experiments in real-time. For example, the prototype was able to test whether achieving 
a price of $30 per kilo across an entire beef carcass was possible for a producer.  
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Figure 5.7 below shows the online shop that was created to test price assumptions in the 
real world. WooCommerce, the online shop platform, provided full data analytics, which 
fed directly into the research results.    
The value of using multi-content research becomes self-evident, particularly when 
results from different lines of inquiry align.  Providing evidence that marketing myopia 
exists in the New Zealand red meat industry will come down to assessing three main 
areas. One, interviewee response cohesion, financial distribution flaws, and myths 
around current animal value assumptions. What does the interviewee cohort think? Do 
the risk and reward ratios across the transvection make sense? Is the New Zealand red 
meat offering valued and positioned correctly?  
 
Figure 5.7: Triple Nine Fa m  online hop de ign  Source (2020) Design by J Wilkes. 
 
5.5.4  Transvection via secondary data (Quantitative)  
Alderson (1965:92) defines a transvection as, A ingle ni  f ac i n f he ma ke ing 
system. This unit of action is consummated when an end-product is placed in the hands 
of the ultimate consumer, but the transvection comprises all prior action necessary to 
produce this final result, going all the a  back  c ngl me a e e ce .  Analyzing 
the flow from end to end and assessing the units of action responsible for moving 
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animals from paddocks to consumer's dining tables has added a layer of evidence to this 
research. The ability to successfully implement transvection analysis supports 
Proposition 1. which suggests outcome observations can diagnose marketing myopia via 
quantitative secondary analysis.  
Outcome observations are required before any assertions about the equity of financial 
distributions can be alleged. For example, assessing the differences in profit distribution 
between the farm gate and a top restaurant has highlighted price variances of several 
hundred dollars per kilogram for beef. Observing this outcome has provided this research 
with links about the influence of marketing on each transaction point. This insight 
supports proposition three; outcomes are not industry given; they are man-made. It may 
be that New Zealand red meat enterprises volunteer to sell their products in markets that 
do not pay well. Low pricing and profitability may also reflect that those responsible for 
selling and negotiating the price have been ineffective.  
For example, transvection mapping has compared the producer's price against the price 
processors, wholesalers, retailers, and restauranteurs receive. This allowed the researcher 
to observe the differences in profit distribution, which opened up thinking about how the 
results were derived? These transactions have generally been easy to identify. It 
generates the question: why would producers simply not shorten the transvection 
between themselves and their consumers and remove those in between who are failing to 
add value? These outcomes have been observable and support proposition 3. These 
outcomes are not an inevitable outcome of the New Zealand red meat industry's nature, 
but rather, are delivered by its myopic management.   
5.5.5  Immersive Prototyping  
To increase the research rigor, I tested the research findings with real consumers. I 
believed this was the best way to know if an assumption was correct. 
According to Wikipedia (2020), the Wright Brothers used the following lift equation to 
calculate the amount of lift a wing could produce 𝐿 = 𝑘 𝑆 𝑉2 𝐶𝐿. Even with all the 
calculations in the world, there was only one way for the Wright Brothers to prove their 
calculations were correct.  They had to take off. This is the metaphorical explanation for 
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my use of immersive prototyping (Triple Nine Farms) as the final research method in a 
multi-content approach.   
The Triple Nine Farms prototype was established as a prototype to test the qualitative 
and transvection methods in the real world. It was also set up to innovate and disrupt the 
traditional model to test marketing assumptions around premium New Zealand grass-fed 
beef and high-end consumers.  
The prototype immersed the researcher in a start-up venture directly connected to New 
Zealand red meat industry transvections.  This provided the 'applied' output for this 
project.  The prototype platform was constantly refined and tuned to test responses to 
defective sorts in existing red meat transvections during the research period. For 
example, the prototype challenged price thresholds, experimented with new value-
propositions and product offerings, and actively listened to the consumer's voice.  
For example, how consumers responded to regenerative farming was tested. Consumers 
were asked to pay a premium for genuine farmer-to-consumer produce, and their 
responses were recorded in the transvection process. The question of the breed was 
tested. The potential to shift from speculation to postponement settings was tested, 
particularly with the online program. Consumer demand was tested against 
homogeneous or heterogeneous environments. The prototype searched for knowledge 
gaps between land and brand. All of this information helped to inform the results 
generated by this research project.  
The research prototype attracted, engaged, and interacted with premium consumers to 
determine if consumers were interested and willing to change the way they purchased 
their red meat? For example, Triple Nine Farms offered both bricks and mortar and 
online options for consumers. In parallel, the research aimed to investigate whether the 
current red meat model was vulnerable to disruption. Could it be overhauled and 
innovated in ways that would improve producer and processor returns? Could the 
transvection be reconfigured to remove defective sorts and shift the power back towards 
the producer and processor?  
One farmer and I provided the initial investment to set up the prototype. This research's 
applied goal was to produce a comprehensive, exhaustively tested body of research 
validating the size, scale, feasibility, and attractiveness of the opportunity to sell 
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premium New Zealand beef and lamb through an innovative farmer-to-consumer multi-
channel format in local and export markets. The organizational structure, ownership, and 
funding situation remains fluid and dynamic. The company is a New Zealand Limited 
entity registered with the New Zealand Companies Register. 
5.6  Qualitative Interviews (Expanded) 
The first research method used to collect data for this research was semi-structured 
interviews, a qualitative methodology. I conducted a series of free-flowing, in-depth 
interviews with key industry personnel. I was looking for evidence of myopic managerial 
mindsets existing within the red meat industry managerial community. Barriball (1994) 
supported this approach for two main reasons, "First, they are well suited for the 
exploration of the perceptions and opinions of respondents regarding complex and 
sometimes sensitive issues and enable probing for more information and clarification of 
answers. Second, the varied professional, educational, and personal histories of the 
sample group precluded the use of a standardized interview schedule." 
The semi-structured questionnaire in detailed above started with a 5 to 10 minute 
preamble to underpin the interviews with a red meat industry context. This enabled each 
interview to start from a level playing field, which provided some direction. This 
approach was useful in facilitating streamlined coding and downstream thematic 
analysis. My question set was designed to open up as many rich veins of inquiry as 
possible, and I was rewarded with the interviewee cohort providing many useful 
observational insights.  
The University of Otago's ethics requirements were strictly adhered to and managed. 
This project has been run under a 'B' class ethics approval signed by the Head of 
Department, Marketing Faculty. The ethics application was lodged/approved as a 
ca eg  B  e hical a al in 2018. Its code is D18/193. No information whatsoever 
has been divulged as to who took part in the interview process. This was discussed and 
agreed upon with the DBA course director and both DBA su e i . An indi id al  
job security could well be impacted due to the nature of my research and the researcher's 
direction, who is actively trying to disrupt the New Zealand red meat industry. 
For the interviews, I selected a relaxed neutral territory. A  significant effort was made to 
ensure interviewees were comfortable and under no time pressure. That said, interviews 
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generally took around one hour or so. It is important to note that many of the 
interviewees selected for this research are part of my extended network and ongoing red 
meat industry networks. Post-interview, and throughout this research project, the 
dialogue around the red meat industry's challenges has been ongoing. This has fed into 
the immersion dynamics behind this research.  
In many cases, the data extracted during the interviews has been augmented by ongoing 
conversations throughout this research project, not just from a few one-hour interviews. 
This is the nature and benefit of industry immersion. The extra time to widen the line of 
inquiry in some cases has afforded a richness of insight not available to most. While I 
selected sixteen specific individuals to interview, I have engaged with hundreds of 
people here in New Zealand and across the world during this research. I would also note, 
the sixteen interviewees selected represent red meat enterprises that constitute 90% of 
New Zealand's red meat industry. 
Throughout the semi-structured interviews, I paid careful attention to managing my body 
language. I maintained a high level of positive energy around the importance of my 
project and the interviewee's contribution to it. The benefit of selecting red meat 
professionals was their industry knowledge. One downside was some interviewees had 
formed biases, and some of these biases were entrenched.  
I remained flexible and adaptable during interviewing. This facilitated a physical and 
psychological environment conducive to open, frank, and free discussion. I was very 
aware of the need to talk less and listen more. My approach facilitated each interviewee 
with the optimum opportunity to transfer relevant observations, industry knowledge, and 
insights.  
5.7  Researcher Belief Systems 
As it related to the interviewee cohort and interview questions, my research design 
remained vigilant to my own beliefs, behavioural nuances, biases, and preferences. This 
requirement defined how I gathered and interpreted the data. The equation (Method + 
Epistemology + Ontology) helps describe how I customized my ultimate research design. 
Embracing thinking this way forced me to ensure my multi-content approach was 
rigorous. I asked myself: How am I thinking about what I am researching? Why am I 
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doing this research? Who will benefit from the study? These were all important 
considerations that needed to be incorporated into my research design.  
Ontology deals with belief systems. The philosophy explores my relationship to the 
nature of reality and how I perceive and analyze the information I absorb from my 
environment. Ontology culminates in four major research philosophies, Pragmatism, 
Positivism, Realism, and Interpretivism. I needed to understand this because it plays a 
critical role in guiding decisions about my research design. Dudovskiy (2017) suggests, 
"Pragmatists recognize that there are many different ways of interpreting the world and 
undertaking research, that no single picture can ever give the entire picture and that 
there may be multiple realities."  
This description was ideal for my challenge of identifying the presence of marketing 
myopia in the New Zealand red meat industry. It also suggested I would be comfortable 
with a mixture of data collection methodologies, which in practice, is correct. 
Importantly, it supported why I selected a multi-content approach. I also preferred to 
leverage multiple data sources because this has proven to be very successful for me in 
the past. I have always considered myself to be a pragmatic idealist. This philosophical 
style rested well with how I viewed and operated in the world.  
Axiology is a philosophy that seeks to understand how my judgments and values will 
impact this research process. As a Pragmatist, Dudovskiy (2017) suggested, Val e  
play a large role in interpreting results, the researcher adopting both objective and 
bjec i e in  f ie .  This was critical to understand; for example, a realism driven 
researcher is highly biased by world views, cultural experiences, and upbringing. I have 
regularly experienced this philosophy in action, working on past engineering projects 
with Muslim Malaysians in Malaysia. Their default tends to be either Realism or 
Interpretivism when testing research assumptions. This is dramatically different from my 
approach, which is naturally more transparent and tolerant of different ways of thinking. 
Achieving successful outcomes in Asia often required modification of both my 
behaviour and style. Asians operate in 'high-context' cultures, and that puts a huge 
emphasis on relationships, which are given top priority in any engagement, well before 
anything else. In general, Muslim Malaysians do not like any form of conflict, and they 
will manipulate the information they retrieve from their environment to avoid hurting 
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your feelings or creating an uncomfortable situation. This can be, and is, problematic for 
man  ea n . Thi  e am le dem n a e  h  an indi id al  a i l g  can ha e a 
dramatic impact on research outcomes.  
I wanted to make sure my research questions avoided unnecessary provocation and 
confrontation by making sure I honed the research design to accommodate these 
nuances. Striking the correct balance has been a critical part of this project, particularly 
when it comes to the defence of my thesis. It also mitigates against research design 
failure. I am very conscious that poor research design can end up reporting findings that 
can be ildl  inc ec . Fel ni  (2015) a icle in Business Insider reminds us of what 
can happen. He states, The 1958 F d Ed el a  osed to be the premiere car for 
middle-class Americans. Ford was so confident in the product that it pumped US$250 
million into it. But instead of starting a revolution, the company lost US$350 million on 
the unattractive gas-g le .  
Getting the research design right is essential. Even large, incredibly well-funded 
organizations full of professionals with research backgrounds can get it wrong. I wanted 
to ensure the multi-content approach selected for this research project had the best 
possible chance of producing accurate insights and data.  
5.8  Looking for Common Ground: Thematic Analysis 
To collate and assemble the data's key aspects, I used the research coding framework 
represented in Table 5.2 below. This is a framework and is not in any way designed to be 
a pseudo-quant exercise. Geetz (1973:5) suggested, "If you want to understand what 
science is, you should look in the first instance, not at its theories or its findings, and 
certainly not what its apologists say about it; you should look at what the practitioners 
of it do." 
The qualitative component of this research has leveraged Thematic Analysis (TA) to 
identify and analyze patterns of meaning in the data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006). I 
selected this approach because the process was ideal for identifying the most critical 




I used Levitt's (1965) theory of marketing myopia as the platform to ground the inductive 
approach. Specifically, this meant identifying links in the transcribed notes to the four 
preconditions required to form a marketing myopia diagnosis. These preconditions are 
sequentially tabled in responses one through four (1-4) in the research coding framework 
illustrated by Table 5.2 below. On the deductive side, responses five through ten (5-10) 
highlight deductive inputs. These themes were driven by questions relating to marketing 
assumptions in the research design. For example, question number eight in the question 
set probes the priority an interviewee attaches to the marketing function. 
Braun and Clark (2006) state, A heme ca e  me hing im an  ab  he da a in 
relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or 
meaning i hin he da a e .  Professor Braun also stated in her University of Auckland 
presentation that platforms are not binary. Braun (2006) suggests the TA rationale is 
predominantly about a flexible approach to engaging with the data. 
Nowell, Norris, White & Moules (2017) suggest, "Thematic analysis has been poorly 
branded, yet widely used in qualitative research (Braun & Clarke, 2006), and has been 
rarely appreciated in the same way as grounded theory, ethnography, or 
phenomenology. Braun and Clarke (2006) argued that thematic analysis should be a 
foundational method for qualitative analysis, as it provides core skills for conducting 
many other forms of qualitative analysis." It should be noted that there is still much 
academic argument about the standing of TA, and this is another reason I decided to 
triangulate this research.  
The approach (documented in Table 5.1 below) to TA that Braun and Clark developed 
involves a six-phase process for doing analysis. As mentioned previously, the method is 
not binary but flexible and, in no small degree, intuitive in its application. The critical 
point in the reflective process is understanding which data mode you are extracting the 
information from. For example, themes supporting 'optimizing the hook' are inductive 
and reflect evidence that supports one of Levitt's (1965) four marketing myopia 
preconditions, a focus on mass volume. 
Although the steps below suggest phases are numbered in sequence from one to six, 
Braun and Clark (2006) indicate any analysis is derived from a backward and forwards 
movement between different stages. They further suggest that individual phases are not 
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rules to follow rigidly, but rather a series of conceptual and practice-oriented 'tools' that 
guides the analysis to facilitate a rigorous process of data interrogation and engagement. 
The description provided by Braun and Clark (2006) offers a good summation of what 
happened in reality. I selected this approach because it is user friendly, flexible, and 
allows the interviewer and interviewee to engage in a two-way immersive experience. 
The process in practice opens up the discussion and allows for better insights to emerge.  
 




Table 5.2:  Research Coding Framework  Source (2017) Design by J Wilkes 
5.9  Transvection 
A transvection is a holistic concept which maps the effectiveness of marketing 
provisioning systems responsible for converting raw materials into offerings capable of 
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satisfying a consumer. The approach is centred on an Aldersonian (1965) belief that 
markets are heterogeneous, information-driven, and discrepant. In layman's terms, this 
means not all consumers will want the same thing; understanding what is going on in 
consumer's minds is critical to success, and markets are never perfectly cleared. This 
thinking is contrarian. The strategy developed by many contemporary marketers assumes 
the opposite. They believe markets are homogeneous and perfectly cleared.    
Brown (2002:247) reports, C n ide ed b  She h e  al. (1988)  be he iche  f all 
Alde n  notions, transvection is a group name for a series of individual exchanges or 
an ac i n . In man  a , he ma ke ing e i alen  f a he d  f b ffal e   ide  
of lions (the biological analogy is not accidental, since Alderson considered them semi-
sentient entities), transvections are the basic unit of marketing activity. The term refers 
to the process by which, say, a pair of shoes makes its way into the consumer's hands, 
from initial manufacture to ultimate acquisition. It includes not only the transfer of 
goods and title but all the inter-firm negotiations, personal communications, physical 
transformations, and geographical relocations along the way. If, in other words, the 
transaction is the part, a convergence of buyers and sellers in immediate contact, the 
transvection is the whole, a conceptual encapsulation of the complete marketing 
ce .  
Applying transvection as part of the multi-content driven research has allowed me to 
follow the pathway and processes behind how an animal transitions from the farmer to 
the consumer. The main objective of the application was to track and highlight financial 
information. Alderson (1965:62), the creator of transvection defines the concept as, A 
single unit of action of the marketing system. This unit of action is consummated when an 
end-product is placed in the hands of the ultimate consumer, but the transvection 
comprises all prior action necessary to produce this final result, going all the way back 
 c ngl me a e e ce .  This research has mapped the flow of animals between the 
producer and the end consumer, comparing and contrasting the conventional business 
model's financial performance against the prototype. 
The transvection mapping process identified each point between the producer and 
consumer where something happens. It has examined changes in the price chain at each 
one of these points. Alderson (1965) referred to these points as sorts, transformations, 
and transactions. This process highlights who is making what, where, and when. The 
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data collected has enabled the researcher to identify, examine, and analyze the New 
Zealand red meat industry's approach to bringing red meat through various channels to 
market.  
It is expected and anticipated that the price will increase across the transvection as the 
animal is transported off the farm, enters into the processing environment, and, finally, is 
made available to the trading environment. In a domestic setting, this is usually, farmer, 
processor, retailer, and consumer. In an export setting, there is usually a wholesale or 
distribution arrangement included. Mapping the transvection will highlight how the 
value increases on its transition from the farmer to the consumer, and it will identify the 
financial build-up at each pivotal point.   
Figure 5.9 below represents the transvection as conceptualized by Alderson (1965). 
There are some limitations to using Alderson's transvection. For example, Engelseth and 
Felzensztein (2009:679) point out, Th gh he d  Alde n  (1965) an ec i n 
emerged as a key organizing construct for both writing the case narrative and analysis. 
Gi en i  nfini hed na e, Alde n  (1965) b k D namic Ma ke ing Beha i  i  
regarded as predominately a foundation for conceptual development. The transvection 
plays accordingly a vital role in this research as the initial and fundamental stepping 
stone towards modelling and thereby describing complete supply networks for analytical 
e .  This research project echoed Engelseth and Felzensztein's (2009) experience, 
where they applied transvection to examine the relationships between supply chain 
management and relationship management in the salmon industry. Of particular note is 
their emphasis on the critical importance of information exchange.  
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Figure 5.8: Salmon industry sorts as events of interaction between actors and the technical 
realm consisting of flows of goods and information between supply chain management and 
relationship management.  Source (2009) Engelseth & Felzensztein, Journal of Business and 
Industrial Marketing 
.  
Figure 5.9:  A i ali a ion of a T an ec ion  Source (2009) Engelseth & Felzensztein, Journal 
of Business and Industrial Marketing. 
 
Figure 5.10 The Flow of Salmon across the transvection. Source (2009) Engelseth & 




Figure 5.11: A customised transvection analysis for this project. Source (2017) J Wilkes. 
Figure 5.11 is the template that belonged to Triple Nine Farms and was created to collect 
the data from across the transvection. This information once determined, maps the 
financial flow between the farmer and the consumer. At each point along the 
transvection the possible options, if any, available to Triple Nine Farms were explored.  
When given a choice, decisions to outsource to a specific supplier were made based on a 
financial and relationship basis. Once collated, the data was used to develop a cash flow 
for the prototype business start-up. Whilst the transvection points between the farm and 
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the consumer were represented by a dollar value, there was also a human interaction 
element sitting alongside. The knowledge gained from this exercise has highlighted how 
these relationships operate. For example, it demonstrated how relationships impacted 
profit distribution and showcased how 'power' worked across the transvection. Who has 
the power? Is the current distribution fair and equitable to all parties? 
5.9.1  Defective Sorts and the link to Marketing Myopia 
Wooliscroft, Tamila & Shapiro (2010) suggest transvection can be a useful planning 
tool, particularly regarding optimizing the steps involved in delivering a product or 
service within a heterogeneous marketing mindset. The use of transvection analysis has 
been selected not only for its ability to identify financial transactions but also to identify 
'defective sorts.' These represent the opportunities for disruption, reengineering, and 
innovative value creation.   
The defective sort is a new concept born from this applied research project. In innovation 
sessions between Professor Wooliscroft and the researcher, both had a 'lightbulb' 
moment when discussing the red meat transvection. It became apparent that transactions, 
sorts, and allocation events offered the potential to innovate. Up to this point, 
transvections  in my mind represented an advanced holistic value chain, but actually, it 
was much more than this. The link to marketing myopia comes from the point where a 
defective sort is identified, for example, a channel decision to sell through a particular 
intermediary such as an international distributor or an arrangement with a large food 
retailer where the return on investment does not stack up or make commercial sense. A 
defective sort would imply, inform, and direct innovation effort to this point. The link to 
marketing myopia is the questioning of why the defective sort exists. 
Was it there because the enterprise had no options? Wooliscroft and Wilkes (2018:1041) 
state, Thi  a e  deal  i h defec i e orts, sorts which irreparably damage the 
assortment, or which would require considerable resources to 'undo.' A defective sort 
leads to a suboptimal transformation and a suboptimal transvection, with suboptimal 
matching processes and reduced potency of assortments." Does a suboptimal 
transvection suggest an enterprise suffers from marketing myopia? Not necessarily, but it 
certainly provides an excellent place to launch an investigation. In the case of this 
research, each methodology probes this line of inquiry as the concept of defective sort 
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thinking is 'baked in' to the researcher's mindset. This mindset is not a bias; it is a 
dashboard for identifying elements of red meat transvections that demonstrate distress. 
For example, the exposure of large financial variances across the transvection that may 
exist between the producer, processor, distributor, and retailer.   
When applied in this way, defective sorts can help provide a litmus test for marketing 
myopia. Even though transvection is in most cases an academic marketing theory 
primarily concerned with illuminating transformation, sorting and transaction problems, 
this project has leveraged the new concept to investigate and identify areas of 
inefficiency in New Zealand red meat enterprise marketing systems.  
5.9.2  The benefit of Transvection 
A major benefit derived from working with the transvection concept was the global view 
its applied use generates. It provided he e ea che  i h a big ic e  ie  f ha  was 
going on between the producer and the consumer. In this way, assumptions and findings 
from the interviewee cohort and other related lines of inquiry (desktop research) were 
able to be collectively applied in the real world.  The ability to extract sales and pricing 
data supported my decision to select transvection analysis as part of the multi-content 
methodology.  
The data from transvection analysis allowed the financial aspects of particular sorts to be 
fully explored to ascertain whether a particular sort could be classified as defective. The 
c nce  f defec i e ' a  a c n ib i n  ne  kn ledge de i ed di ec l  f m 
this research. Wooliscroft and Wilkes (2018:1018) proposed, Ma ke ing i  a 
provisioning technology that through transvections aims to match heterogeneous supply 
and demand, intending to increase the potency of assortment of both parties of 
exchanges. Macromarketing considers the interactions between markets, marketing, and 
society. This paper considers a major industry in New Zealand, the red meat industry, 
and how its transvections lead to system-wide loss of potential potency of assortment. It 
identifies the concept of defective sorts, sorts which negatively remove heterogeneity in 
the channel." Note, heterogeneity is removed from the marketing process when those 
responsible for marketing embrace homogeneous mindsets. For example, if attitudes 
were heterogeneous, Chefs would be able to buy hogget regularly.  
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Unde anding defec i e  was the very essence behind the application of 
transvection methodology in this re ea ch jec . W li c f  and Wilke  (2018:1018) 
presented an article at the Macromarketing Conference in Leipzig, Germany. The article 
outlined the downside of a defective sort stating, "The red meat industry in New Zealand 
takes cattle of a variety of breeds, raised on different feed, in different climates, of 
different ages and within minutes of entering the killing plant the source of the meat is 
lost (while it may be traceable for health purposes it is not for branding or 
communicating the value proposition of the meat) and the meat separated by cut 
h gh  he lan . Mea  i  c n ide ed in e m  f nne , a c mm di  f c .   
Transvection offers the potential to facilitate and support change because it clearly 
defines what is happening, where, and why. This research project has accurately and 
precisely pinpointed who extracts what revenue from transformations and transactions 
across the transvection. Related to understanding transvections is transparency. Andrén-
Sanberg (2018) believes consumers can now accurately trace provenance, which he 
thinks will create a macro-marketing environment, where differentiation will come back 
into vogue. This may have the effect of increasing competition as commodities decouple 
from traditional markets. Transvection analysis has been a useful tool in determining this 
statement's validity in the New Zealand red meat industry because you cannot fully 
understand a transvection if transparency is missing. Reconnecting consumers to their 
food is one of the side benefits of mapping transvections.   
A great story is a crucial engagement point for connecting the consumer with the 
producer. The industry transvection investigation in this research exposed more than just 
price; it exposed issues like authenticity gaps in red meat enterprise narratives. The 
transvection concept's ability to capture this level of information is why it was used as a 
critical method for this project. A transvection mindset is inherently a marketing mindset 
coupled with an ability to see the wood from the trees, which is the polar opposite of a 
marketing myopia mindset, which cannot see the wood from the trees.  
Currently, the New Zealand red meat processing industry is structured around two 
traditional pillars, production efficiency, and commodity trading. Andrén-Sandberg 
(2018:1) suggests, A commodity is a product, but what sets it apart from the 
conventional products category is that it is indistinguishable from any other product of 
the same type in the eyes of the purchaser, regardless of its origin.  This suits the 
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antiquated economic construct of homogeneous markets, which were useful to power the 
industrial revolution but are no longer relevant today.  
Transvection analysis tested how commodified the New Zealand red meat industry was 
by providing data on the ratios of profit distribution. For example, it has looked at how 
long a farmer takes to produce an animal for the market and what the farmer receives 
under the current schedule arrangements. It compared and contrasted that information 
with how long a supermarket takes to convert its meat inventory into profit and then 
examined the size of the margin produced. This process has pinpointed several areas that 
show signs of financial stress and may attract an eventual classification as a defective 
sort.   
5.9.3  The Evolution of a Defective Sort 
The New Zealand red meat industry currently operates a business model that could be 
argued is a direct descendent of American Industrialist Gustavus Swift's original red 
meat disassembly line. Schatzker (2010) suggests Swift inspired Henry Ford to create his 
now-famous automotive assembly line. It is a model that has barely changed in a 
century. Before Swift's industrial processing innovation, cowboys strategically drove 
their cattle to market taking their time to fatten their cattle on the way. When they 
arrived in town, they sought the resources of resellers such as butchers and restaurateurs.   
Back then, the connection between producer and consumer was more profound and 
much more heightened than it is today. To attract top dollar, the best cowboys were 
focused on delivering the best possible animals to market. They were in control of 
quality and their destiny. In the end, the advent of railroads and increased transport 
efficiency killed off this traditional business model and changed the way cattle were 
sorted.  
Cattle from this point were herded onto trains and sent to large processing plants at scale. 
This new method resulted in increased efficiency and lower costs, but the quality was 
often elusive and unpredictable. The need to resolve this issue led to the development of 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) grading system, which sorts beef 
into Prime, Choice, Select, and Standard grades. During this 'industrialization' period, the 
USDA grading system became intensely and single-mindedly focused on marbling. 
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Schatzker (2010:22) states, "The US Department of Agriculture employs 200 meat 
graders, 140 of whom specialize in beef. In a single day, a USDA grader can judge as 
many as 1200 beef carcasses, each carcass requiring no more than six to eight seconds 
of the grader's time." This project's transvection analysis has examined the New Zealand 
red meat industry to determine the prevailing attitude.   
The problem with an intense focus on marbling from a marketer's perspective is that the 
marbling system is far from perfect when selecting the very best tasting steaks. These 
days, modern beef lovers demonstrate heterogeneous demand, especially if they are 
paying top dollar. While there are many proponents of marbling being the Holy Grail, 
particularly within processing companies, there are many others who believe there are 
more important attributes, for example, taste and flavor.  
F m a ma ke e  e ec i e, f c ing lel  n ma bling ma  lead  defec i e ing 
and a significant loss of value. For example, Schatzker (2010:25) reported, "By the 1960s 
the USDA was no longer interested in feathering and frosting. Now they would take a 
side of beef, make an incision between the twelfth and thirteenth ribs, and peer at the 
ribeye. They were looking for little dots and curls of fat. They were looking for marbling. 
They still are today." At this point, steak becomes a fully-fledged, industrialized widget. 
This example illustrates how a defective sort evolves in a transvection.   
Kajsa Hulth n and Lars-Erik Gadde (2007:184) are supportive of transvection benefits 
stating, We conclude that the transvection concept is particularly well-suited for 
nde anding he cha ac e i ic  and effec  f he e l ing di ib i n a angemen .  
Whilst Hulthén and Gadde (2007) are more broadly referring to manufacturing 
environments in general, the New Zealand red meat industry, particularly at the 
processor level, has all of the same challenges and transvection is one approach a 
researcher can employ to successfully deconstruct what is happening between the 
producer and customer and that has been the case with this project.  
5.10  Immersive Prototyping and Triple Nine Farms 
I believe from experience, the longer a researcher remains immersed in a project, and the 
deeper they become immersed in it, the more knowledge and insight they are likely to 
produce. The knowledge gained also tends to be richer, more relevant, and significantly 
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more useful. As mentioned previously, the commercialization of Triple Nine Farms, 
efe ed  a  he e , c ea ed ni e ni ie   enhance he e ea ch 
output. For example, one of the ways it accomplished this goal was by increasing the 
accuracy and relevance of the interview findings by using the prototype platform to test 
many of the research findings in the real world.  
Li e  e ing findings from the qualitative and transvection methods provided a third 
filter and an additional perspective unique to this research project because results were 
anchored in reality. Triple Nine Farms was a retail butchery located in Nelson, New 
Zealand, and traded daily with real customers until the end of this research project, 
which coincidentally coincided with the emergence of Covid 19. The business has since 
been placed into hiatus.   
A vital benefit of the prototype was it provided the researcher with the ability to interact 
and engage with the New Zealand red meat transvection. Starting an enterprise like 
Triple Nine Farms automatically connected the business with suppliers across the New 
Zealand red meat industry. In doing so, it joined the project directly with farmers, 
livestock transport companies, processing companies, refrigerated transport companies, 
the Ministry for Primary Industries, other government agencies, butcheries, retailers, and 
consumers. As the prototype was commercialized over time, immersion highlighted the 
challenges fledgling enterprises needed to overcome to survive in the New Zealand red 
meat industry. 
This research has built a deep understanding of the New Zealand red meat industry step-
by-step. The insights extracted contribute to one more step on the road towards higher 
earnings. In this research project, the prototype has played a pivotal role, adding 
significant new knowledge that is potentially useful for helping the New Zealand red 
meat industry think about new ways to earn a better living. Investing more in marketing 
may well end up being one of those ways.  
5.11  Innovation Hotspots and Applied Outcomes 
 
During the research study, the prototype investigated many new and emerging trends in 
the red meat space. For example, the project assessed the digital space, offering 
producers new ways of engaging and connecting with premium grass-fed beef 
consumers in distant markets. By innovating distribution dynamics, the research 
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uncovered approaches that would be capable of delivering premium retail meat boxes to 
the doorsteps of high-end consumers in London, Sydney, Singapore, or San Francisco.    
In collaboration with Savory, this project initiated opportunities to capitalize on and 
monetize regenerative farming practices. This research project was instrumental in 
establishing the first Savory accredited EOV regenerative farm in New Zealand. It 
provided this research project with the opportunity to test how powerful an influence 
regenerative farming was with consumers.  
A m ch be e  nde anding f Regene a i e  and Sustainability' benefits have flowed 
directly from this project, and they are expected to be long-lasting and durable, i.e., a 
new approach. In conjunction with regenerative philosophy, this research also tested the 
Ne  Zealand d ce  a i a i n  roduce the world's best beef in a new red meat 
transvection farmers would be an integral part of. Innovations would help the industry 
shift from value to volume, and successfully shifting from a production mindset to a 
quality mindset could change everything.  
Thi  jec  m l i-content method is a novel, new, and innovative approach to 
researching high-value exporting options for New Zealand red meat producers. There are 
parallels to previous studies and past strategies have attempted to address the 
profitability concerns of red meat farmers by better understanding consumer behaviour 
and market dynamics. These initiatives have been driven by red meat processors like 
Alliance and Silver Fern Farms, who are both now attempting to shift as much product as 
they can into higher value. That said, an argument remains that large commodity trading 
organizations are not the ideal structures for delivering super-premium beef to 
consumers or a super-premium experience to sit alongside.  Ferrari and other exclusive 
brands are not sold out of mainstream car dealerships for a good reason; it does not 
work. 
5.12  Why is this Project Needed?  
Ne  Zealand  producers do not want to be left behind. This research project has been 
designed to identify how producers can invest in front of the curve to ensure they don't 
miss out on emerging red meat opportunities. Man  f he c n  farmers want to 
understand what the future drivers for premium red meat might look like, especially in 
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export markets. This research project tests the assumption that focusing on the consumer 
is likely to reward farmers and help them to stay relevant and profitable in the future. 
The demand for premium grass-fed beef is rapidly increasing globally. Burwood-Taylor 
(2017) reports, Grassfed beef is a growing segment of the US meat industry. Retail 
sales of labeled fresh grass-fed beef reached $272 million in 2016, up from $17 million 
in 2012 and doubling every year, according to a new report entitled Back to Grass: The 
Market Potential for U.S. Grass-fed Beef. This still represents just 1% of the US beef 
market, with unlabeled grass-fed beef acc n ing f  ab  4% f US beef ld.  
Simultaneously, per capita, beef consumption for traditional beef products continues to 
decline, particularly in western and mature markets where shifting consumer trends are 
impacting red meat sales.  
Terazono, Hook, and Hancock (2019) report, "With meat consumption -especially beef- 
increasingly seen as a contributory factor in carbon emissions, deforestation and high 
water usage, a key question among food experts, environmentalists, and agricultural 
economists is when "peak meat" where consumption hits a ceiling  will be reached." 
Deeply understanding this trend is critical.  
For example, McKinsey consultants (2016) report,  Reflecting 10,000 in-person interviews 
with people aged 18 to 56 across 44 cities, our 2016 China consumer report, The 
Modernization of the Chinese Consumer, found that the days of broad-based market growth 
are coming to an end. Consumers are becoming more selective about where they spend their 
m ne , hif ing f m d c   e ice  and f m ma   emi m egmen .    
New Zealand has the innate ability along with the red meat products to target the 
Chinese consumer trend towards premium with precision, but mindsets may need to 
become more flexible. Delivering premium products to wealthy Chinese consumers with 
unlimited choice requires every touchpoint to be perfectly aligned and executed. The 
higher the return, the higher the bar and producers and processors need to realize they 
must consciously step up to the next level. The current industry mindset maybe one of 




5.13  Research Method Conclusion 
Levitt (1960) has been extensively referred to during this research. This is because his 
theory underpins the central technical line of inquiry.  Levitt (1960) became world-
renowned for publishing a paper called Marketing Myopia. The article suggested 
organizations often do not see things because they have not been designed or structured 
to see them. Levitt (1975:26) suggested, "In every case, the reason growth is threatened, 
slowed, or stopped is not because the market is saturated. It is because there has been a 
failure of management." What he means is management missed the boat. That may be 
harsh commentary to some ears, but it has proven to be correct time, after time, in 
industry, after industry.  
It has occurred in the transport, automotive, mining, energy, financial, engineering, oil 
and gas, and computer industries, to name a few. In many ways, these case studies are 
worthy of reflection because if well-capitalized, highly sophisticated, and globally 
significant businesses can suffer from the risk of management failure, then all other 
enterprises can too. The ultimate aim of this research is to use all three research methods 
to mount an investigation into whether marketing myopia exists in the New Zealand red 
meat industry or not. 
The stories of marketing myopia have ranged far and wide. For example, rail missed 
trucking, shipping, and air freight opportunities because it defined itself in very narrow 
terms. They thought they were in the railroad business when they were really in the 
transport business. Defining the business represents ground zero for any enterprise. 




Part IV: BUSINESS QUESTION ANSWERED 
 
Chapter Six:  Results and Discussion  
 
Key Points 
x Top Tip: Not listening to your people or your customers is expensive. 
x Marketing has gone missing and so have the profits. 
x Th ee diffe en  line  of in i one an e  
6.1  Introduction and Overview 
The following overview will help my reader enter the space I have been immersed in for 
the previous three and a half years. The following pages contain numerous intersecting 
ideas and concepts, some of them independent, some of them born from interaction with 
the consumer, and some were born from a rigorous debate with colleagues. 
Understanding why the New Zealand red meat industry has not ignited to reach its 
potential is a hotly debated topic. Providing an answer is a complex undertaking, and 
there appear to be few silver bullets. That said, there may be one bullet that offers more 
silver than others. That bullet is marketing, particularly when marketing is viewed as a 
comprehensive provisioning system.  
The premise that marketing is critical is the premise this research leans on. My applied 
research focuses on understanding the past, observing the present, and looking to the 
future to understand what role marketing has played in the New Zealand red meat 
industry. To this end, my view champions the discipline of marketing. Its effective 
implementation is widely acknowledged for its crucial role in helping enterprises prevent 
marketing myopia. The ability to see is more likely to unlock the potential for an 
enterprise to maximize present opportunities and minimize future threats. It is for this 
reason; my research focuses on analyzing the New Zealand red meat industry for 
symptoms of marketing myopia.  
The following results suggest all is not well in New Zealand red meat marketing. Senior 
red meat industry interviewees are universally concerned with marketing's status. Their 
direct observations suggest that marketing myopia is not only present, but it is also 
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highly likely to be growing. Interviewees collectively report that the industry is investing 
heavily in 'failing backward.' The phrase 'failing backward' describes an incumbent's 
tendency to invest in areas that support defending the status quo, for example, plant 
efficiency. These capital allocation decisions get made by risk-averse organizations 
when there is a requirement to maintain, marginally improve, or prop up performance. 
This strategy is in contrast to the alternative, which risks 'failing forward'. This approach 
is future centric, embraces more risk-taking, and considers a broader range of initiatives 
that are often driven by marketing and innovation.  
6.1.1 Defending the status quo can lower status. 
Defending a business model for too long often means an enterprise, by default, can wind 
up being forced to choose revolution over evolution. Ignoring signs of change usually 
means to stay relevant requires paradigmatic shifts. These are likely to be expensive, 
exceptionally disruptive, and much harder to install. For example, in the red meat 
industry, investments made in grading technology or robotics could be construed as a 
sign of investing in increased efficiency instead of investing in developing disruptive 
new value-added products for example, red meat offerings centred around climate 
change proactivity, human wellbeing,  and consumer experience. 
Which direction offers the most significant upside? Is it failing backward or forward? 
For example, here is an extract from a group researching the alternative protein industry. 
Stephens, Di Silvio, Dunsford, Ellis, Glencross, and Sexton (2018), concluded, It seems 
reasonable to argue that the production of small-scale cultured meat products of edible 
quality should be achievable shortly and in some regards is possible now. These are 
likely to be versions of processed meat products that seek visceral equivalence to 
familiar products. However, the timeline for delivering this at a competitive price point 
similar to existing processed meat products is less determinate." That was only two 
years ago. What would they say now?  
6.1.2 Diversity drives Discovery 
Interviewees were drawn from a diverse cohort of senior industry professionals. All 
those selected demonstrated deep experience and knowledge of the New Zealand red 
meat industry. Subsequent interviews were implemented on the premise of continuing to 
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run interviews up to the point where I was learning nothing new. This situation is called 
saturation. Mason (2010) suggests, "Within any research area, different participants can 
have diverse opinions. Qualitative samples must be large enough to assure that most or 
all of the perceptions that might be important are uncovered, but at the same time, if the 
sample is too large, data becomes repetitive and, eventually, superfluous. For example, 
suppose a researcher remains faithful to the principles of qualitative research. In that 
case, the sample size in the majority of qualitative studies should generally follow the 
concept of saturation when the collection of new data does not shed any further light on 
the issue under investigation. 
The cohesiveness of interviewee responses and the overwhelming corroboration of 
opinion was to a degree unexpected, but when I was actually confronted by the 
narratives and industry story-telling in real life, the impacts were powerful. Did this help 
to emphasize any biases I already had? Perhaps, but rarely have I seen as many people 
agree about anything in the New Zealand red meat industry. When it came to many of 
the core themes around leadership, not seeing the wood from the trees, a lack of 
innovation and the complete failure to transition to value, my interviewees' informed 
opinions and insights were as one.   
F  e am le, In e ie ee 001  ini n a , The Ne  Zealand ed mea  ind  i  
bia ed and enginee ed f  h gh .  Interviewee 003 suggested, "The New Zealand 
red meat industry lacks courage, leadership, and imagination." Interviewee 004 supports 
the previous statements arguing, "The industry is not getting anywhere. It has a dinosaur 
mentality (it is at least 20 years behind) and does not produce what the customer wants. 
They are not receiving the message from customers or getting the information needed to 
make better marketing decisions." Interviewee 005 stated, B ll ing, li ic , and l  
innovation all result from having no time to think or challenge and n    d  .   
Interviewee 006 said, The  (meaning la ge Ne  Zealand ce ing c m anie ) ill 
never change; they just don't get it. It is politics and more politics on top of more 
poisonous politics." Interviewee 007 reported, New people might try to shift the needle, 
but they are very quietly and very effectively brought into line. They are then 
e g ammed   en e he a   emain  in ac .  
These comments and supporting references derived from multiple sources would appear 
to support the New Zealand red meat industry being in a real mess. Perhaps more 
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concerning, the sector seems to be at a loss about how to remedy the situation. Could it 
be this situation exists because the industry is suffering from marketing myopia? The 
inabili   ee i  a  he e  hea  f Le i  (1960) he  f ma ke ing m ia, and 
Levitt's approach has some very significant supporters.    
6.1.3 The Support Crew 
Thompson (1976:48) identified these supporters as world-class management and 
marketing thought leaders and innovators. They included Peter Drucker (Austrian 
Management consultant who many say laid the foundations for modern management), 
J.B. McKitterick (GE Marketing Director who re-orientated marketing to reflect changes 
in the external environment), Wroe Alderson (highly regarded marketing theorist who 
championed heterogeneity of markets among many other ground-breaking concepts), 
John Howard (consumer behaviour specialist) and Neil Borden (developed the concept 
of the marketing mix).  
Each one of these highly respected marketing practitioners and scholars had, according 
to Levitt, travelled in a parallel universe. Levitt (1964) states that his idea of marketing 
myopia was far from a new concept or theory. Levitt (1964) at heart, was a humble 
Harvard economist and professor. He simply thought of himself as being the scholar who 
wrote about marketing myopia. Theodore Levitt has never claimed to be the inventor of 
the marketing myopia concept, but he is famous for bringing the idea to life. 
6.1.4 Growth Mirage: It can be challenging to see. 
Highly relevant to this research, Levitt (1964:26) famously stated, I  i  im ible  
mention a single major industry that did not at one time qualify for the magic appellation 
f g h ind .  The New Zealand red meat industry appears to reflect this 
sentiment. My deep dive (immersion) into the New Zealand red meat industry combined 
with the benefit of time has enabled me to compare and contrast a range of evidence 
derived from qualitative responses, transvection, and 'live' model prototyping. The data 
conspires in ways that appear to make it more likely, rather than less likely, that 
marketing myopia is present in the New Zealand red meat industry.  
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In assessing for marketing myopia, my research has investigated why the New Zealand 
red meat industry has failed to develop effective strategies. Strategies capable of 
delivering sustainable profitability to red meat producers (farmers) and cooperatives 
( ce ). While c nd c ing a dee  di e in  he ind , I le e aged Le i  (1960) 
ma ke ing m ia len   ie  he ind  a a en  inabili   c e i h,  e nd 
to, the need for change. This state is an essential element to understand because the 
failure to change appears to be locking the industry into a potential extinction pathway.  
It is very clear from the following interview extracts that the industry has been slow to 
respond to competitive developments in its key export markets and has also failed to 
respond to shifts in consumer trends and behaviours. Why? I have examined, analyzed, 
assessed, and discussed the current situation with interviewees to ascertain whether 
marketing myopia is a primary cause. According to them, the answer is yes; marketing 
myopia is a sensible way to explain the industry's current state-of-play.    
Marketing Myopia as explained in-depth is a specific phenomenon in marketing that has 
been extensively researched by many academics and practitioners alike.  It is essentially 
marketing's version of n  eeing he d f  he ee .  The qualitative component of 
this research has asked key red meat industry individuals, managers, and executives for 
their input on whether they think Marketing Myopia can lead to otherwise competent 
managers making decisions that are strategically disadvantageous for their organization. 
Their unequivocal answer is yes. 
6.1.5 Engaging with Expertise, Dancing with Data 
Are red meat players trapped inside an endemic culture with no apparent escape? Is 
Marketing Myopia a potential cause for the underperformance of the red meat export 
sector? Why is there so little focused research specifically addressing this possible 
cause? My study aims to answer the following questions: 
x Can a specific 'market myopia' be observed in the New Zealand red meat industry 
management? 
x What is the nature and extent of this myopia? 
x What are its social, cultural, and environmental impacts? 
x Are there any pathways to addressing any myopia that is identified?   
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This project's primary research methodology is qualitative and relies on a series of 
interviews with key industry personnel. I am an experienced mid-late career business 
manager and consultant who has extensive personal contacts within the industry.  These 
contacts have been used to recruit the sample. A semi-structured interview technique was 
used to establish frameworks and boundaries. Still, the format also allowed for a 
considerable scope to undertake a deep unstructured inquiry into all aspects of the red 
meat industry, including looking at its financial challenges in the past, present, and 
future.   
If interviewees have headed down interesting and related pathways during interviews, I 
have encouraged them to open up and fully share what they know and what they have 
learned. My absolute commitment to their anonymity has allowed this research to drill 
down into what is going on. The data gathered from this approach has provided real 
insight from the inside about New Zealand's red meat industry enterprises' existing 
culture and environments. It is on the strength of these opinions, combined with the 
broad literature review that allows me to be very confident in suggesting that marketing 
myopia exists in the New Zealand red meat industry. Its presence allows many of the 
challenges (past, present, and future) facing the New Zealand red meat industry to be 
explained. 
As previously highlighted, the research sample includes red meat senior executives, 
senior operational personnel, professional marketing people, and farming operations 
owners. Experienced fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) professionals have also been 
interviewed and consulted.  The focus of the red meat industry interviews has been in 
New Zealand. However, I have travelled worldwide to assess individual red meat 
'transvections.' They have added significant value to the research, particularly around 
defining which enterprises in the supply chain are the most profitable. Examining the 
financial flows of red meat transvections has been helpful by providing another 
dimension of evidence.  
Concerning data collection, information was acquired directly after each interview as a 
set of transcribed interview notes. These notes were securely stored until the thesis was 
submitted and assessed. On successful receipt of the Doctoral degree, all of the 
transcribed notes from interviewees will be destroyed by the researcher. Participants' 
anonymity was paramount due to the intense and political nature of the New Zealand red 
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meat industry. Anonymity will be maintained throughout the results chapter by the use 
of numerical codes to identify interviewees. For example, 001, 002, 003, and so on. Any 
information that might directly identify an interview participant will be recursed or 
coded.   
The analysis will be entirely from qualitative techniques, primarily thematic analysis. 
Thematic analysis has been fully explained in Chapter 5, subheading 5.8. Direct 
quotations and interview sourced information/data used in this thesis are included and 
subject to the safeguards above. This thesis investigation is grounded by Levitt's (1960) 
work on marketing myopia and Alderson's (1965) work on transvection. The interview 
results have been integrated with concepts from both of these scholars. 
My rationale for this approach was: the great marketing scholars of our time have seen, 
written, and outlined similar challenges facing many different industries over 50 years 
ago. Levitt (1964:23) is very clear. He states, Managemen  i  e n ible f  he fail e 
hen g h in an ind  i  l ed  ed.  Failing to see and act is a good way 
of ensuring redundancy.  
In support of marketing myopia existing, interviewees reported the following comments: 
x Din a  ma ke ing, he  a e en  ea  behind.  (Interviewee 004) 
x The  lack leade hi ,  he  lack inn a i n,  he  lack c edibili .  
(Interviewee 003) 
x "They don't get it, and they will never change." (Interviewee 006) 
x The  a e a  i k f l ing ignifican  ma ke  acce .  (Interviewee 002) 
x The  a e j  ade . N  ma ke e .  (Interviewee 001) 
x Ind  i  f ll f li ic , big eg  and b ll ing.  (Interviewee 005) 





6.2 Qualitative Responses: The interviews: What do those in the sector have to say? 
This applied business project's qualitative interview component has been revealing, 
confronting, and insightful in equal measure. The responses from a wide range of senior 
industry executives, farmers, and critical players provide a call to arms for an industry in 
crisis. The interviews capture the genuine fear that exists inside the New Zealand red 
meat industry. 
Critically, New Zealand red meat industry executives and marketing people do not 
understand the concept of exchange information. The current red meat industry 
transvections indicate that most enterprises are not viewing consumers as having 
heterogeneous requirements.  They have not made or understood the significance of the 
connection between these two Aldersonian concepts. This means their enterprises can be 
missing critical information they need to serve their consumers. They are not all wanting 
the same thing. Recognition of these fundamental marketing concepts appears to be 
missing, suggesting two key questions: 
1. Have New Zealand red meat enterprise business models been built from the 
farmer to the consumer? Or have they been made the other way around? This 
state would mean the industry has a market driving orientation rather than being 
marketing-driven. The interviewees' answer supports a production mentality 
behind the farm gate and a sales mentality in front of it. In this world, production 
creates an environment where selling volume supplants strategic marketing. 
2. Does the New Zealand red meat industry assume the market is homogeneous? 
Again, the unanimous answer from my interviewees was yes. 
Interviewees provided empirical evidence pointing to industry initiatives not being 
resourced with the human and financial capital required to deliver quality outcomes. This 
may help explain the comments above. The overwhelming and thematic message 
received from interviewees about the state-of-play in the New Zealand red meat industry 
was it could not see the wood from the trees. These qualitative findings support the 
diagnosis that New Zealand red meat enterprises are suffering from marketing myopia. 
Interviewee 007 suggested, If  ha e a ne   inn a i e idea ha  h ea en  he 
status quo, the existing culture goes to work on the individual that presented the new 
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c nce  n il he/ he ee  he ligh .  007 went on to report, "It is all about optimising the 
hook."  
6.3 Blending pure results and discussion: An Explanation 
Ordinarily, the results in a research project would stand by themselves and be isolated 
from the discussion. The interviews for this project have proven to be fascinating and 
exciting, to say the very least. A lot is going on in the New Zealand red meat space. 
Understanding how the future of the industry will play out is incredibly complex.  
This applied project doesn't pretend to have all the answers, but it does outline one 
strategic direction, and that narrative is brought fully to life in the following chapters 7 
and 8. The results in this chapter are reported alongside commentary. I have chosen to 
combine and integrate some discussion alongside each result as they are reported. This 
approach has been used to stimulate the reader to reflect on the findings as they unfold 
through questions 1-22. The next chapter's extended discussion will expand and amplify 
the key themes emerging from the interview sessions. The results from sixteen 
qualitative interviews with significant industry players are represented in the findings 
reported below. The qualitative conclusions reported were ultimately derived through 
empirical means.  
Gaskell (2000) suggests, Em i ical e ea ch me h d  de i e f m he a lica i n f 
observation and experience to a research question rather than being grounded in theory 
al ne.  In this case, I leveraged semi-structured interviews with senior industry players 
and kept interviewing up to the point where I felt I was not learning anything new. 
Interestingly and also relevant, Kaufman (1994:127) suggests that in-depth interviews 
like the kind utilized during this research can be therapeutic and may provide both 
ethnographic and biographic information to the researcher.  
Kaufman (1994) suggests as interviewees talk about their challenges, they begin to 
grapple with them, and this reflects my own experience. By taking a highly confidential 
dive into the New Zealand red meat industry's challenges, my interviewees were free to 
explore options and express opinions they would generally keep to themselves. These 
opinions often lie dormant because the New Zealand red meat industry culture can be 
intensely combative internally and externally. For example, processors compete for 
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producer stock; this practice has often contributed to trust overrun by a transaction's 
needs.  
It is difficult for the industry to deal with these problems because, as interviewee 001 
suggests, "The industry is based on structures that are engineered for throughput." 001 
en  n  a e, They're just traders, not marketers. They are volume-driven, and there 
are no consumers in view." Interviewee 002 reported, "Success equals production 
efficiency. We still have a hangover from the Dunedin effect. We are a long way from 
markets, we have a small population, and by accident, we ended up with a lot of arable 
lands suitable for using animals to process grass." 002 points out that New Zealand has 
come from a processing angle driven by the glory days of selling sheep meat to Britain. 
002 also stated that it had been nearly 50 years since Britain joined the EU, heralding the 
end of the New Zealand red meat industry's glory days. In 002's view, this should have 
signaled to the industry that it was time to innovate.  
Callagher (2015) advises, L e  inn a i n can be e lained b  he ell-known 
inci al  f d c  lifec cle .  The reluctance to recognize a fading cash cow, creating 
broad organizational ramifications towards the end of a product lifecycle, feeds into 
Le i  (1960) he  and hinking a nd ma ke ing m ia. Le i  (1960) ci e  he 
railroad industry missing road, sea, and air freighting opportunities as a relevant example 
of this phenomenon. At the time, the railroad industry also had the capital to 'own' these 
new opportunities, but you can never 'own' what you cannot see. 
Not being able to see is myopic, which is an accurate descriptor in this case because, 
according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, myopia means being nearsighted, lacking 
in discernment, foresight, or intellectual insight. It suggests the following synonyms: 
unimaginative, uncreative, unadventurous, and narrow-minded. Sadly, this research has 
identified some smoke, and where there is smoke, there is often fire. My interviewees 
suggest the New Zealand red meat industry ticks many of the descriptors signifying 
marketing myopia.     
I  i  n  all bad ne . Callaghe  (2015) in   he ind  hi ical abili   
innovate in the past, reporting, One hundred years ago firms in Ne  Zealand  ed 
meat sector changed the way beef and sheep meat were consumed in the United 
Kingdom through the adoption of discontinuous product, process, and business-model 
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innovation built on the commercialisation of refrigeration technology. Large-scale 
distribution channels were created and new organisations, in the form of industrial-scale 
abattoirs and intermediary stock agents, were established to secure seasonal supplies of 
ca le and hee .  This extraordinary innovation period allowed New Zealanders until 
the early 1970s to enjoy one of the world's highest living standards. 
6.4 The Questions: Asked and Answered 
Question 1: How do you think the New Zealand red meat industry is travelling from a 
financial, cultural, and innovation standpoint? Is the industry positioned to thrive into the 
future given the evidence shows it has not succeeded for a very long time? 
Question number one may appear to be a loaded question. Still, it was designed as an 
opening question to help transition myself and the interviewee into the optimal frame of 
mind to allow a wide-ranging and broad exploration of the issues. Interviewee 001's 
response to the first question began with, "It's all about volume, it's all about throughput. 
Nothing else matters, and frankly, the results from this approach speak for themselves." 
001 repeatedly emphasized, Small i  bea if l, mall i  c l.  Interviewee 002 
responded in a similar vein suggesting, "The industry is travelling very badly. It is at risk 
of losing significant market access. The industry is culturally poor and is not even 
vaguely concerned with quality, not really. There is much noise out there, but look 
carefully, and you can still see the leopard hasn't changed its spots." Interviewee 003 
stated, "There is a lack of leadership, imagination, and action, and that is a combination 
that does not bode well for the future. Nothing, absolutely nothing, has changed. Murray 
is still there, Rob is still there, what's different?" 
There was eerie agreement across this question's financial performance aspects, with all 
interviewees accepting and acknowledging the current level of financial performance 
was not sustainable. Interviewee 004's opinion was, "The current leadership are on 
'Island Time' and are not keeping up with what consumers want. This attitude, which is 
endemic to the culture of the red meat industry, will end up becoming an even bigger 
problem in the future than it is now." Interviewee 005 felt, The fa me  a e al  
problematic, and they make it very hard for the processors to get out in front of changes 
in b h end  and c n me  beha i .  Interviewee 006 reported in frustration, "They 
will never change Jim; the whole system is broken. The structure is wrong, and it's 
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wrong on both the producer and processor sides. Farmers just keep producing what they 
want, and the processor has to find a way to get rid of it."  
Interviewee 007 supported this standpoint and spoke from personal experience, 
reporting, "If you're not in sync with the existing culture after three beers, they go to 
work on you until you are either onboard or out the door." Interviewee 008 suggested, 
"They are totally frozen in time, what chance have they got, what future?" In response, 
Interviewee 011 said, "I'm worn out Jim, I need a break from the whole industry. It is 
just way too hard." Interviewee 015 replied, "There have been way too many farmers 
involving themselves in stuff they have no clue about. The red meat industry, as a result, 
has been an absolute disaster." 
Question 2: What does marketing mean to you? Please describe and explain your 
understanding of the marketing function. 
Interviewee 001 suggested, Ma ke ing is the opportunity for the industry to learn how 
 be e e hing hei  c m e i i n i  n .  Interviewee 001 discussed opportunities 
available to the industry by effectively deploying and leveraging marketing, particularly 
in export markets. Interviewee 001 has an expert level of marketing capability and deep 
experience in the New Zealand red meat industry. Interviewee 005, another marketing 
savvy individual, reported, "The politics embedded into the red meat industry culture 
means it doesn't matter what marketing means to me because it isn't going to be 
le e aged f  an hing he  han  n  a fe  fa me .  I found this an interesting 
comment, particularly when considering the effort and expense to produce the Annual 
Report. The Annual Reports produced by the larger red meat enterprises, in my opinion, 
represent some of the industry's finest promotional work. Interviewee 005 went on to 
say, "As a result, we have no clue what the consumer wants." 
My discussions with all the interviewees without any prompting supported a lack of 
marketing focus throughout the red meat industry in New Zealand. Interestingly, the 
interviewee's responses went further than confirming marketing myopia. They suggested 
an almost inbuilt, preprogrammed response existed when marketing concerns were 
raised because it was a very sore point. They were very defensive, almost as if to say, 
according to interviewee 005, "There are no marketing issues here, nothing to see, move 
along." These communications flow through various media channels, often promoting 
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marketing as a core element of strategy. For example, the often touted and now almost 
cliché claim of transitioning-to-value.  
The internalization of such a belief system has potentially allowed the industry to create 
an environmental  cultural effect that further locks in marketing myopia. According to 
the cohort interviewed, marketing myopia is endemic and ingrained in the red meat 
industry psyche. Interviewee 001 suggested, "They look straight through opportunities, 
they are traders, not marketers and operations are volume-driven to the point where they 
get in their own way, and there are no consumers at this point do not feature."   
Interviewee 005 reported, The ca n, n  c , men ali  eign  eme.  The 
boardroom talk and public PR might well be about transitioning to value, but the 
inherent and collective red meat enterprise actions beg to differ. Interviewee 005 went on 
to say, "All innovation comes from smaller enterprises which are owned and managed by 
passionate people with skin in the game, not from worn-out red meat industry 
employees." In answering the above question, interviewee 005 drew a triangle 
(represented by figure 6.0 below) on a blank sheet of paper to demonstrate that 
processing companies, particularly large processing companies, are focused on 
production. Interviewee 005 had a solid knowledge of marketing and worked with others 
that also had expertise in marketing. The problem 005 outlined was the organizational 
structures that currently existed did not hear marketing's voice.  
The diagram in Figure 6.0 below is the replicated drawing from interviewee 005. The 
in e ie ee a  ing  dem n a e h  he ind  f c  i  c ncen a ed al ng he 
triangle base, which is where the bulk of human and financial resources are deployed. 
This simple diagram graphically depicts the lack of priority and help given to marketing. 
This appears counterintuitive and supports the marketing orientation of the industry 
being centered around a production mindset. 
Interviewee 005 suggested that a square would be a better way to distribute the resources 
making the point that more even distribution of resources across the business would be 
more balanced and make more sense. Perhaps a highly responsive circle arrangement 
would make even more sense as strategic priorities can shift in response to competition. 




Figure 6.0: Diag am ho ing Ne  Zealand ed mea  ind  lack of ma ke ing o ien a ion  
Source J Wilkes (2020) 
One of the insights derived from question two was the realization that while there was a 
general understanding of marketing, there was very little evidence of a deeper 
understanding of purist marketing theory. For example, during the interviews, not one 
interviewee referred to the differences between heterogeneous markets and 
homogeneous markets. Understanding this difference is fundamental to the ambition of 
transitioning to value, which appears to be the broader New Zealand red meat 
community's aspiration.   
Interviewee 001 reported, Ma ke ing mean  everything to me, but the reality is boards 
and executives and farmers cannot hear or see the potential of marketing because it is 
e l  d ned  b  he ince an  and in i e n i e f l me, l me, l me.  
This insight may provide some insight into why marketing appears so poorly utilized.  
Question 3: What do you think marketing should deliver for the New Zealand red meat 
industry? 
Interviewee responses to this question can be summed up by one word, more. There was 
a great deal of frustration, disappointment, and even a level of anger in each 
interviewee's anecdotes. Interviewee 001 suggested, "There are pockets of marketing, 
but the industry is constantly playing catch-up, and it seems we are forever late to the 
party." Interviewee 002 thought, "The 'Dunedin Effect' is alive, and well, we're a long 
way from markets, and we consistently orientate our businesses from the processing 
angle, not the marketing angle. Not investing in marketing is proving to be one of our 
most flawed decisions." 
171 
 
Interviewee 003 reported, "Jim, the industry doesn't get marketing. They just don't get it. 
More marketing focus is desperately needed, but you are constantly bashing your head 
against a brick wall trying to sell that message. Sometimes, you think there has been a 
breakthrough, and in a blink of an eye, you are right back to where you started. The 
industry lacks leadership and imagination, making it very hard for marketers and 
marketing to have a voice. Just look at the makeup of the boards." Interviewee 004 
stated, "The wrong guys have been appointed; it's an industry in crisis. Marketing isn't 
even on the list. What could it deliver? Potentially, the answer." Interviewee 005 agreed, 
"Marketing is the red meat industry Achilles heel, we know we need it, but for some 
reason, we just cannot download the app." Interviewee 006, Ma ke ing i  de e a el  
needed, but implementing genuine change is always a b idge  fa . I  idic l , b  
i  i , ha  i  i , he  ill n  change.   
Interviewee 007 suggested, "They are making some of the right noises, and the 
packaging has improved, so there is that. It isn't marketing, though, is it?" Interviewee 
008 reported, The lack f ma ke ing e e i e ha  c  he c n  billi n  and billi n  
of dollars in GDP and lost opportunity. It has put our entire industry at risk. These 
al e na i e  g  a e n  m cking a nd. The  ha e he ca i al and he ma ke ing 
know-h   ea   l nch, and he  j  migh .  Interviewee 009 said, "Let's not even 
go there, Jim, we know the answer." Interviewee 010 felt the same way suggesting, "Who 
else can we yell at? We know we need marketing, and so do they, but nothing ever 
happens. The numbers do not lie. Nothing has changed." 
Question 4: What do you think the discipline of marketing has delivered to the red meat 
industry to date?  
Question four echoes question three. My objective with this interview question was to 
explore the gaps between what interviewees thought marketing could deliver (what was 
possible) with the realities of what marketing has delivered. In the end, interview 
question number three managed to answer question number four. Marketing is so lacking 
in the red meat industry that this level of distinction appears to be unnecessary. 
Interviewee 011 managed to sum the collective feeling up quite well, reporting, "Jim, I'm 
worn out, completely exhausted, and I need to go and do something else for a while." 
The collective frustration around what marketing could have and would have achieved 
for the New Zealand red meat industry was palpable in each interview. There were some 
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glimmers of hope around particular projects. Still, in every case, the lack of marketing 
enables red meat enterprises to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory over and over 
again. 
Question 5: How well represented and influential is the marketing function at the 
boardroom level and in the 'C' suites of New Zealand red meat industry enterprises? Is 
the voice of marketing being heard, or is the voice of optimization and efficiency louder? 
Where does the customer feature? 
Interviewee 007 suggested, The e le nning he e en e i e  ha e n  changed f  
ea . The c l al  e  e ained and embedded in the boardroom incumbents is 
absolute. For this reason, optimizing the hook will win out against marketing every time. 
Efficienc  c eam , ma ke ing hi e .  Interviewee 013 reports, I  all ab  he 
conveyor Jim. It should be all about the table. This is what marketing tells us, and we 
ill cann  change. We j  ack hem and ack hem.  Interviewee 014 agreed, "You 
cannot do your job properly; the pressure to pump out volume drowns out everything. 
The boardroom guys might talk about marketing but, we certainly don't see or feel 
anything different down here." 
Interviewee 015 suggested, The  a e fa me  Jim, n  ma ke e . L k a  he b a d 
makeup of Alliance, not one marketer. How can marketing have its voice heard? We are 
so far behind it is ridiculous. It is a ridiculous situation, and until it changes, the 
ind  a  igh  he e i  i in c i i ." Interviewee 015 went on to suggest, Ha e a 
l k a  Be nd Mea  b a d. The  a e g ing  be making he le  e  h l . The  
are now mainstream, and they have bottomless pockets with an appetite for disruption. It 
is not going to be a fair fight." 
Ma cha  (2018)  In e ie ee 015  en imen  a ing, Impossible Foods, maker 
of the plant-based Impossible Burger, has hired creative veteran Sasha Markova as the 
c m an  fi  e ec i e c ea i e di ec . Ma k a ill lead Im ible F d  in-
h e c ea i e eam, hich ill manage all i al me aging ac  he b and  
channels.  Ma cha  highligh  Ma k a  a i n e ing Ma k a a ing, The en e 
f mi i n ha  e i  a  Im ible F d  i  e f l and in ica ing. I m h illed  be 
leading the charge in uncovering the most brilliant and contagious ways of 
c mm nica ing ha .  This statement does not resemble in any way reports emanating 
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from the New Zealand red meat industry, where there does not appear to be the same 
passion. Sadly, not many people are intoxicated about the mission to sell the world some 
of the most outstanding red meat on the planet.  
Question 6: What is leadership's role in directing, supporting, and providing the 
resources for marketing? 
The interviewee cohort all raised severe concerns over New Zealand's red meat industry 
leadership. The interviewees collectively suggested the industry's leadership problems 
stemmed from a lack of priority given to leadership at the very top. There were no 
champions of direction and no champion leaders. This included the government, its 
departments, the red meat boards, and senior executives across the red meat sector. 
These, of course, are the people ultimately responsible for resourcing marketing, 
developing policy, and driving strategy. 
Levitt's (1964) preconditions for marketing myopia reinforce the industry phenomenon 
the interviewees are consistently referring to during my interview sessions with them. 
Levitt (1964:23) stated, In e e  ca e, he ea n g h i  h ea ened, l ed,  
stopped, is not because the market is saturated, it is because there has been a failure of 
managemen .  The interviewees, in this case, are collectively reporting a systemic 
failure to lead. They also reported a systemic failure to recognize the critical role 
marketing plays in enterprise success.   
Question 7: How effectively do you think New Zealand red meat is marketed? Can you 
think of an example of a brand that is making its producers well above schedule returns? 
Interviewee 001 suggested, "The New Zealand red meat model is a volume model, and it 
is all about throughput. Industry marketing is poor." In e ie ee 001  b and e am le 
was First Light. Interviewee 001 thought, "First Light have lost their 'pioneering' 
positioning. They did not brand Wagyu correctly at the start." Interviewee 001 also 
suggested, "The wine boys have cracked it. They call it terroir, and the red meat industry 
should take a leaf out of their book. It is about marketing from a district and regional 
level first and building the narrative from there." 
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Interviewee 007 suggests, "We don't market our product well. Silver Fern Farms thought 
about creating a spin-out business to create better ways to market. I wish that initiative 
had won over some fans. It didn't, and now the company is fifty percent owned by the 
Chinese. To my way of thinking, that outcome does not bode well."  
Question 8: What could the industry look at improving about marketing? Is there 
anything else that can make a more significant difference than marketing? For example, 
Robotics. 
Question eight allowed each interviewee to look inside their own experiences connecting 
with insights that drove the sessions to challenging places. For example, interviewee 001 
suggested, Small i  c l beca e di ce ning c n me  a e a ing  d ill d n  
find he h.  Interviewee 001 went on to state, "Brand is all about the brand. 
Consumers either like or dislike the brand's positioning." Interview 001 felt more focus 
on these areas would produce better returns. 
Interviewee 004 suggested, An ind  in c i i  need  eal men  ha  a e e a ed  
 hem el e  n he line.  Interviewee 004 felt leadership was the most critical element 
to master to improve returns. Interviewee 004 went on to state, "The wrong guys stay 
with the status quo to protect their CV's and for this reason, change never happens. They 
come in, do a three-year stint and bugger off." Quite a few interviewees in the cohort 
shared this belief. Interviewee 005 felt, "The industry needs more women and fewer 
farmer directors. They just don't have the skills. Look at who we're up against now. 
These guys making meat out of thin air are going to kill us." 
Interviewee, 010 reported, "We need to get better and get better fast. We have done all 
we can do on the farm. We are at the edge of the efficiency envelope. The improvements 
have to come from achieving better returns in the market. What other options are there?" 
Interviewee 009 said, "The top ten percent of farmers are doing well, the middle is just 
hanging on, and the guys at the bottom are probably in trouble, especially when this 
cycle turns, and it always does. Our co-ops, industry bodies, and the New Zealand 
government have let us down, and we haven't shouted loud enough either. The current 
round of compliance has removed the benefits from 20 years of efficiency gains." 
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Question 9: Why do you think the New Zealand red meat industry has struggled to 
produce acceptable returns for its producers and processors for the last decade or so? The 
combined total of Earnings before Tax extracted from annual reports available at the 
New Zealand Companies Office and documented in Table 4.0 in Chapter Four.  
Silver Fern Farms generated $20.8 billion for an EBT of $52.5 million or 0.25% return. 
Alliance generated $32 billion for an EBT of $85.6million or 0.27% return. 
In combination with Question 10: What is your view on the future of New Zealand red 
meat? Would you invest? Will things get better? Why? When? How?  
These are probing questions. The answers shifted with intensity depending on where the 
interviewee stood in the industry regarding their earnings and futures. Farmers with 
intergenerational skin in the game had much stronger biases and views on the current 
state-of-play than those with less skin in the game. 
In response, interviewee 006 suggested, Low margins fuelled by intense competition 
can be seen by the low-profit margins on profit and loss accounts across the industry's 
players. Only the big retailers are making any real money. Farmers are paid high prices 
at the farm gate, and after that, processing plants have to try and make it all work. They 
have to make enterprises operating with high fixed costs and low capacity utilization 
work in a commodity market where New Zealand no longer enjoys the advantages it 
once took for granted." 
Further, into our interview, 006 was quite vocal, reporting, "Consumers are becoming 
more conscious of animal welfare and the environment. How the industry treats animals 
is under the microscope. The near boycott of New Zealand bobby veal in 2015 is a good 
example of changing customer perceptions around animals' unfair treatment. Jim, why 
would I invest in this industry? The risks are very high compared to the returns. If 
nothing changes, it's a sunset industry, and who wants to invest in an industry like that?"   
In  f in e ie ee 006  c mmen  ab e, Ryan (2015) reported, New Zealand 
needs to act quickly to tighten up on the way it deals with bobby calves to prevent 
potentially serious damages to its international reputation for dairy and meat products, 
say, industry commentators. The call comes after TV One's Sunday program showed 
176 
 
disturbing footage of animals being severely mistreated on a farm and in a 
slaughterhouse - something it said was not just a one-off incident." 
Question 11: What is your view on alternative proteins? We see everything from cricket 
flour to test-tube burgers. Should red meat producers be fearful? 
As expected, this question about the impact of alternative proteins was a hot topic. 
Interviewee 001 suggested, We need  be e e hing he  a e n .  Interviewee 001's 
thinking was the New Zealand red meat industry needed to Defend, defend, defend.  
The interviewee's general concerns were based around a prolonged and very 
undercapitalized response from the wider New Zealand red meat industry. Interviewee 
001 felt that separating volume from value and breaking away from the gravitational pull 
of 'commodified' meat strategy was a great place to start. At the same time, there was not 
much confidence from Interviewee 001 that this would happen. The feeling of frustration 
was shared across the interviewee cohort. This feeling was heightened when they 
compared the New Zealand red meat industry's marketing capability against the cutting-
edge marketing teams and immense financial resources being made available to 
alternative protein enterprises. There was genuine fear about the future of the industry.  
Interviewee 005 felt problematic farmers, insufficient returns, a lack of scale, and no 
time to think contributed to an inadequate response. Interviewee 005 suggested, "We 
need to develop and invest in two distinct channels. We need to be smarter about how 
and where we trade because that provides returns to farmers and pays the bills, and we 
need to invest heavily in innovation. All the good ideas come from small companies, and 
most of them fall by the wayside because they lack capital. It's crazy. Something needs to 
be done to join the dots." Interviewee 005 also felt that the existing industry culture and 
politics prevented his company from being genuinely free to innovate. Again, the issue 
of poor culture and industry politics was mentioned several times across the interview 
cohort. Interviewee 005 summed up the state-of-play in the industry, stating, While  
best and brightest are tied up fighting for their survival, the alternative protein ventures 
a e nning am k ealing  ma ke  ha e b  he da .   
Interviewee 004 reported, "Al e na i e ein  a e n  c ming he ' e he e n , and 
there is no stopping them. They are growing faster than everyone thinks. The New 
Zealand ed mea  ind  i   fa  behind i  i n  f nn . L k a  he Silic n Valle  
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investment being poured into these ventures. They are becoming runaway juggernauts. 
The fi  al e na i e nic n can  be fa  a a .  Interviewee 004 felt the New Zealand 
red meat industry had failed to employ the right people at the operational and executive 
levels. Interviewee 004 thought that the industry was in crisis and now required its 
incredibly well-paid leaders to step up, put themselves and their reputations on the line, 
and become accountable for the industry's survival. Interviewee 004 viewed the 
alternative protein players as a clear and present danger to the New Zealand red meat 
industry. 
Question 12: Is the industry marketing itself successfully enough and strong enough to 
resist losing further market share to competitive substitutes? 
This question was not always asked as directly as it appears above, but its thematic intent 
was 'inserted' into conversations with all interviewees. I wanted to learn what they 
thought about the marketing effort per se. Responses were deeply felt, and whilst 
individual feedback is obviously held in separate thought silos, the responses were 
delivered in unwitting solidarity. It was incredible to experience how a diverse cohort 
drawn from the wider red meat industry could be synergistic. Qualitatively, this was 
evidence of a powerful message. 
In e ie ee 004  ie  a , "They don't produce what the customer wants; they have an 
approach to marketing which is at least twenty years past its use-by date. Now there's 
irony for you." Interviewee 006 suggested, "They simply don't get marketing. They spend 
more time communicating with a warmed-up audience of farmers than they do fighting it 
out in the hurly-burly of a competitive marketplace. You have to win customers." This 
was an interesting comment, and drilling down further again saw the path lead back to 
politics. Interviewee 006 felt that the 'boys club' politics was partly responsible for 
allowing very political structures to form. These structures demonstrated extended 
hierarchies and were accountable for embedding enterprise structure and culture that 
belonged to another time. 006 suggested, I ld n  ha e been i ed  ee a ea 
lad .  These structures were locking in a trajectory that was myopic and leading to 
industry failure. Interviewee 006 suggested, "Just look at who's leading these businesses 
and then look at who is leading the alternative protein businesses. It's not rocket science. 
Who do you think is going to win? They need to hire champion disrupters, not CV 
ec ing cham i n  f he a  .   
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Interviewee 009 reported, "We've done all we can on the farm. The New Zealand 
government ripped the subsidies off us in the 1980s, and ever since, we've had to work 
hard to achieve efficiencies and cost savings on-farm. There is always some new 
technology coming our way, but the low hanging fruit has been picked. Costs are rising 
again too. Every other day it seems we need to address something, and it all has a cost, 
for example, look at the compliance costs now, the environment, animal welfare, and it 
goes on and on." 
Marketing was very relevant to Interviewee 009 because achieving higher prices offered 
a glimmer of hope for the future. Succession and future survival were viewed as being 
directly linked to the red meat industry's ability to respond to the threats coming from 
alternative protein ventures. Interviewee 009 felt more and more alternative protein 
players popped up every day, which meant more risk.   
Question 13: What would you do if you were a red meat producer to earn more and 
secure your future? Would you consider growing soybeans and raising crickets? Is it 
time to move out of animal production into crop production?  
This was a revealing line of inquiry. As it was explained to me, the reality centered on 
much of the sheep and beef country being farmed now not being suitable for planting 
crops. Planting trees is one option being considered by some, but there is also some real 
concern about that whole industry being very distorted. There is also real concern about 
land being planted to trees being lost to the livestock sector for a long time, reducing 
farmer options downstream. In terms of earning more for red meat in the future, the 
cohort's solidarity came together again. 
The unifying thinking suggested moving up the value chain was the most repeated 
strategy. For the first time, there were some conflicts from the cohort on how this could 
be achieved. Their differences were driven by where they were positioned in the 
industry.  
Interviewee 008 summed up the challenge stating, "I'm heading off now to have a meat 
sandwich, so that will give me some protein from animals; tomorrow for breakfast, I'll 
get my protein from plants." Interviewee 008 argued that it was not time to move out of 
red meat production. Interviewee 008 suggested that future consumers want to secure 
protein from both plants and animals. Understanding how consumers made their protein 
179 
 
choices was one of the questions the New Zealand red meat industry needed to answer. 
Interviewee 003 supported this position suggesting, "In my view, it doesn't come down to 
plant or animal. It is more like a choice between industrial food systems and 
regenerative food systems. The New Zealand red meat industry could be regenerative but 
has so far opted for industrial. The irony is, premium consumers don't want the 
approach we've chosen." 
While some early adopters of regenerative farming techniques in New Zealand, the vast 
majority of farming operations are still dialed into extractive, process-driven, industrial 
agriculture norms. Interviewee 003 responded further by arguing that the alternative 
protein ventures also had some issues to address. Interviewee 003 identified numerous 
weak points in alternative protein business models. These included a high degree of 
processing and ecological and environmental issues stemming from sourcing plant-based 
protein from mono-cultural farming systems. 
Alternatives also rely on pesticides to manage crop production and yield and require high 
levels of processing. These traits are generally not considered optimal for human health. 
Communicating these messages successfully to consumers is one of the New Zealand red 
meat industry's most significant future challenges. Failure to win consumers' hearts and 
minds now may deliver dire consequences to the New Zealand red meat industry in the 
future. 
Question 14: Do you have a view on why the value chain (transvection) is so distorted? 
Di c i n  a nd h  al e  a  di ib ed and a i ned ac  he ransvection 
were interesting. They arguably provided the most substantial evidence so far that the 
New Zealand red meat industry suffers from marketing myopia. Interestingly, even with 
the highly skilled and experienced cohort being interviewed, there was very little 
understanding of how the problem of value distribution could be addressed. The cohort's 
response dynamic to this line of inquiry was muted. Interviewees accepted that value was 
not shared equitably, but, for whatever reason, they had not had the opportunity to 
develop their thinking about how to deal with such a challenge. The production, sales-
driven orientation of red meat firms may explain this situation. 
The rhetoric emanating from the industry about transitioning-to-value seemed to miss the 
importance of superb negotiation skills. Marketing is, of course, critical. It provides the 
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transvection strategist with the big picture. Transvection mapping highlights how value 
travels across the provisioning system; however, it is the sales professional's skill that 
cuts the deal. They achieve or fail to achieve the returns sort by the enterprise.   
A relentless focus on production can set up the sales force of any industry to fail. Levitt 
(1964:34) outlined a similar preoccupation in Detroit reporting, "In some industries, the 
enticements of full mass production have been so powerful that for many years top 
management in effect has told the sales departments, "You get rid of it; we'll worry about 
profits." Levitt continues stating, "By contrast, a truly marketing-minded firm tries to 
create value-satisfying products and services that consumers will want to buy."  
During the interviews, there was robust recognition of the 'value' issue but not many 
ideas about creating more value. Interviewees would mostly suggest sound bites. For 
example, interviewees suggested moving up the value chain, investing more in 
innovation, or working backward from the consumer to allow research insights to inform 
strategy and drive decision-making. The rhetoric sounded promising, but notably, none 
of the interviewees appeared to hold or actively be promoting a clear plan about exactly 
what actions needed to be taken next. 
The interviewee cohort's response to this question concerning value suggested a general 
and complete acceptance of low returns. Simultaneously, on the surface, there was very 
little insight into how to solve this issue in the future. Transvection was not a concept 
recognized by the cohort. Marketing was viewed mostly as sales and promotion. It was 
not viewed as an end-to-end discipline. Marketing was not viewed as being responsible 
for the conversion of on-farm production into consumer satisfaction. There was some 
knowledge about challenges with engaging supply chains, but the commentary appeared 
to echo from the red meat industries' revolving ideas door. Interviewee 010 described 
this door reporting, "The revolving door is an industry device dreamt up by bureaucrats 
where the same idea gets fed in on one side, and then it spins around several times until 
it comes out the other side. The idea then receives another makeover and gets fed back 
through the same revolving door device again to produce more or less the same result as 
before. Welcome to the New Zealand red meat industry." 
Interviewee 005 suggested, "The industry is so focused on-farm, and on processing, that 
it cannot see anything else. I mean, for goodness sake, our head engineer cannot use a 
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c m e e a e ck in he da k age . We a e n  e i ed  emb ace c nce  like 
transvection. Our strategy is to hope and pray for the Chinese to stay hungry and get 
hungrier." Drilling down into these types of questions tended to produce some blunt 
responses. Interviewees were frustrated and fed-up with thinking about a way forward. 
They had been here before. Their responses appeared to suggest the industry has been, 
and remains, in some sort of existential crisis. No one seems to have an answer. 
Interestingly, no one appeared to be looking in the marketing direction for one either. 
Interviewee 005 supports the idea of industry malaise, suggesting the critical industry 
players responsible for generating fresh ideas develop very few of them.  For example, 
interviewee 005 stated, "Beef and Lamb are sluggish and slow, processors are focused 
on optimizing throughput, and farmers complain. They won't commit capital when it is 
clear that capital is required to shift the needle. The industry's commodity orientated 
salespeople end up at the end of the line with thousands and thousands of tonnes of meat 
coupled to the impossible task of turning a sow's ear into a silk purse."   
Question 15: How will the New Zealand red meat industry combat the enormous 
investments being made into marketing by new entrants like Impossible Burger and 
Beyond Meat? The capital these enterprises have attracted, and are continuing to draw, is 
nothing short of staggering. The cash in their war chests most likely exceeds what the 
most prominent red meat companies generate at the topline. 
Interviewee 002 suggests, I  ab  he T i le Nine hing Jim. Small disruptors will 
thrive because they build their business models back from the customer just like you guys 
a  T i le Nine Fa m  ha e d ne.  While drawn from a wide selection of enterprises 
across the industry, the interviewee cohort still demonstrates a bias towards volume, 
even if it is subtle in specific individuals. Interviewee 002 was an outlier here and stated, 
"When we look at where New Zealand agriculture needs to go, it isn't heading in the 
direction as 'alternative' protein. That isn't our game. Branson and Gates' massive 
investments into alternative foods cloud the main issue: producing and marketing highly 
nutritious food. It does not matter if it is 'alternative' or natural.  In New Zealand, 




Interviewee 002 stated, "The only way 'man' can exchange solar energy for food is with 
healthy soils and healthy pastures, which are responsible for producing both healthy 
plants and animals." Interviewee 002 also suggested, Wh  d e  i  ha e  be a b ge ? 
There are some great plant options. The concept of creating some healthy substitutes is a 
g d ne.  In essence, interviewee 002 was trying to point out that New Zealand is one 
of the few countries in the world perfectly suited and perfectly positioned to produce 
premium animal protein. Interviewee 002 was perplexed about why the industry could 
not see that point. 002 finished by stating, "We are meat eaters, that's why we developed 
big brains, and that's why we are where we are today. It is just a reality. Get real. The 
key thing with animals is respecting them, not exploiting them. We also need to keep an 
eye on the consumer shift away from industrial farming systems. This possibly represents 
our bigge  ni  ince e in en ed ef ige a ed hi ing in D nedin.   
Question 16: Can New Zealand red meat industry marketing's performance be linked to 
the significant decrease in red meat consumption by consumers? Figure 6.1 below shows 
since 1980, Canadian beef consumption has declined from 40 kilograms per person to 25 
kilograms per person. This trend is global. What role has marketing played, if any, in this 
decline?   
 
Figure 6.1:  Meat Consumption in Canada. Source: Statistics Canada (2020) 
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Leveraging Canada as an example of declining red meat consumption, I sought the 
cohort's views about the possible connection to marketing. Interviewee 002 felt, "Our 
industry has not invested in marketing; we've also made some simple errors and haven't 
learned by them. We have demonstrated a failure to understand what consumers want 
and need. We are still struggling to recognize the flexitarian market. Many of our 
traditional consumers are shifting to less meat intensive diets for health and animal 
welfare reasons. Our marketing needs to shift with them, and ideally, we get in front of 
the curve, so we lead, rather than playing catch up like we usually do, and like we are 
doing now." 
Interviewee 001 stated, "Small is cool because that's what discerning consumers want. 
As I said before, First Light nearly got it right, and then they went and lost their 
'pioneering' positioning. They didn't brand Wagyu correctly from the start, so yes, a 
bloody good example of marketing missing the boat. As a result, they are being dragged 
back into the commodity space, even if it is a slightly premium commodity space.  I've 
seen them heavily discount their prices at times, in Reaward Fresh, New World, and 
Fresh Choice. It's even worse for the red meat industry because marketing has ended up 
watching the boat float past with a new group of consumers onboard, and it missed 
hem. H  m ic i  ha ?   
In contrast to this comment, Williscroft (2019) reports, A 30% inc ea e in demand f  
First Light Wagyu beef has led the Hawkes Bay company to look for more farmers to 
fini h i  ca le.  Williscroft also reports, "The grass-fed movement is growing in the 
United States, and FirstLight is well placed to tap into that, given it has picked up 
several accolades in the past 12 months including Forbes Magazine describing its beef 
as the best in the world." 
The juxtapositions referred to above are interesting. Interviewee 016 argues, "Yes, there 
is some luck involved; look at the current lamb prices. AFFCO has put out a limited 
lamb contract at $9 per kilo for August. Beef is also strengthening, but the swine flu in 
China drives the increase, not marketing skill. Those of us in the meat exporting business 
all understand commodity markets go up and down. Some in the industry claim 
strengthening prices as we see now are related to their well-crafted, value-transition 
strategies when this is not the case. Peter Fraser summed this up beautifully in 
Wellington yesterday while providing his assessment of why Fonterra has failed. He 
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suggested Fonterra's foodservice division thinks value-add is manufacturing big blocks 
of cheese, putting them into plastic bags, zipping them up, and sending them off to China 
so they can be put on pizzas." 
The point or insight shining through from the discussions with the broader interviewee 
cohort is marketing plays a minimal role in any red meat export success. Interviewee 016 
stated, A  n a  ma ke ing l k  like c ing m ne , he  e ea   hei  c mf able 
c mm di  c e and hi  ill ne e  change. The  d n  ge  i , ne e  ha e, ne e  ill.  
In support of this comment, it is hard to define or point towards a deliberate marketing 
strategy in the past or present that has been successfully executed and implemented, 
creating a situation where the industry's producers and processors have enjoyed financial 
success. Sure, you can argue that First Light's focused effort in the USA is strategic; 
however, as interviewee 016 suggested, S me ime   d  j  end  being in he igh  
lace.   
Bear in mind First Light commenced in 2003. If you map the USA grass-fed market's 
growth from 2003 to 2020, the increase in FirstLight demand makes sense. That said, 
credit where credit is due, the company is there engaging with consumers in the market.  
The FirstLight transvection demonstrates that their farmers receive $7.00 per kilogram. 
The New Zealand Herald in their CHB Mail publication (2019) reported,  
"Payments are known upfront, based on a set per kilogram price, modelled off 
established market returns," says First Light general manager Wagyu, Matt Crowther. 
"We set pricing 12 months ahead. This year, on average, our shareholders get more than 
$7/kg. It's about 20 percent over commodity on average, so that's breaking into a new 
bracket, which has been our aim for the last five years."  
S ing he in e ie ee c h  a g men  f  he g a -fed growth story Thurlow 
(2019) states, Industry experts maintain that growth in grass-fed beef is very stable and 
has been between increasing by 25-30 percent annually over the past decade." Williams 
(2015) reported, "Sysco Corporation, one of the largest food distributors in the US, 
recently signed a deal with ABP Food Group of Ireland to bring Irish grass-fed beef to 
the US consumer. The deal is worth a reported $17 million annually and is the first 
European beef to be exported to the US in 16 years." Strategy or serendipity?  A grass-
fed beef report commissioned by the Stone Barnes Centre For Food and Agriculture 
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(2017) cites a Nielson survey which identified, Sale  f f e h g a -fed beef grew 15 
ime  in he f  ea  ince J ne 2012, eaching $272 milli n b  J ne 2016.  
Question 17: People say New Zealand red meat is a premium product. If this is true, 
why is red meat predominantly traded through commodity platforms and wholesale 
channels where marketing has little influence, and the price is the primary clearance 
mechanism? 
Interviewee 002, listening to Peter Fraser's destruction of the Fonterra business model 
with his Apocalypse Cow presentation, suggested the problems in the New Zealand red 
meat industry might have a similar origin. Interviewee 002 stated, A  F a e  aid, 
fa me  a e e  ea   nde and. The  d n  like a ing che e , b  he  enj  
receiving cheques, and a big cheque is better than a mall che e.   
What interviewee 002 is driving at is New Zealand farmers have historically embraced a 
strong on-farm, behind the gate mindset. As a result, they rarely engage with actual 
consumers. That task has been abrogated to their processors. In theory, cooperatives 
make sense. In New Zealand, they are the dominant structure for the country's largest 
exporters. In Fonterra's case, Fraser argued its design had enabled multi-billion-dollar 
destruction of farmer value. 
Interviewee 006 suggested, "They will go broke, Jim. Look at the numbers, look at the 
returns. It is not a sensible way to allocate capital. Most of these guys are just trying to 
preserve lifestyles." Fox (2015) reported findings from the Meat Industry Excellence 
reform promotion group suggesting, A rationalisation that included the four largest 
companies - the two cooperatives, Silver Fern Farms and Alliance Group, plus privately 
owned AFFCO  and ANZCO - agreeing to a co-ordinated and managed consolidation 
process was found to offer savings of more than $1 billion over five years." The report 
went on to highlight that MIE's research and analysis also highlighted low farmgate 
returns, with the latest ANZ red meat sector strategy report showing sheep and beef 
farmers were receiving a "miserly" 0.7 percent return for the past seven to eight years of 
investment. The report highlighted an urgent need to address overcapacity in the 
processing sector.  
Interviewee 006 continued, "As I said Jim, what has changed? Nothing. The industry is 
being sold off to the Chinese and Japanese. The overcapacity issue is even worse now. 
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Look at ANZCO. They achieved record sales of $1.65 billion last year and recorded an 
after-tax loss of $26.9 million. How will that allow the industry to focus on premium 
products?" 
Interestingly, Farmers Weekly reported ANZCO suggested this was because, Sales for 
the year to December 31st were up 18% on the previous year on the back of growing 
gl bal demand f  hee  and beef d c  and he c m an  hif  in  highe -value 
f d and heal hca e d c , b  a ee e n ma gin  affec ed fi .  This statement 
does not make sense. The shift to higher-value seems to be delivering less value. 
This opinion of reality contrasts with the reality on the street. Triple Nine Farms recently 
assessed the opportunity to take over the ANZCO value-added lease in Christchurch. We 
discovered a venture that was producing retail-ready products using costly (leased) 
German equipment. The equipment pictured in Figure 6.2 below made our German 
butcher think he had died and gone to heaven. Unfortunately, the business delivered low 
margins selling products like retail-ready ground beef (mince) to Foodstuffs, one of New 
Zealand's big two supermarket conglomerates. The returns for providing these products 
exceeded the ability of the venture to survive. In other words, ANZCO was unable to 
negotiate or secure a high enough price with the conglomerate supermarket for their 
business to remain viable. The irony in this outcome was not lost on me as this business 
was presented to me as part of ANZCO's value-added program. 
 




Question 18: What is your view of New Zealand's red meat industry leadership? 
The interviews unearthed some solid and deeply held beliefs about the state of the New 
Zealand red meat industry leaders, and none of them were flattering. Interviewee 001 
suggested, "There are pockets of leadership, but they are not strong enough to be heard 
or to make any real difference. There are some good intentions, but as soon as there is 
any farmer agitation, it evaporates very quickly, and farmers are production-focused to 
the point of being destructive of their futures. Industry leadership is an issue too; for 
example, the four scenarios report by Beef & Lamb was not that great." Interviewee 001 
was, however, optimistic about the industry's future and felt significant opportunities 
would come from, Being e e hing he c m e i  a e n .   
Interviewee 002 stated, "We have come down from the processing angle, not the 
marketing angle, and unlike the Irish, we're fighting each other instead of working 
together. That failure is a failure of leadership across the entire industry. It isn't rocket 
science, and we all know this, Jim. The beginning of the EU was the end of New 
Zealand's glory days. We're not Britain's south pacific farm anymore. We're hoping 
China will get us out of this mess, which is a dangerous position to be in. This is where 
our leaders have taken us, and it isn't great." Again interviewee 002 remains optimistic 
about the future. This is because, at some level, there appears to be a belief that 
somehow New Zealanders will get this right. That would appear to be debatable based 
on the ind  ack ec d.  
Interviewee 003 laughed when I asked this question looking at me as if to say, really, are 
you serious. 003 took a harder line, reporting, "What leaders? You must be kidding; the 
leadership in the industry is an absolute joke. They've turned left when they should have 
turned right, they are unable to collaborate, which is particularly a problem in export 
markets, and they have proved inept at innovating. Doing things in dribs and drabs has 
not amplified our reputation. We're seen as top-class mediocre meat. The Aussies and 
the Irish are cleaning us up in every premium market. Leadership, what a massive 
disappointment. These guys are paid an absolute fortune to get this stuff right, and they 
just haven't." 
Interviewee 006 reflected and a ed, It's a big disappointment, Jim. The sooner I can 
get out of here, the better. The organizational structure is toxic, inept, and wasteful. And 
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h  i  ha ? Leade hi , leade hi , leade hi he c m le e lack f i ." Interviewee 
007 stated, "If you don't see things their way, they sideline you until they can get rid of 
you. New ideas are not welcome. It's the status quo forever. Nothing changes and that 
includes the leadership; just look at the boards." In e ie ee 008  c mmen  n 
leadership was, "We've been left behind. Look at the alternative protein guys. They are 
flush with capital and creativity, and they are technologically savvy. They understand the 
convergence of convenience and nutrition. Our so-called leaders are still chopping up 
meat and putting it in a bag. The days of the weekly lamb roast are gone. Get real. Do 
they not do any market research? Sorry Jim, rhetorical question. They don't even know 
what research is, or we would have strong brands positioned at the inflection points of 
change, but you have to know where they are first."  Senior industry players and 
influencers represent the interviewee cohort. They collectively and repeatedly report 
concerns about the New Zealand red meat industry leadership.  
Question 19: Do you think New Zealand is wise to invest in and rely so heavily on high-
growth markets like China? What happens if the growth dries up? 
Discussions around China were concerning and insightful. Processors appear to be 
caught in the bright lights and eternal hope of a relentlessly growing and continuously 
protein hungry China. With the luxury of reflection, I believe thinking like this exposes 
the industry to be even more susceptible to marketing myopia. There is no doubt about it; 
China is very influential; however, it is much harder to hear the rattling sabre of change 
when you lock into' forever growth' markets. 
History is littered with similar examples of marketing myopia from the Russian Tsars to 
the American railroad Barons. The leadership in both camps failed to see what was 
happening right in front of them. The Tsars missed the significance of population unrest, 
and the Railroad Barons missed innovation from the air, land, and sea. The Barons 
owned all of the assets, all of the infrastructure, all of the money, all f he ma ke and 
then... they did not. I asked the interviewees if they thought the China growth story held 
similar risks for the New Zealand red meat sector.  
Interviewee 002 suggested, "China will always be one of the most protected markets in 
the world and for New Zealand not to understand this puts us in a perilous position." 
Interviewee 003 reported, China  hee  ind  i  imed  g  i h ignifican  
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in e men  a ing.  In support, Campbell (2019) suggests, "What New Zealand is good 
at is animal husbandry, forage management, quality processing, and capitalizing on 
increasing land prices. What we are not so good at  on the other hand  is industrial-
style thinking, cooperating as unified businesses, and creating value for our products in 
the market." Campbell (2019) also stated, Sh ld he Ne  Zealand hee  ind  be 
c nce ned? Ye , babl , b  le  e ha  a  he im e  f  a egic ac i n.   
Interviewee 007 suggested, "It is a difficult question, Jim. Right now, as you know, New 
Zealand is dealing with the impacts of reverse integration in many sectors, including the 
logging and dairy industries. Perhaps it isn't so much about whether New Zealand 
should invest in China, but whether we should let China invest in New Zealand. I was 
never a fan of the Silver Fern Farms sell-off because ultimately, I don't think it will end 
well for New Zealand farmers or New Zealand."  
Arguably, in instances like the Silver Fern Farms sell-off to Shanghai Mailing, the 
Chinese have ended up with the power because they bring the two elements New 
Zealand red meat companies like Silver Fern Farms lack, capital, and customers. In my 
view, and my interviewee cohort shares the opinion, this situation is likely to depress 
innovation and increase marketing myopia because in the go-to-market ecosystem like 
the one Silver Fern Farms now operates in, there is a very opaque connection to the 
consumer, which begs the question: do they know what is going on? 
These arm's length initiatives appear to have left a very negative and worrying residual 
taint in the air, with many unanswered questions. These large enterprises also appear to 
champion powerful internal lobby groups, which are tasked with projecting a potent 
influence externally through spin and PR. Peter Fraser (2019) noted during his 
presentation of Apocalypse Cow at Victoria University in Wellington, on June 28th, that 
Fonterra had managed to get numerous articles published across multiple media channels 
as of that morning highlighting the excellent progress the dairy company was making. 
This was in stark contrast to Fraser's presentation, in which he eloquently argued 
Fonterra had already failed.  
In e ie ee 007 gge ed,  The  (P ce ing c m an  e ec i e ) a e n  al a  
working in the best interests of farmers, but they always seem to be working very hard 
for their own best interests. Look at how much they pay themselves and then look at what 
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he  deli e . Wha  ha ened  a g ading em f  ed mea  e ec i e ?   Hutching 
(2017)  in e ie ee 007  assertion reporting, SFF is no longer a co-op since 
signing a deal with Chinese company Shanghai Maling. Outgoing CEO Dean Hamilton 
earns a salary of $1.5m, while chairman Rob Hewett gets $184,000. It suffered a $30.6m 
l  n e en e f $2.2b in 2016.  Before Hamilton's reign as CEO, Mackenzie (2013) 
reported, D nedin-based Silver Fern Farms has about 128 employees earning more 
than $100,000 with one, presumably chief executive Keith Cooper, earning between 
$970,001 and $980,000.  Mackenzie went on to report the financial performance stating, 
SFF e ed a $36.5 milli n l  in he ea , a ed c i n n he $42.2 milli n l  
e ed in he e i  c e nding e i d ( c ).  It appears that the Chinese growth 
story may not be perfect, after all.    
Additional negative Silver Fern Farms headlines have also included:  
F eign O ne  f Sil e  Fe n Fa m  Failed  Deli e   
Source: www.rnz.co.nz 
 
Sil e  Fe n Fa m  Ci e  T gh Shee  Ma ke  in P fi  Slide  
Source: www.sharechat.co.nz 
 
Sil e  Fe n Fa m  e  Shanghai Mailing Deal  a  ff $203 milli n f Deb  
Source: www.stuff.co.nz 
 
Pe e  Rallie  Again  A alling C i n in Sil e  Fe n Fa m  Sale  
Source: www.tvnz.co.nz 
 
Mea  C m an  Sil e  Fe n Fa m  ha  been ca gh   i ing ff mig an  lab  
Source: www.thedailyblog.co.nz 
 
AHDB analyst Oborne (2019), based in the United Kingdom, highlights the impact 
market growth in China is having on New Zealand sheep meat exports, O e  he a  
ten years, Chinese imports of sheep meat from New Zealand have increased by nearly 
five times (+150,000 tonnes), according to China Customs data. Meanwhile, New 
Zealand  hi men   he EU ha e declined b  e  a hi d (-70,000 tonnes), according 




Figure 6.3: Imports of frozen sheep meat from New Zealand. Source: IHS Maritime &Trade 
Global Trade Atlas, Eurostat, HMRC, China Customs. (2020) 
 
The point of the above reference from the interviewee cohort's perspective is simple. 
Because of its sheer size, China can have a very volatile impact on farmgate pricing and 
demand. Interviewee 006 suggests, "The massive size and opaque nature of China mean 
we don't have a clue what is going on and we will always be strategically 'dark' as a 
result. Should we be so heavily invested in China? No, not in my opinion, but it's almost 
too late now. The horse has bolted." Meat & Livestock Australia (2019) support 
in e ie ee 006  i i n e ing, "China is unique in being the world's largest sheep 
meat producer, consumer, and importer." MLA also highlighted the commodity platform 
exposure risk alluded to by several members of the interviewee cohort reporting, "Small 
herders still represent a significant proportion of producers in China, and they 
principally add volatility to the market, by growing flocks to take advantage of high 
prices and exiting when prices fall, or livestock rearing conditions deteriorate. This 
means that over-production is an ever-present risk and, given domestic production 
accounts for 95% of consumption, it can have an immediate negative impact on import 
demand, a ic la l  a  he c mm di  end f he ma ke .  The commodity market is, of 
course, the end of the market where New Zealand predominantly trades, and like all 
commodity market participants, they are exposed to volatility. This means they are price 
takers as a result. Look at New Zealand timber and honey exporters. Both sectors were 
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shedding employees and profits in 2019, and both industries have been very reliant on 
Chinese markets and a never-ending Chinese growth story.  
This question to interviewees was about confidence in the Chinese growth story, and 
growth stories can go wrong. For example, Smith (2019) reports, Surging beef prices 
should be good news for Australia, one of a handful of countries that exports their meat 
to China. However, producers are worried that demand could go the other way. Donald 
Trump's trade war with China has unnerved the nation's middle-class consumers, and 
he ' e a ed c ing back n l ie  ch a  A alian Wag .  Smith also quotes 
Tim Ryan, a Singapore-based analyst with Meat and Livestock Australia, who stated, 
We a e en i el  la ing in ha  emi m end f he ma ke . We a e e ed  ha  
emerging middle class continuing to grow and having enough money to spend on 
premium imported beef." As Levitt (1964) has proven, time and time again, growth 
stories end. Figure 6.4 below outlines the disposable income situation in China compared 
to other countries. How accurate are the 2022 projections, and what happens if the 
projections fall short?   
 
Figure 6.4 Household earnings comparison. Source: BMI Research. (2018) and (2022) forecast 
figures. 
 
The insight from interviewee 006's response is an acknowledgment by this researcher 
that the Chinese market is gigantic, and for that reason (on the surface at least) it suits the 
New Zealand red meat industry's traditional 19th Century derived mindset and modus 
operandi, which is to optimize production efficiency. This arguably out-of-date business 
model represents the comfort zone for New Zealand producers and processors. 
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Unfortunately, at the same time, the momentum to produce volume from what is now a 
much lower animal base, combined with the massive overcapacity of processing plants, 
is likely to not only stifle value-adding innovation, it is expected to encourage, embrace, 
and embed marketing myopia. 
There are many facets to this argument, but history has proven to be a very reliable 
predictor of the future, particularly around economic growth stories. The Chinese 
situation is beginning to resemble many past growth experiences, and they all end the 
same way. That is, growth stops abruptly. Look at what is happening in the automotive 
industry with internal combustion engine vehicles versus electric vehicles. Look at what 
is happening with traditional proteins versus alternative proteins. Look at what is 
happening in the bricks versus clicks space. The pivot to digital is underway.  These 
changes are nothing less than a revolution. The keyword here is looking. Failure to look 
provides the link back to marketing myopia. While an enterprise is consumed with 
meeting demand, they are not consumed with looking beyond the horizon to see what 
might become the next big thing. Ironically, it is nearly always the next big thing that 
ends the current big thing. 
Question 20: Is the New Zealand red meat industry ripe for foreign acquisition? 
Shanghai Mailing has acquired 50% of Silver Fern Farms. ANZCO has turned Japanese. 
Who is next? How will this impact financial returns to producers? 
Oram (2019) sets the scene for the next interview questions with two extracts from his 
recent and highly relevant article on the Westland Dairy takeover by Chinese dairy giant 
Yili. Oram states, Westland is a small dairy co-op but a big cautionary tale for our 
entire economy, not just the primary sector or narrowly dairying or even just co-ops. It 
shows how incredibly hard it is for a small commodity-producing country like ours to 
move up global value chains to niches of greater value and market power. Astute 
strategies, excellent execution, and diligent governance are required every step, every 
day." 
The result of this now completed foreign takeover is captured by Oram's (2019) 
narrative, where he states, B  b  fa  he b lk f he eal h l ima el  gene a ed b  ha  
milk acc e   Yili and i  ha eh lde  and em l ee  e ea . Yili  ffe  i  he be  
Westland shareholders can get. Yet such foreign ownership is absolutely not the best 
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model for our entire dairy or primary sector, or the economy at large. We have to have 
the skills and capital to build up our own ownership of businesses that can push far up 
he al e chain gl ball   he e he eal e a d  lie.  
Interviewee 001 suggests, "We should break up the industrial processors, separating 
volume from value and break away from our inherent weakness and let others that can, 
create the value, create it.  This is what has made us weak and vulnerable. The 
cooperative models we champion are too slow on every front, and our lack of capital 
means we are often very late to the party. The end game can be seen at Silver Fern 
Farms and over at ANZCO. If I were a gambler, I would bet on Alliance being next." 
Interviewee 007 reports, We don't know enough about what happens to our beef and 
lamb after it hits the wharf in China, but the math is pretty simple. It isn't New Zealand 
making money. Not being profitable makes the industry weak, and it ends up with few 
options but to sell. We need to cooperate, but look at us; we've been there and done that 
with the meat excellence caper, and look how that ended. To be honest, we're sitting 
ducks." Interviewee 002 said, We a e e  a idl  bec ming e f  in  n land.  
Interviewee 006 felt, "They are too slow, Jim, and I mean too slow to do anything and 
everything. What's frustrating is that we know what we need to do, but we just can't do it, 
and I have no idea why. We are great at talking, but not so good at doing, and when we 
need to deal with the hard stuff, we try hard to pretend it isn't happening." 
The implications from 001,002, 006 and 007s responses appear to coalesce in problems 
being derived from low prices, a belief in mass volume, and an inability to respond to the 
issues emanating from this approach. As a result, New Zealand is giving up ownership of 
its prized processing assets. Downstream, this also implies a loss of control and that is 
likely to include a loss of control over pricing. This is an inherent fault in the system and 
the producers and processors need to transact in volume has meant the balancing 
feedback loops have been ignored. This means the failsafe systems have been turned off. 
For example, the industry attempts to deal with poor performance by transitioning to 
value, when the system is not actually designed for value. It is designed for volume. In 
the same way, climate change is not the problem, it is the symptom.  
Question 21: If you had total power over the New Zealand red meat industry, what 
would you change? And Finally, Question 22: in your opinion, does the New Zealand 
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red meat industry suffer from marketing myopia? In essence, can the sector see the wood 
from the trees?  
Interviewee 001 says, "Yes, according to the definition you have used, Jim, the New 
Zealand red meat industry is myopic. As I've said previously, we must find a way to 'see' 
through to customers, and once we know what they want, we need to focus on delivering, 
particularly in areas where New Zealand has particular strengths. Our 'pure' story 
migh  be ge ing ld, b  i  c n ain  all he DNA e need  ec e  f e if we can 
see it." 
Interviewee 002 reflects and suggests, "We're coming into an age where small disrupters 
can thrive. To do that, we first need to disrupt everybody that is standing in the way. 
That means farmers, the government, and its ministries like MPI, MBIE, and NZTE, and 
above all, red meat processing companies. They all need to change. They need to be 
completely rewired. Is this achievable? Can we meet this requirement? The jury is in 
e i n.    
Interviewee 003 reflects, "Yes, if not seeing what we need to see means we have 
marketing myopia, then our red meat industry is 100 percent pure myopic. I'm quietly 
confident we will wake up, but the clock is ticking, and we have certainly got plenty of 
stuff wrong. I'm probably just saying that last bit to make me feel better." 
Interviewee 004 felt, "The industry is myopic, and sadly, I think deliberately and 
desperately so. The industry needs some real men and women to deal with this crisis. 
The industry needs leaders who are prepared to put themselves on the line. Too many of 
the wrong people have been picked by external consultants who know nothing about our 
business, and everything about selling a CV to a board." 
Interviewee 005 suggests, "We've backed ourselves into a corner, and we can't get out. 
Can our leaders see this? I think the answer is yeah-nah. Yeah, they can see it, but nah, 
they will not do anything about it. Are they myopic? That's easy, yeah. It  obvious to me 
and  e e ne ha  kn  and k  in hi  ind  ha  e need  change.  
Interviewee 006 states, "A blind person would be less myopic. There is information, 
history, and metrics on nearly every aspect of on-farm production and red meat 
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processing, but there is little awareness of what is required to compete. They cannot see 
the consumer, and they cannot hear the c n me  ice. They are highly likely to be 
myopic because they cannot only not see; they cannot hear either. More critically, and to 
cap it off, they continually demonstrate that they cannot learn as well.  
Interviewee 007 reports, "Yes Jim, as we have discussed at length, these guys cannot see 
the wood from the trees. They don't just have marketing myopia; they have every kind of 
myopia. I have tried many times to raise a range of issues with leadership. They have not 
been prepared to listen. Yes, they can be polite and acknowledge a point, but they never 
actually do anything to make a change or implement an initiative. They don't do 
anything that could make a real difference. We are still cutting up meat and putting it in 
a bag. Seriously,  how much longer will that last?   
Interviewee 008 felt, "They are just not with us. I don't know what it is. It reminds me of 
the Hand Maiden series, where good people looked the other way when they knew better. 
Is that marketing myopia? Sure, why not? That is as good an explanation as I've ever 
heard to describe failing to see what you need to see. We need to do better quickly, and 
maybe that means we need to start hiring people who can see. Maybe we need to hire 
some marketers." 
Interviewee 009 reported, "I've been talking about this for years, and now it has a name. 
Excellent, and yes, the industry suffers from marketing myopia, big time." 
Interviewee 010 echoes 009, stating, "How can we not see this stuff? It's bloody 
frustrating, especially when you've got serious capital tied up, and you're betting on 
these guys to get stuff right. We need to be a lot more careful about what we're looking 
for. We need to step up and make el e  hea d. We e in a tough global market, and 
we still think we're the best when quite obviously, e e n .   
Interviewee 011 stated, "These farmers just want to play it safe, Jim. They don't want to 
disrupt anything, they don't want to take risks, and they don't want to step outside the 
farm gate. Is that myopic? Wow, yes, it is. They are 100% reliant on the processors 
getting the marketing stuff right, and the evidence plus history strongly suggests they are 
not capable of delivering on that front. It's a tough situation because farmers have to 
rely on a group that can't create value. That means their operations are a long way from 
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being future-proof. Should be some interesting succession sessions coming up. Who in 
hei  igh  mind ld a  in fa ming?  
Interviewee 012 reports, "Lack of collaboration is killing us. We head offshore into 
export markets as individual enterprises, and once we get there, we open up on each 
other with price. It's ridiculous, and even though we can see what's happening, nothing 
changes. Even the so-called 'premium' guys who market premium cuts in the morning 
are back in the commodity trading game by the afternoon. The industry has difficulty 
downloading what it experiences in the market. Marketing myopia seems to be an 
excellent way to describe this situation, and if we don't learn from what we see and 
change, we're in a lot of trouble." 
Interviewee 013 states, "I think we can see some of what's going on Jim, but that doesn't 
matter; we still act myopically. For example, look at some of the premium lamb brands. 
They have ended up fighting each other mano-mano for market share in New Zealand. 
All this does is pitch farmer against farmer and processor against processor, while the 
e aile  and he e a an  ne  ake he in.  
Interviewee 014 thinks, The e a e plenty of opportunities to appeal to consumers with 
different needs and tastes, but they all just put stuff in a bag and flog it off. Many of the 
stories do not have much integrity either, and I think that is myopic and disingenuous. 
FirstLight Wagyu, for the most part, sell F1 animals. That means no more than 50% 
wagyu, which means the other half is a dairy cow or if you're lucky, Angus.   
Interviewee 015 states, "Marketing myopia is a brilliant concept. Looking back over my 
career, I could point to numerous examples of marketing myopia. It is one of those 
concepts that exposes some of our human failings. We don't like change; we don't like 
being uncomfortable; we prefer to stay with what we know. And if we have capital and 
assets tied up in enterprises like farming or processing, we like to play it very safe. If the 
land value can increase year on year along with the farm producing a nice return on 
production, what else is there to see? Rhetorical, I get it. The New Zealand red meat 
industry needs to start acting like it is in a crisis because if the Chinese sneeze, we're 
going to get the full-blown flu." 
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Interviewee 016 suggests, "As soon as a marketing initiative looks like costing real 
money, they run for the hills. Marketing myopia describes this behaviour entirely. Does 
the New Zealand red meat industry suffer from marketing myopia? Yes, it most certainly 
does. 
The insights from questions 21 and 22 point firstly to senior sector personnel suggesting 
the industry is definitely being impacted by a lack of marketing focus, marketing 
investment, marketing advocacy, and last, but not least, marketing implementation. In 
essence, the industry is underweight in marketing. Secondly, there is a sense of urgency 
being transmitted through the interview process. People are frustrated and concerned 
about where the industry is currently positioned. There is genuine fear that New Zealand 
is missing out and falling behind.  
Equally, the many in the cohort expressed disappointment that New Zealand has not 
seized on the opportunities presenting themselves, nor has it grasped the opportunity to 
lead in a sector where it could become a world leader. There is some restrained hope in 
the voices of the interviewee cohort, but patience has worn thin, and belief in the New 
Zealand red meat sector having a vibrant future has also demonstrably weakened. This 
last point was supported by the high number of interviewees that reported they were 
looking for opportunities outside the sector.   
6.5  Transvection Analysis: A new way to think about who makes what, where, 
 when, and how.  
To complement the information gleaned from the qualitative interviews and add some 
perspective to the interviewee's comments, a full transvection is developed in this 
section. It is one thing to talk about poor performance and financial missteps, but could 
we see them playing out in real markets? The research intention was to assess marketing 
myopia, not just myopia per se. Transvection analysis was instrumental because it 
exposed obvious marketing mistakes (defective sorts) between the producer and the 
consumer. This added another level of rigor to help guide the diagnosis regarding 
marketing myopia in the New Zealand red meat industry.  
Can a premium be achieved by leveraging or modifying the transvection? Yes, they can. 
Could transvection be useful in practice? Yes, very useful. Can transvection principals be 
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used to test assumptions about marketing elements like the price? Yes, that is what 
Alderson (1965) designed it for. Will applying transvection principals improve the 
financial returns of Triple Nine Farms or any other red meat enterprise? Yes, it will. In 
Triple Nine Farms' case, the business model has already achieved this goal because it has 
been designed from the ground up to deal with defective sorts.   
The information collected for this project reflects the flow of product from its raw state 
in nature (live cattle) to the final consumer (premium red meat). This sequence 
demonstrates Alderson's (1965) concept of transvection in a real business setting. The 
data inputs were created early on in the prototype startup phase using the best estimates 
available.   
6.6 Triple Nine Farms: Applied Transvection  
In an applied modality, Transvection is incredibly useful. In this research project, 
particularly with regard to developing the prototype, applied transvection proved to be 
invaluable. Once you get your head around understanding transvection is a holistic 
description for a multi-lateral, end-to-end, market provisioning system, its value as a 
marketing and innovation tool emerges.  
For example, as Triple Nine Farms was being developed the business experimented and 
trialled numerous contract arrangements. The iginal a -  a i nale a   c n ac  
out the animal processing requirements, so Triple Nine Farms could focus its resources 
on marketing. This was the business function I wanted to focus on. I wanted to get the 
word out there to consumers. I though that would be the bigger challenge. I was wrong.  
In practice, as I negotiated across the transvection I struggled to locate and build 
satisfactory relationships at a multitude of key processing points, including slaughter, 
transport and downstream processing. It was clear almost immediately that the 
distribution and processing infrastructure in New Zealand was designed almost solely to 
service a volume driven, commodity mindset. For example, mimimum kill requirements 
did not suit a small start-up, transport was not geared to boutique companies and the cost 
of interacting without scale was costly. Hulth n and Gadde (2007:186) expand on this 
suggesting, E l i a i n f he en ial ec n mie  f cale in man fac ing e i ed 
distribution systems that c ld efficien l  channel  g d   end e . The e f mance 
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of these systems was therefore evaluated mainly from the perspective of the 
man fac ing fi m. In he d  f Alde n (1954) he echn l g  f d c i n  
ruled the game, implying that the prerequisites for efficiency were set primarily by the 
out- a d di ec ed e a i n  f he fac .  
Regulatory policy and industry bodies also demonstrated a predominantly commodity 
driven mindset. For example, MPI requirements around mobile slaughter and slaughter 
on farm. Small business are completely locked out of export markets unless they partnet 
i h ce  and ha  can  be d ne i h  cale. The ce ing c m anie  a e al  
competitors, which brings significant challenges, particularly around power imbalances 
in the transvection.   
Looking at the situation more globally, which transvection facilitated, it became obvious 
the industry was almost exclusively driven by speculation. In other words, the 
underpinning philosophy of the industry was to drive the market. In fact, the equation, 
production orientaion + sales orientaion  = market driver orientation.  This industry state 
had enormous implications for a start-up like Triple Nine Farms. I wanted to leverage 
postponement and the Triple Nine Farms business model was designed to be consumer 
driven. The ultimate end goal was to have animals paid for before they left the 
d ce  fa m  be c m c  f   c n me . The a m i n T i le Nine fa m  
tested during this research project was premium red meat lovers bring heterogeneous 
demands. The results demonstated this assumption was correct. Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 




Figure 6.5: Transvection demonstrating speculation: Source: (2017) Kajsa Hulth n and Lars-




Figure 6.6: Transvection demonstrating postponement: Source: (2007) Source: (2017) Kajsa 
Hulth n and Lars-Erik Gadde, Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden. 
Very early on, it was apparent that distribution was going to be a challenge. The benefit 
of transvection was that it allowed me to break the provisioning system down into 
defective sorts. This is where innovation begins. Every flawed sort identified provided 
Triple Nine Farms with a potential opportunity for differentiation. The issue the 
prototype faced in terms of innovating and responding was that the business lacked the 
capital depth required. Transvection application also highlighted there were pockets of 
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marketing myopia present in the meat industry distribution systems, most of it subliminal 
to any casual observation and well hidden from view. Many value chains students might 
describe the events described above as merely a supply chain negotiation, but 
transvection is much richer than that.  
Another example of a transvection challenge was an arrangement made with a Butchery 
in the North Island. It ended up that the processing facility did not have the MPI 
certification required to allow Triple Nine Farms to buy wholesale from them. This 
presented yet another defective sort, which resulted in another contract arrangement 
being short-lived. Eventually, the business managed to build up relationships that 
enabled a smoother transvection; however, it was never perfect, and the prototyping 
exercise had exposed the company to significant risk.  More capital would be required, 
and the firm would need to lobby for policy changes that would enable it to deliver on its 
promise to consumers, particularly consumers in export markets.   
The financial data presented in Figure 6.7 below, were developed based on early 
assumptions made about the business process, as described in Figure 5.11 in Chapter 
Five.  The data inputs have been consistently firmed up by using data from ongoing 
testing in the live prototype. The process is iterative and non-linear. The approach begins 
with best guess projections, and assumptions are progressively replaced with actuals. 
The resulting cash flow projections and Profit and Loss Forecasting become more 
confident and more accurate over time. For example, chilled freight services were 
e en i e and n eliable. I  k ignifican  ial and e  m men  i h l gi ic  
companies until the best result was achieved. After the pricing was negotiated and 
finalized, the spreadsheet was updated with an actual true figure. This process of 






Figure 6.7 Triple Nine Farms - data gathered for cashflow projections, fully detailing the 
transvection between the farmer and the consumer. Source: J Wilkes (2020). 
This data was then used to build a 12-month Cashflow; see Table 6.0 below. This was 
then extrapolated out to provide three years of Forecasted Profit and Loss Statements. 
These are shown in Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3. The financial statements are dynamic due to 
the changing information as the assumptions are tested. Estimates are firmed up, and 
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new data is added or deleted as the business moves into the operational space.  The 




Table 6.0: A cashflow prediction using the values extracted through testing financial 





Table 6.1: Profit and Loss  First Year 
 






Table 6.3: Profit and Loss  Third Year 
 
Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3: Profit and Loss for first three years built on full transvection analysis 
reported above in Figure 6.7. Source: J Wilkes (2020) 
 
6.7 Dealing with Defective Sorts 
Wooliscroft and Wilkes (2018:1046) state, An efficient market is not one in which every 
product is reduced to a commodity and sold for the lowest price, contrary to economic 
thinking, rather it is a market where the key heterogeneous attributes are maintained, 
and both producers and consumers benefit from a matching process that leads to 
maximum potency of assortment. As a part of transvection analysis or on its own, 
identifying deficient sorts is a macromarketing tool for system-wide potency 
maximization."  
Examination of transvections offers many insights, including insights into how profits 
are distributed. Investigation of transvection flows can highlight innovation points, 
which, if addressed, can help an enterprise successfully compete. Transvections in the 
New Zealand red meat industry are currently stacked against the producer beyond the 
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farm gate. They work against the processor/exporter beyond New Zealand shores, where 
i  al ead  eak c n l e  ice dimini he  f he . In he c en  adi i nal  Ne  
Zealand red meat industry transvection, no farmer controls how profits will be delivered, 
extracted, or distributed. These processes are currently far from transparent. The negative 
aspects of the existing red meat transvection are what this research seeks to showcase.  
It is complicated to obtain accurate data regarding how the internal transvections of 
processing companies and retailers operate. They are not available to the public or this 
researcher. We can observe the flow from the farm gate into the schedule, we can see the 
sale from the processor, and we can see the red meat prices that retailers such as 
restaurants and supermarkets offer their consumers and customers.  In New Zealand, two 
supermarket groups (Woolworths New Zealand & Foodstuffs New Zealand) dominate 
the market and extract significantly higher prices than farmers. Transvection analysis, 
even at a very rudimentary level, suggests supermarkets may represent a defective sort, 
especially if they do not contribute to a fair and equitable distribution of profits to all of 
the players operating across the red meat transvection.  
Attempting to engage supermarkets proved to be an excellent transvection experiment. 
Most supermarkets have a minimum 30% margin requirement, which meant the 
profitability for Triple Nine Farms broke down immediately. The business could not 
maintain the profit margins required for its strategy to work at this price level. As a 
result, supermarkets were identified as a defective sort. Transvection had successfully 
highlighted the area where innovation was required. 
The solution for defective sorts is to modify them so they are no longer defective or 
avoid them altogether. As explained previously, defective sorts represent opportunities to 
innovate, which is a dynamic that appears to be lacking in the New Zealand red meat 
industry. Its actions to continue commodity trading with supermarkets highlights this 
problem.  Many of these defective sorts appear to be endemic and potentially support 
some level of marketing myopia existing. The following price list featured in Table 6.4 
below demonstrates a particular defective sort. During its startup phase, Triple Nine 
Farms negotiated a wholesale arrangement with a premium retailer in Nelson. The 
branded chiller display is pictured in Figure 6.8.  
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The agreement delivered a guaranteed 30% Gross Margin to the retailer. In the end, the 
eali  a , he e aile  ecei ed he li n  ha e f he ma gin a ailable in each kil g am 
of red meat. The reason for trying this approach was the farmer's need for break-even 
volume, which was driven by the funding limitations of the startup. It is an excellent 
example of a defective sort. The example demonstrates how they can occur even when 
your awareness of them is high. It begs the question; how many defective sorts are 
embedded subliminally in the New Zealand red meat industry? If a channel decision like 
the one above does not fit an enterprise's profit metrics, the situation fits the definition of 
a 'defective sort.' 
 
Figure 6.8:  The chiller display unit in Connings retail store - testing qualitative and 





Table 6.4: Connings Food Market wholesale to retail price list showing their mark-up of 43% 
creating a Gross Margin of 30%. 
 
Acknowledging defective sorts represents, on the surface at least, the possibility of 
developing new business models capable of significantly improving profitability. For 
example, Triple Nine Farms' ultimate vision was to double the schedule price for farmers 
in its group. During Covid-19, Triple Nine Farms was still paying $6.50 per kilo for all 
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beef grades compared to the advertised schedule prices represented in Table 6.5 below 
(www.interest.co.nz). This represented an increase of 34%. 
 
Table 6.5: Indicative Processor schedules at 14 April 2020. Source: www.interest.co.nz (2020) 
 
During this time, my connections in meat processing companies have reliably informed 
me that beef sales in supermarkets have increased by nearly 50 percent. This market 
intelligence is credible, as all of the supermarket's traditional competitors were mostly 
shut down during this time.  During Covid-19, butchers closed, and restaurants closed. 
Feedback from the market suggested red meat prices to consumers did not move 
downwards during this time either, which speaks to how power is distributed in the 
system because the schedule prices for farmers fell dramatically, as Table 6.5 highlights. 
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This situation was confirmed from my own experiences, and the anecdotally reported 
experiences of those in my professional and private networks. The pricing structure for 
beef was held stable by supermarkets during Covid-19 compared to schedule prices 
significantly decreasing for producers. This dynamic suggests there are defective sorts in 
the current New Zealand red meat industry transvection. This is an example of where 
operating a prototype in conjunction with qualitative interviews, and transvection 
analysis has improved the research output. It also provides a level of confidence from 
which a red meat participant might develop a response to defective sorts.   
6.8 Shining a light on Innovation and Alternatives 
The transvection analysis results suggest that addressing a defective sort like those 
represented by the New Zealand supermarket cartel could make a difference. Why do 
processing companies have to sell through supermarkets? The short answer is always 
volume. I believe that answer represents an inadequate response to removing a 
ignifican  b acle  im ing fi abili . Wh  can  he Ne  Zealand ed mea  
industry develop a concept like Whole Foods Market in the USA? Conway (2020) 
reports, The gourmet supermarket Whole Foods Market had net sales amounting to 
over 16 billion U.S. dollars in 2017, up from 15.72 billion U.S. dollars in the previous 
year.  S a i a c n in e , Wh le F d  Ma ke  ha  e anded apidly in the last decade, 
growing from 275 locations in 2008 to nearly 500 locations in 2017. That was the same 
year in which Whole Foods was acquired by the e-commerce giant Amazon for 13.7 
billi n U.S. d lla .   
Figure 6.9 below outlines the rise and rise of Whole Foods. Why can't New Zealand Inc. 
invest in developing a significant consumer-facing business that removes defective sorts 
from all New Zealand red meat exporters? In thinking about that question, consider for a 
moment what the taxpayer has spent and still spends on programs related to assisting red 
meat producers and processors improve their exporting prowess. Then add in the 
additional funds invested into other sectors such as horticulture and dairy. It is a vast 
number. How much money was required for the Whole Foods startup? Clifford (2018) 
provides the answer, reporting, Without a diploma but newly inspired by the power of 
organic eating, Mackey and his then girlfriend, Renee Lawson Hardy, decided to go out 
on their own and open a natural grocery store. They set out to raise $50,000 but could 





Figure 6.9: Whole Foods Market Net Sales. Source: Statista (2020). 
 
An important insight derived from assessing transvections in the red meat industry is, the 
closer you get to the consumer, the more impressive the returns. Triple Nine Farms, in a 
small way, exemplifies this insight. In reality, this understanding is nothing new; 
however, applying transvection theory to identify defective sorts is new thinking. 
Transvection is different from the more widely used and understood value system 
developed by Porter (1985).  Alderson's (1965) concept of transvection is heavily 
influenced by organizational behaviour systems, prefaced on the critical importance of 
information exchange. Based on a belief that communities at both ends of the 
transvection inhabit heterogeneous worlds.  
Transvection analysis strongly suggests that engaging more directly with the consumer is 
likely to be highly beneficial to producers in the New Zealand red meat community. This 
research also suggests that conservative mindsets combined with a lack of marketing 
expertise are likely to be part of the problem. These mindsets present a significant risk to 
the New Zealand red meat industry as Skilling (2020:25) reminds us, Demand f  
alternative sources of protein is growing rapidly, and the New Zealand agriculture 
sector will need to respond: moving more rapidly into the premium end of the sector, 
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reducing emissions intensity of production, developing new products that meet consumer 
demand. Innovation and technology will become a significant part of the solution for the 
Ne  Zealand ind .   
Most of the red meat marketing I have witnessed in the New Zealand red meat sector 
almost universally assume that markets are homogeneous. This thinking represents the 
very essence of marketing myopia. In reality, the need for red meat is more likely to be 
heterogeneous, particularly at the premium end where discerning consumers are 
demanding customized service and offerings to accommodate the experiences they seek 
are prepared to pay for. 
High-end consumers are less likely to pay a premium for an offering that fails to 
differentiate or acknowledge their particular heterogeneous needs. Barksdale (1980:1) 
channels Alderson on the subject of heterogeneous markets, writing, The ec nd 
emi e f Alde n  he  i  he e gene  ma ke . In c n a   ec n mic m del  
of perfect competition, which assume homogeneous markets, Alderson postulated 
he e genei  n b h he demand and l  ide f ma ke .   
Figures 6.10 and 6.11 bel  c m a e Alde n  an ec i n i h P e '  al e 
system, and on the surface, each design looks similar, but there are some very distinct 
and subtle differences. In layman's terms, Alderson (1965) suggests that not everyone 
wants the same thing from his market observations. Porter (1991:95) suggests, The 
reason why firms succeed, or fail is perha  he cen al e i n in a eg .  My view 
is Alderson's approach, while not as widely embraced as Porter's Value Systems model, 
offers a marketer significantly more insight because of the model's emphasis on fully 
understanding organized behaviour systems. Sorting and transforming also offer 






Figure 6.11:  
 




6.9 Homogeneity versus Heterogeneity 
Could it be how an organization's leaders and marketers extract information from a 
transvection, or a value chain is central to whether their enterprise's strategy will be 
successful? For example, if premium red meat consumers reside in heterogeneous 
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markets, and a red meat enterprise is driven by a strategy built on believing the world is 
homogeneous, what happens? The answer to that question can be found by observing the 
New Zealand red meat industry, where most enterprises in the sector are doing precisely 
that with minimal demonstratable improvement to the sector's profitability. 
There is a significant body of research supporting the assumption that not every 
c n me  an  he ame hing. F  e am le, T i le Nine Fa m  interactions with 
consumers reinforced this reality. A passionate home griller intends to access the very 
best heritage Angus brisket for their weekend low and slow cook, while a discerning 
steak lover may wish to have his prime steak cut just the way he likes it. Customers may 
want their steak aged for 14 days or 28 days, or 55 days. They may request a specific 
breed known for its eating qualities, such as Aberdeen Angus or  Wagyu, or Hereford. 
The Triple Nine Farms prototype observed these consumer behaviours again and again.  
A sausage is not just a sausage to a German or a Brit or an Argentinean consumer. Each 
consumer is searching for product attributes that are likely to be unique. Individual 
consumers all have particular flavour and taste nuances. These preferences cannot be 
provided through universal offerings. Almquist, Senior, and Bloch (2016) suggest, 
When customers evaluate a product or service, they weigh its perceived value against the 
asking price. Marketers have generally focused much of their time and energy on 
managing that equation's price side since raising prices can immediately boost profits. But 
that's the easy part: Pricing usually consists of managing a relatively small set of numbers, 
and pricing analytics and tactics are highly evolved. What consumers truly value, 
h e e , can be diffic l   in d n and ch l gicall  c m lica ed.  
Alde n  (1965) c nce  f an ec i n i  ab  efficien l  m ing a d c  f m i  
raw state to consumers through a series of transformations and sorts. This is the premise 
used to build Triple Nine Farms. From direct experience, I would happily argue that the 
elements of value identified by Almquist et al (2016) are identifiable through the 
transactions, transformations, and sorting processes of a transvection. Figure 6.12 below 
shows Bain & Company Inc.  Elemen  f Val e P amid. It provides an example of the 
rich layers of information available to a marketer. Understanding the functional, 
emotional, life-changing, and social constructs of value enables marketers to maximize 
he e gene  a eg . Thi  hel  a e ma ke e  deal i h he ch l gicall  




Figure 6.12: The Elements of Value. Source: Bain & Company (2015). 
 
For example, Triple Nine Farms experimented with concepts that will move its red meat 
offerings out of the functional space towards the emotional space and beyond. For 
instance, flavour can be classified as an emotional driver because it is associated with a 
reward. Grass-fed beef can also be grouped as an emotional construct in Figure 6.12 
because being healthy plays to wellness. Regenerative farming could be grouped under 
social impact because of its potential carbon-reducing has implications on climate 
change. Improved consumer information derived using tools like Bain's Value Pyramid 
is more likely to deliver better consumer understanding. Triple Nine Farms has already 
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shown such an approach is capable of providing improved margins across its 
transvection.  
Widening this line of thinking across the industry could help reduce red meat enterprises' 
reliance on homogeneous approaches and help mitigate being trapped in transvections 
displaying defective sorts. As demonstrated by Triple Nine Farms, defective sorts are 
likely to negatively impact the profitability of red meat producers, processors, and red 
meat enterprises. Barksdale (1980:1) channels Alderson stating, Inf ma i n i  he 
mean  f clea ing he e gene  ma ke .  To achieve this state, an enterprise must 
understand why information is vital in the first place. In a commodity market, price is 
responsible for clearing markets, and this is where the New Zealand red meat sector sells 
most of its products. 
The value pyramid represented in Figure 6.12 above plays little or no role in such a case. 
The Ne  Zealand ed mea  ec  en a men  in he c mm di  ace i  a l  beca e 
its participants lack rich consumer information. This limitation suggests those 
responsible for making decisions about where to play and how to win in the New 
Zealand red meat industry suffer from some of the effects of marketing myopia. 
The interviewee cohort was mostly unable to pinpoint heterogeneous markets' 
importance, which might explain why price remains the most significant determinant in 
how New Zealand's red meat product is cleared. Even today, with lamb prices at record 
levels, the industry actors still talk about dollars per kilo. They do not readily comment 
on the 'customer satisfactions' they have created because that information is mostly 
irrelevant to their commodity and homogeneous based strategies. Why are they receiving 
record prices? Laing (2019) reports, PGG W igh n li e ck manage  Neil C mm n 
said returns for lamb and beef were at record levels and would stay that way because of 
ine fe e  in A ia and d gh  h gh  a big a  f A alia.  This is a perfect 
example of price clearing markets. What happens when the Chinese and Australians get 
back on track? With farmers basking in the price boom, how much effort is going into 




6.10 Schooled by the farmer 
Understanding the limitations of homogeneous markets is important information because 
hi  i  he e Alde n  (1965) an ec ion concept begins in earnest. In a very long 
conversation with a farmer group, I was 'schooled' on what makes a good beef and lamb 
farming operation perform well. "It's all about converting grass to protein, Jim. That's 
the game we're in." Interesting, I thought, is it? I looked around the group and pre-
warned them. I was about to ask a stupid question. They all grinned in a good-natured 
way. I piped up, suggesting, Ha  an ne e e  h gh  ab  ha  ld ha en if 
some crazy farmer decided to focus on b eeding ca le f  fla  in ead f eigh ?  
Complete silence. Notably, my research with chefs also demonstrated some quirks with 
lamb. I asked chefs if they would prefer lamb or hogget. Ninety percent of them said 
they would prefer hogget. They cannot easily access hogget because the processing 
companies are geared to procure volume spring lambs each season. Many farmers rely 
on the cash flow that comes from selling the bulk of their lambs to the processors at this 
time. As a result, few lambs become hoggets. 
6.11 Differentiation not at work 
In Figure 6.13, First Light, known as an enterprise producing and supplying a premium 
d c , ha  failed  diffe en ia e hei  ffe ing.  Of a ic la  n e i  he ecial  
pricing applied to their product. In a situation where one product looks like another 
product, price is nearly always the clearance mechanism. How can the consumer tell the 
difference here? Why would they pay a higher price? All the meat in the image supplied 
below looks the same, especially to non-meat experts. Alderson (1965:29) reminds us 
that, "Markets in the real world are never wholly cleared. Some goods are leftover which 
nobody wants. Some wants remain unsatisfied for lack of any corresponding goods. 
Some consumers accept goods, which only partially satisfy their wants. This market 
imperfection results from a failure in market communication." Being caught out in this 





Figure 6.13: Raeward Supermarket, Christchurch. Source: J Wilkes Photography 2018. 
Alderson goes onto suggest, I  i  he b ine  f he ma ke ing eciali   in e iga e 
he e la e  and  in i e emedial mea e .  For example, when you compare the 
gross profit results of  Alliance and Foodstuffs, both cooperative enterprises, Foodstuffs 
have been able to leverage more gross profit from their interactions with their customers 
than Alliance has achieved. If you compare the two enterprises' marketing efforts, 
Foodstuffs' more robust financial performance would appear to support the benefits of 
more significant investment in marketing across the entire marketing system. 
Foodstuffs (in conjunction with Woolworths) own the key channel to the consumer in 
New Zealand, which Alliance does not. This means consumer information levels are 
tilted in favour of Foodstuffs and Woolworths, and the margins will follow. Triple Nine 
Farms has experimented with both supermarket conglomerates and reports it is a very 
challenging experience. They seek control from the beginning. They want to control your 
packaging, pricing, and positioning. The value of using a prototype is demonstrated yet 
again in this example.  
There are other apparent differences between Alliance Group and Foodstuffs. Alliance is 
a commodity trader, and Foodstuffs is a top food retailer. Unlike Alliance, Foodstuffs 
operates in a domestic sector with very little competition and considerable barriers to 
entry. Alliance operates in a cut-throat, domestic, and international environment, which 
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is highly competitive. The constant grinding of low prices and poor performance might 
also contribute to other negative impacts. For example, Alliance has recently been 
reported as having a highly toxic culture. Anderson (2019), a journalist for Rural News, 
recently wrote, Big aff mbling , afe  i e  and he likelih d f e  an he   
e l  a e claimed  be nf lding a  he Alliance g .  Anderson went onto state, 
R al Ne  i  ld hi  l ng li  f eni  e ec i e resignations and departures can be 
blamed n he c m an  c l e, de c ibed a  e i l  ic  and in f eefall.  
Environments under this sort of stress and scrutiny are more likely to be vulnerable to 
marketing myopia.  
To market successfully to red meat-loving consumers, Wooliscroft, Tamilia, and Shapiro 
(2006) remind us that inefficiencies in markets (such as the inability to sell at the 
recommended retail price) could be minimized or reduced through better information 
exchange between suppliers and buyers. They also remind marketers that this 
information is not free. Market research is required. 
A marketer requires enough information to deeply understand the drivers behind a red 
meat consumer's purchase decision. An individual consumer may buy beef and lamb for 
many reasons. These include nutrition and health, flavour and taste, a penchant for meat 
derived from a sustainable farming operation (organic or regenerative), or an association 
and trust in a particular brand.  
When the meat is packaged the same way and displayed the same way the message to the 
consumer is, O  mea  i  n  ha  ecial.  The photo in Figure 6.13 above is an 
example from 2018. It demonstrates the complete inability of farmers and processors to 
have any real influence on how a retailer markets their product. I would argue that any 
marketer selling their meat this way is entering into a situation where they no longer 
have control over their brand or their brand's positioning. Of course, this means they no 
longer have control over their pricing either. 
In, 2019 the First Light website promoted its grass-fed wagyu section narrative with, 
"We chose Wagyu as our breed because it is the Rolls Royce of beef, the food of 
Emperors and Samurai warriors. Grass-fed Wagyu is sweet, nutty, juicy, tender, and just 
downright delicious." Why, then, in the example above, is it on special on a supermarket 
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shelf? Has there been a failure in market communication? I note my negative, bearish 
bias. It stems from disappointment.  
6.12 Transvection versus Transaction 
Transvection thinking differs from transactional thinking because it takes into account 
the entire product delivery cycle. In a transaction, it is generally accepted that ownership 
transfers, and once that ownership transferral takes place, the information that goes along 
with each transaction is also compartmentalized. This information loss is not helpful to 
marketers. 
For example, the farmer sells his cattle to the processor, who then either wholesales the 
product to a retailer or clears it through various commodity trading platforms. This is 
unlikely to be the best way to reach the discerning red meat consumer. In the New 
Zealand red meat industry, this approach has led to value being disproportionately 
allocated. Failing to see or take action to improve the transvection provides some 
e idence ha  he Ne  Zealand ed mea  ind  ma ke ing c h  i  ffe ing f m 
some degree of marketing myopia.  
Engelseth and Felzensztein (2012:685) point out additional advantages of transvections, 
suggesting, Customer-supplier relationships exhibit primarily competence in balancing 
of product supply with product demand. This shows how marketing at the sales office is 
impacted by the technological characteristics of the industry. The sales function in this 
ca e ada   echn l g  and n  ice e a.  Transvections capture the entire 
marketing cycle. If sorting out, accumulation, allocating, or assorting is flawed as in the 
case with selling through supermarkets, then an entity moves from the world of Alderson 
(1965), thinking about how to win customers, to the world of Levitt (1964), thinking 
about why you are losing customers, and failure becomes more likely.  
Barksdale (1980:3) summarises reporting, Alde n ie ed he ma ke ing cess as a 
series of sorting transformations which match heterogeneous segments of supply and 
demand. Transactions specify the terms and conditions under which products change 
hands. All the transactions for a product, beginning with the producers of the raw 
materials and ending with the final consumers, and the related sorting transformations, 
form a sequence called transvections, which explains the flow of products through the 
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en i e ma ke ing em.  Alderson (1965) believed that the never-ending search for 
differential advantage was the key element behind competition dynamics. Barksdale 
(1980:3) reported, The f nc i n f he ma ke  i   ma ch  he diffe en ia ed d c  
f elle  i h he di e e e i emen  f b e .  Pondering this concept in a New 
Zealand red meat marketing context can be an exercise in frustration because there is a 
lack of buy into this concept.   
Back in 2017, at the beginning of this research, I wrote an article titled, Is Red Meat a 
Commodity Product, a Luxury Product, or a Life le P d c ?  How should red meat 
and the red meat industry be defined? What business is it in? I posed these questions 
because the way it is defined now does not have to be the way it is defined in the future. 
I ask these questions on behalf of producers who still report being challenged by low 
returns derived from a business model geared to commodity trading. Is it time for a 
rethink? A hands-on assessment of the transvections in the New Zealand red meat 
industry suggests it is.  
The winds of change are indeed beginning to blow.  The behaviour of the 21st Century 
consumer is shifting, and new trends continue to emerge. Their expectations and 
demands around nutrition and health, laboratory-derived meat products (so-called 
synthetic meat), eating less but higher quality, environmental concerns for the planet, 
and a focus on animal welfare are all being amplified. For these reasons, maybe it is not 
crazy to consider luxury, lifestyle, and red meat in the same sentence. Is creating a 
luxury New Zealand steak brand an opportunity to differentiate? Right now, I would 
argue that no such brand exists. There is no Ferrari steak. 
How narrowly the red meat business is defined is likely to be linked to how narrowly the 
industry's options are represented too. Commodity, luxury, and lifestyle categories all 
have value propositions, they all have consumers, and they all compete for a share of the 
c n me  alle . Wha  diffe  i  each ca eg '  g al and he b ine  m del ha  he 
value proposition is applied through. Commodity platforms have proven themselves for 
shifting volume at low prices; could luxury and lifestyle business models prove a better 




6.13 Live Testing 
The two previous sections have discussed the interviewing process results and 
highlighted the results from assessing an applied transvection. The results of both 
methods have been used to make critical decisions about the structure and supply lines of 
Triple Nine Farms. The interviewee cohort results were enlightening, confirming, and 
insightful; however, interviewees have only provided their personal viewpoints. There is 
always going to be room for additional perspectives. 
As the researcher and interviewer, I have done everything possible to ensure my research 
design, the question set and interviewing style retrieve accurate, relevant, and current 
information. There are, however, sometimes, issues with qualitative research methods. 
For example, Strauss and Corbin (1990:9) stated, "B  he e m ali a i e e ea ch  e 
mean an  e f e ea ch ha  d ce  finding  ab  e n  li e , li ed e e ience , 
behaviours, emotions, and feelings as well as about organisational functioning, social 
m emen , c l al hen mena, and in e ac i n  be een na i n .  The information 
extracted by qualitative means is not statistical and, as Rahman (2016) points out, 
demonstrates multiple realities. It is these 'realities' that provide room for novel 
interpretation, error, and ambiguity. Three outcomes this research wants to avoid.   
The weakness above is a reinforcement for why I selected the multi-content approach. 
The two methods I chose to support my primary qualitative approach were transvection 
analysis and "live" modelling, represented by the prototype's commercialization of Triple 
Nine Farms Limited.  
A significant challenge in the New Zealand red meat industry is cutting through the 
'noise' that distorts what is going on in the industry. This is important because to fix a 
problem; you need to be able to understand it. As the interviewees reported, seeing what 
is going on is challenging.   Fragmented and disconnected communication lines between 
the ultimate producer and the ultimate consumer do not help.  In between sits a range of 
individuals and entities competing with each other while demonstrating some very 
negative traits, for example, toxic culture, which is an observable trait. Negative 
characteristics can make shifting the profit needle harder. They also have a dampening 
effect on innovation. There is little evidence of disruptive innovation emanating from the 
New Zealand red meat industry, and organizational culture could help account for this 
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situation. Drucker (1958) suggested that everyone was in marketing. I'm not sure that is 
the case in the New Zealand red meat industry.  
Transvection has proven useful in thinking about these issues. The following four 
transvection charts were developed to map various strategic positions on the red meat 
journey from farmer to consumer: 
x Graph One: The Commodity Transvection (The Traditional Method) 
x Graph Two: The Sub-C n ac  T an ec i n (T i le Nine  fi  a em ) 
x Graph Three: The Fully Integrated Transvection (Current Triple Nine model) 
x Graph Four: The Future Transvection. (Vision of Triple Nine Farms Concept) 
The idea behind the chart presentations below is that green lights represent an effective 
sort, orange lights are cautionary, and red lights represent defective sorts. This is a new 
idea generated by Professor Ben Wooliscroft of Auckland University of Technology and 
myself. It is a by-product of this research. A 'defective sort' implies the loss of value. The 
premise for understanding this idea has been extensively dealt with previously. The 
results reported in this section will be expanded on in the discussion chapter following.  
In essence, a defective sort is a point across the transvection where a suboptimal action 
can be identified, such as the loss of an individual animal's provenance, breed 
information, or heritage information. The maps are all based on the actual efforts 
employed when structuring Triple Nine Farms.  
Graph One, shown in Figure 6.14 below, immediately displays a cautionary tale 
revealing orange lights at each transvection end.  This is because beef or lamb's 
movement from its natural state to the ultimate consumer by the traditional method fails 
to produce acceptable returns for farmers and processors. A loss of control over pricing 
defines this approach. In this instance, the farmer is a price taker making his selling 
decision based on a seasonal schedule process, which moves up and down in typical 
commodity cycles. In this transvection, processors also fail to generate significant 





Figure 6.14: Graph One:  The Commodity Transvection (The Traditional Method)  
Source: J Wilkes (2020) 
 
The consumer does not win in this structure either as they cannot see or witness their 
food's transparent journey. If not impossible, it is challenging for consumers to 
differentiate in this scenario, which means their purchase decision is likely to be driven 
by price. The Commodity transvection provides the potential for suboptimal sorting 
between the farmer to the consumer. Profits in this structure are disproportionate and 
tend to favour consumer-facing entities, for example, supermarkets and restaurants.    
In Graph Two, depicted in Figure 6.15 below, the subcontractor transvection 
demonstrates the initial structure adopted by Triple Nine Farms. In the initial phase of 
setting up Triple Nine Farms, I believed that proactive marketing would be sufficient to 
shift the profitability needle in favour of Triple Nine Farms and our producers. In reality, 
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the experimentation to get this right has been an expensive exercise. The results were 
sub-optimal. I learned that subcontracting out various tasks like chilled transport, 
processing, and packing with the current infrastructure available to small firms in New 
Zealand was a quick way to destroy value. There are many reasons for subcontracting 
not working, but the nub of the problem is a lack of available infrastructure at 
competitive price levels. Market access, particularly to export markets, is also extremely 
problematic. These challenges and many others are significant and could explain why 
farmers do not venture off the farm. It may also explain why farmers have put up with 
long term poor performance from their cooperatives. What other options do they have?  
The only real option they have is to change processors, which many of them 
continuously do. To counter this tendency, processing companies encourage farmers to 
'share up' in return for incremental rewards. This industry quirk often comes with a sting 
in the tail when processors find themselves having to compete to procure stock. Of 
course, as the processor drives the price up inside a homogeneous environment designed 
for commodity trade, it runs the risk of damaging its balance sheet. The current FOB 
export prices would also suggest that the processing companies cannot influence in-
market prices to any significant degree. 
For these reasons, Graph Two has a cautionary orange light adjacent to farmers because, 
in this transvection they at least entertained the notion of reaching consumers under their 
own steam. Unfortunately, those offering subcontracting services were mostly about 
maximizing their profits. Few had a real interest in helping small startups like Triple 
Nine Farms. The best negotiation I could achieve required Triple Nine Farms to kill a 
minimum of ten cattle each time and 100 sheep. This may not sound like a large volume, 
but when you are in startup mode, dealing with that level of volume level pushes and 
influences the business model towards homogeneous settings. It is quite subliminal too, 
and you can very quickly start going down a commodity pathway. This result 
demonstrated to me the mental side of how marketing myopia could creep in. Farmers 
are also incredibly homogeneous in their thinking. To this day, I have been unable to 
convert farmers to thinking in a heterogeneous way. Customer satisfactions are not on a 
farmer's radar. If they were, quality would reign supreme, and it just does not.  
The need to deal with volume starts to feed a rationalization behind how the business 
needs to market itself. Consumer satisfaction at this point quickly takes a back seat, and 
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pricing becomes the key driver. I had to jolt myself out of this mindset physically. Our 
farmers made life difficult too, always wanting to kill their stock ahead of the new 
enterprise's ability to deal with it.  I could see how the disconnect between the consumer 
and the farmer ultimately distorts the entire system. This is not a great result. 
Unfortunately, this is how commodity structures work. 
Another challenge is nearly all processing companies, even those that offer toll 
processing, have red meat brands. They also need to compete for procurement to 
optimize their production efficiencies. This leads to tension and natural resistance to 
fully embracing, engaging with, and providing much-needed assistance to small, 
disruptive startups like Triple Nine Farms.  
 
Figure 6.15:  Graph Two: The Sub-Con ac o  T an ec ion  T iple Nine  fi  a emp  
Source: J Wilkes (2020) 
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In Graph Two, the defective sorts are highlighted between the farm gate and the 
specialty processor. Again, in this situation, the returns are enjoyed by the subcontractors 
and the retailers. Consumers do see some improvement, hence the effective green rating; 
however, the provisioning model supplying them with a quality product is likely to be 
fleeting. The price gouging at each stage across the transvection coupled to the lack of 
scale and control sees margins eroded from the beginning. In the subcontracting 
transvection, farmers manage to reach consumers, but they are poorly rewarded for their 
effort due to the transvection being overrun with defective sorts.  
Graph Three, shown in Figure 6.16 below, depicts the state-of-play at Triple Nine Farms 
before being placed into hiatus during Covid 19.  This transvection displays green lights 
across the entire transvection, with the only defective sort identified as the abattoir. This 
is because, in the New Zealand red meat industry, abattoirs are geared to process 
volume. Again, their strategic mindset embraces the dictum that red meat markets are 
homogeneous. This, of course, is not the case hence the defective sort red light. 
The industrialized killing of any animal is becoming more and more unacceptable to 
many consumers. Many consumers view sheep and cattle as sentient animals. The 
industry needs to get ahead of this consumer trend now because the impact could be 
enormous, particularly if you believe that alternative proteins are likely to mount a 
competitive challenge in the ground meat category. This is a significant export category 
by volume, so the threat is clear and present. In Graph Three, the ownership transvection, 
Triple Nine Farms projections provide strong returns for the company and pay schedule 
premiums of 20% for its producer group members. The challenge for Triple Nine Farms 
here was complying with the short-term thinking of its shareholders. Farmers want 
immediate results, and the most prominent current challenge brought to me by Covid 19 





Figure 6.16: Graph Three: The Fully Integrated Transvection (The Current Triple Nine model) 
Source: J Wilkes (2020) 
 
Graph Four, Figure 6.17 below, highlights an all green transvection and demonstrates my 
vision for the future of the Triple Nine Farm concept. This transvection example displays 
effective green lights from producer to consumer. This transvection distributes the 
financial rewards and the human experiential rewards across the entire marketing 
provisioning system. This transvection represents a scalable, regenerative, and 
ecologically sound business model devoid of defective sorts. Producers win, Triple Nine 




Figure 6.17: Graph Four: The Future Transvection. (Vision of Triple Nine Farm Concept) 




PART V: EXTENDED DISCUSSION 
 
Chapter Seven: Extended Discussion, Insights, and Implications 
 
Key Points 
x Leadership in hiatus, number eight wire not working. 
x C ome  a WIFM  
x If not now, when? 
 
7.1 Re ea che  In od c ion 
This chapter has been designed to capture my voice, the researcher's voice. It is my 
opportunity to discuss, reflect, and write what I think. In the following narrative, I share 
some of my applied research insights coupled with implications. These stem from what I 
have learned. Levitt (1964:43) suggested, "No organization can achieve greatness 
without a vigorous leader who is driven onwards by his own pulsating will to succeed." 
During my applied research in the New Zealand red meat industry, one of the first things 
I learned was vigorous leadership with the will to win was missing. It was sporadic to 
hear anecdotes or testaments to strong or visionary leadership. As Levitt (1964) points 
out, without some leadership genesis at the top, aspirations of greatness are genuinely 
illusory. A lack of leadership also places true collaboration, innovation, transitioning-to-
value, and a return to industry profitability at risk. 
Interviewees, without exception, stated leadership has gone missing in the New Zealand 
red meat industry. They believed the lack of healthy, visionary, collaborative, and ethical 
leadership was a significant factor behind why such an essential sector to New Zealand's 
economy has continually failed to reach its potential. The New Zealand red meat 
ind  leade hi  eam  a ea   ha e ie ed ma ke ing a  a c , and a  a e l  f 
thinking this way, has failed to invest in and champion a critical, value-creating function.  
Marketing is a crucial connectivity and engagement application for consumers. When it 
is limited, reactive, or missing, organizations can become more vulnerable to marketing 
myopia, and often the downstream implication of this orientation is a failure. 
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7.2 Customer satisfactions are Everything 
Levitt (1964:43) reminds us, Management must think of itself not as producing 
products but as providing customer-c ea ing al e a i fac i n .  Marketing is the 
discipline responsible for creating, developing, and implementing customer satisfactions. 
During this project, I have spoken with New Zealand red meat customers all over the 
world. Very few reported experiencing exceptional 'customer-creating value 
a i fac i n .' S me c n me  had nice hing   a  ab  Ne  Zealand  lamb, and 
companies like First Light have recently been hailed for their superb offerings. For 
example, Chang (2019), a travel contributor at Forbes magazine, suggests, And if  
an    h  inc edible Fi  Ligh  beef eall  i , b  d n  feel like c king, and 
find yourself in Southern California, run (don  alk)  San a M nica  HiH  
Chee eb ge .   
The bottom line, though, as Wooliscroft and Wilkes (2018:1040) have identified, is, 
Ma ke ing i  a i i ning echn l g , ha  h gh an ec i n  aim   ma ch 
heterogeneous supply and demand, with the goal of increasing the potency of assortment 
f b h a ie  f e change .  When defective sorts populate transvections, (a pivotal 
concept to understand), like those this research project has witnessed and uncovered, the 
inf ma i n e i ed  de el  customer creating value satisfactions' can be 
challenging to locate.  
An inability to meaningfully connect with customers feeds into marketing myopia and 
reduces an organization's ability to respond to shifts in consumer trends and behaviour. 
Critically, such a handicap also limits an organizations' ability to innovate, adapt, and 
compete. It creates a tendency to rely on worn-out go-to's like 'grass-fed,' 'pure,' and 
'provenance.' The narrative is important, there is no doubt about that, but if offerings are 
not producing the customer satisfactions sought, a story, no matter how good it is, will 
not be enough. 
There is, of course, no guarantee of future success. The red meat industry business model 
will require constant monitoring to maintain successful transvections. We live and 
operate in a very competitive and very dynamic world, so staying vigilant, along with the 
need to continually respond and adapt to consumer's needs and wants, is challenging. 
Ideas, people, and capital will be needed to harness an effectively designed transvection.  
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7.3 T iple Nine Fa m  Capi al Dilemma 
The capital required for business start-ups to succeed is often needed well ahead of the 
revenue curve. Such is the case with Triple Nine Farms, and the Level 4 lockdown at the 
onset of Covid 19 coinciding with the official retail store launch did not help the 
fledgling business. The high cash burn rate was undoubtedly a challenge for Triple Nine 
Farms' proving to be a stumbling block for the venture. The farmer shareholder, the 
business established to benefit, withdrew support shortly after the onset of Covid 19, 
forcing the fledgling business into hiatus. Ironically, the farmer had just completed the 
purchase of a multi-million dollar farming property, providing an interesting reflection 
point on marketing myopia.   
Innovation requires a great deal of bravery and equal measures of commitment. In an 
interview between Harvard Business School Research Fellow Gary Hamel and Jeffrey 
Marshall (2002:27), Hamel stated, "In recent quarters, companies have told themselves 
that what they have to do is start focusing on the basics. And in a way, I don't disagree 
with that - except that business never changes. How do I grow revenues, how do I get 
permission to raise my prices, and how do I cut my costs? That is the fundamental 
arithmetic of business." The answer to the 'how' questions identified by Gary Hamel 
above can often be found in innovation.   
7.4 Mouse holes, China and Slowbolisation 
In many ways, the butcheries of the future are already here. The confluence of health, 
climate, consumer behaviour, desire for flavour, provenance, and animal welfare has 
already kicked off irreversible industry changes. Beef, in particular, is likely, at some 
point, to transition from a commodity product into a luxury product. These trends could 
deliver significant upside to New Zealand's transition from volume to value aspirations.  
Achieving such a goal will require belief, courage, and capital to try something new. 
Currently, these ingredients do not appear to be abundant. These traits represent some of 
the critical requirements needed to improve the New Zealand red meat sector's 
performance, and their absence is perhaps one of the most important insights from my 
research. If management can see the issues, they do not appear to be in a hurry to fix 
them. This is unnecessarily exposing the industry to risk.  Avoiding such a fait accompli 
requires absolute commitment from those at the very top. If they are not on board, the 
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aspiration to produce the consumer satisfactions needed to transition from volume to 
value remains nothing but words without actions. 
Dr. Robert Hamlin from the University of Otago has always suggested, elephants cannot 
go down mouseholes. The marketing myopia effect on BIG meat enterprises may come 
from the fact that they do not understand this. As a result, they keep on trying to do what 
history proves cannot be done. Transitioning-to-value requires the ability, structure, and 
resources to go down multiple mouse holes because that is where the high-value 
customers like chefs and premium consumers live.  
Incumbents are unable or unwilling to embrace this reality and seem to be locked into an 
'optimization' agenda instead. Sadly, this means new, potentially innovative, and 
disruptive entrants (desperately needed) cannot readily germinate because growth 
conditions are not ideal. In a more collegiate environment, the elephant and the mouse 
might have worked together and played to their strengths. 
From my experience, a start-up in the New Zealand red meat industry requires 
extraordinary passion and resilience combined with a willingness to lose some money. 
This is just the price of entry. It is also a problem I would like to help solve in the future.  
I believe such a challenge deserves some research support; otherwise, the industry will 
keep reinventing the wheel, and by the time the industry decides to move, it may be too 
late; for example, Feffer (2019) reports, The eal ea n  behind 'slowbalisation' are 
more structural. The Economist reports: The cost of moving goods has stopped falling. 
Multinational firms have found that global sprawl burns money and that local rivals 
often eat them alive. Activity is shifting towards services, which are harder to sell across 
borders: scissors can be exported in 20ft-containers, hair stylists cannot. And Chinese 
manufacturing has become more self- elian ,  need   im  fe e  a .  Feffer 
e ed hi  end bef e C id 19. H  migh  he end f l bali a i n  im ac  he 
New Zealand red meat industry?  
Fa me  e n  a e l , and inc ea ing c m liance c  h ea en  ed ce hei  
profitability further. The farmers I have worked alongside know this, and they are 
hungry for change because, as one farmer said to me yesterday, Ha e  hea d Jim. 
Beef is coming back to 5 bucks per kilo in 2020. The Chinese have opened up their 
ma ke   B a il and he . Tha  he end f ha .   The problem with $5 per kilo is it is 
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insufficient to make cattle farming robust and viable long-term. And what happens then? 
And what happens if New Zealand receives another economic shock or the country 
experiences trade issues with a significant market like China? Look at the interaction 
between Australia and China. Australia is New Zealand's second-largest trading partner, 
so remaining neutral over time will require some deft diplomacy. For example, Lin Tan 
(2020) reports, China banned four Australian meat processing plants last week while 
also imposing an 80 percent tariff on Australian barley imports. The move raised 
suspicions that China was using technical requirements to punish Canberra for its call 
f  an in e na i nal in i  e  he igin  f he c na i .   
7.5 Reversing Transvection Polarity 
One of the most significant opportunities for the New Zealand red meat industry may 
emanate from the realization that many premium red meat consumers are heterogeneous. 
With some industry restructuring, New Zealand could amplify its small-but-mighty 
credentials to take advantage.  For example, it could flip being a small exporter of beef 
into a competitive advantage by actively developing a strategy to reverse the polarity of 
its traditional transvection. It could achieve this state by choosing to move away from 
homogeneous settings and embrace a heterogeneous approach. At the same time, it could 
deleverage its reliance on speculation and leverage postponement. This would force the 
industry to new ground and allow it to leverage an entirely new trading platform, one 
where the price is not relied on to clear the market. 
A hybrid model could be developed. For example, Volkswagen acquired Audi, SEAT, 
k da, Ben le , B ga i, Lamb ghini, P che, and e en D ca i. In he c mme cial 
world, Volkswagen owns Scania and MAN. These brands may at times share platforms 
(an efficiency initiative), but they reach consumers through very different marketing 
modalities. Presumably, Bentley and Bugatti customers will have very different 
e i emen   SEAT and k da c me .  Achie ing he e c me  ld e i e 
industry-wide collaboration, which this research highlights, may well be the biggest 
challenge of all. Could Silver Fern Farms own artisanal enterprises like Triple Nine 
Farms, Cardrona Merino, and others? Could adopting a heterogeneous approach at both 




That said, the current strategy dials are set to homogeneous, which means strategies to 
pursue high-value customers are more likely to struggle. Maples, Lusk, and Peel (2017) 
support the importance of recognizing consumers are heterogeneous, stating, O  
results imply that consumers are heterogeneous in preferences for steak size but are 
generally in unison in their dislike for the thinnest cuts of steaks. Our results also reveal 
the importance f acc n ing f  he e genei .  
In reality, it is not just thickness preferences that differ. A vast array of variables include 
breed, aging status, retail experience, provenance, ecological credentials, and subliminal 
traits like tenderness. These are all essential traits for marketers to understand to reach, 
attract, and retain customers. Unfortunately, globally, the red meat industry is riddled 
with homogeneous influencers, and some of these influence the New Zealand red meat 
sector. For example, the need to define the quality of beef in the USA in the early part of 
the 20th Century led to the creation of the USDA grading system, an approach that has 
been embraced and adopted in New Zealand. This approach embeds homogeneous 
thinking. I would argue, dangerously so.  
7.6 To grade or not to grade? 
In the USA, beef is sorted into prime, select, and choice grades based on fat marbling 
e alence. Scha ke  (2010) e nal e e ience gge  hi  em i  hea il  
influenced by a belief in homogeneity. For example, as previously mentioned, Schatzker 
(2010:22) states, The US De a men  f Ag ic l e em l  200 mea  g ade , 140 f 
whom specialize in beef. In a single day, a USDA grader can judge as many as 1200 beef 
carcasses, each carcass requiring no more than six to eight seconds of the grader's 
time." As Schatzker (2010) has identified, the problem with this approach is, there is 
much more complexity to selecting a great-tasting steak than a cursory glance at some fat 
running through the muscle. What happens if the health-conscious consumer wants less 
fat? What if the consumer wants to pay more for flavour and taste, or succulence, or 
some other attribute that has nothing to do with marbling?  
Often, there are historical reasons for approaches and systems to exist. Polkinghorne and 
Thompson (2010:229) report, In the USA the growth of large competitive livestock 
markets as a consequence of urban growth and improved transportation created a need 
for greater uniformity in the terminology used for describing livestock and meat, and 
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uniform use of such terms,  ma ke  c ld be e i abl  c m a ed.  It was a method 
selected in an attempt to drive a consistent approach to meat selection from the inside of 
a commoditized industrial meat system. To be useful, the system had to be quick and 
efficient, and it needed to be simple to apply. The system was never designed to 
accommodate the heterogeneous requirements of premium, flexitarian, health-conscious 
consumers. It makes no sense that a system with this configuration would be capable of 
operating at the 'customizable' level required to satisfy heterogeneous consumers willing 
to pay a premium. 
Hayenga and Kliebenstein (1994:140) report, "Government commodity grading systems 
have a long and sometimes controversial history in the livestock and meat industry. 
Historically, the only way to develop standard procedures for a very independent and 
fragmented group of producers and processors has been to utilize the auspices of 
government." Do these types of systems contribute to marketing myopia in the New 
Zealand red meat industry? I think they do because these types of systems, once adopted, 
become the default system for quality and price. Once a system like the beef grading 
system is embedded, it is tough to change, even if a better way to grade beef for 
premium consumers is identified.  
Relying on marbling to guarantee flavour and a positive customer experience comes with 
marketing myopia risk too. The Black Legacy Angus that Triple Nine Farms offer 
consumers is not spectacular on a marble grading scale, but they are sensational to eat. 
Winning numerous New Zealand Steak of Origin competitions is a testament to this. 
How is this possible? The short answer is that many factors go into making an animal a 
great eating experience. The breed and genetics, farming system, nutrition, farmer style, 
animal finishing and selection, transport, slaughtering operation, antemortem stress, 
animal age, carcass composition, environmental factors, butchery techniques, aging, 
cutting, and cooking are all factors that go towards producing the perfect steak. 
Thompson (2002:295) states, Fail e f ne  m e f he e link  in he beef l  
chain inc ea e  he i k f a  ea ing e e ience f  he c n me .  The point I am 
trying to demonstrate is identifying an excellent tasting steak is far more complicated 
than just providing a carcass with a marbling score, and while marbling has its place, it is 
not the be-all, and end-all, of a guaranteed high-quality steak eating experience. 
Similarly, marketers should look to exploit more than primary marbling attributes. There 
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is a diverse fabric of rich information on which to tell the story of New Zealand's red 
meat, and my research suggests, now is an excellent time to start. 
7.7 Industrial Farming Systems and Transparency 
One thing that has struck me from the very beginning especially with so-called premium 
breeds like Wagyu and Aberdeen Angus, is why enterprises producing these cattle invest 
a ton of money to promote and emphasize quality and then kill the animals in an 
industrial system? The moment the animal steps onto the ramp of a transport truck for 
the stressed-out final ride to the slaughterhouse the quality of its carcass is put at risk. It 
is possible to slaughter on-farm using stress-free killing approaches and mobile 
technologies, which would be the preference for many red meat consumers.  
Animal welfare and respect for animals are becoming a concern for many premium 
consumers. As transparency becomes 'weaponized' in terms of its access to consumers, 
opacity around farming systems will be reduced. This could challenge many red meat 
brand narratives, particularly if their story is compromised. For example, a future proof 
red meat business model will most likely need to address animal welfare issues and 
climate change as priorities. Transparency is destined to play a vital role here. 
Explaining what grass-fed means may become more complicated. 
Was the cow eating grass in a mono-culture paddock with grass grown with synthetic 
fertilizers and chemical sprays, or did the animal have access to diverse grass species 
grown in soils with healthy biomes? Currently, the discussions at a meta-level with many 
regenerative, organic, and natural farming systems vying to be 'the' system. Eventually, 
the inquiry is likely to drill down into the facts, and consumers will be watching and 
listening. Is it true you can still use synthetic fertilisers and chemical sprays in some 
regenerative approaches?  
The New Zealand red meat industry's response to future-proofing requirements has seen 
processors invest millions into such initiatives as plant upgrades, robotics, and camera 
grading equipment, which costs millions and often challenges balance sheets that do not 
historically have much in reserve. Where will the money come from to continue this 
response? This preference to believe in commodifying technology over producing 
customer satisfactions is how the industry got into trouble in the first place. The Triple 
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Nine Farms' prototype, small as it was, demonstrated that $30 per kilo across the entire 
beef carcass is achievable in a real-world setting. Had the business not been infected by 
Covid-19 and starved for capital, the indications from online consumers suggest it would 
have achieved an even higher price per kilogram. 
7.8 Get off the Grass 
The New Zealand red meat industry pursues and promotes a fairly one-dimensional 
grass-fed proposition for New Zealand red meat. This approach is credible, but at no 
age d e  i  ide an an e   he ange f defec i e  Ne  Zealand ed mea  
enterprises are locked into. Current systems do not provide marketers with all of the 
information required to hit the target they are aiming for, which, if you believe the 
industry media and rhetoric, are premium consumers. If this was indeed the case, the 
grass-fed proposition might be more subliminal, operating as a grounding platform to 
anchor additional attributes. In 2020, the grass-fed proposition remains dominant.  
Fresh new attributes offer an opportunity for red meat offerings to differentiate in the 
premium consumer's eyes. Grass-fed animals are not that unique. With very few 
exceptions, most New Zealand animals are grass-fed, as are animals from many other 
parts of the world. Grass is not unique to New Zealand, and grain also has fans too, 
particularly in the USA, one of New Zealand's largest export markets. One of the best 
steaks I ever enjoyed was grain-fed T-Bone steak at Neil Perry's Rockpool restaurant in 
Sydney. 
Homogeneous thinking linked to optimization mindsets is not likely to present the best 
combination for successfully marketing beyond commodity markets. The New Zealand 
red meat industry being structured this way contributes to the sector being trapped in the 
commodity space. There is no requirement to do anything other than be prepared to sell 
at the market's clearance price in commodity markets. The lack of information drives this 
necessity because the provisioning technology referred to above is compromised and 
unable to develop or create 'customer satisfactions' in these circumstances.  
Many enterprises in the sector try to communicate the industry's stated intention to move 
 he al e chain. F  e am le, Beef and Lamb Ne  Zealand  la e  ini ia i e, he 
Taste Pure Nature campaign, suggests, "Nature is the best producer of food, no question. 
And in our remote, unspoiled corner of the world, we enjoy some of nature's best 
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growing conditions. Our climate is gentle, with clear blue skies and plentiful fresh rains 
that nourish fertile soils. Our wide-open spaces are brimming with lush, green grasses 
that animals roam through and graze on, freely and happily. As farmers, we work with 
these natural gifts to produce the one thing you can only get from New Zealand beef and 
lamb. That's the taste of pure nature." There is much to like about the narrative above, it 
is a lovely bit of prose, but it is not necessarily grounded in reality. For example, Hawkes 
Bay and the Wairarapa are currently experiencing the worst drought conditions on 
record, and farmers are quitting stock.  
This climatic trend is increasing and is highly unlikely to be suited to commodity animal 
farming. In the three and half years, I have worked with farmers in these regions, they 
have experienced the same problem every year. During these dry periods, the 
desertification of their farms is the signal for them to send stock to the processors. How, 
at any level does this annual sell-off align or support an industry aspiration to transition-
to-value? How is it representative of an industry with a market orientation?  
The narrative does little to address the need to embrace a heterogeneous approach. What 
is the taste of pure nature? How does a consumer reconcile this message? What does it 
mean? In my mind, thinking this way further locks in vulnerabilities to marketing 
myopia. Hendy and Callaghan (2013) suggested that getting off the grass was a good 
idea from a future perspective. Getting off the grass certainly makes sense from a 
marketing perspective.  
What are the attributes premium consumers will pay up for? Is it tenderness and flavour 
first and foremost? I suspect it is, but more consumer information is required. Once that 
is achieved, marketers will be able to move off the grass. During the immersion phase, 
many people I spoke with across the industry referred to the 'pure' and 'clean-green' 
imagery of New Zealand as some sort of magic differentiator, but in my experience, at 
best, it buys you a ticket to the game.  
7.9 Burning daylight: If not now, when?  
The New Zealand red meat industry has work to do if it wants to remain relevant to 21st 
Century consumers. The sector faces headwinds and many challenges. Barber (2019) 
channel  KPMG  Gl bal Head f Ag ib ine  a ing, Before Christmas Proudfoot 
identified three major agribusiness challenges: if we want to target the 40 million most 
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sophisticated consumers worldwide we must learn to feed our population with high-
quality food instead of gaining a reputation for obesity; change is continuous so there 
will not be a transition to a new state of stability, and we have already used up a large 
proportion of the time advantage to own the grass-fed market position which might have 
only five years maximum left." Undoubtedly, the central issue here is to pay attention to 
Levitt (1964:41) and make sure that the New Zealand red meat industry develops 
customer creating value satisfactions.  
The current lack of 'customer satisfactions' is not surprising. The reality is, a great deal of 
investment has been channelled into pursuing operational efficiency initiatives like 
robotics in preference to investing in product research and development or marketing 
initiatives. Operational efficiencies do provide benefits, but many are incremental. 
Callagher (2015) suggests these approaches signify a mature industry, which of course, 
the New Zealand red meat ind  i . Callaghe  (2015:45) 'Re c ing Red Mea " a icle 
supports this position from another angle, reporting, "Low (or no) private R&D 
investment is problematic because R&D is known to be an important investment for 
organizational learning. The theory of absorptive capacity, advanced by Wesley Cohen 
of Carnegie Mellon University and Daniel Levinthal of the University of Pennsylvania, 
explains organizational learning as an organization's ability to "recognize the value of 
new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends." I would also 
suggest these are the attributes of an enterprise not blinded by marketing myopia. 
As a result, the industry is reactive rather than proactive. Callagher (2015:42) reports, 
Inc emen al d c  and ce  inn a i n d mina e  he ed mea  ec  c en  
d c  f li .  This is what happens when an industry is locked into managing 
around reactivity. There is also a tendency, particularly in mature industries, as Levitt 
(1964) has pointed out, to double down on the advantages of mass production by 
investing in technologies that will deliver rapidly declining unit costs. For example, in 
2017, the New Zealand Herald reported, Leading meat processor and exporter Alliance 
Group is to invest $10.6 million in advanced technology at its Dannevirke Plant as the 
company focuses on exploring innovations in how it processes livestock, according to a 
c m an  e  a emen .  
Wh  d e n  he b ine  in e  $10.6 milli n in  ma ke  e ea ch, lanning, and 
strategic consumer targeting? What would the bottom line's impact look like if the firm 
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invested in consumer engagement instead of ploughing more capital into fixed assets? 
Assets that could end up becoming stranded if the industry continues on its current 
pathway. At some point, someone, somewhere (they might be in a bank) is going to 
wake up and realize that turning over billions in sales for almost zero return is arguably 
not the most efficient use of capital. Marketing as a function, as a profession, and as a 
discipline, has many of the answers, so if not now, when?  
7.10 Ein ein  La  
Twenty-five years ago, Brett (1994:273) reported, "Here lies Fortex: choked to death on 
its hype. The bitter little epitaphs have come thick and fast as New Zealand comes to 
grips with the spectacular failure of its most favoured public company since the 1987 
share market crash...But as we pick over the carcass, it seems most have forgotten one 
critical fact: Fortex was a meat company. And all around it is the bones of other meat 
companies - some of them giants - which have gone to the wall in very similar 
circumstances. Nobody in the meat industry is infallible and the signs are that Fortex's 
collapse is just another chapter in the endless restructuring of a high-risk sector. 
T m  i  ill be me ne el e'  n.   
I would argue the industry has not progressed as far as some may think. I also suggest 
that the significant reason for the lack of progress can, at least in part, be explained by 
marketing myopia. The qualitative interviews conducted for this research confirm that 
the lack of progress is real.  
In a genuinely ironic statement, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (2020) 
quotes Albert Einstein, The e ign f in elligence i  n  kn ledge, b  
imagina i n.  Is it time for the New Zealand red meat industry to imagine something 
new?  
7.11 Times, they have been changing 
Figure 7.0 below details the top ten food trends from 1995 and 1996, which doing the 
maths in 2020 means these trends were taking place 25 years ago. This is astonishing 
because the New Zealand red meat industry has not yet fully embraced many of these 
trends even today. For example, recognizing the switch to more organic and 
regeneratively derived food. Those conversations have only recently commenced. The 
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lack of response would suggest marketing myopia at some level must exist. How else 
can it be explained?   
 
Figure 7.0: Sloan's "Top Ten" trends for the year 1995 & 1996 (U.S.A.)  
Source: Food Technology, USA. 
There has been some innovation in the industry around nutrition attributes. Omega 3 
research is an excellent example. It attempts to intersect the consumer's need for health 
with the genetic enhancement of an attribute in grass-fed lamb, but is it going to be 
enough? And is it the right place to invest? We now live in a world where lamb 
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consumption is declining in traditional markets, and significantly, it is declining rapidly 
in New Zealand. Lee (2018) reports, Lamb a  nce c n ide ed a a le f he 
Kiwi diet, but has been quietly and quickly disappearing from our dinner plates. New 
Zealanders are now consuming less lamb per capita than countries like Tanzania, 
Malaysia, and Bangladesh, and only slightly more than India, where about a third of 
people are vegetarian. That was according to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), which in a February report said New Zealand's 
annual sheep meat consumption has plummeted from more than 19 kilograms per person 
in 2006 to just 900 grams in 2016.   
Beef and Lamb New Zealand suggest consumption was a higher 3.6 kilograms per 
person for the three years before 2016. This still represents a dramatic decrease and 
points to a concerning issue. It provides tangible evidence that consumers, even the most 
loyal, can change their eating habits. Statista's (2020) results and projections for New 
Zealand sheep meat consumption in kilograms per capita are highlighted below in Figure 
7.1.  
 
Figure 7.1 Per capita sheep meat consumption for New Zealand in kilograms. Source: (2020) 
www.statista.com 
 
Even in-hero growth markets like China, consumer trends are changing, and they do not 
necessarily reflect the rhetoric we hear in New Zealand. Menon (2018) highlights this 
point stating, China, the world's largest market for beef, pork and poultry is steadily 
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growing wary of meat as health-conscious Chinese are taking to a vegetarian diet that 
has sparked a mushrooming of vegan restaurants in the world's m  l  c n .  
As an example of this trend, Menon highlights, "UN trade figures show that between 
2010 and 2016, China's imports of avocados rose from 1.9 tonnes to 25,000 tonnes a 
13,000-fold increase. According to one study, the vegan market in China is expected to 
rise by more than 17 percent between 2015 and 2020. This will be the fastest rate of 
growth internationally in this period and suggests a huge shift in consumer habits in 
Asia." Lewis (2018) supports the Chinese transition to vegetarian alternatives, 
particularly in the young reporting, Data collected by China's largest search engine, 
Baidu, provides corroborating evidence: 30 percent of China's vegetarian population 
are young educated people aged 20  29, a generation who recognizes the devastating 
impact human activity can have on the planet, having grown up in heavily polluted 
urban environments." 
Currently, it is difficult for a red meat lover to see innovation. There is some refreshed 
packaging here and there, and perhaps a better articulated and presented origin story is 
on the packaging, but when you drill down and look hard, what significant changes are 
there? There is no shortage of virtue signalling, but not much appears to have changed. 
Some industries like the automotive industry have realized that dramatic change is 
required to stay relevant to consumers, and sometimes these changes need to embrace 
and champion paradigmatic shifts. 
In the automotive industry, many of its consumers are no longer prepared to accept 
conventional, non-experiential, and transactional transport solutions. Those days have 
gone. Car buying consumers do not like, or enjoy, or want to engage with car dealerships 
or their self-interested car salesmen. These changes in consumer behaviour look set to 
deliver catastrophic impacts. For example, Chesterton (2019) reports, "It's a feeling 
echoed by the KPMG Global Automotive Executive Survey, which estimates that 50 
percent of all dealerships would vanish between now and 2025. Those that do survive, it 
says, will need to evolve from transaction hubs to experience hubs, (operating) at a very 
e nali ed le el.  Does the automotive industry demonstrate symptoms of marketing 
myopia? I believe it does.  
An observation of the past fifty years would suggest the automotive industry business 
model has changed little until now, and changing now, for some, might end up being too 
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little, too late. I have purchased my last six vehicles online with no visit to a dealer apart 
from the day I inspected the cars, paid for them, and drove off. Likewise, I do my best to 
avoid shopping in supermarkets. I accept that I am an outlier, but the trend to avoid 
enterprises that do not offer great experiences is shifting in this direction. At some point, 
experiences, IOT capability, and other consumer trends like entertaining more at home 
will converge, and the changes could become seismic. How will the New Zealand red 
meat industry reach consumers then? 
Can we see any similarities between the automotive industry and the red meat industry? I 
think you can. Levitt (1964) outlined evidence of marketing myopia occurring across 
multiple industry groups highlighting the railroad industry, the movie industry, and the 
petroleum industry. Levitt (1964:41) suggested, "The view that an industry is a 
customer-satisfying process, not a goods-producing process, is vital for all businessmen 
to understand. An industry begins with the customer and his needs, not with a patent, a 
raw material, or a selling skill. Given the customers' needs, the industry develops 
backward, first concerning itself with the physical delivery of customer satisfactions." 
Nowhere in my applied research has this philosophy been firmly in evidence. The New 
Zealand red meat industry seems to exist to 'optimize-the- hook,' not to optimize 
customer satisfaction.  
7.12 Titanic Struggle ahead 
The current approach and philosophy are understandable for an industry that views its 
operation in commodity space. Perhaps the question is: should the commodity space be 
where the New Zealand red meat industry should be playing? Can it win there? Andrén-
Sandberg (2018:74) suggests, "Just as the introduction of commodities, the end of 
commodities might turn out to be a very productive evolution path for the global 
economy where externalities are better priced into the products, enabling producers 
who minimize their negative external impact (and market their positive impacts) and 
reap higher margins for their produce." Could this be a better space for the New Zealand 
red meat industry to play? It has zero subsidies, and its externalities are nearly all priced 
in.  
The image in figure 7.2 below depicts the FEED shop in Sao Paulo, Brazil. FGMF 
Arquitetos and Projeto de Perto studio have created a space that demonstrates one 
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concept of how the future of butcheries may look. Their look and feel is nothing like a 
traditional butchery shop. That intent was deliberate, and notably, this concept store was 
opened five years ago in 2015. This suggests the New Zealand red meat industry is 
lagging behind the leaders, which means there is a risk the competition gets to set the 
agenda. If New Zealand is a leader, why is this so hard to see in the market?  
 
Figure 7.2: FEED, located in Sao Paulo, Brazil. Source: (2015) Tangram Intelligent Brand 
Experiences. 
 
Levitt's (1964:23) concept of marketing myopia has been applied to many different 
industries over time with predictable results. And yet, the message being sent to New 
Zealand red meat operations via the equivalent to the Titanic's wheelhouse (Co-operative 
boards and executive teams of red meat enterprises) is to maintain the current heading 
and speed and press the alarm bell if anything happens. Icebergs, or strategic challenges 
in executive speak, appear not to be seen, heard, or responded to. Levitt (1964) identifies 
this attitude as a critical ingredient signifying the presence of marketing myopia. Levitt 
(1964:24) suggests, The fail e i  a  he .  As my interviews have demonstrated, 
this is not only possible but probable.  
7.13 A focus on efficiency can be inefficient 
Almost the entire New Zealand red meat industry is built around hook optimization and 
cost-efficiency. This, in theory, ensures some level of competitiveness, enabling red 
meat companies to survive in the harsh trading conditions of global commodity markets. 
In reality, this single-minded focus on efficiency is more likely to lock in extinction, or 
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at the very least, prevent the emergence of something fresh and new. This is a very 
different approach to other large enterprises around the world. Ambler (2017) reports, 
Even traditional food giants like Nestle acquired vegetarian food producer Sweet 
Earth, while Cargill gave a capital injection to Memphis Meats, which grows sustainable 
cultured meat without the animal. In an interview with Fox News, Tyson Foods CEO, 
T m Ha e  e e ed hi  c nfidence in he ea change, lan -based protein is growing 
almost, at this point, a little faster than animal-based, so I think the migration may 
c n in e in ha  di ec i n.  The bells are simply not going off in New Zealand, and no 
one even looks like ringing them.  
In support of my current argument that the New Zealand red meat industry cannot see 
the wood from the trees, Chalmers (2018) reports a shortfall of workers across the New 
Zealand export meat industry. Why is this? Chalmers quotes Alliance Group chief 
executive David Surveyor who suggests, "The reality is that at our Lorneville plant 
[Invercargill], on any given day in the season will have 100 people not turning up for 
work because of vacancies or absenteeism. If you take that and multiply it across all our 
plants, about $20 million of value is lost. That is not coming back to the co-operative 
farmer-owners. So it is a huge prize if we can get access to enough people to run plants 
at an optimum level." Customer concerns or satisfactions are where? 
Perhaps one might ask why Alliance and other processing companies cannot gain access 
to quality workers. Why could this be? There are many people in the market wanting 
well-paid jobs. My one-on-one interviews with ex-meat worker employees provide the 
answers, and they all revolve around how these enterprises have treated their people. 
One ex-Alliance worker reported, I j  g  fl gged and fl gged me m e. I  a  all 
about efficiency, efficiency, efficiency. Workers were treated like bloody robots." 
Another senior player informed me in confidence that engineers were often forced to put 
"patches on patches" because of aging plants and insufficient maintenance budgets.  
The information from this particular interviewee flies in the face of the hype found on 
page fifteen of the 2018 Alliance Annual Report. Here the company proudly promotes its 
people development credentials stating, Alliance is making a significant investment in 
our people to boost skills, encourage employees and provide a career path for everyone 
ac   ffice  and  lan .  My only comment is that my interviewee cohort did 
not support this statement. I acknowledge that I did not exhaustively test or challenge 
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this assertion. I also admit to being strongly biased against industrial farming, large 
processors, and commodity trading. This bias makes me one of the industry's outliers 
because I believe New Zealand should not play in commodity markets. 
In stark contrast, I think New Zealand should play in the premium red meat space, 
beginning with adopting a heterogeneous attitude towards consumers combined with a 
well-supported and funded change management program. This would include regime 
change, if necessary. I believe if reconfigured correctly, New Zealand could dominate 
the world's premium red meat market. I would commence this transformation by asking 
what premium consumers want and comparing their responses against what the industry 
provides them now.  
There is evidence suggesting that many consumers want ethical meat and want a return 
to food with dense nutrition levels. They seek confidence and reassurance that the food 
they purchase is good for them and good for the ecology of the planet. This may be more 
subliminal in some consumers, but understanding the trend and shift in consumer 
behaviour is key. The Centre for Food Integrity (CFI) in Georgia, USA, (2015) identified 
six areas of critical concern for consumers. These were: 
 Impact of Food on Health 
 F d Safe  
 Im ac  n he En i nmen  
 H man/Lab  Righ  
 T ea men  f Animal  Rai ed f  F d 
 B ine  E hic  in F d P d c i n  
How well does the New Zealand red meat industry address the areas above from the 
c n me  e ec i e? The insights from my interviews suggest, not well. It may talk 
value, but its walk is all commodity. For example, the 2018 Alliance Annual reports 
suggested, The co-operative is a value chain extension from farm to consumer, which 
brings together the collective passion, care and skill of our farmers, our people and our 
a ne   g , make and ell fa me  d ce.  This makes all the right noises but 
contrasts dramatically with Alliance's inability to source willing workers. 
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The Annual report also states, "Farmgate pricing for lamb, in particular, was extremely 
strong, however as the year progressed, it became apparent these levels were not 
aligned with global market conditions. We experienced price resistance in our markets 
f m me c me .  In other words, the enterprise had the wrong product for sale at 
the wrong time, and because of the business model, there was no choice but to sell. This 
is not a strategy for being an exemplar of value chain extension for farmers. If processing 
companies like Alliance purport to be 'value chain extensions', then by definition, their 
operations should add value under all market conditions. This means making, not taking 
prices, and to do that they will need to embrace marketing in its most pure form. I would 
argue that if an enterprise is in a position where it has to sell at any price, they are also 
locked into a 'defective sort.' In my opinion, the prevalence of marketing myopia is a 
significant contributor to enterprises being backed into these corners.  
7.14 Hearts and Minds 
The New Zealand red meat industry's significant players myopically pursue more and 
more efficient measures to drive down costs. They are compelled to take this approach to 
ensure survival. Times are changing, though, and the red meat industry in New Zealand 
seems unable to recognize or respond to this fact. Based on the work of Levitt (1960), 
Alderson (1965), and Forrester (1989), and looking through the lenses they have 
provided, it can be seen that the world now has a new band of very emotionally driven, 
ecologically bent, and environmentally conscious consumers.  
These are a group of consumers; the New Zealand red meat industry is simply not 
c en l  e i ed  e ice. In a ela ed de el men , Niall Fe g n  (2019) ecen  
article in the Boston Globe suggests democracies have become 'emocracies'. This is 
interesting because Ferguson is suggesting that governments are now driven more by 
emotion than by long-term strategic thinking. The recent 'dramatics' of Trump and 
Brexit's craziness would appear to support Ferguson's assertion. 
This subtle global change will have potentially enormous influence over trade in the 
future. Market access is critical to New Zealand red meat enterprises, so it needs to make 
sure it remains alert and relevant. For example, a climate policy could stifle market 
access. A global economic shock could dramatically reduce opportunities. What happens 
in round two of Covid 19? What happens if western countries chase reparations from 
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China? How will these issues impact the New Zealand red meat industry? Maybe, there 
are some salient reasons for diversifying and explicitly targeting the world's wealthy red 
meat lovers. Like a profitable subscription model, this is likely to increase resilience. 
Netflix is doing well. Proactive strategic planning would suggest remaining commodity-
driven, and China-centric is high-risk.    
P emi m ed mea  c n me  al  inhabi  an em c ac  and hi , al ng i h a lack f 
red meat innovation, aids the stellar growth of red meat substitutes. Red meat consumers 
a e bec ming e  a  f fal e claim  and big mea  ma ke ing h e and nce bi en, 
twice shy. Premium consumers are not stupid, and thinly veiled marketing spin will 
never be enough to win their business or retain their support. How do you put a positive 
in n b i ed  ind ial killing?  
Beef and Lamb's 'Taste Pure' campaign, in my opinion, sits on this spectrum. It contrasts 
with the findings this research has generated. The premium consumer segment is 
distinguished by high disposable income levels, almost unlimited choice, and these 
consumers are acutely aware of their substantial market power. What has the New 
Zealand red meat industry done to demonstrate any capability of successfully engaging 
and selling to this discerning market segment? For example, a significant proportion of 
beef products exported to the USA is ground beef. Why has the industry not developed 
value-added products?  
So, a boutique creative agency in the United Kingdom suggests an enterprise needs to 
consider the following six conceptual spaces to appeal to premium consumers 
successfully. 
1. Build a unique offering. 
2. Heighten the senses to build an emotional connection. 
3. Look at the category differently. 
4. Immerse customers in the brand ethos. 
5. Limit access to the brand. 
6. Make it special. 
How many of these attraction categories can the New Zealand red meat industry say they 
are successfully engaging in? Withdrawal from production addiction is not easy, and 
operations addicted to the 'stimulative' impact of commodity trading are likely to be the 
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la   a k f  hel and b  he ime he  d , acc ding  Le i  (1960), i  ill alm  
certainly be too late for some. It is the boiled frog scenario in action.  
Unfortunately, farmers are not perfect, either. Their operations are often addicted to the 
same production optimization stimulants. They do not think in terms of the world's best 
quality. They think in terms of weight x volume = success. Breed, taste, flavour, 
customer experience, customer touchpoints, meaningful value propositions, 
environmental concerns, industrial farming versus regenerative farming, and a host of 
other nuances are almost irrelevant. There are some exceptions, but they are few and far 
between. Even First Light (a highly regarded industry innovator and market darling) 
appears to have succumbed to the seemingly addictive temptation of scale. 
That said, there are many examples of thinking differently to win the hearts and minds of 
consumers. For instance, Uyehara (2018) reports, O iginall , Herminjard assumed that 
the older dairy-cow meat, as opposed to the beef produced by younger cattle, would be 
 gh f  an hing he  han g nd beef. Ranche  and b che  fi  ld me, 
G d l ck finding g d eak,  he ecalled. B  hen he harvested the first two cows 
and en  hem  me l cal chef , he  came back i h i ing feedback: Thi  i  he 
be  beef e e e e  had.  In he  e  f  ainable mea  in Ame ica, He minja d had 
unwittingly stumbled onto a culinary tradition of mature meat that has roots 5,500 miles 
a a  in S ain  Ba e c n .   
In the future, when the dust settles and hindsight reigns supreme, I am confident 
marketing myopia will be viewed as a contributing factor to the New Zealand red meat 
industry's failure if it fails.  Am I prepared to call failure? Almost certainly, the 
commodity red meat offering from New Zealand is on borrowed time. When I compare 
the New Zealand red meat industry to the industries, Levitt (1964)  surveyed, the New 
Zealand red meat industry resembles a ticking time bomb.   
A key challenge alluded to by many interviewees was their organizations did not have 
the capital to reconfigure plants to deliver heterogeneous outcomes even if they could get 
their heads around the fact that consumers are heterogeneous. I will argue that this is also 
a symptom of marketing myopia. My view has always been New Zealand should focus 
solely on playing to its strengths in the premium red meat space.  If the industry keeps 
plodding along like it is, the "Alternatives' are likely to gain even more traction. Once 
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they scale production and marketing, they will use their significant financial and human 
capital firepower to smash the commodity space driving down already low prices as they 
compete for market share against traditional commodity companies trying to avoid 
extinction. After they have completed their disruption, they will be in charge of resetting 
the agenda, which will most likely not suit incumbents. This is not inevitable, but 
significant change is overdue.  
Another critical insight is commodity trading in the New Zealand red meat context is a 
textbook definition of a 'defective sort.' Is it possible to make such a claim? Yes, I think 
it is. The processors and broader New Zealand red meat community claim the shift to 
value is on. They claim to be sorting the farmer's products based on consumer attributes 
to ensure premiums, but the reality is 95 percent of the product that goes through a large 
red meat processing enterprise is traded through intermediaries. This approach ensures 
that the provenance needed to secure a premium is largely lost, and potential premiums 
available in high-end markets fail to be secured. The average export price per kilo for 
beef at circa $7 to $8 per kilogram FOB is evidence of this painful truth. Figure 7.3 
below details FOB export prices by region. 
 
Figure 7.3: FOB Export prices by Region. Source: (2020) Beef and Lamb New Zealand Economic 
Service - New Zealand Meat Board  
In general, red meat enterprises are reported by senior industry players to be woefully 
underfunded, which may explain why the current business models hint of decay and 
desperation. One interviewee said that their engineering teams were persistently fighting 
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for maintenance funding. The OH&S side of these problems was recently highlighted in 
the Moerewa Boiler explosion at AFFCO reported by the New Zealand Herald in 2018. 
Could New Zealand red meat enterprises flip their model on its head and restructure the 
transvection? Is this a viable option? Could a red meat processor call Tesco's red meat 
buyer and say thanks, but no thanks, we are working on some better opportunities for our 
farmers? 
7.15 Origin Green 
Back in 2013, I was invited to attend a conference in Queenstown, New Zealand. The 
conference was organized by AbacusBio and facilitated by Mary Shelman from Harvard 
and Anthony C. Cunningham Professor of Marketing, Damien McLoughlin from UCD 
Michael Smurfit Graduate Business School. In attendance was a broad cross-section of 
the New Zealand agribusiness community, including a strong contingent from the 
sizeable red meat processing companies. This was my first introduction to the red meat 
industry people in New Zealand. The focus of the conference was on securing better 
value in the market. The program leveraged the Harvard case study method. Along the 
way, there were many references to the Origin Green program.   
The key take away for me was the potential to leverage premiumization. The case study 
that stuck with me was the Nestlé study. Working through how they developed the 
Nespresso coffee pods and the retail concept it was rolled out through convinced me that 
connecting New Zealand agribusiness strongly to the marketing function was the way 
forward. I felt at the time, marketing was the missing ingredient. In terms of marketing 
orientation, the red meat industry was market driving, not market-driven. 
Post-conference and in partnership with AbacusBio, I engaged in developing a 
premiumization workshop based in-market in Singapore that would allow New Zealand 
enterprises to learn how to focus on delivering premium offerings to consumers in 
markets driven by rising incomes. The premiumization phenomenon was particularly 
visible across Asia, where rapid urbanization was creating a new middle class on a scale 
not witnessed before in human history. The top end of this relatively new consumer 
group was driving the premium and super-premium category for food and beverage 
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worldwide. It made sense for New Zealand to engage. The Irish, by this time, were well 
into developing their Origin Green program.   
Premiumisation requires market insights and knowledge to be converted into actions to 
create value. That means someone somewhere has to buy something and pay the asking 
price. It doesn't pay to invest in trying to access premium markets if the business model 
is flawed or the product lacks customer appeal. The Origin Green program is an 
excellent example of how things can be done differently. The principles behind 
premiumization in any market remain the same. It comes back to how consumers 
experience and emotionally connect to a brand. Success with wealthy consumers in any 
market is about crafting the brand, creating the experience, and emotionally engaging the 
customer. The Origin Green program is an exemplar of how to achieve unity, 
collaboration, market cut-through, and above all, premium returns. 
Origin Green while critiqued in some of its pursuits, has demonstrated collaboration is 
possible across the entire agri-food sector, and it makes a compelling case for pursuing 
value over volume and, by doing so, delivering numerous benefits. Savory, a global 
regenerative movement, encompasses a land to market concept, which with some 
de el men  c ld be he ca al  f  Ne  Zealand  Origin Green. The program is the 
world's first verified regenerative sourcing solution for meat, dairy, wool, and leather. 
Savory advertises that it's land to market concept makes the connection between brand 
and land. Transvection mapping could streamline such a process and improve 
connectivity by eliminating defective sorts and identifying innovation opportunities. 
Analysing O igin G een  transvection would be an ideal place to begin. In some ways, 
starting from behind the bleeding edge may offer some advantages as New Zealand has 
the opportunity to learn from Ireland's mistakes. That said, in the current, New Zealand 
environment, collaboration appears far away. 
7.16 Summary 
In so many ways, this extended discussion chapter has been the most challenging to 
write and articulate. There is just so much dynamic change going on across the red meat 
sector right now. Consumers are misbehaving and becoming unpredictable, and red meat 
enterprises are grappling with survival. Survival is not discussed openly very much, but 
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the reality of current financial performance suggests the sun is getting lower in the sky, 
particularly in the traditional sky. It is not a sunset industry yet, but neither is it a vibrant 
sunrise. When you deep dive into the New Zealand red meat industry, what you see is an 
industry that might well have reached its tipping point.  
This tipping point's strategic nexus is providing all of the players now sitting at the red 
meat table with an opportunity to stop and reflect. As marketing myopia has proven, 
enterprises suffering from the malady will most likely fail to see the changes they need 
to make to survive. Some of these enterprises will end up defining themselves too 
narrowly. The red meat sector is at the point where the red meat croupier has asked 
players to place their bets.  In this case, the bets are on the future.  
How the New Zealand red meat industry thinks about these challenges and how they 
decide to break them down will be pivotal to whether they are solved or not. According 
to Lane (2007), the field of systems dynamics was developed in 1956 by MIT professor 
Jay Forrester. From that time, systems dynamics have proven an effective way to solve 
problems, especially when they are complex. Fundamentally, systems thinking is 
focused on understanding all of the touchpoints, and drivers, impacting any given 
problem or challenge. It seeks to understand whole systems, complete ecosystems, and 
entire environments. In stark contrast, the traditional analysis aims to dissect and 
separate systems into individual components, so they can be studied in great detail. 
This is often a requirement; however, heading into too much detail too early comes with 
risk. Staying out of intimate detail until the entire system is fully understood can enable 
new perspectives and new solutions. . Lane (2007:105) reports, "Forrester consistently 
argued that senior managers should build models to understand their organizations. He 
believed that a manager's role was not merely as "captain of the ship" but as "designer 
of the ship." This "corporate designer role" was an innovative approach to both 
modelling and management which he promoted throughout his career (e.g. Keough and 
Doman, 1992)." In my view, Forrester's 'systems dynamics' is the perfect antidote to 




PART VI: RESEARCH APPLIED 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion  Learning from the past, taking stock, and 
   the Beginning of a new way forward 
 
Key Points 
x I  a b a e ne  o ld and i  pe fec  fo  Ne  Zealand 
x Ostrich behaviour has to stop 
x Best and brightest step forward 
 
8.1  Research Objective  
The key objective of commissioning this research was to investigate the New Zealand 
red meat industry to understand why such a critical sector has been and remains a serial 
underperformer. New Zealand is primarily a producer of primary products and needs to 
export them to earn its living. The New Zealand red meat industry is a significant 
contributor to GDP, generating NZD 9.1 Billion in revenues in 2019. The sector employs 
25,000 and processes around 25 million sheep and 5 million cattle every year. 
The industry currently trades mostly through intermediaries and receives commodity 
prices for the bulk of its output. The industry has been conscious of its low financial 
returns and has been attempting to transition-to-value. In 2020, significant value is still 
being created by upstream enterprises in-market. These enterprises often own direct 
connections with consumers and appear to accrue the lion's share of the benefits.  
Over a century ago, New Zealand producers began life with a distinct competitive 
advantage. They were able to produce red meat relatively cheaply compared to many 
he  c n  and hei  game-changing innovation in freezing technology enables the 
industry to provide commodity beef and lamb to protected markets back in the United 
Kingdom. This provided enormous benefits to New Zealanders and their standard of 
living, one of the highest in the world, emanated its red meat production advantage to the 
world. New Zealand was wealthy from processing grass.  
By the 1950s, farmers were looking beyond the United Kingdom. To achieve this aim, 
producers made moves to create cooperatives to control their fate. The idea was these 
new cooperatives would combine the capital resources of farmers to increase their ability 
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to negotiate better prices. Improved returns would then flow to farmers. For the next 
forty years, New Zealand farmers, through their cooperatives, enjoyed steady export 
growth. However, the industry, instead of retaining its dominant market position, 
squandered the gains through under-investment and lack of product differentiation, 
which brought the industry to the beginning of a period of trading difficulty, which still 
dominates the industry in 2020. By this stage, there is only one wholly-owned New 
Zealand red meat cooperative remaining. 
8.2 Research Findings 
This research highlights that trading as a commodity producer with no real product 
differentiation to the end customer, New Zealand's primary products do not enjoy the 
premium they deserve. This research also identifies that challenge as an important 
opportunity for the industry. Two big ideas from two marketing giants have been used to 
underpin the direction of this project. Those ideas come from Theodore Levitt (1960) 
and Wroe Alderson (1965). Levitt (1960) gave us the theory of marketing myopia, and 
Alderson (1965) provided his ground-breaking transvection concept. 
Using Levitt's (1960) preconditions for marketing myopia, I confidently support my 
finding that New Zealand red meat enterprises have not paid sufficient attention to 
marketing. The value that has been left behind is enormous. Alderson's (1965) 
transvection mechanism allowed this research to assess product flows to identify how the 
value was distributed in the New Zealand red meat industry and beyond. It answered 
questions about who made what? Where? How? And Why? Applying these frameworks 
has identified a pattern of defective sorts, which equate to value-destroying components 
in the New Zealand red meat marketing provisioning system. 
The research question underpinning this applied business research project is: Does the 
New Zealand red meat industry suffer from marketing myopia? The answer from where I 
sit after three and a half years of research and total immersion in this space is a 
resounding and definitive, yes. 
8.3 The Research Pathway 
The journey began with the introductory chapter, which discussed my aspirations for the 
project and paved the way to my findings, succinctly detailed above. The working 
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proposition in Chapter Two contextualized the research referencing the New Zealand red 
meat story, past, present, and future. Chapter Three provided an applied literature review 
focusing on marketing myopia and transvection, the two concepts that would create the 
platform for the project.  
In Chapter Four, I outlined the symptoms of marketing myopia, opened up the narrative 
on the problem, and pointed to a decade of poor performance. This established the core 
problem which application of the research findings hopes to reduce. The investigation 
always felt like it was going to be complicated and challenging, and it was. Chapter Five 
put forward three research propositions and provided a methodological review, which set 
out and explained the multi-content approach used to collate the data to produce the 
project results. Chapter Five provided an in-depth explanation of each method used. 
These were trade interviews, transvection, and immersive prototyping.  
Chapter Six laid out the results and combined them with a relevant discussion on each 
key topic as it was raised. This approach was leveraged to assist the reader to immerse 
themselves in the world of the research.  In Chapter Seven,  Le i  (1960) 
preconditions were directly linked to the New Zealand red meat industry. At this point, I 
suggested my research would, during its course, brush up against intense politics, and it 
did. I asserted that conservative mindsets on both sides of the fence, producer, and 
processor would prove a challenging dynamic for my applied business research project, 
and they were. 
8.4 The New Red Meat Reality 
The current operational environment New Zealand producers and processors inhabit are 
challenging. To survive, New Zealand red meat enterprises must successfully deal with 
disruption from multiple sources, increased complexity, shifting consumer behaviour, 
climate dynamics, and new, aggressive, and disruptive competition. Rising to this 
challenge i  n  ea . U   hi  in , he Ne  Zealand ed mea  ind  e n e  
the changing and dynamic red meat landscape has not translated into improved 
profitability for producers. Along the way, balance sheets weakened by poor 
performance and taking on too much debt have radically altered the ownership and 
organizational structures in the New Zealand red meat landscape. While, in some cases, 
new capital structures have shored up some of the financial challenges, for the time 
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being, there are significant marketing challenges on the horizon. These challenges 
present on multiple fronts and will soon test the relatively new New Zealand red meat 
industry structures' resilience.  
My assertion fronting this research, or hypothesis if you prefer, was marketing had gone 
missing. I could see no better explanation to explain such poor performance. I was 
confident that the lack of professional marketing in its most pure and applied form was a 
significant reason for the New Zealand red meat industry fitting the definition of a 
alema e  ind . In e ence, ha  a  m  a g men . Ma ke ing i  mi ing, and 
because it is missing, the industry is failing. Undoubtedly, many in the red meat industry 
would claim they are investing in marketing, but the promise of improved results is yet 
to materialise.  
During the research, I argued the industry's marketing definition was somewhat limited, 
hea il  el ing n he 4 P . E en n, C n ad  & Kn le  (2013) gge ed, I  ime 
 e l he 4 P  f ma ke ing f  da  B2B eali . A  a f ame k f  fine-tuning the 
ma ke ing mi , he P product, place, price, and promotion have served consumer 
marketers well for half a century. But in the B2B world, they yield narrow, product-focused 
a egie  ha  a e inc ea ingl  a  dd  i h he im e a i e  deli e  l i n .  Note, this 
statement was made in 2013. Breaking free from homogeneous settings will require the 
application of marketing theory beyond what is currently deployed.  
8.5 At the core 
Thi  he i  e  Le i  (1960) he  f ma ke ing m ia a  i  c e he . Thi  
theory has been extensively explained and referred to up to this point. Notably, Levitt 
(1964:45) stated, "Marketing Myopia said nothing new. Others preceded me, saying 
what was original and instructive about the marketing concept much more carefully than 
I, as a latecomer, did. The major purpose of the article was to communicate to a wider 
audience in a much more provocative way what my predecessors had pioneered. It 
sought to emphasize thereby the powerful relationship between marketing and the 
corporate purpose. It sought also to harness a knowledge and appreciation of 
technology to marketing thinking." I have attempted to emulate the provocative aim of 
Levitt. My research aim has always been to encourage an understanding of the role of 
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marketing, and the New Zealand red meat industry's case, emphasizing why it is not fully 
utilized or exploited. 
As it turns out, the New Zealand red meat industry appears to be short of ideas about 
shifting their go-to-market strategies from volume to value. This idea vacuum suggests 
that aspirations about moving the profit needle from red to black will continue to be 
reliant on the vagaries of commodity markets. This reliance is unlikely to end well for 
either producers or processors. The downside risks are increasing, and they include asset 
stranding and farming futures being cut short. Banks will need to become more empathic 
in the future to enable farmers and processors to survive in the commodity space. A 
space New Zealand is grossly underweight to play in, particularly in beef exports. 
Pinning an industry's hopes and dreams on growth markets like China may yet prove to 
be a very dangerous and very expensive mindset to embrace.   
It is noteworthy to remind readers that many of the gains to date have been science and 
technology gains. For example, improved genetics and better farming technologies. 
AbacusBio (2020), a highly regarded science and technology enterprise in Dunedin, New 
Zealand states on their website that, "We apply world-class science and technology to 
improve and enhance the performance, resilience, competitiveness, responsiveness, and 
profitability of our clients' enterprises." To secure improved outcomes by moving away 
from volume (a stated future requirement), at some point, those in the New Zealand red 
meat industry will need to find effective ways to serve premium consumers and respond 
to increasing competition. Investing more in marketing makes sense because marketing 
understands the sequences required to improve the genetics of strategy. Of course, 
marketers will engage with all parties capable of facilitating improved value, including 
working with world-class companies like AbacusBio Pty Ltd. 
The New Zealand red meat industry could benefit by fully leveraging marketing and 
placing the function at the core of its organizations. What marketing efforts should the 
industry invest in? In an interview with Drucker, Darroch (2008:8) asked the famous 
marketer if he still thought it was feasible for companies to create customers through 
innovation and marketing. She asked if he would change his mind in hindsight. Drucker 
answered,  W ld I e a e m  i i n n ma keting and innovation differently today? 
N , I d n  hink . Y  a  c m anie  d  b h ma ke ing and inn a i n. M  
companies do neither. The great majority of businesses, all over the world, are inwardly 
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focused, partly because they see the inward people every day and partly because there is 
a dilemma if you do not take your product or your service seriously, you do a poor job. 
Y  m  belie e.  What should the New Zealand red meat industry do to improve? 
Innovation and marketing might be good places to start answering that question.  
8.6 Virtue signalling does not equal action. 
While there is significant rhetoric, narrative, virtue signalling, and communication 
stressing the transition-to-value is underway, the reality is, the evidence is hard to find. I 
believe the enterprises and individuals responsible for promoting this myth help embed 
marketing myopia across the New Zealand red meat landscape. The output from this 
research strongly suggests the New Zealand red meat sector has failed to grapple with a 
wide range of issues successfully.    
These include dealing with animal welfare, alternative and substitute proteins, climate 
change, environment and ecological concerns, government policy settings, increased 
compliance, changing banking criteria, global trade dynamics, diversification, 
environmental stewardship, sustainability, future-proofing farming operations, and 
dealing with the challenges of intergenerational succession and the trend towards 
corporate farming. Of particular note, the industry has also failed (miserably) to get its 
head around investment, particularly the investment required to fund world-class 
marketing. 
I believe marketing myopia plays a pivotal role in restraining the New Zealand red meat 
industry from successfully and proactively responding to the headwinds that challenge it. 
Marketing is a provisioning system. It is the discipline responsible for taking produce in 
nature, and from nature, through a process, Alderson (1965) called transvection, to the 
ultimate consumer. In the New Zealand red meat industry, this process is disconnected, 
fragmented, and failing. In Levitt's (1960) examples, companies suffering from 
marketing myopia were often either late to the party or missed the party altogether. Of 
course, the ugly truth that continues to rear its head throughout this research is that 
producers and processors lack profitability. They simply do not make consistently 
excellent returns. They do have the odd good year, but any ground gained is very quickly 
surrendered. The desire to deal with this persistent problem is the one unifying 
dimension of my research, and getting to grips with it has been the key aim of this 
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applied business research project. It is interesting to note that the schedule prices for beef 
during this research have hardly moved. Sheep prices have generally strengthened, but 
there are challenges ahead as low consumption rates in the domestic market highlight. 
8.7 Lessons from the Past 
Marketing myopia as a concept appears to be straightforward; however, drill-down and it 
ickl  bec me  e iden  ha  ma ke ing m ia i  an hing b . Ma ke ing m ia  
inherent ability to remain hidden (for all sorts of reasons) makes its presence hard to 
detect. This feature is what makes it potentially very dangerous to organizational 
performance.  It is a corporate disease that most often comes with a very poor prognosis. 
The rusty Kodak sign pictured in Figure 8.0 below is a stark reminder of marketing 
myopia's value-destroying potential.    
  
 
Figure 8.0: A rusty Kodak sign says it all. Source: Blogs.ubc.ca (2014) 
 
The commercial landscape across the globe is littered with examples of bankrupted, 
liquidated, and deceased enterprises whom all failed to recognize they were suffering 
from marketing myopia. Kodak is perhaps my favourite example. This iconic company, 
founded in 1889 by George Eastman, would wind up missing out on the digital 
revolution after Steve Sasson, a Kodak employee and engineer, invented the digital 
came a in 1975. B and Mind  (2014) e ed Bill Ll d  c mmen  a ing, I  eem  
Kodak had develo ed an ib die  again  an hing ha  migh  c m e e i h film.  Bill 
Lloyd was Kodak's, Chief Technical Officer.   
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Further from home and proof that marketing myopia is not selective of industry type or 
geographical location, Patel (2017) provides another excellent example of marketing 
myopia. His narrative reminds all enterprises, including New Zealand red meat 
enterprises, that not looking is dangerous and often fatal. Patel references the famous 
'Ambassador' car manufactured by the Indian conglomerate Hindustan Motors as a prime 
example illustrating the severe impacts of marketing myopia. In many ways, the term 
'Ambassador' in this case can be taken almost literally. The example of failure below is 
an Amba ad ial  representation advocating for marketing. 
Based on the 1956 British Morris Oxford Series III, the Ambassador car once held a 70 
e cen  ma ke  ha e. The 'Ambi  a  he fi  indigen  ca  b il  in India and a  nce 
regarded as a status symbol with ownership communicating wealth. Patel (2017) states, 
What made the country's most iconic car of its time to close down the business? The 
answer lies in the company's inability to understand the market and the changing 
business environment. It's a classic case of marketing myopia where the company failed 
to understand that customer are not loyal to your product; rather, they are loyal to their 
need satisfied by your product; as long as your product is satisfying their need, they will 
buy it else they will switch the moment they get a better alternative. The case of 
Ambassador Car is learning for all; about how ignoring the marketing customer and 
competition may put you in trouble." The 1956 K lka a Amba ad  Ta i image in 
Figure 8.1 below highlights many ominous parallels with the New Zealand red meat 
industry. 
 




Levitt (1960:141) states, The belief that profits are assured by an expanding and more 
affluent population is dear to the heart of every industry. It takes the edge off the 
apprehensions everybody understandably feels about the future. If consumers are 
multiplying and also buying more of your product or service, you can face the future 
with considerably more comfort than if the market were shrinking. An expanding market 
keeps the manufacturer from having to think very hard or imaginatively. If thinking is an 
intellectual response to a problem, then the absence of a problem leads to the absence of 
thinking. If your product has an automatically expanding market, then you will not give 
m ch h gh   h   e and i .  This excerpt from Levitt (1960) would be an 
excellent discussion topic for New Zealand red meat enterprises' boards because it is 
eerily accurate and foreboding in equal measure.    
Remember Nokia, in 1998 they were the best-selling mobile phone brand in the world. 
According to Cristina (2020), N kia  fi  en  f m $1 billi n in 1995  alm  $4 
billi n b  1999.  In 2003, Nokia continued its stellar run creating the best-selling mobile 
phone of all time, the Nokia 1100. In 2007, Apple's Steve Jobs famously launched the 
iPhone. Eight years later, Nokia sales had declined by 90 percent, and Microsoft 
acquired the company in 2013. Marketing myopia had well and truly struck. 
Cristina (2020) reported the industry observer's top three reasons for Nokia's failure. 
They were: 
1. Inferior technology; 
2. Arrogance, particularly prevalent among top-level managers; 
3. Lack of vision. 
The story of Nokia is similar to the Ambassador and Kodak examples, and so are the 
conclusions. The interviewee cohort also felt the New Zealand red meat sector suffered 
from inferior technology, arrogance, and a lack of vision. Disruptive innovation often 
delivers changed circumstances to incumbent industries. For example, Lynn (2020) 
e  n Te la  la e  e l  a ing, It reported an unexpected profit in the last 
quarter and managed to deliver more than 350,000 cars last year. From the lows of 
2019, when Musk threatened to take it private, the shares have risen from $US180 to 
more than $500. It is now worth more than Ford and General Motors combined, and has 
bea en hei  high   bec me he m  al able Ame ican ca  c m an  f all ime.  In 
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my view, Substitute proteins have the potential along with their innate attributes to 
provide a 'Tesla' moment to the New Zealand red meat industry.   
Of course, there are many in the industry that will argue vehemently and argue 
differently. They will refer to innovations like the advanced robotic technology being 
utilized by processors. They will refer to cameras capable of grading meat quality, and 
they will talk about enhanced branding. It is all true; progress has been made; however, 
most of those innovations are more closely related to improving efficiency than 
delivering customer satisfaction. Efficiency is a survival requirement when you earn 
your living in a commodity environment, so this mindset is understandable up to a point.  
The problem is that competitors marketing alternative and substitute proteins are gaining 
market share. What was once a tentative foothold is turning into a mainstream offering. 
If consumers' trend to substitute 'alternative' proteins for natural protein like they are 
doing now keeps increasing, winning lost ground back could prove expensive. The 
eekl  meal c ld bec me al e na i e  i h l  ea ing cc ing n he eekend. 
How would a trend like that impact the current New Zealand red meat industry? Trends 
can accelerate, and right now, there are many acceleration facilitators present for 
example, Covid 19 and climate change. Multi-billion-dollar alternative protein 
companies are looking to scale, and they have very deep-pocketed shareholders who will 
deploy their immense and very patient capital? What happens to commodity prices when 
these companies scale production? How will the New Zealand red meat industry match 
their significant investment in marketing?  
The most prevalent theme reported through this research was, "We're all good." The 
ind  c n i en  me age a  ha  here is nothing to worry about; the situation is 
under control. They pointed to improved results and less debt. Both have explanations, 
and they are not related to successfully transitioning to value. The enterprises putting out 
this message believe consumers will reliably purchase premium red meat from New 
Zealand countries in the future. I think that is probably correct, but many questions 
remain unanswered, and the product mix could be up for a real shakeup. China has 




New Zealand industries have a rich history of chasing growth markets, especially when 
the commodity of the day signals strong demand.  The results to date have been, at best, 
varied. The country's history of creating and adding value has been way less stellar, and 
failing to deal with this issue has enabled many overseas interests to leverage their 
financial strengths to reverse integrate and purchase the weak new Zealand firms.  The 
result has been foreign-owned companies have continually ended up owning many of 
New Zealand's premium income-producing enterprises and assets. These are likely to be 
the assets New Zealand will need to support its future living standard aspirations. Where 
will the profits from these foreign-owned companies flow? 
Could avoiding marketing myopia prevent these dynamics from occurring? 
Ackn ledging ma ke ing m ia  e ence c ld hel  ed mea  gani a i n  hif  
closer to dealing with their situation's realities. There are four significant red meat 
enterprises in New Zealand, Silver Fern Farms, Alliance, ANZCO, and AFFCO. Only 
one, Alliance, remains in New Zealand farmer's hands.  
8.8 Research Limitations 
There are always limitations to any project. During this project, fundamental limitations I 
faced include stretched financial resources and the extensive scope and scale of the 
problem I was attempting to research. Trying to combine three different approaches was 
ambitious, and while integrating them has been challenging, the method's mutual 
reinforcement has strengthened my findings.  
The lack of marketing orientation of most people involved in the New Zealand red meat 
sector was also a real limitation beca e i  i  ha d  k  a blem if he e i  an 
underlying knowledge gap. For example, almost everyone I spoke with struggled to 
understand the significance of the differences between viewing markets as either 
homogeneous or heterogeneous.  
When you see these two words together, they do not necessarily scream game-changing 
dynamics, but an industry's consumer orientation is everything, especially if it is heading 
in the wrong direction. Shifting the industry from volume to value will require an equal 
commitment to shifting mindsets from homogeneous settings to heterogeneous settings. 
This in no way belittles the superb range of people who assisted me with my research. 
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The concepts of Levitt (1960) and Alderson (1965) behind this research have not, to the 
very best of my knowledge been linked to the New Zealand red meat industry before. 
The approach is, therefore, novel and experimental, and both can create limitations. 
Crossing the innovation chasm to locate early adopters for a new product represents a 
similar challenge.   
I also leaned into headwinds driven by incumbents. Few people in the industry 
welcomed the research direction I was taking, particularly individuals responsible for 
marketing-related areas. These people viewed what I was doing as confronting, and they 
did not like being challenged on any level. This part of my research was quite eye-
opening, but also very supportive of my interviewee's comments. 
As a result, I found it very challenging to cut through traditional thinking. For example, 
many in agricultural supply chains have very strong traditional views about how the red 
meat industry needs to operate, and they will not be swayed. This is disappointing 
because it locks away knowledge that could have benefited this research. This same 
dynamic also highlights the incredible naivety and ignorance of many farmers. Most 
simply have no idea of what a premium red meat consumer looks like, and they have 
even less knowledge of what they want or how to reach them. 
There was also a definite 'lawnmower' culture evident in the New Zealand red meat 
industry, and there was a strong preference to immediately shoot down anything new, 
particularly research that may not be aligned with contemporary viewpoints. There was 
an inclination to shoot the messenger, particularly if they presented thinking that 
challenged existing comfort zones. This inclination emanated from producers and 
processors.  
There are still producers out there borrowing heavily from banks to aggressively expand 
their commodity footprint. I struggled to reconcile this motivation, which may be a 
limitation, but I admit to not believing in a commodity future for New Zealand. It is the 
little things that will end up biting too. For example, animal welfare is a powder keg 
waiting to explode. Whilst animals must be slaughtered for us to eat them, the tolerance 
to the industrial dispatching of sentient animals will, I believe, become a huge problem 
very soon. My test for this thinking is to imagine taking red meat lovers to a 
contemporary processing plant's viewing platform. What do you think consumers would 
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think? How would they respond? Putting your head into the sand, the way the industry 
does will not resolve this issue. People who love eating red meat are ok with slaughter, 
but they want to see the animal's lives respected. The head-in-the-sand mindsets of many 
created some research limitations because it tends to augment defensive behaviour, 
limiting two-way learning. 
The consumer's involvement was critical to this research, and their views are expressed 
throughout this project. That said, the research methods used did not specifically engage 
in formal investigations with consumers. The decision was made to assess the red meat 
sector for marketing myopia, and the investigation was honed towards this pursuit. There 
is no doubt; targeted consumer research would bring significant additional value to this 
study's direction. Investigating the confluence of red meat industry performance and the 
consumer's voice would have added value to this project.  An investigation of defective 
sorts and their inherent potential to deliver innovation, new opportunities, and high 
differentiation levels would be an excellent way to extend this research.  
8.9 Research Contributions  New Knowledge 
This applied business research project was always going to be a dynamic piece of 
research. My goal, like Levitt (1960), before me, was to be provocative and push some 
boundaries. I wanted to stimulate discussion, open up debate, and try to help make the 
New Zealand red meat industry better. I believe those goals and outcomes have been 
successfully achieved and demonstrated, and most importantly, applied. The highlights, 
key themes, contributions, and learning from this research included: 
x Identifying transvection as a highly relevant marketing tool capable of creating 
highly differentiated marketing approaches for red meat. It is an approach that 
could accelerate transition-to-value aspirations. It would achieve this by 
highlighting defective sorts, innovating and enhancing product development, and 
by doing so, offering premium consumers enhanced customer satisfactions.  
x The a lica i n f Le i  (1960) f  ma ke ing m ia ec ndi i n  in a ed 
meat industry context, opening the way forward to a new way to examine and test 




x The start-up of Triple Nine Farms. During the research period of this thesis, I 
created, funded, and developed a prototype responsible for testing existing 
industry assumptions and testing novel ideas and concepts. The Triple Nine 
Farms prototype delivered insights and played a pivotal role in this project.  
x Establishing the first farmer-to-consumer accredited regenerative farming 
business in New Zealand under the Savory group, based in Denver, Colorado. 
Triple Nine Farms were early partners of Savory in New Zealand and 
championed the shift to more regenerative farming methods. Transvection 
analysis was the tool that identified regenerative farming as having a direct 
benefit concerning differentiation.   
x Being selected by the University of Otago to provide the first-ever case study for 
the inaugural universities MBA competition. Two research projects have now 
emanated from that initiative, a blockchain study and a market access project 
looking specifically at Singapore. Both projects have opened up fresh thinking 
and have fed into the marketing strategy of Triple Nine Farms. Blockchain's 
potential impact on transparency could have a game-changing effect on the red 
meat industry. Once consumers can see everything, the gloves will come off, and 
virtue signaling will no longer cut it. Talking about something and delivering it 
are two very different things, for example, talking about animal welfare versus 
the actual reality. 
x The explorational DNA of this project has also generated an exciting new spinout 
idea, hich ffe  he en ial  e end Alde n  (1965) e ea ch in ne  
di ec i n . A  a  f hi  e ea ch jec , a j in  a e  n Defec i e S  a  
written and submitted to the Macromarketing Conference in Leipzig, Germany. It 
has attracted interest from universities in Germany and the Netherlands.   
x This research has been responsible for increasing my profile and increasing my 
ability to make a difference to the New Zealand red meat industry and the red 
meat industry globally. This outcome is enormously satisfying and will hopefully 
be responsible for realizing the potential of this research, which in a nutshell, is 
adapting to disruptive change by leveraging marketing.  I aim to continue my 
research in the future. This research has already opened up new research 
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pathways in areas like defective sorts and marketing directly to consumers via 
social media channels and digital ecosystems. These two areas by themselves 
could be game-changing. Successful development and implementation of these 
technologies could shorten the New Zealand red meat industry's transvections 
and significantly increase the average return per kilogram. 
x Triple Nine Farms had to pivot to digital during the Covid 19 lockdown, and the 
data analytics from 'WooCommerce' quickly demonstrated an average retail price 
of $30 per kilogram was achievable across the entire cattle carcass. Remember, 
the farmers part own and participate in the Triple Nine Farms' transvection. 
Compared to current processor schedule prices, this is ground-breaking and 
game-changing, particularly if the approach can be appropriately scaled. In my 
view, it is a perfect approach for New Zealand, which is a country perfectly 
positioned to become the world's most exclusive producer, curator, and provider 
of premium natural red meat protein in the world. 
8.10 Recommendations: Taking Stock and Future Research 
As this research project has progressed, a deeper understanding of the New Zealand red 
meat industry has been captured, particularly with regard to the impact marketing 
m ia i  ha ing n he ec  e f mance. Eme ging al ng i h hi  nde anding 
have been new pathways for further exploration and future research. These pathways 
would most likely direct new research towards a much more focused consumer study 
aimed a  h ning he ind  nde anding f c n me  end  and al  hei  
behaviours. This would have the impact of amplifying the voice of the consumer.  
This research has also seen additional ideas emerge. For example, the potential to apply 
established concepts in novel ways, such as the combination of transvection, marketing 
myopia and systems dynamics. This systems troika has the potential to open up 
information exchange between consumers and industry in exciting new ways, 
particularly around older concepts like the validity of growth as a legitimate enterprise 
goal. For example, Meadows et al (1972:23) suggest, If the present growth trends in 
world population, industrialization, pollution, food production, and resource depletion 
continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within 
the next one hundred years. The most probable result will be a rather sudden and 
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uncontrollable decline in b h la i n and ind ial ca aci .  Future research 
could explore paradigms like these to develop new hubs of innovation capable of 
positioning New Zealand as a world leader in value-added sustainable food systems.  
The key aspiration for this research, however, was to help enhance and deepen the 
understanding behind how the New Zealand industry marketed its red meat. The aim 
apart from reporting on marketing myopia was to e he jec  finding   hel  
establish leverage points capable of correcting the power balance in the red meat 
transvection, increase profits for farmers, and amplify customer satisfactions for red 
meat consumers.  
During the research process, major defective sorts were identified in six areas across the 
red meat transvection. This project recommends further research being undertaken in the 
following six areas. This will augment and accelerate the required transition-to-value 
goal held by New Zealand's red meat enterprises. The six areas identified as likely to 
enhance red meat marketing, increase value, and enhance customer satisfaction are:  
1. Regenerative agriculture 
2. Bred for flavour 
3. On-farm slaughter 
4. Health and nutrition 
5. Artisan & Craft 
6. Farmer to Consumer 
 
1. Regenerative agriculture 
The key idea here is to look after the planet; we only have one. Carbon sequestering and 
ecological operations were a mandatory requirement for Triple Nine Farm suppliers. All 
T i le Nine Fa m  lie  c ld dem n a e hei  fa ming e a i n  e e 
Ecologically Output Verified (EOV) and accredited through the Savory Institute in the 
USA.  
Recent fires in California and my home country of Australia, along with the emergence 
of Covid 19, may well prove to be the tipping point for how consumers view the world. 
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If they begin to consider the planet as finite, as they should, then what is produced and 
how it is produced becomes will become much more critical than it is now.    
Climate change is here, and responding proactively to it is likely to become mandatory 
for success,  particularly when engaging with the red meat market's premium and luxury 
end. The image in Fig e 8.2 a  aken n Ne  Zealand  fi  acc edi ed egene a i e 
farm managed by my colleague Dr. Hugh Jellie. The consumer response to this image on 
Triple Nine Fa m  cial media a  e f ll  i i e.  
 
 
Figure 8.2: Triple Nine Farms accredited regenerative operation. Source: J Wilkes Photography 
(2019) 
 
2. Bred for Flavour 
T i le Nine Fa m  cattle were all F3 and F4 Aberdeen Angus. This was a minimum 
e i emen . T i le Nine Fa m  Ang  ca le e e lied f m d ce  ing 
Waigroup Angus genetics. Waigroup is based in Southern Wairarapa, New Zealand.  
The Falloon and Fouhy families have stayed true to the original Scottish Aberdeen 
Angus for a century, ensuring the 'originals' survived and thrived to this day. Over the 
years, the progeny from their passion and dedication has won numerous New Zealand 
Steak of Origin competition awards and a Lifestyle Magazine supreme producer award, 
which attests to the eating qualities of the original Aberdeen Angus beef.  
New Zealand has many other farming families with similar stories, and this rich history 
provides a unique foundation on which to build premium brands, which ideally would 
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proliferate across the country, emulating the provincial success enjoyed by New 
Zealand's varietal wine producers. Most of these world-class animals are currently sold 
into the commodity markets via big processing companies that compete for the farmer's 
cattle. Unfortunately, as soon as the animal is loaded onto the truck in the commodity 
world, both value and the story are lost.    
Triple Nine Farms' farmers breed cattle for flavour, not just for weight. Unfortunately, 
due to the New Zealand red meat industry's commoditized leaning, this attention to 
delicious flavour has never been rewarded. Chefs and high-end consumers seek the 
originality, authenticity, and eating qualities of these animals. Original Scottish 
Aberdeen Angus is a scarce heritage breed. Just like the famous 1980's Caltex 
advertisement used to promote, 'Oils ain't oils,' it is the same way with Triple Nine 
Farms' beef, Ang  ain  Ang . 
 
Figure 8.3: A Triple Nine Farms T-Bone cooked over charcoal and Manuka to 63 degrees 
(medium rare).  Source: J Wilkes Photography (2019) 
 
 
3. On-Farm Slaughter 
Triple Nine Farms has been working with colleagues investigating the possibility of 
developing on-farm slaughtering capability. This will further enhance the consumer-
driven offering, and it meets a heterogeneous consumer requirement. Slaughtering was 
he nl  a  f he T i le Nine Fa m  an ec i n he c m an  did n  f ll  c n l. 
As those in the industry appreciate, animal welfare is one of the elephants in the animal 
protein room. Premium consumers want to know that sentient animals have been treated 
with the utmost respect, particularly at the endpoint of their lives. 
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In support of this consumer requirement, Tri le Nine Fa m  fa ming em  e e 
being developed and designed to move away from a reliance on the commodity space. 
The ability to achieve this goal will be assisted by the ability to slaughter and process 
animals on-farm. The ethos behind this thinking was simple. It is what premium beef 
consumers want; it is a better way to ensure a premium product is delivered; it is better 
for the animal and better for the farmer. It is also what consumers will pay a premium 
for. In the future, I believe this will be a minimum requirement at the premium end of the 
market. Luxury beef is unlikely to be supplied from an industrialized process.  
The new focus on "ethical" meat and the consumer's wish for transparency and 
traceability through the entire transvection offers many opportunities. I believe a single 
animal focus from nose to tail is the best place to start developing a luxury beef brand. 
The prime cuts, totalling approximately 40 kilos on a Triple Nine Farms' Black Legacy 
Angus carcass, are simple to sell for excellent returns. The additional trim presents a 
more significant challenge, but it was not insurmountable as this project demonstrated.  
Premiumisation is potentially a handy tool as well, and single-sourced heritage beef is a 
good building block for developing products like luxury burger patties and other unique 
products. Artisanal expertise and craft beef mentality also feed into the psychology of the 
ethical consumer. After spending years immersed in the New Zealand red meat space, I 
would happily argue that the future of beef will reside in the luxury category. Red meat 
purchase decisions of tomorrow's consumers are likely to be made for very different 
reasons than they are today. Figure 8.4 below showcases the on-farm, mobile 
slaughtering system set up by Britt-Marie Stegs. Britt-Marie is a passionate Swedish 
entrepreneur and founder of Hälsingestintan AB. These days she operates as a senior 
business consultant at Stegs Consulting in Järvsö, Sweden. She has very kindly offered 
assistance to begin the mobile slaughtering journey in New Zealand. That journey is 
pivotal to removing the farmer reliance on processing companies, representing an 




Figure 8.4: Swedish Mobile Slaughtering vehicle. Source: (2020) 
https://www.halsingestintan.se/ 
 
4. Health and Nutrition 
T i le Nine Fa m  f c  a   en e c n me  ha e acce   beef (and lamb, 
venison, and pork), which contained high levels of ecologically sourced, dense nutrition 
with superb flavour. This is what high-end consumers wanted to pay a premium for, and 
right now, if you drill down into many of the current offerings from the New Zealand red 
meat industry, their stories do not stack up under scrutiny. Instead, their offerings rely 
heavily on consumers, not asking too many hard questions. This research does not see 
that approach being future-proof or sustainable. The knowledge gained from this project 
suggests respect for the animal, and high levels of dense nutrition will become a 
critically important factor in how consumers make decisions about the beef and lamb 
they buy in the future, particularly at the premium level. 
Flavour is paramount, and that was a core driver for Triple Nine Farms. If a steak does 
not taste great, a premium offering is dead in the water. It would appear that alternative 
proteins have a few gaping holes in their narrative too. The Achilles Heel of the 
alternative protein enterprise is often what they offer is highly processed. Their 
ecological credentials are also far from perfect, and their nutrition claims are dubious. 
This is the gap they have left open for now. New Zealand producers with strong 
marketing skills should be able to drive a London bus straight through such an apparent 
weakness. As a marketer, the natural red meat story has far more to offer passionate 
meat-loving consumers than the current alternatives. Meat lovers are meat lovers. As 
long as red meat enterprises love their customers and remain sensitive and adaptive to 
their needs, consumers who love natural red meat are more likely to stay loyal.  
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5. Artisan & Craft 
One of Triple Nine Farms' aims was to scale high-end value-added products here in New 
Zealand and then progress to accessing premium export markets. For example, Los 
Angeles consumes 30,000,000 pounds of beef frankfurters per year. In San Jose, 
California, Marx Foods retails ground New Zealand beef supplied to their operation by 
Silver Fern Farms for NZ $45 per kilo. At the time of writing, most of these export 
markets are out of small premium suppliers' reach. This is because New Zealand Inc. has 
sent a signal to farmers to move up the value chain without providing them with the 
necessary infrastructure to do so. Creating this infrastructure is expensive, but SME red 
meat enterprises will struggle to reach premium consumers in export markets without it, 
which is ironic because the premium consumers are waiting. 
6. Farmer to Consumer 
T i le Nine Fa m  business model cuts out the middle man and, by doing so, shortens 
the transvection. Instead of relying on traditional profit depleting distribution, Triple 
Nine Farms focused on building profitable, relationship-driven direct channels. The 
future is likely to include clicks and bricks but will not rely on mainstream channels, 
particularly in New Zealand.  As previously stated, the market is controlled by a cartel of 
two powerful and dominant supermarket conglomerates in this country. Both of these 
entities have demonstrated they do not put the farmer or consumer interests before their 
profits.    
Myopically, the supermarkets have failed to realize that their red meat comes from 
farmers, not from processors. Consumers, where they can, will choose to deal directly 
with farmers because they want to know where their food comes from, and they want to 
know who produces it. These days trust is everything, and supermarkets have squandered 
this asset where red meat is concerned.  Consumers also want to know how their food 
was made and who made it. Enterprises like Triple Nine Farms can answer all of these 
questions.   
For a farming system to be considered fully regenerative, it must be capable of 
continually regenerating across the entire farmer to consumer spectrum, not just in parts 
of it. The transvection itself needs to be regenerative. Farmers need to be rewarded, 
artisans need to be rewarded, and consumers need to be rewarded too. Win-win-win. 
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When this does not occur, the system becomes clogged with 'defective sorts,' 
representing system weaknesses. Not addressing them can result in system-wide failure. 
The current New Zealand red meat industry practices and structures are deeply flawed, 
myopic, and not consumer-driven. Instead of repeating what has not been wildly 
successful, Triple Nine Farms attempted to provide premium consumers with an 
alternative to industrial meat. The graphic below in Figure 8.5 is the Triple Nine Farms 
brand story displayed visually. The use of the 1950's design influence was selected to 
emphasize the premium and boutique nature of the Triple Nine Farms offers.   
  
 
Figure 8.5: T iple Nine Fa m  i al b and o  in de elopmen   Image supplied by 
J.Wilkes 
 
8.11 Final Thoughts 
I undertook this research to provide up to date industry intelligence and insight to help 
farmers make better business decisions. I wanted to encourage progressive producers to 
invest in front of the curve, ensuring they would not miss critical shifts in consumer 
trends or behaviours. In this way, they would not miss out on emerging opportunities. 
The results of this applied business research project have delivered some very unique 
research and development outcomes. Some of those outcomes are more significant than 
others, but even small steps forward demonstrate anything is possible when enterprises 
and their people are not suffering from marketing myopia.  
An example of a small refinement focused on delivering 'customer satisfactions' is the 
research and development that was applied to frankfurters, bacon, and other smallgoods. 
Triple Nine Farms removed nitrates from its bacon and frankfurter offerings, making 
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them much more appealing to health-conscious consumers and those who enjoy an 
occasional treat. 
The market for such a product in export markets is potentially enormous. Just look at the 
recent export success of Lewis Road grass-fed butter. Imagine what GMO-free, 
antibiotic-free, 100% no nasties, 100% pure Angus, artisan-made New Zealand 
frankfurters would sell like in the USA. There is room for a super-premium hotdog. 
Figure 8.6 below depicts these hotdogs being grilled on a Triple Nine Grill. They were 
delicious. This product's initial target market would be busy New Zealand mothers, 
which the research had identified, were looking for an alternative to unhealthy chicken 
nuggets.   
 
Figure 8.6: Nitrate free Triple Nine Farms frankfurters. Source: J Wilkes photography. 
It is envisaged that the results stemming from this research will play a role in facilitating 
the changes required to ensure the New Zealand red meat industry avoids marketing 
myopia while developing innovative approaches that will remain relevant to consumers 
in the future. Levitt (1964:44) reminds those executives leading red meat enterprises that 
If an  ad i  k, he chief e ec i e ma  a  ell ack hi  a ach  ca e and g  fi hing. 
If an organization does not know where it is going, it does not need a ceremonial 
fig ehead. E e b d  ill n ice i  n en gh.  
This applied project and the research effort from it has endeavoured to understand what 
the future drivers for premium beef and lamb might look like, particularly in selected and 
lucrative export markets like those in North America, Europe, and parts of Asia. The 
hunger for grass-fed beef has been rapidly increasing globally. According to Burwood-
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Taylor (2017), Re ail ale  f labeled f e h g a -fed beef reached $272 million in 
2016, up from $17 million in 2012 and doubling every year, according to a new report 
en i led Back  G a : The Ma ke  P en ial f  U.S. G a -fed beef.   
This project has identified that premium consumers around the world are challenging 
their meat suppliers to prove provenance. These challenges are getting bigger and going 
deeper. Most traditional retailers, like butchers and supermarkets, are likely to be left 
wanting. They generally have little idea about where their meat ultimately comes from, 
and as a result, are not well-positioned to tell the farmer's story. Interestingly, according 
to Whole Foods UK in-store promotional material pictured below in Figure 8.7, their 
mea  i   g d  beca e: 
x It is free-range; 
x It contains no added hormones; 
x It contains no antibiotics, ever; 
x The meat is animal welfare rated. 
I submit this as evidence that this enterprise has little idea what great meat is all about. 
The message being sent here arguabl  am n   ing  c af  a h  emi mi e  
the offerings in-store. In reality, the consumer still has no idea where the meat came 
from. Even the in-store butcher was not happy. I know this because I spent an hour 
chatting to the butcher, and he lamented what his beloved trade has morphed into.   
In this case, Whole Foods UK is trying to comfort and convince their consumer that the 
above elements guarantee a great meat-eating experience. They simply do not. What 
about the breed, animal age, farming system, taste, flavour, terroir, butchering, slaughter 






Figure 8.7: Whole Foods Store in Kensington, London: Source J Wilkes Photography (2018) 
 
It is widely accepted that discerning consumers are prepared to pay a premium price for 
high quality, ethically raised, and regeneratively produced red meat, but they will need a 
lot more than just a good story and some excellent packaging. They will seek trust and 
transparency and want to get as close to the farmer as possible. During this project, some 
of the most important questions being asked about red meat by premium consumers 
were: 
x Is this the best and healthiest option for my family? 
x Is it hormone and antibiotic-free? 
x Is this 100% grass-fed, natural, and pesticide-free beef? 
x Are the farm systems behind supplying and producing this beef doing so in a 
sustainable, environmentally friendly, and gentle-on-the planet way? 
x Has the animal been humanely treated, and can you prove it? 
x Who is behind the product? 
x What is their track record of looking after animals and the environment? 
x Where does the product come from? 
x Does the farmer have a focus on quality over volume? 
x How much of my money goes to the farmer? 
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x Can I buy the same product every week? 
x Is the product fully traceable to the source? 
Positioning premium products in the right place, with the right price, at the right time, 
begins with insight. Triple Nine Farms is committed to deeply understanding what 
eal h  c n me  ill a  a emi m f . The h  i  a  he hea  f he b ine  
model. Premium beef consumers are heading for business models with integrity. And 
just like the discerning craft beer drinking consumers before them, they are well on their 
way to figuring out why craft beef tastes way better than industrial beef. A new game is 
in play with a new consumer, and thanks to this applied business research project, Triple 
Nine Farms is aiming right for the centre of this exciting movement. For those electing to 
stay in the past, Figure 8.8 below says it all. 
 
 
Figure 8.8: Historic and Current P2 Steer Schedule Prices. Source: (2020) www.interest.co.nz 
 
Oram (2020), recently reflecting on his 50-year journalism career, insightfully suggested, 
"Yet, we know that many of the systems that got us here are fatally flawed. They are 
incapable of providing us a sustainable future. Consequently, ecosystems are dying, 
economies are stagnating, inequalities are rising, politics are polarising, and societies 
are shattering." From where I sit at the end of this DBA journey and with a 40-year 
business career zigzagging between countries and between engineering, strategy, 
marketing, consulting, and entrepreneurship, I find it hard to disagree with Oram.  
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Skilling (2020) says it in a different way stating, "New Zealand has weak aggregate 
productivity performance, relying on growth in the labour input to drive headline GDP 
growth. And there has been little sign of convergence towards the global productivity 
frontier, despite high-quality policy foundations. This is reflected in New Zealand firms' 
performance: few New Zealand firms are at the global productivity frontier. 
Strengthening New Zealand's productivity performance materially rests on developing 
more frontier firms at scale." I reiterate: the thinking and business models that have 
brought us this far are now in desperate need of renewal. To embrace the concept of 
renewal, we must see clearly. To take action, we must reimagine, redesign, take risks, 
and display courage. In this brave new world, where our futures lie, there is no room for 
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